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Abstract 
Dam systems are arrangements of interacting components that store and convey water for 
beneficial purposes. Dam failures are associated with extreme consequences to human life, the 
environment and the economy. Existing techniques for dam safety analysis tend to focus on 
verifying system performance at the edge of the design envelope. In analyzing the events which 
occur within the design envelope, linear chain-of-events models are often used to analyze the 
potential outcomes for the system. These chain-of-events models require that combinations of 
conditions are identified at the outset of the analysis, which can be very cumbersome given the 
number of physically possible combinations. Additional complications arising from feedback 
behaviour and time are not easily overcome using existing tools. Recent work in the industry 
has begun to focus on systems approaches to the problem, especially stochastic simulation. 
Given current computational abilities, stochastic simulation may not be capable of analyzing 
combinations of events that have a low combined probability but potentially extreme 
consequences. This research focuses on developing and implementing a methodology that 
dynamically characterizes combinations of component operating states and their potential 
impacts on dam safety. Automated generation of scenarios is achieved through the use of a 
component operating states database that defines all possible combinations of component states 
(scenarios) using combinatorics. A Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework 
systematically characterizes each scenario through a number of iterations that vary adverse 
operating state timing, impacts and inflows. Component interactions and feedbacks are 
represented within the system dynamics simulation model. Simulation outcomes provide 
useful indicators for dam operators including conditional failure rates, times to failure, failure 
inflow thresholds, and reservoir level exceedance frequencies. Dynamic system response can 
be assessed directly from the simulation outcomes. The scenario results may be useful to dam 
owners in emergency decision-making to inform response timelines and to justify the 
allocation of resources. Results may also help inform the development of improved operating 
strategies or upgrade alternatives that can reduce the impacts of these extreme events. This 
work offers a significant improvement in the ability to systematically characterize the potential 
combinations of events and their consequences.  
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Summary for Lay Audience 
 
This research presents a novel approach to define and characterize potential combinations of 
events that can impact the ability to safely manage water flow in dam systems. Dam systems 
consist of infrastructure whose primary purpose is to store and convey water for beneficial 
purposes, such as power production, water supply, flood control and recreation. The water 
barrier is the dam itself, and water passages may include gated or ungated spillway systems 
that release excess flows, diversions, tunnels or penstocks (pipelines) that convey water to 
power-generating turbines. Another key part of a dam system is the system operator(s). 
Operators can be a single person or an organization. In some cases the operation of the dam 
may be automated. Operators make decisions on how to adjust water flow through the dam 
based on available information, with the goal to safely and economically manage the reservoir. 
The failure of a dam can cause a major flood, potentially having catastrophic consequences to 
human life, the environment and the economy. One possible way in which a dam can fail is 
through the inadequate control of water flow. For example, should the outflow passages fail to 
function, inflows into the reservoir can cause the water level to rise to critical levels that may 
result in failure of the dam. This research focuses on the analysis of flow-control in dam 
systems. A dam system and the interactions amongst its components are modelled in detail and 
an exhaustive list of possible combinations of events is developed. Each of these combinations 
is simulated many times to characterize the potential outcomes that may occur. The simulation 
model calculates the water levels and flow releases as they change over time. Parameters were 
developed to provide some indication about the potential impacts of a scenario. The result is a 
systematic characterization of these unlikely, yet potentially hazardous, combinations of events 
that can affect the ability to safely operate a dam system. The information produced through 
this methodology may be useful in developing operating strategies and emergency response 
plans that could occur over the course of a dam’s lifetime.       
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses on the development of a new approach to the assessment of dam safety 
flow control using a systems approach. Concepts from within risk assessment, general 
systems theory and control system theory are investigated as potentially promising 
techniques for the assessment of dams as systems. A new methodology is presented which 
allows for automated generation and simulation of a more complete range of potential 
operating conditions for the system using a Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation 
framework with a system dynamics simulation model. System behaviour is quantified 
directly from the simulation outputs and helps identify combinations of events which can 
lead to the failure of dam systems to safely control inflows.  
This chapter contains an introduction to dam systems and a historical overview of dam 
failures. An introduction to the systems approach is also provided here, as well as research 
objectives and conclusions.  
1.1 Dam systems 
Dams are highly complex systems containing arrangements of components which interact 
to store and convey water for one or more purposes, including hydroelectric power, flood 
control, mine tailings impoundment, and water supply for residential, agricultural or 
industrial purposes. Dams create reservoirs and use of their storage provides for the 
redistribution of inflow in time and space. These systems contain physical infrastructure, 
mechanical components, electrical components, communications equipment and human 
controllers which are all functioning together for a single purpose: the safe and economical 
storage and passage of water. The components that influence the behaviour of a dam system 
can be both physical (eg. infrastructure), or nonphysical (eg. operational decision making). 
Typical components of a dam system can be grouped into categories of: (1) Infrastructure 
components such as the dam, penstocks, spillways, gates, turbines, etc., (2) Actuators 
which are typically mechanical or electrical assemblies that make changes to infrastructure 
positioning either manually or automatically, remotely or on-site, (3) Operators which 
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include human or automated system controllers as well as institutional and organizational 
operating guidelines and rules, and (4) Sensory components such as Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems or visual observation. Dam systems have external 
inputs, such as reservoir inflows and various disturbances, and system outputs or products. 
Products of a dam system can include reservoir outflow, power generation, environmental 
or recreational flows, flood control and irrigation water supply. Figure 1-1 contains a 
labelled photograph of Revelstoke Dam in British Columbia, Canada, which has a number 
of features that are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The key feature of a dam system is the dam itself, which acts as a barrier to the natural 
course of a stream or river. Dam structures may be constructed of a variety of different 
materials in a variety of different ways, and this choice is dependent on the purpose for 
which the dam will serve as well as the geological conditions in the vicinity of the dam and 
the availability of construction materials. Materials used in the construction of dams can 
include timber, concrete, masonry, steel, as well as earth or rockfill in the form of 
embankment dams (Jansen 1983). Some dam sites may have multiple dam structures, with 
auxiliary structures known as “saddle dams” that also act to retain the water in the  
reservoir. For large dams, concrete and earthfill structures (or a combination of these) are 
most common. There are a number of types of concrete dams, including concrete gravity, 
arch and buttress dams (Jansen 1983). Earthfill dams may also come in a variety of forms 
and may be homogeneous (one material makes up the entire dam) or have zones of different 
fill materials with engineer-specified parameters designed to control seepage and hydraulic 
gradients. Dams may also have provisions for foundation seepage control such as cutoffs 
or grout curtains that increase the seepage path to prevent the erosion of foundation 
materials (Jansen 1983). In Figure 1-1, Revelstoke Dam, British Columbia, Canada 
consists of a concrete gravity dam and an earthfill dam.   
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Figure 1-1: Revelstoke Dam, British Columbia, Canada 
In addition to the water barrier, dams are typically equipped with some sort of outlet 
structure to pass the water downstream. In the simplest case of a free overflow weir, water 
flows over the top of the structure and down the natural course of the river. More complex 
dams often involve a number of outlets, which can include free overflow spillways, 
spillway gates, low level outlets and turbines (Jansen 1983). Free overflow spillways are 
sometimes a lowered section of the dam that is equipped to pass water when the reservoir 
exceeds the elevation of the spillway crest. The amount of water passing over the free 
overflow spillway is a direct function of the level of the reservoir. These uncontrolled 
release structures sometimes involve a chute to direct water downstream. Spillway chutes 
may be unlined or lined with a material such as concrete (Jansen 1983). Spillway gates and 
low level outlets are mechanically controlled structures (typically gates or valves) which 
can be opened and closed to release the desired amount of water. Spillway gates and valves 
may direct water into a chute, if there is a considerable distance for the water to pass or 
may discharge water directly downstream of the opening. Each gate or valve has its own 
rating curve, which is the numerical relationship between gate opening, gate position and 
4 
 
reservoir level (USBR 1987). Gates require many different components to operate, 
including structural, mechanical and electrical – and in some cases can be operated 
automatically or remotely as well as onsite. In Figure 1-1, a gated spillway is shown, with 
two radial gates that discharge into a concrete chute, terminating in a flip bucket and plunge 
pool.  
In the case of hydropower dam systems, another key component of the system is the 
hydropower generating infrastructure. Intake gates are sometimes used to control the flow 
of water towards the generating units from the upstream end. Water passes into a power 
conduit, typically a tunnel or penstock depending on the application, and moves 
downstream towards the turbine (Komey, 2014). Penstocks are large pipelines, which 
may be constructed from steel, woodstave, plastic or concrete. Surge shafts are 
sometimes used to regulate pressure transients in the penstock, which can fluctuate 
significantly due to adjustments to the turbine flow or closure of valves along the power 
conduit. Once the water reaches the end of the penstock, there may be a turbine intake 
valve which controls the flow and may be closed for maintenance. Past the penstock, 
water enters the turbine. The generator transfers the rotational energy of the turbine into 
electrical energy which is then converted unto useable voltage in a switchyard connected 
to the power grid. Turbines may also be equipped with Pressure Relief Valves, which 
control pressure transients in the penstock during load rejections where the wicket gates 
must be suddenly closed (Komey, 2014). At Revelstoke Dam (Figure 1-1), water passes 
through penstocks to the turbines at the powerhouse.  
There are many other features of a dam system which function to monitor, protect and 
control the dam and outlet structures. In some systems, dam operation is implemented 
primarily from a control center which may be located far away from the site itself. 
Operations planning based on an inflow forecast typically takes place off site at the control 
center. Operations may be implemented in real-time, with hourly instructions and minute-
by-minute changes to gate and/or turbine flow. The instructions may be sent out as signals 
from the control center via satellite or communications towers and are interpreted by 
Remote Terminal Units (RTU’s), which convert the signals into instructions for outlets 
and/or turbines and may also function to send information back to the control center 
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(Komey 2014). These RTU’s are part of the SCADA system which collects and distributes 
information and implements controls. Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC’s) are 
another key part of the SCADA system with a variety of functions, including 
implementation of the instructions transmitted by the RTU’s, implementing controls 
through a human-machine interface, as well as the collection and analysis of sensory data 
(Komey, 2014). Dams may have extensive monitoring equipment, including gauges to 
measure the elevation of the reservoir and positions of the gates, piezometers to measure 
the water level in dams, and weirs to monitor dam seepage (Jansen 1983; Duscha and 
Jansen 1988). This information can be recorded manually or collected by a PLC and 
transmitted to the control center using an RTU.  
The key input to a dam system is the reservoir inflows. Inflows are a function of the 
watershed characteristics, local climate and the hydrologic cycle. In the hydrologic cycle, 
moist air enters the atmosphere through evaporation and transpiration. As it cools, it 
condenses to form clouds, which release precipitation. Precipitation can fall in the form of 
rain or snow, depending on temperatures and ground elevations. Precipitation and 
snowmelt may contribute to reservoir inflows through runoff (water passing over the land 
surface) or groundwater (water passing through the sub-surface). Precipitation can vary 
significantly depending on the time of year as a result of seasonal climate influences. In 
addition to the amount of precipitation, the geological conditions, ground cover, and 
topography are significant factors affecting reservoir inflows. In regions closer to the poles, 
snow melt and the associated increase in inflows is often referred to as the “freshet”. The 
freshet is a period of high inflow resulting, in part, from snowmelt due to increasing 
temperatures. Freshet inflows may also be affected by heavy rainfall which can speed up 
the rate of snowmelt. The duration and magnitude of the freshet depends significantly on 
the regions topography, ground cover and climate. In other parts of the world, there may 
be wet and dry seasons that affect seasonal inflows. Contributions to inflow from 
groundwater may be significant depending on the regional geology and climate. In addition 
to natural inflows, there may also be additional inflows to the system from upstream dam 
outflows or in some cases, water diversion facilities. Forecasting of the inflows is a key 
part of safe system operation. There is inherent uncertainty in meteorological forecasts, 
with forecasting errors generally increasing as inflows increase.  
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Internal or external disturbances represent another input to dam systems. These include 
earthquakes, debris accumulation, forest fires, extreme wind and rain, ice storms, ice 
accumulation, vandalism, rodent activity, human error, component aging, etc. These 
disturbances may also be considered inputs to the system. Proper management of the 
system under these circumstances is of critical importance in keeping dam systems safe 
and preventing losses resulting from failures. 
For the remainder of this thesis, a dam system is defined as all components which interact 
for the purposes of water storage and conveyance. This includes all civil, mechanical and 
electrical infrastructure at a dam site, human operations and decision making, personnel 
and staffing, site access, sensory and communications equipment, information flow, as well 
as water in storage and conveyance. The dam system input is the inflow as well as any 
natural disturbances. The dam system output is the outflows and products of the system 
such as energy. This research focuses on the analysis of dam system flow control – that is, 
the safe conveyance of water through the system.  
 
1.2 Dam system failures 
The three general modes of failure for various types of dam include (1) internal erosion, 
which involves the migration of material from an embankment (or abutments) and can lead 
to weakening of the water barrier and eventually dam breach, (2) instability, which can 
result from uplift pressures or uneven settlement and can lead to failure by toppling or 
sliding, and (3) overtopping or flow control failures which result from a loss of control of 
the reservoir elevation and can potentially lead to failure modes (1) and (2) (Regan 2009). 
Different types of dams have different risks, for example an embankment dam has risks 
relating to slope instability, overtopping or internal/foundation erosion whereas a concrete 
dam has risks relating to foundation erosion, overtopping and instability due to sliding or 
overturning (USBR 1987). Dams also have risks relating to the conveyance of water: if one 
or more of the water conveyance components of the system fail or become blocked, there 
may be an uncontrolled release of flow or the reservoir could rise to an unsafe level that 
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could trigger failure of the entire dam (Baecher et al. 2013; Komey et al. 2015). High 
reservoir levels can result in a number of adverse impacts, including increased seepage, 
increased foundation or dam uplift pressures that could compromise dam stability, or 
overtopping of dam structures and/or abutments which can progress to erosion, head-
cutting and potentially loss of containment of the reservoir. Further, there are obvious risks 
relating to the collection, transfer, and use of information to make decisions that will 
ultimately affect the infrastructure and the risk of dam failure or uncontrolled flow release 
(Komey et al. 2015). In simple terms, the safety of dams relies on the ability to safely 
contain and convey flows through the dam system. 
A better understanding of how dams fail to operate safely and what the contributing factors 
are can help practitioners identify potential risks in similar structures and system 
arrangements. Despite the extreme consequences associated with dam safety incidents, 
post-event information is often limited to the immediate failure mode or proximate cause 
and the incident consequences. There are very few detailed accounts of the design, 
operational decisions and other states of the system that may have contributed to dam safety 
incidents. Some of the more well-known post event assessments of dam safety incidents 
include Teton Dam (Jansen 1983; Seed and Duncan 1987), Vajont Dam (Jansen 1983; 
Genevois and Ghirotti 2005), Baldwin Hills Dam (Jansen 1983), St. Francis Dam (Jansen 
1983), Carsington Dam (Kennard and Bromhead 2000), Taum Sauk pumped storage 
facility (FERC 2006), Folsom Dam (Todd 1999) and Oroville Dam (France et al. 2018a).  
There are a variety of different resources for information about dam safety incidents, 
mostly from American organizations. The Association of State Dam Safety Officials 
(ASDSO) has a number of sources for information about dam failures in the United States, 
including a website with case studies and lessons learned about select incidents (ASDSO, 
2016) and a table containing basic information relating to 187 incidents (ASDSO, n.d.). 
Jansen (1983) provided an excellent review of dam failure case histories in a technical 
publication by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). The National 
Performance of Dams Program (NPDP) is a database of American dam incidents and 
failures developed by Stanford University. Most of the incidents are from the late 1900s 
but the database includes incidents ranging from 1848 to 2015. A wide variety of incidents 
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are covered, from issues discovered during safety inspections to flow control incidents to 
complete dam failures, with a total of 2977 incidents. Other researchers have compiled and 
assessed similar databases to draw conclusions about dam safety risks (Foster et al. 2000a; 
Zhang et al. 2007; Charles et al. 2011). Regan (2009) compiled a database of over 4000 
dam failures worldwide, with half of these incidents coming from the United States. The 
database was assessed to answer questions mainly about the age of the dam at failure as 
well as the type of dam and the general failure mode (flood, seepage/piping, structural). 
Fry et al. (2004) developed a web-based Dam Accident DataBase (DADB) with 900 
incidents. Database entries included basic information about the dam and breach 
characteristics, dates of construction and failure as well as the failure mode, with links to 
references for users. Analysis of the past failures has shown that internal or foundation 
erosion and flooding events (overtopping) are the two major causes of catastrophic dam 
failure (Foster et al. 2000b; Donnelly 2005; Regan 2009). 
The likelihood of failure by internal erosion is traditionally estimated using empirical 
criteria developed by Foster et al. (2000b) and Foster and Fell (2001). Internal erosion 
processes are generally not well understood, and there are ongoing efforts to better 
understand the physical processes. Assessment of failure by overtopping is also a 
complicated process, because of the sheer number of factors which can contribute to the 
likelihood of dam overtopping. Such factors can include but are not limited to inflows, 
operational decisions, gate reliability, personnel availability, site accessibility, and natural 
disturbances such as ice or debris buildup (Lewin et al. 2003; Regan 2010; Komey et al. 
2015). There is a large amount of literature detailing various approaches to extreme flood 
estimation (Bocchiola et al. 2003; Kwon and Moon 2006; Kuo et al. 2007; USBR and 
USACE 2012), and many risk assessment methodologies check dam performance under 
these extreme flood loads (Regan 2010; Komey et al. 2015). However, it is difficult to 
assess overtopping incidents that could happen within the design envelope of the dam 
system due to a combination of events which together prevent water from being released 
and allow the reservoir to rise to an unsafe level (Regan 2010).  
Hartford et al. (2016) describes the “uncommon combination of common events”, where 
multiple seemingly benign events combine together to become a significant dam safety 
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problem. In the Noppikoski Dam failure incident, a number of conditions contributed to an 
inability to pass flows through the system, leading to overtopping failure of the dam. The 
mechanical hoist equipment did not function, and a crane was unable to be mobilized to 
the site in time to remove the stoplogs from the spillway as a result of extreme weather 
conditions (loss of access) and site staff unavailability. These issues, combined with higher 
than normal inflows, lead to rising reservoir levels which eventually overtopped and failed 
the earthfill embankment. Taum Sauk is another example of combinations of events 
interacting with disastrous consequences. The pumped storage facility was overfilled and 
breached as a result of improperly calibrated reservoir level sensing equipment and 
differential settlement of the dam crest. 
Lewin et al. (2003) analysed several USACE dams and noted that failure to operate the 
gate on demand would increase the probability of failure of the dam by between 2 to 250 
times. Furthermore, dams may also be in an unsafe state without complete structural failure 
of the dam, as a result of uncontrolled flow releases through a failed conduit. Regan (2010) 
and Baecher et al. (2013) assess several dam failures and uncontrolled flow releases, noting 
that dam safety incidents are often a result of complex interactions between system 
components. Both researchers advocate taking a “dams as systems” approach when 
assessing dam safety risks in order to avoid omission of potentially significant failure 
modes.  
The existing databases relating to dam safety incidents tend to focus more on the proximate 
causes of the incidents. The database assessments of Foster et al. (2000a, b) and Zhang et 
al. (2007) focus mainly on internal erosion in embankment dams, looking at embankment 
design and construction practices. Other assessments (Donnelly 2005; Regan 2010) look 
at dams in general but don’t tend to further decompose the incidents to look at contributing 
factors such as operational decisions, lack of maintenance, and component failures. 
King et al. (2016a) used information from a variety of sources to assess the causes of dam 
incidents resulting in uncontrolled releases of water. A database of dam incidents was 
compiled, and dam incidents were decomposed as much as possible to determine the 
components involved and the contributing factors. Failures were categorized depending on 
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the type of incident, with incidents grouped into categories based on the following failure 
modes: overtopping, penstock failure, embankment failure, uncontrolled flow release and 
other. Internal erosion events were considered to be a design and surveillance issue and as 
such were not included in the database, which intended to focus on operational safety. The 
database also recorded the type of component involved: Mechanical, electrical, structural, 
operational, and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Incidents 
relating to a certain type of component could then be broken down more specifically (eg. 
for structural the spillway chute, the dam, the penstock, or the gate). Maintenance was 
considered to be an operational issue and as such is recorded in that category. Other 
relevant factors relating to the incident were also recorded, for example the presence of 
disturbances such as debris buildup, landslides, vandalism and earthquakes. 
Based on the completeness of information, incidents were then categorized as either 
acceptable or incomplete. Incomplete sources were omitted in some of the more detailed 
figures to allow for a more accurate assessment of the proportions of various types of 
contributing factors. Once all information for an incident was collected, the quality of 
information was assessed (acceptable or incomplete) and the incident was assigned a rank 
based on its severity using the following guidelines: 
• Catastrophic: Complete loss of flow control 
• Major: Temporary disablement of hydraulic structures leading to temporary loss 
of flow control 
• Minor: Temporary disablement of hydraulic structures that could potentially have 
resulted in a loss of flow control 
Table 1-1 (King et al., 2016) contains a list of the different sources used to compile the 
database. The number of incidents contributed to by each source is also listed. Most of the 
dams considered are in the United States because this data was most easily accessible. In 
the future, accessing the DADB of Fry et al. (2004), which was developed by a European 
team, could help increase the number of dams considered outside of the United States. 
Figure 1-2 (King et al., 2016) contains a breakdown of the source quality for each source 
used. The data from NPDP was scaled by 10 in the figure to make the quality of the other 
sources more clearly visible.  
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Table 1-1: Sources of incident information for database development (King et al., 
2016) 
Source Number of Incidents 
NPDP (2016) 1018 
ASDSO (2010) 79 
USBR (2014a) 17 
Charles (2011) 10 
Tavakoli (2015) 8 
Chanson (2000) 5 
FEMA and NJOEM (2004) 5 
Van Niekerk and Viljoen 
(2005) 
3 
Other 37 
 
Figure 1-2: Sources used in dam incidents database (King et al., 2016) 
A pie-chart of incident types is shown in Figure 1-3 (King et al., 2016), considering all 
incidents in the database. It is clear from the data that the most common incident type in 
the database is overtopping. It should be noted that overtopping can be related to many 
other factors such as operational decision making, gate failures, turbine failures, ice and 
debris buildup, etc. 
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Figure 1-3: Dam safety flow control incidents, by incident category (King et al., 
2016) 
Figure 1-4 (King et al., 2016) contains a plot showing the factors which contributed to 
overtopping events, taking into consideration only incidents with an acceptable amount of 
information. The most common reason for overtopping events is due to lack of spillway 
capacity. Over half of the overtopping incidents in the database were due to insufficient 
spillway capacity. However, this could be an indication that the operator did not leave 
enough freeboard in the reservoir to accommodate inflows up to the probable maximum 
flood volume. A more detailed analysis of each incident would be required to determine 
whether this was the case – such information is often not available or not reported. The 
second most common reason for dam overtopping was a result of a blocked spillway (eg. 
ice or debris). The next most common contributors to overtopping are gate issues and 
operator errors. Operator errors could involve the operator deciding not to open the gate, 
opening it too late or opening it to the wrong position. 
Figure 1-5 (King et al., 2016) contains a pie chart of the components involved in the 
incident, taking into consideration all events in the database that had enough information 
(677 incidents). Structural incidents were by far the most common, followed by mechanical 
and operational. Fewer events were related to electrical or SCADA failures. This 
distribution could be a limitation of the data: because issues relating to electrical and 
mechanical components may be more quickly resolved and thus less likely to lead to major 
incidents, it is possible that events relating to these components are under-reported. 
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Figure 1-4: Factors contributing to dam overtopping (King et al., 2016) 
 
 
Figure 1-5: Components involved in dam incidents (King et al., 2016) 
Figure 1-6 (King et al., 2016) contains a plot of the components involved in structural-
related dam safety incidents. Incidents are divided in each category to show the proportion 
that were catastrophic, major and minor. The most common type of structural incident was 
an inadequate spillway capacity; most of these incidents result in complete loss of control 
(the reservoir overtops the dam) and are thus classified as catastrophic. It should again be 
noted that inadequate spillway capacity may be tied to lack of conservatism in reservoir 
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operations. The second and third most common structural incidents were related to the 
spillway chute and penstock, respectively. Because these components actively pass water, 
they can become deteriorated and may fail if not properly maintained. For the spillway 
chute failures, not all were classified as catastrophic (uncontrolled flow release) because in 
some cases the gates could be closed or the reservoir level fell below the sill and the chute 
could be repaired. Most of the penstock failures are catastrophic because in some systems 
the intake gates may not be able to be closed under rupture flows. Penstock intake sills are 
also lower in comparison to spillway sills and therefore significantly more reservoir 
volume may be released in the event of penstock failure. Structural dam failures and 
spillway gate failures were the next most common structural flow control incidents. It 
should be noted that internal erosion and foundation failures were removed from the 
database and would influence the number of structural dam failures in the figure. Outlet 
pipes and intake structures were the least common components involved in structural flow 
control incidents. 
 
Figure 1-6: Components involved in structural incidents (King et al., 2016) 
Figure 1-7 (King et al., 2016) contains a graph showing the mechanical components 
involved in spillway related incidents. Spillway gate issues were by far the most common, 
followed by low level outlet and penstock valve failures. Less common were mechanical 
issues associated with gates, turbines and siphons. It is likely that turbine related issues are 
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under-reported because forced turbine outages may happen at any power generating facility 
without impeding the ability of the dam system to operate safely. In some cases, however, 
turbine outages during high inflow events could lead to potential loss of flow control. It is 
interesting to note that these incidents did not involve a high number of catastrophic events 
in comparison with the structural incidents. This is likely due to the fact that mechanical 
issues can be more rapidly repaired than structural incidents.  
 
Figure 1-7: Components involved in mechanics incidents (King et al., 2016) 
Figure 1-8 (King et al., 2016) contains a plot of the operational factors which contribute to 
flow control incidents. The data shows that maintenance issues were the most common 
operational factor, followed by the wrong decision being made. There were less instances 
of implementation errors or late decisions. It is important to note that operational factors 
are likely under-reported. Dam operators are not likely to admit mistakes following an 
event for liability reasons. It is also possible that lack of maintenance was a factor in many 
of the incidents reported under other component categories but wasn’t explicitly mentioned 
in the event synopsis. 
There were only 21 total incidents involving electrical issues and these were mostly 
related to inability to generate power (forced turbine outage) and power outages. It is 
possible that electrical issues are under-reported because electrical problems can be 
solved using back-up diesel, battery or mechanical power sources. Turbine-related power 
issues are also likely underreported as they are less likely to lead to serious dam safety 
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issues since the grid can often be brought back online relatively quickly. There were also 
very few issues relating to SCADA systems and it is likely these are also underreported. 
 
Figure 1-8: Operational factors contributing to incidents (King et al., 2016) 
 
Figure 1-9: Components and factors involved in spillway related incidents (King et 
al., 2016) 
Figure 1-9 (King et al., 2016) shows a plot of the components involved in spillway related 
incidents. By far the most common component involved in spillway related incidents was 
the chute. Debris buildup and mechanical gate issues were the second most common issue 
reported followed by structural gate issues and ice. As discussed earlier, because the sill of 
the spillway is relatively high, many spillway related incidents are not catastrophic. 
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Figure 1-10: Disturbances contributing to incidents (King et al., 2016) 
Figure 1-10 (King et al., 2016) shows the various disturbances involved in flow control 
incidents. The most common type of disturbance was landslides, and many of these were 
responsible for the penstock rupture incidents. Ice and debris were the next most common, 
followed by wind, earthquakes and animal burrows. Some of the disturbances are 
indicative of potential maintenance issues; for example, removal of vegetation, debris and 
animal burrows should be an important part of any dam safety program. Of all incidents 
where information about disturbances was available, 7.5% had multiple disturbances 
contributing to the incident. 
The results King et al. (2016a) indicate that there are many factors that influence the ability 
to control flows in a dam system. As such, dams should be considered (and analyzed) as 
complex systems of various components working together, quite often known as 
“system(s) of systems”. The sources of information for the King et al. (2016a) study 
include many non-technical articles which contained limited information about the 
incidents and as such provide only some insight into the complexity of the incidents and 
the factors involved. Understanding some of the more detailed event assessments can help 
illustrate the complexity of the problem of flow control in dam safety. The recent Oroville 
Dam spillway incident provides some useful context with respect to how a variety of 
factors may contribute to dam safety incidents. The interplay of components and events 
within a system can lead to emergent and dynamic behaviour, which the Oroville incident 
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is a good example of. A brief synopsis and discussion of the incident is described in the 
following section.   
1.2.1 Oroville dam spillway incident 
Completed in 1968, the Oroville Dam is a large embankment dam on the Feather River in 
California and is located at the upstream end of the Oroville-Thermalito complex, which 
consists of a number of dams and generating stations (FERC 2005a; France et al. 2018a). 
The Oroville Dam, as shown in Figure 1-11 (France et al. 2018a), consists of an 
embankment dam, a gated service spillway with eight operating gates and a large concrete 
chute, an emergency spillway overflow weir discharging into an unlined channel, and the 
Hyatt Powerplant. There is also a river valve outlet system and a tunnel carrying water 
towards another generating station downstream.  
  
Figure 1-11: Overview of the Oroville Dam (France et al. 2018) 
In February 2017, after severe storms and above average inflows, the gated service spillway 
was opened and discharged 1400 m3/s into the chute. On the morning of February 7, 2017, 
engineers noticed spray coming from the spillway chute and the gate was closed. Upon 
inspection, a large hole in the foundation and damage to concrete slabs was noticed, as 
shown in Figure 1-12 (France et al. 2018a). At this point, the reservoir was still rising, and 
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water began flowing over the emergency spillway overflow weir on February 11, 2017, 
peaking at around 350 m3/s on February 12. As the water flowed past the spillway crest 
structure and onto the natural ground downstream, erosion began to occur, and it 
progressed through head-cutting, upstream towards the chute structure as shown in Figure 
1-13. Undermining of the emergency spillway structure could have resulted in a 
catastrophic, uncontrolled release of flow. As such, an evacuation order was issued on 
February 12, 2017 and flow was increased to around 2800 m3/s over the gated service 
spillway (France et al. 2018a). This helped lower the reservoir levels to stop flow over the 
emergency spillway, however it resulted in extensive damage to the service spillway chute 
as shown in Figure 1-14.   
 
Figure 1-12: Oroville spillway chute damage (France et al. 2018)
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Figure 1-13: Erosion downstream of Oroville emergency overflow weir (France et 
al. 2018) 
 
Figure 1-14: Oroville spillway chute after incident (France et al. 2018) 
Following the incident, an independent forensic team (IFT) consisting of experts from 
various organizations was assembled to review in detail the factors contributing to the 
incident, providing a detailed report regarding contributing factors and proximate causes 
of the failure. The immediate cause of the issues in the service spillway chute was uplift 
pressures that were sufficient to dislodge and remove a section of spillway slab, exposing 
the underlying foundation directly to high velocity spillway flows. The underlying 
foundation consisted of rock that was “moderately to highly weathered and even soil like”, 
meaning erosion was able to progress to the degree that additional slab sections both up 
and downstream of the initial failure were mobilized (France et al. 2018a). For the 
emergency spillway, erosion began to occur of the natural ground downstream of the 
spillway structure and in some areas, it began to progress through head-cutting upstream 
towards the structure. This was mainly a result of the significant depths of erodible 
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weathered rock and soil as well as hillside topography and insufficient erosion protection 
and energy dissipation structures.  
Management decisions during the events were complicated by a number of issues. 
Continued erosion of the spillway chute could potentially lead to failure of a transmission 
tower located beside the spillway. There were uncertainties relating to whether progression 
of the chute failure upstream could eventually compromise the spillway headgate structure. 
Debris blockage of the river in combination with spillway tailwater could result in 
powerplant flooding, presenting potentially long-term issues with water management if the 
powerhouse was no longer able to discharge flows downstream (France et al. 2018a). 
Closing the spillway to mitigate these issues would mean utilizing the emergency spillway, 
the consequences of which were not known at the time. A decision was made to reduce 
service spillway flows, which resulted in water being released over the emergency spillway 
and the initiation of erosion there (France et al. 2018a). This presented a new, avoidable, 
and more threatening issue (undermining of the emergency spillway could progress to dam 
failure). The system operators were presented with a difficult trade-off and ultimately the 
decision to reduce flow over the service spillway meant increased flows were necessary 
later on to prevent further erosion at the emergency spillway.  
The IFT report also details extensively many indirect causes of the incident. Several issues 
in the design and construction of the spillway chute are mentioned, including insufficient 
foundation preparation for both the chute and emergency spillway, foundation drains which 
protruded into the chute slab sections, lack of additional reinforcement and robust slab joint 
keys, and anchor lengths which were insufficient considering the amount of weathered rock 
on which the chute was constructed (France et al. 2018a). A number of systemic issues 
relating to organizational, industry and regulatory factors were also identified.  Examples 
of these include a focus on dams instead of spillways, cost control resulting in a reactive 
approach to managing infrastructure problems, emphasis on dam production ahead of dam 
safety, as well as overconfidence and complacency regarding the safety of the 
infrastructure (France et al. 2018a).  
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The Oroville Dam spillway failure provides insight into the dynamic and often emergent 
nature of dam safety incidents. There were a large number of direct and indirect factors 
which contributed to the spillway failures, and management decisions during the incident 
were complicated by a number of trade-offs. The incident illustrates well the importance 
of considering the degree of complexity and interactivity in dam systems when analyzing 
dam safety flow control. This is essential to capture emergent system behaviour, which 
may not be obvious through analyses of the individual parts.  
 
1.3 Systems Approach 
Hartford et al. (2016) advocate for a systems approach to the problem of operational safety 
in dams and reservoirs, noting that: 
“A new approach is required, as current engineering practices do not and cannot 
address the character of some of the most probable causes of incidents and failures, 
which are the unforeseen combination of rather usual conditions. That is, most 
incidents and failures occur not because an extreme event occurs (eg. a flood or an 
earthquake), but rather because a series of more common events occurs, which in 
their unfortunate and unexpected combination leads to an adverse outcome – an 
incident or a failure… It may not be possible for an incident or failure to occur if 
all components, and therefore events, are in a perfectly normal state. Some 
conditions must be in the range of ‘not quite usual’ – for example, a 50-year flood, 
lack of required maintenance, slightly incompetent personnel or organization, bad 
instructions or policies, a power blackout, or the like – and yet not be extreme or 
malicious individually” 
Traditional risk assessment approaches include Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA). FMEA is a systematic approach to determining the potential failure 
modes of system components and the effects that these may have on the system as a whole. 
PFMA is a heuristic failure modes brainstorming technique used commonly within the 
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dams industry (particularly in the United States). ETA is an inductive, chain-of-events style 
technique that can be used to determine the potential outcomes from a single initiating 
event. FTA is a deductive chain-of-events technique that starts with a high-level 
undesirable event and proceeds in more levels of detail to determine its causes.  
Hartford et al. (2016) suggests that systems safety engineering recognizes the three major 
ways for accidents to occur result from (1) the system capacity being exceeded, (2) 
combinations of failures of system components, none of which occurring individually 
would be cause for concern, or (3) a result of complex interactions between system 
components, none of which may have failed. In traditional dam safety practice, a standards 
based approach is followed, which addresses the first of these three causes of accidents – 
checking the system capacity against expected design loads, including extreme floods and 
earthquakes. Existing risk assessment approaches may provide some insight into the 
second and third type of accident, however there are a number of shortcomings in this area 
which are well documented within and outside of the dams industry (Regan 2010; Hartford 
et al. 2016; King et al. 2016b): 
1. The focus of traditional risk analysis tends to be on extreme events at the edge of 
the design envelope in terms of structural loads and inflows, while failures may 
occur well within the design envelope due to an uncommon combination of events 
which individually may not be uncommon (Baecher et al. 2013; Komey 2014; 
Hartford et al. 2016) 
 
2. Using chain-of-events analyses, all possible system hazards and component 
operating states must be determined at the beginning of the analysis. This 
requirement creates immense challenges for the analysis of anything other than 
simple dam and reservoir systems, since the number of physically possible 
combinations becomes overwhelmingly large (Hartford et al. 2016) 
 
3. Traditional analysis techniques such as fault trees and event trees often assume a 
linear progression of events, ignoring component interactions and oversimplifying 
dynamic system behaviour (Regan 2010; Leveson 2011; Thomas 2012) 
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4. Events are often assumed to be completely independent of one another, despite the 
fact that common cause events are possible (Putcha and Patev 2000; Leveson 2011; 
Komey et al. 2015) 
 
5. Systems are decomposed into more manageable sub-systems for analysis and the 
interactions between them are completely ignored or simplified (Regan 2010; 
Leveson 2011; Thomas 2012) 
A systems approach is beginning to emerge as a new technique to address some of the 
aforementioned shortcomings and make progress towards addressing the second and third 
type of incident. This is discussed in detail within the recent book “Operational Safety of 
Dams and Reservoirs” by Hartford et al. (2016). The systems approach is fundamentally 
rooted in systems theory.   
Systems theory has a long history of concurrent developments in various fields, with 
general systems theory being first defined by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950; 
1968). Von Bertalanffy (1968) defines a system as “complex of interacting elements” in 
his book dealing with general systems theory and first used the term in a 1950 article 
dealing with open systems in the fields of physics and biology (Von Bertalanffy 1950). 
Open systems are those which have inputs and outputs resulting in a change in the system 
state, whereas closed systems have no external inputs or outputs. The idea of system 
feedbacks being a function of the system structure is described in this work, with the theory 
of feedback having origins in cybernetics (Wiener, 1948)  and social sciences (Richardson 
1991).  
Von Bertalanffy (1968) and Forrester (1961, 1969, 1971a) further developed the concepts 
of systems theory in a series of books dealing with biological, social, economic and other 
applications. Systems theory, cybernetics and control system theory were at least partly 
influenced by the efforts of some of the key authors to develop automatic systems for anti-
aircraft weaponry and radar devices during World War II (Wiener 1948; Brown and 
Campbell 1950; Forrester 1989), though Von Bertalanffy (1968) describes several other 
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key developments which led to a general systems theory. Forrester (1961) began 
developing system dynamics to analyze industrial and management systems, and pioneered 
the earliest forms of system dynamics simulation software packages. He later extended the 
application of system dynamics simulation to model the social dynamics of cities, countries 
and the world as a whole (Forrester 1969, 1971b, 1989).  
Key concepts in general systems theory include the consideration of the system as a whole 
consisting of interacting parts and the system boundary distinguishing its elements from 
their surrounding environment. Systems may be as small as a single atom and as large as 
the universe (Simonovic 2009). Simonovic (2009) provides a more detailed definition of a 
system as “a collection of various structural and non-structural elements that are collected 
and organized in such a way as to achieve some specific objective through the control and 
distribution of material resources, energy and information”, and formalizes this as: 
𝑆: 𝑋 → 𝑌 (1) 
Where 𝑋 is an input vector, 𝑌 is an output vector, and the system is a set of operations that 
transforms 𝑋 to 𝑌. Figure 14 (Simonovic 2009) contains a schematic presentation of this 
definition. 
 
Figure 1-15: Schematic presentation of system definition (Simonovic, 2009) 
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Another key concept of systems theory is feedback. Open systems, as shown in Figure 1-16 
(a) have inputs and outputs that drive the system behaviour. In feedback systems, as shown 
in Figure 1-16(b), the input is influenced by the system’s own past behaviour (Simonovic 
2009). The system is able to respond to its outputs by adjusting the inputs. This self-
regulating behaviour, known as homeostasis, is present in many mechanical systems and 
inspired the work of Wiener (1948) on man-machine systems. Wiener (1948) pioneered 
cybernetics – which is the study of control mechanisms in man-machine systems – and his 
work introduced the theory of feedback mechanisms, describing a variety of stabilizing and 
oscillatory systems. In parallel with the concept of feedback being introduced within the 
field of cybernetics, it was also being described within the context of social systems (Kast 
and Rosenzweig 1972; Richardson 1991). A thermostat provides an excellent example of 
self-regulation, where the thermostat is able to adjust the heat production based on the 
temperature in the room and the desired temperature (Simonovic 2009). Homeostasis acts 
to steer the system towards some desired goal.  
 
Figure 1-16: Schematic of an open system (a) and a closed system (b) 
A feedback loop is a closed path connecting two or more elements of a system. 
Understanding feedback loops requires an understanding of causality, that is, what 
elements of the system affect other elements of the system. The two types of loops are (1) 
27 
 
negative or balancing loops, which act to keep the system in a steady state, and (2) positive 
or reinforcing loops, which reinforce changes to the system with more change. Systems 
may contain one or potentially many of these loops and can be represented using causal 
loop diagrams that show the relationships between elements of the system (Forrester 
1971a). 
Dams may be considered a type of open system, where the inputs consist of system inflows 
and disturbances, and the outputs consist of system outflows and products (for example 
electricity). This is shown in Figure 1-17. 
 
Figure 1-17: Dams as open systems 
This configuration indicates limited “self-awareness” that is seen in closed systems. 
Inflows and disturbances cannot be controlled. However, within the system itself there may 
be many examples of closed-system type feedback loops present. To model the internal 
dynamics of the system itself there are a few useful aspects of general systems theory to 
consider. Control systems theory, which falls under the umbrella of general systems theory 
(Von Bertalanffy 1968), offers a new way of considering the structure of hydropower 
systems, which are effectively flow control systems.  
Control systems theory arose as a means of designing man-machine feedback systems that 
self-adjust to achieve the desired outputs (Wiener 1948). Åström and Murray (2008) define 
control as the use of algorithms and feedback in engineered systems. According to Åström 
and Murray (2008), controllers act to dynamically adjust the behaviour of system elements 
to achieve desired system outputs, using feedback to make adjustments.  One of the earliest 
examples of feedback in engineered systems was the development of a centrifugal 
governor, which controls the throttle of a steam engine to maintain a constant speed 
(Åström and Murray 2008). The central concept of control systems theory is the use of 
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feedback loops for sensing, computation and actuation. Leveson (2011) presents a generic 
feedback control loop which is simplified slightly in Figure 1-18.   
 
Figure 1-18: Generic control system structure 
Considering how the generic control system structure shown in Figure 1-18 can be applied 
to dam systems is relatively straightforward. The controlled process represents the 
hydraulic system state, that is, the water barriers, passages and infrastructure on the ground 
– the dam(s), gate(s) and turbine(s). The system state is measured by sensors – sensors may 
measure the current reservoir elevation, positions of gates, and even rainfall to predict 
system inputs (inflows). The controller represents the processing of that information into 
decisions regarding the required control actions to maintain safety and push the outputs 
towards the desired level (outputs can be power production as well as outflow). In a dam 
system, the controller may be a software program, a single person interpreting the system 
state and making decisions, or multiple people within an organization working together 
and using mathematical process models to assist in decision making. The output of the 
controlled process in the feedback loop is a set of control actions, or instructions, that are 
implemented through actuation of system features that change the hydraulic system state. 
Actuators in this case are the mechanical-electrical arrangements of infrastructure that 
function to change the positions of outlet structures (gates and turbine) to modify the 
outputs and keep the system safe. A control action could be to open the gate (actuate) to a 
certain position, with the goal of maintaining a safe reservoir level and avoiding excessive 
flooding downstream of the dam. 
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Leveson (2011) has applied the concept of control systems to safety in the aerospace 
industry, developing the Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling Process (STAMP) for 
accident analysis as well as Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) for the design and 
analysis of engineering control systems. These methods provide a systematic process for 
determining the potential control flaws that can lead to hazards in engineered processes, 
and they are based on the analysis of the hierarchical control system structure (Leveson 
2011). An STPA analysis is essentially a guided brainstorming session whose participants 
work through the control loop to determine potential control flaws, and further analyze 
what conditions could possibly lead to them. Identifying the control flaws allows engineers 
to determine methods to mitigate or eliminate them in system design and improvement. 
One fundamental difference limits the potential of the STPA approach when applied to 
dams. Leveson (2011) presents the approach to analyze control systems operating within 
the natural environment. Dam systems are systems that both operate within nature and 
attempt to control it. The key issue that complicates the problem of dam safety analysis is 
that the main system input (inflow) is a completely uncontrollable, nonlinear variable that 
the system intends to control. Controls may also be active (gates) or passive (free overflow 
spillways). As such, determining how the system will respond to changes in inflow as well 
as disturbances (both internal and external) requires a slightly different approach. 
Characterizing the reservoir elevation in response to the system operating state and inflows 
is a critical problem for dam safety analysis. While STPA can provide very useful insights 
regarding the system’s structure and its potential vulnerabilities, dynamic analysis of the 
system response is required to fully understand and mathematically characterize system 
behaviour.  
Two of the major techniques that can be used in the dynamic analysis of systems include 
simulation, optimization and multiobjective analysis (which expands on optimization to 
problems with multiple objectives). Simulation involves a “what if” assessment of the 
various inputs to a system, where outputs are determined in response to a particular set of 
inputs. Simulation inputs may be varied to determine system behaviour under a range of 
conditions (Simonovic, 2009) and link the system structure to its behaviour. Optimization, 
in contrast, provides a single optimal solution to a given system configuration, with 
30 
 
performance measured based on some objective function (eg. maximize profit). 
Optimization techniques are useful mainly for determining optimal operations strategies 
driven by a single articulated goal. They are unable to deal with the dynamic, feedback-
driven behaviour of complex systems. Optimization techniques may, however, present a 
useful tool for capturing operator’s thought processes and priorities in development of 
operating instructions. Optimization can be extremely useful for developing optimal 
operating decisions and policies. Simulation is the most promising systems analysis 
technique for this research because it (a) facilitates a very detailed representation of system 
structure, interactions and feedbacks, (b) links the system structure to system behaviour, 
and (c) allows for the assessment of the dynamic system response to various operating 
conditions.  
System dynamics simulation (Forrester 1971a) is a particularly promising simulation 
environment to deal with highly complex hydropower dam systems. In system dynamics 
simulation, the pattern of interaction between system elements is called the system 
structure, and the behaviour of the system is linked to its underlying structure (the 
relationships between system components). System behaviour is defined by the way in 
which the system variables change over time. The dynamics of how a system changes over 
time can be investigated by changing either the inputs or the system structure (Simonovic, 
2009).  
In order to carry out a system dynamics simulation, development of a model includes the 
following steps (Simonovic 2009): 
1. Understanding the system and defining its boundaries 
2. Identifying the variables that will influence the system’s behaviour 
3. Using mathematical relationships to describe the relationships between the 
variables 
4. Defining the structure of the model 
5. Simulating the model to understand the system behaviour 
The building blocks of system dynamics simulation models include (1) state variables 
(stocks), (2) flows, (3) auxiliary variables and (4) arrows showing relationships between 
variables which may include delays. The links between these model elements are 
interactions and feedback loops which ultimately drive the system’s behaviour. Stocks are 
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shown as boxes and represent the state-variables, or variables which increase or decrease 
in value over time and whose value can only be changed by flows. Flows are represented 
as rates over time which change the value of a stock. Each auxiliary variable in the model 
represents either an equation that is a function of the inputs (represented by arrows) or a 
constant. Delays may be added which represent time lags to variable changes.  
The key advantage of system dynamics simulation is the ability for it to be used as a 
problem-solving method. When problematic patterns of behaviour are observed, the 
relationships in the model that contribute to the issue can be inspected and the system 
structure can be modified to potentially eliminate or reduce the problem (Simonovic 2009). 
The system behaviour contains dynamic information about the state of each model variable, 
which could be useful for characterizing the reservoir elevation in response to a variety of 
system loads. System dynamics modelling offers a potential approach for assessment of a 
wide range of operating scenarios for a dam system, using automatically generated 
scenarios of potential component operating states. System dynamics is particularly suited 
for the modelling of control systems. The generic control system of Leveson (2011) is 
modified to represent a dam system in Figure 1-19, and extended to show the components 
within the different sub-systems in Figure 1-20. These provide a basic representation of a 
dam system as defined in this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 1-19: Generic control system structure adapted for a hydropower system 
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Figure 1-20: Detailed control system structure adapted for a hydropower system 
The following section describes the proposed objectives of this research in further detail. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this research is to apply systems analysis techniques to the 
problem of flow control in dam safety. In particular, developing and implementing a 
methodology that facilitates the characterization of reservoir elevations for particular sets 
of inflows and operational constraints (scenarios) is necessary. This research draws on 
aspects of the broad domain of general systems theory as well as risk assessment, with the 
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goal of providing a systematic and thorough assessment of dam system performance under 
a wide range of loadings. The research objectives are as follows: 
1. Investigate the use of systems analysis and risk assessment concepts from within 
and outside of the dams industry in terms of their ability to determine potential 
operating scenarios for dam systems and the impacts scenarios have on system 
outcomes. 
2. Develop an approach that helps define a more complete range of potential operating 
scenarios (operating constraints) than is possible using existing techniques alone. 
3. Develop an improved dam safety analysis methodology that facilitates 
investigation of all potential operating scenarios and allows for information 
pertaining to individual scenarios to be analyzed. 
4. Develop a simulation approach that can handle complexity in system structure, 
feedbacks, interactivity and nonlinear behaviour and uses object-oriented 
modelling to improve model accessibility. 
5. Investigate dynamic indicators of system performance with respect to safety, as 
well as scenario criticality parameters that can be used to rank the importance of 
various scenarios from the simulation outcomes. 
These objectives lead to the development of a methodology that is applied to the 
Cheakamus Hydropower Project, which is located North of Squamish, British Columbia, 
Canada (See Figure 4-1). Cheakamus Hydropower Project is a single-reservoir system 
which discharges water from Daisy Lake through the main dam into the Cheakamus River 
through two spillway gates and a low level sluice gate. The Cheakamus River is part of the 
Squamish River catchment and flows into the Squamish River further downstream, 
eventually discharging into the ocean. Water from the reservoir is also discharged through 
two hydroelectric generating units in a remotely located powerhouse on the Squamish 
River, upstream of the Squamish-Cheakamus confluence. This system is modelled in detail 
and operating scenarios for the system are generated. Due to computational time 
limitations, a simpler version of the same system is also created, and the scenarios for the 
34 
 
simple system are run through a simulation model to produce a wide range of potential 
outcomes for the system. A comparison is provided between two different free overflow 
spillway configurations and operating schemes, to demonstrate how the modelling 
approach can give insight to dam owners and decision makers in terms of how system 
modifications affect system safety. 
1.5 Research Contributions 
The key outcomes of this research, in terms of advancements to the current state-of-
knowledge are as follows: 
1. It is generally accepted that a complete probabilistic risk assessment of complex 
dam systems is outside the current state-of-knowledge. This is partly due to the 
difficulties in estimation of failure probabilities (of the individual components and 
the systems themselves). This research shifts the focus to assessment of as many 
possibilities as can be identified, with the goal of providing a complete and 
indiscriminate assessment of as many possible outcomes for the system as can be 
generated (improved coverage of the “possibility space”). Probabilistic assessment 
is possible using the approach presented but is not the focus of the current research. 
However, the direct outputs from simulation can be used to estimate conditional 
probabilities of dam overtopping failure and reservoir level exceedance for a 
particular scenario.  
2. Current practices tend to focus on extreme, low probability events such as the 
Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) and Maximum Design Earthquake (MDE) at the 
edge of the design envelope, when events well within the design envelope may be 
contributing more to the overall risk. Assessment of events within the design 
envelope typically rely on expert judgement for scenario selection with only a small 
portion of possible scenarios being assessed in detail. There is currently no 
automated procedure available to determine a complete set of operating scenarios 
for dam systems. This research proposes a methodology that uses combinatorics to 
generate a more complete set of potential system operating conditions, including 
events within and at the edge of the design envelope. The approach presented in 
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this research automates the procedure of scenario generation, producing an 
exhaustive list of scenarios which results in slightly reduced subjectivity, though 
some subjectivity and expert judgement is inherently required in model 
development and operating state definition.   
3. Chain-of-event techniques such as fault trees are commonly used in dam safety 
assessments. This type of analysis is linear and oversimplified because it is 
incapable of properly handling component interaction and system feedbacks. The 
simulation model presented in this research is capable of modelling feedbacks and 
component interaction, providing a more realistic representation of complex dam 
systems. Results show how the reservoir level changes with time, which is a key 
goal of dam safety assessments that is not easily achieved using chain-of-event 
modelling.  
4. The simulation framework presented in this research is capable of a more thorough 
analysis of all potential scenarios determined through the automated scenario 
generation. In the Deterministic Monte Carlo Simulation framework, scenarios are 
the deterministic model inputs. The scenario impacts, timing and inflows can be 
varied using Monte Carlo techniques to more thoroughly explore the system’s 
“possibility space”. This results in estimates of conditional probabilities of failure 
and reservoir level exceedances over key levels, as well as failure inflow thresholds, 
which are natural outcomes of the approach presented in this work.  
5. The simulation modelling approach presented in this research is easily adaptable 
and can be modified to experiment with various sets of potential operating rules, 
response strategies and upgrades. When compared, asset owners and decision 
makers can quantify how the potential scenario outcomes change as different 
measures are introduced.  
Much of the recent focus on the operational safety of dams and reservoirs involves the 
utilization of fully stochastic simulation techniques, where probabilities of operating states 
are defined as inputs and operating states are randomly changed throughout a single 
continuous simulation. Stochastic simulation is quite useful and efficient for determining 
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the overall likelihood of flow control failure for a dam system. However, the simulation 
effort focuses on more likely events, so an extremely large computational effort is required 
to thoroughly analyze combinations of events. The coverage of the complete “possibility 
space” is driven by the probabilities of the events being considered and the number of years 
for which the model is run.  
This research proposes a Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework to 
systematically analyze combinations of component operating states. A systematically 
defined set of possible combinations of operating states (scenarios) is used upfront as a 
deterministic simulation input. Monte-Carlo variation of operating state outcomes (such as 
outage lengths, error magnitudes, timing of impacts and inflows) explores each scenario 
more completely. The key sources of novelty in this work are (a) the automated, 
combinatorial definition of operating scenarios and (b) the exhaustive exploration of 
scenario outcomes using a Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework. System 
dynamics simulation modelling is used to execute the simulations. The modelling approach 
is object oriented, providing a convenient tool for representing complex systems, and is 
easily modifiable which makes it particularly amenable to optioneering-style assessments. 
The analysis in this research is performed for each scenario, regardless of scenario 
likelihood. The influence of initial events on subsequent events is analyzed to ensure 
scenario outcomes are representative of the input scenario. Useful information can be 
extracted from each scenario’s simulation results. The goal is a more thorough assessment 
of potential operating scenarios than is possible using traditional risk assessment 
approaches or stochastic simulation techniques. The Deterministic Monte Carlo approach 
ensures a more complete coverage of the “possibility space” for a dam system. Complete 
probabilistic assessment is possible using this approach if information is available to 
support it. Sensitivity analysis to operating state probabilities is possible without significant 
additional computational effort (this is a particularly promising direction for future research 
but is not focused on in the current research).  
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1.6 Outline of the Thesis  
Chapter 2 provides a literature review detailing existing techniques most commonly used 
for traditional dam safety as well as the relatively new field of dam safety risk assessment. 
Next, a discussion of the research relating to the shortcomings of the traditional approaches 
to general risk assessment techniques is provided, including a review of some more recent 
work meant to reduce these shortcomings. Finally, a discussion of systems analysis 
techniques is provided, and some conclusions about the capabilities of these techniques are 
provided. 
Chapter 3 contains the complete and detailed methodology used in this work. An overall 
methodology justification and requirements are presented first. Next, the scenario 
development is described in two sections relating to the development of the component 
operating states database and the mathematical formulation to automatically convert 
database information into operating scenarios. Next, the Deterministic Monte Carlo 
simulation framework is presented. A description of the system dynamics simulation 
modelling approach is described, followed by the Monte Carlo techniques used to create 
scenario iterations. The general simulation framework and steps are presented next as well 
as a discussion of computational considerations. The following section describes the 
necessary simulation model input data. Finally, scenario outcome assessment is described.  
Chapter 4 contains a description of the case study. First, a description of BC Hydro’s 
Cheakamus Power Project is described, followed by a presentation of the database and 
scenario generation. Next, a description of scenario generation for a simplified 
representation of Cheakamus is described, followed by a description of the simplified 
system dynamics model development, testing and model runs. Simulation model input data 
is described in the following section. Finally, results are presented.  
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the results and an overall methodology assessment. A 
discussion of future directions for this research is also provided. References and appendices 
follow.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Literature Review 
A review of the literature relating to traditional dam safety practice and current risk analysis 
techniques is provided in this chapter. The following section describes traditional dam 
safety practice. Next, a detailed discussion of risk analysis techniques is provided in the 
general context as well as within the domain of dam safety. The final section of this chapter 
contains a discussion of the systems approach to safety.  
2.1 Traditional dam safety practice 
Traditional dam safety practice typically follows a standards-based approach, where a dam 
is expected to be capable of passing a certain set of extreme loading conditions, such as the 
PMF (Mcgrath 2000). There is a significant amount of effort spent on estimating these 
extreme loading conditions, which are the “edge” of the design envelope. Factors of safety 
used in the design of the system are checked as more information becomes available and 
the estimates of these extreme loading conditions are refined. For example, as new flood 
estimation methodologies and improved hydrometeorological and hydrological data 
become available, dam owners can use this information to re-calculate the probable 
maximum precipitation (PMP), which is then used to compute the PMF (USBR 1987; 
USACE 2011). Similarly, structural, seismic and other load conditions relating to natural 
disturbances can be refined over time, and the standards-based approach essentially checks 
and re-checks whether the dam can withstand them. 
The United States Bureau of Reclamation USBR has a series of publicly-available 
standards, a number of which relate to dam and spillway design. The Spillway and Outlet 
Design Standard (No. 14) deals primarily with flow control in dams. The USBR states that 
the hydraulic loadings to be considered in spillway and outlet design are the Inflow Design 
Flood (IDF) and construction diversion floods (USBR 2014b). The IDF is defined as the 
maximum flood hydrograph used in the design of a dam, and it is either equal to or smaller 
than the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). The USBR defines the PMF as “the flood 
hydrograph that results from the maximum runoff condition due to the most severe 
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combination of hydrologic and meteorological conditions that are considered reasonably 
possible for the drainage basin under study” (USBR 2014b). Selection of the IDF in dams 
built before the early 1940’s was based on extrapolation of existing data, for example 
selecting a flood that was 50% larger than the flood of record for a site (USBR 2014b). 
Between the late 1940’s until the 1980’s, IDF’s were set equal to the maximum probable 
floods (roughly equal to the PMF but computed with only site specific data) until the PMF 
was adopted. IDF selection was then modified to consider the downstream hazard potential 
classification and possible impacts relating to loss of operation. Eventually, frequency 
flood hydrograph calculations were used in selection of the IDF, where dams of a particular 
consequence category were designed to withstand a flood with a particular return period. 
Since the mid 1990’s, a quantitative risk-based approach has been adopted by most 
American agencies. The USBR utilizes an f-N chart, which is a graph that plots estimated 
loss of life against the probability of different failure modes. The USBR’s f-N chart has 
defined zones, where points within certain zones of the chart require either increased or 
decreased justification for further risk reduction. A starting frequency flood is defined and 
f-N pairs corresponding to it are plotted. The frequency flood is then increased until all of 
the f-N pairs (for each failure mode) are within the zone indicating decreasing justification 
to reduce risks. The USBR’s design standard also contains a description of potential failure 
modes (PFM’s).  
A similar process for IDF calculation is used by the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) and other American dam organizations, and the process is generalized in the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) “Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety” 
(FEMA 2004). The Canadian Dam Association’s (CDA) guidelines describe both risk-
based and consequence-based approaches for selection of IDF and MDE (CDA 2007). The 
USACE also provides engineering manuals that include technical guidance and standards. 
In the “Safety of Dams – Policy and Procedures” document (USACE 2011),  minimum 
requirements for hydrology and hydraulics of dam systems are outlined, including the 
capacity requirements for spillways and outlet works, as well as the reliability of gates. 
Geotechnical and structural minimum requirements are also described, and the document 
cites reference material containing quantitative standards, where applicable. Factors of 
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safety for structural assessment and design may be provided by the dam agencies, as well 
as loading conditions to be considered (CDA 2007) 
In addition to standards, there is a considerable focus on best practices in dam safety. The 
USBR and USACE developed a Best Practices Training Manual (USBR and USACE 
2015a) containing chapters covering a variety of considerations in dam safety. Of particular 
relevance to the flow control focus of this work are the chapters relating to overtopping 
failure, failure of spillway gates and operational considerations. In the chapter on 
overtopping failure, the manual mentions that vulnerability of the system to gate failures 
during major floods can be simulated using simple flood routing by eliminating one of the 
gates from the analysis. The manual also suggests testing the sensitivity of flood routing 
by implementing delayed control of the gates as a result of human error.  The chapter on 
failure of spillway gates focuses mainly on structural strength and stability assessment, as 
well as failure modes and best practices for maintenance. The operational risks chapter 
focuses on issues relating to events within the design envelope of the dam and suggests the 
use of event trees for their assessment (see Section 2.2.4). There is also a chapter on the 
probability of failure of electrical and mechanical systems of spillway gates, which 
suggests a multi-step approach to incorporating this equipment in dam safety analysis. 
First, probability distributions are applied for estimation of individual component failure 
rates. Next, fault trees (see Section 2.2.3) are presented as a way of analyzing the 
probability of failure for the gate system as a whole. Finally, event trees detailing the chain-
of-events for the overall dam system are suggested as a means of determining the overall 
likelihood of failure as a result of failure of the gate to operate on demand. Frequent 
inspection is suggested as a best practice to identify and address failures of gate equipment. 
Gate power supply redundancy is also recommended. 
In general, the North American dam associations seem to be shifting towards a risk-based 
approach to dam safety, the key tools of which are described in the following section. In 
terms of international dam safety practice, McGrath (2000) provides an overview of the 
use of risk assessment in dam safety, using specific examples of legislature and current 
practice from several countries. Bowles (1998a) provides a review of the state of the 
practice based on experience in risk assessment for dams in the U.S. and Australia, noting 
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several drivers that have lead dam owners to adopt a risk-based approach. One of the key 
issues is that severe standards may require cost-prohibitive measures for compliance. 
Bowles (1998a) notes that increasing severity of standards does not always result in 
reduced risk because dam owners, regulators, and government agencies simply cannot 
afford to meet the standards. In some states, regulators have worked with dam owners in a 
risk-based approach which prioritizes projects and partial fixes that are affordable to the 
dam owner, resulting in an overall reduced risk (Bowles et al. 1998a). Using a risk-based 
approach, dam owners can provide numerical risk assessment outcomes as justification for 
focusing on the most significant dam safety risks in the portfolio of dams (Bowles et al. 
1998a, b; Bowles 2001). Portfolio risk assessment is a technical ranking method used to 
prioritize dam upgrades, and has been applied to dams in Australia (Bowles et al. 1998b; 
Foster et al. 2000b), the U.S. (Cyganiewicz and Smart 2000; USACE 2011; USBR 2011; 
Srivastava 2013), the U.K. (Morris et al. 2012), Europe and Canada (Donnelly 2005).  
It is important to note that the standards-based approach and the risk-based approach are 
not mutually exclusive, as standards are typically included in the risk-based approach 
(USACE 2011). Further, the focus in these technical guidelines still seems to be placed on 
definition of the design envelope and assessment of dam performance at the edge of this 
design envelope. In essence, the standards-based approach is still in place – the system’s 
design envelope is simply determined using more sophisticated probabilistic risk 
assessment tools.  While some discussion is provided with respect to operational safety 
under normal conditions (eg. USBR 2014b), there is very little guidance relating to how 
the operational safety of the systems can be assessed, though event trees are presented as a 
potential tool. It is worth noting that Canadian structural code associations are 
contemplating a switch to “performance-based engineering” which uses simulation to 
assess structural performance risk in response to a range of potential loading conditions 
(Ellingwood 2017). This shift has resulted from a need to consider climate change impacts 
in structural design.    
The following section details some of the current practices in risk analysis, from within 
and outside of the dams industry.  
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2.2 Current practices in risk analysis 
Risk is most frequently defined as the product of the failure probabilities and consequences. 
Risk analysis is the process used to determine and estimate risks – this may involve the 
definition and analysis of different loading conditions, failure modes and consequences as 
well as probability estimation (Cyganiewicz and Smart 2000). Risk assessment is the use 
of information from risk analysis to evaluate the various sources of risk and make decisions 
(Mcgrath 2000). This section focuses on techniques used for risk analysis. 
There are a variety of different practices used in the analysis of risk and safety of 
engineered systems. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)’s Aerospace Recommended 
Practice document (SAE 1996), and a number of standards (IEC 2008, 2010) from the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) provide useful reference material for 
developing an initial understanding of the various assessment tools. Many of the 
approaches described by SAE and IEC are not mutually exclusive; that is, multiple 
approaches may be used in a system safety assessment, and the results of one approach 
may become the inputs of another. Four of the most commonly used techniques for system 
safety assessment, in particular within the dams industry, are Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) and it’s descendant Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA), Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA). These are described in the following 
sections, which present the general theory, applications and limitations of each approach. 
Additional methods are then briefly described. 
2.2.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is a systematic assessment approach that seeks to determine potential failure modes 
and identify their causes and the potential effects on system performance (IEC 2008). It 
was first developed in 1949 by the U.S. Military for weapons systems and refined in the 
1960’s for applications in the aerospace industry (Stamatis 2002; Thomas 2012). The use 
of FMEA was extended in the 1970’s to automotive, aerospace and petrochemical 
industries (SAE 1967; National Research Council 1981) and was later applied in the 
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nuclear, food, drugs, and cosmetics industries (Duckworth and Moore 2010) as well as the 
dams industry (Hartford and Baecher 2004; dos Santos et al. 2012).  
There are a number of different implementations of FMEA, however the general approach 
remains consistent (Thomas 2013). FMEA essentially identifies components and their 
failure modes, and then identifies the causes and effects for each failure mode. Failure 
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) adds an additional step where the 
severity and probability of events are used to determine the failure modes criticality 
(Thomas 2013). Details regarding the FMEA and FMECA processes are described in the 
IEC’s International Standard 60812 (IEC 2008) as well as SAE’s Aerospace 
Recommended Practice manual, ARP4761 (SAE 1996).  
The IEC standard provides an overview of the information that should be made available 
to the team performing the analysis. In particular, the system boundary should be clearly 
defined and its elements, their characteristics, function and connections with other elements 
should be known. Levels of redundancy, system inputs and outputs, and information 
regarding how the system structure changes in response to different operating modes are 
also essential for the analyst team (IEC 2008). Representing the hierarchical system 
structure through the use of diagrams is recommended to illustrate relationships between 
components, redundancies and the inputs and outputs (IEC 2008). Information relating to 
maintenance routines, frequency of use of the different aspects of the system as well as 
operation should also be made available to the analysis team. The FMEA process described 
in IEC 60812 is illustrated in the following diagram (Schmittner et al. 2014): 
The process involves identifying failure modes for a particular component, and then for 
each failure mode determining the effects, severity, causes and the frequency or 
probability. Analysis of severity may be done using qualitative descriptors such as 
catastrophic, critical, marginal and insignificant. This process is done for all components 
of the system at the particular level of detail of analysis. Once this detailed, component-
level assessment is complete, the effects of failures on the next level of the system should 
be determined (IEC 2008). In a hierarchical system, the effects at the immediate level 
become the failure modes at the next level, and this can continue until the highest level of 
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the system is analyzed (IEC 2008; dos Santos et al. 2012). In this way, the immediate 
effects of a failure on the system as a whole can be determined. In FMECA, criticality is 
a qualitative measure of the relative degree of importance of a failure mode, and it is 
determined using the likelihood and severity of the failure mode (IEC 2008). There are a 
number of different ways in which criticality can be assessed and these are outlined in 
IEC 60812.  
 
Figure 2-1: FMEA Process (Schmittner, 2014) 
The FMEA/FMECA process typically involves a multi-disciplinary team of experts who 
work together to analyze the system (Hartford and Baecher 2004; dos Santos et al. 2012). 
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Information from the process is usually recorded in a tabular worksheet form and often 
uses the aid of diagrams and flow charts to illustrate how the event propagates through the 
system (Mcgrath 2000; Bartsch 2004; IEC 2008; dos Santos et al. 2012). The IEC standard 
(IEC 2008) and the dam-specific risk assessment text by Hartford and Baecher (2004) 
provide example worksheets similar to the one shown in Table 2-1. Analysts may wish to 
consider the ways in which a failure may be detected or prevented in the analysis and can 
use the results of the analysis to form conclusions regarding actions that can be taken to 
mitigate or eliminate important failure modes.  
Table 2-1: FMEA Sample Worksheet 
Component Function 
Failure 
Modes and 
causes 
Local 
consequence 
Global 
consequence 
Ability 
to 
detect 
Severity Probability 
Treatment 
action 
         
Within the dams industry, there are some examples of FMEA being utilized for 
assessments of dam safety (Putcha and Patev 2000; Shaw et al. 2000; Hartford and Baecher 
2004; dos Santos et al. 2012). Hartford (2001) notes that BC Hydro considered FMEA to 
be an important precursor to quantitative risk assessment as early as the mid 1990s. By the 
early 2000’s the majority of American dam associations (eg. USBR, USACE, FMEA) 
began advocating for a heuristic FMEA-inspired approach called PFMA (see Section 2.2.2) 
that would reduce the time and effort required to complete a true FMEA.  
The IEC and SAE standards note some limitations of the FMEA/FMECA approach. 
Despite successful applications in multi-level hierarchical systems, IEC (2008) states that 
analysis of multi-level systems can introduce complications and errors, suggesting that 
limiting the analysis to two levels of a hierarchical system is preferable. It is noted that the 
key assumption in FMEA is that failure modes are independent. The ability of the FMEA 
process to deal with common-cause failure is quite limited, and at best they can only be 
analyzed qualitatively (SAE 1996; IEC 2008). This means that only a subset of all possible 
failure scenarios are considered (Thomas 2013). There are also limitations in dealing with 
human factors and software errors that may contribute to system failures (IEC 2008). 
Nonlinear and feedback relationships are unable to be analyzed effectively using 
FMEA/FMECA (Thomas 2013), so failure initiation and progression can be extremely 
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difficult to assess (Shaw et al. 2000; Bartsch 2004). Zhang et al. (2018) note that analysis 
of redundancy in systems is complicated by component interdependency. The IEC (2008) 
suggests utilizing fault tree analysis to deal with interrelationship scenarios and common 
cause failures. Thomas (2013) suggests that FMEA/FMECA, by its nature, is only able to 
analyze scenarios that are triggered by a failure – the result is a set of both safe and unsafe 
scenarios, with an equal amount of time spent analyzing each. There are, however, some 
unsafe scenarios which may not be triggered by failures at all, and these are omitted from 
the analysis. Dos Santos (2012) and Zhang et al. (2018) suggest that components may take 
on multiple potential states so the binary definition of functional or failed may not be 
adequate. Many authors have also noted that FMEA is a time and resource consuming 
process which requires a significant amount of information and spends considerable time 
analyzing less-relevant failure modes (Mcgrath 2000; Shaw et al. 2000; Bartsch 2004; IEC 
2008; dos Santos et al. 2012). Shaw et al. (2000) points out that FMEA was developed for 
active systems, in which each component has an output action – whereas in dam systems, 
many of the components are passive. dos Santos et al. (2012) found that FMEA did not 
give adequate consideration to time dependencies or deterioration where in reality, some 
components progress slowly towards a failed state.  
The advantages and disadvantages of the approach are summarized in Table 2-2. In spite 
of these limitations, FMEA/FMECA still provides a useful and systematic tool for the 
identification and assessment of potential failures modes in a variety of systems and 
processes. Identifying failure modes is an important aspect of risk analysis and for the 
analysis of system safety in general. Knowing what the possible failures are facilitates the 
development of strategies to eliminate, detect, mitigate and/or reduce their likelihood of 
occurrence. 
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Table 2-2: Advantages and disadvantages of FMEA 
Advantages Disadvantages 
-Systematic approach1,2,3 
-Determines potential failure states of 
system components and their effects on 
other components of the system1,2,3 
-Failure-focus that can miss unsafe non-
failure component states or interactions2 
-Difficulty in analyzing redundancy1,3 
-Static analysis with limited ability to 
analyze feedback, interaction, time, 
dynamic system behaviour1,2 
-Common-cause failures, human factors 
and software errors are challenging within 
this framework2 
-Difficulty and significant complexity 
with multi-level hierarchical system 
analysis1,3 
1 Hartford and Baecher (2004) 
2 Thomas (2013) 
3 IEC (2008) 
2.2.2 Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA) 
PFMA is a qualitative analysis tool that is utilized primarily within the dams industry. 
PFMA is essentially a simplified, heuristic variant of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) which was developed in the early 2000’s by FERC in response to the time and 
resource commitments required to perform a comprehensive FMEA (Hartford and Baecher 
2004; France et al. 2018a). Dam safety literature pre-dating FERC’s introduction of PFMA 
(FERC 2005b) often refers to FMEA (eg. Bowles et al. 1998b; Putcha and Patev 2000; 
Stewart 2000; Barker et al. 2003; Faber and Stewart 2003; Hartford and Baecher 2004; 
Wieland et al. 2005), though many researchers and dam agencies now use the simplified 
PFMA methodology as a result of the influence of the American dam associations (eg. 
Bowles et al. 2011; USACE 2011; SPANCOLD 2012; USBR and USACE 2012b; Adamo 
et al. 2017).  
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Despite sometimes being mentioned as a single approach, there are fundamental 
differences between PFMA and FMEA/FMECA. FMEA/FMECA is a systematic approach 
that works up from the most detailed level of a hierarchical system to higher levels of the 
system. In PFMA, this is done heuristically for the system as a whole. This also means the 
definition of a failure mode may be slightly different between the two methods. In FMEA, 
a failure is defined as a components ability to achieve it’s intended function – failures are 
defined at the component level. In PFMA, failures are defined at the system level – only 
events which result in a problem at the system level are considered.  
PFMA is essentially a failure mode brainstorming session involving a team of experts, 
including engineers, field staff and operating staff. The PFMA team performs a review of 
all existing data, historical records and information and uses this to come up with possible 
modes of failure for the dam, including their causes, qualitative likelihood descriptors, and 
consequences (FERC 2005b). The failure modes are categorized into the following groups 
(FERC 2005b): 
• Category I – Highlighted potential failure mode (increased significance and 
likelihood) 
• Category II – Potential failure modes considered but not highlighted (lesser 
significance and likelihood) 
• Category III – More information or analysis needed to classify  
• Category IV – Potential failure mode ruled out (physically impossible or unlikely) 
FERC (2005b) states that the result of a PFMA analysis is an information resource that can 
help illuminate failure modes not previously considered, while highlighting the importance 
of failure modes with high consequence and likelihood. The guidance document also states 
that the analysis may identify some failure modes which are less significant than previously 
thought, due to their associated consequences or likelihood (FERC 2005b). It is suggested 
by some researchers and organizations (eg. Bowles et al. 1999, 2011; FERC 2007; USBR 
and USACE 2015; Adamo et al. 2017) that PFMA is the first step in risk assessment, to be 
followed by the quantification of risk, using event trees or other guidelines.  
In 2003, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) made PFMA a requirement 
for all American dams meeting certain criteria (relating to hazard level and size under the 
Code of Federal Regulations 18 Part 12 Subpart D), and published a technical document 
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detailing the steps of the analysis (FERC 2005b; Hoeg et al. 2007). The USACE and USBR 
also include PFMA in their dam safety policies and best practices manuals (USACE 2011; 
USBR and USACE 2015b). Several other agencies have their own guidelines, webinars 
and supporting documents (Hydrometrics Inc. 2011; USSD 2013; ASDSO 2018). The 
CDA dam safety guidelines do not specifically mention PFMA (CDA 2007).  
Despite its widespread use and successes in identifying some failure modes as well as 
helping dam owners prioritize risk reduction measures (eg. FERC 2007; Adamo et al. 
2017), the PFMA process is not without its shortcomings. This became especially apparent 
following the Oroville Dam incident of 2017 (France et al. 2018a).  
In the aftermath of the incident, an independent forensic team consisting of engineers from 
a variety of organizations was assembled to review the causes of the incident (France et al. 
2018a). It was revealed that the dam had been the subject of three PFMA’s in 2005, 2009 
and most recently in 2014. Failure modes relating to the emergency overflow spillway and 
spillway chute were overlooked in 2005 and 2009. In 2014, two relevant failure modes 
were identified. The first was related to the emergency spillway: “A PMF flood event is 
occurring and over 10 feet of water is spilling over the emergency spillway at Oroville 
Dam. Erosion begins where the flow is entering the Feather River and progresses by head-
cutting into the reservoir” (France et al. 2018a). The possibility of erosion happening at 
lower spillway flows was not considered and the failure mode was classified as Category 
IV (non-credible) as a result of its perceived likelihood being small. The second relevant 
potential failure mode was the failure of the spillway chute: “Cavitation or slabjacking 
results in loss of the concrete lining in the spillway chute downstream of the [spillway 
gates]. The rock in the spillway chute erodes and the [spillway gates are] undermined and 
lost” (France et al. 2018a). Again, this potential failure mode was classified as Category 
IV (non-credible), as a result of its perceived likelihood being small.  
The Oroville incident has helped highlight some of the shortcomings of PFMA. In two of 
the three PFMA sessions, the pertinent failure modes were completely missed, and in the 
third, their likelihoods were perceived to be so low as to not warrant further investigation 
or remediation. The 2014 PFMA was the result of two weeks of analysis and was 
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considered to be very thorough by all involved, however some key errors in judgement 
were made relating to assumptions about the geologic conditions and the condition of the 
spillway chute (France et al. 2018a). France et al. (2018a) notes that a considerable 
emphasis is placed on loss-of-life during the PFMA process, resulting in some plausible 
scenarios being eliminated from the list and categorized as Category IV due to perceived 
minimal consequences. In addition to this, there tends to be more emphasis on the dams 
themselves, and less emphasis on their appurtenant structures. France et al. (2018a) also 
noted issues with the FERC categorization scheme – FERC (2005b) states that “If you do 
not fully develop a [potential failure mode], you cannot categorize it”, when in reality more 
information is often necessary to properly categorize some of the potential failure modes. 
Another key issue with the PFMA process is that the results are subjective and could vary 
significantly depending on the individuals involved, the data available and the time 
allocated for the process. This is obvious when considering that two of the three PFMA 
reports overlooked failure modes relating to the spillways (France et al. 2018a). The 
independent forensic investigators also noted that PFMA was considerably less structured 
than FMEA. 
The advantages and disadvantages of PFMA are summarized in Table 2-3.While PFMA 
represents a positive step by the dam industry towards considering more than just 
engineering standards like the PMF and MDE, there are some limitations to simplifying 
the analysis of such complex systems. The interactions among components and the 
consequences of these interactions may be missed in the analysis. The system is not 
necessarily broken down and analyzed in a hierarchical way as it is in FMEA/FMECA, so 
lower level failures may be overlooked. The approach suffers from the same issues as 
FMEA/FMECA in terms of common cause failures, human factors and software errors. 
The classification scheme allows practitioners to “rule out” lower-consequence or less 
likely events, despite the fact that these events do contribute to the overall system risk. The 
focus of the PFMA reports available publicly tends to be on dam breach or collapse over 
other seemingly less consequential modes of failure. Many researchers and agencies (eg. 
Bowles et al. 1999, 2011; FERC 2007; SPANCOLD 2012; USBR and USACE 2015; 
Adamo et al. 2017) consider PFMA to be the first step in quantitative risk assessment (event 
tree analysis is often recommended as the next step). While identification of failures modes 
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is an important first step in quantitative risk assessment, PFMA effectively rules out some 
failure modes and could potentially be missing others. It is also not possible using PFMA 
to systematically identify possible sequences of events which may be benign on their own, 
but together could lead to catastrophic consequences (Hartford et al. 2016).  
 
Table 2-3: Advantages and disadvantages of PFMA 
Advantages Disadvantages 
-Improves the understanding of dam risks 
by determining the site-specific causes of 
potential issues1  
-Efficient1 
 
-Heuristic brainstorming approach that 
relies on expert judgement and mental 
models of complex systems2 
-Failure-focus that can miss unsafe non-
failure component states or interactions  
-Tendency to analyze only conditions that 
lead to uncontrolled release of the 
reservoir2 
-Static analysis of linear chains of events, 
with limited ability to analyze feedback, 
interaction, time, or dynamic system 
behaviour2,3 
-Human and operational aspects of 
failures difficult to analyze2 
-Some failure modes may be determined 
“non-credible” but may still have 
significant safety impacts2   
1 FERC (2005b) 
2 France et al. (2018a) 
3 Regan (2010) 
 
2.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault trees were originally developed in the 1960’s to analyze missile systems (Thomas 
2012). Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed as a way of identifying combinations of 
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failures and determining their likelihoods. They were first applied to assess the launch 
system of Minuteman I, and were extended for components throughout the system on 
Minuteman II (Ericson 1999). Boeing began using fault trees to assess aircraft by 1966 and 
by the end of the 1960’s, fault trees were the standard of practice for the weapons and 
aerospace industries (Ericson 1999). In the early 1970’s, fault trees were adopted by the 
nuclear and chemical industries and software systems were developed to improve analysis 
abilities (Ericson 1999; Thomas 2012). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the approach was being 
applied in the robotics industry (Lin and Wang 1997) and software industry (Leveson 1995; 
Hansen et al. 1998). 
Fault trees can be thought of as the mirror image of event trees, in that they use deductive 
reasoning whereas event trees use inductive reasoning. Fault trees start with an undesirable 
event and proceed from the general to the specific, using a backward logic to determine the 
potential causes of an undesirable event (Hartford and Baecher 2004). The result is a 
graphical depiction which moves down the page in levels of detail that progress with each 
step in the tree (SAE 1996). This results in a tree structure which shows how combinations 
of undesirable events or failures at lower level components can cause the event in question. 
In fault trees, faults are the undesirable events (also known as “top events” and lower level 
events are failures (Thomas 2012). In FTA, a separate fault tree would be constructed for 
each undesirable event (SAE 1996). There are several graphical constructs used in the 
development of fault trees including what are known as “logic gates”, which are presented 
in Table 2-4 (Lee et al. 1985; SAE 1996). There are also graphical constructs showing 
events, with different symbols representing different types of faults (Lee et al. 1985).  
The development of a fault tree starts by determining what immediate failures would be 
responsible for the top event (fault). The analyst then moves down the tree in increasing 
levels of detail, determining the causes of each failure and linking them using the 
appropriate logic gates. Fault tree creation stops when the root causes of an event are 
determined or further development is deemed unnecessary (SAE 1996).  
The act of constructing the fault tree alone can provide useful information in terms of what 
needs to fail for the top event to occur. A cut set is a unique combination of events within 
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the fault tree that could lead to failure. A fault tree may have many cut sets depending on 
its level of complexity. The smallest set of events that can lead to the top event is known 
as the minimal cut set (Thomas 2013). Investigating the cut sets and organizing them based 
on the number of primary events in each cut set can be a useful qualitative tool for 
determining what primary events (or combinations of them) are the most concerning.   
Table 2-4: Basic event tree logic gates 
Symbol Name Description 
 
AND TRUE if all input events occur 
 
OR TRUE if at least one of the input events 
occurs 
m  
VOTE TRUE if at least m of the input events 
occurs 
 
EXCLUSIVE OR TRUE if only one of the input events 
occurs 
 
PRIORITY AND TRUE if input events occur in a particular 
order 
 
INHIBIT TRUE if all inputs event occur, as well as 
an additional (typically external) event 
Determining the minimal cut set can be challenging if events occur in multiple places 
within the fault tree – this can happen if there is dependence between two or more events 
and is relatively common for complex systems (SAE 1996). For fault trees without 
interdependence (each event occurs only once), relatively simple rules can be followed to 
determine the probability of the top event. Assuming the probability of an event A can be 
represented by P(A), the basic rules for quantitative analysis are derived from set theory 
and are determined as follows (SAE 1996): 
• The probability of events 𝐴 AND 𝐵 both occurring is 𝑃(𝐴𝐵) and is equal to 𝑃(𝐴) ∗
𝑃(𝐵). For three events connected by AND gates, the three probabilities are 
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multiplied, and so on. This represents the intersection of sets A AND B, as shown 
in Figure 2-2 by the area represented by AB. 
 
Figure 2-2: Illustration of the intersection of A AND B 
• The probability of events 𝐴 OR 𝐵 occurring can be denoted 𝑃(𝐴 + 𝐵) and is equal 
to 𝑃(𝐴)  +  𝑃(𝐵) – [𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐵)]. For three events connected by OR gates, the 
equation becomes 𝑃(𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) + 𝑃(𝐶) − [𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐵)] −
[𝑃(𝐵) ∗ 𝑃(𝐶)] − [𝑃(𝐶) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴)] + [𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐵) ∗ 𝑃(𝐶)]. The set theory used to 
develop the second equation is shown in Figure 2-3. The total area shaded is known 
as the union of sets A, B, and C. Each of the two-circle intersections (AB, AC, BC) 
is negated once to avoid double counting, and then the three-circle intersection 
(ABC) is re-added to ensure the complete area is counted for. 
 
Figure 2-3: illustration of the union of sets A, B and C (OR) 
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• The probability of mutually exclusive events occurring (if one occurs the other 
can’t) is simply equal to 𝑃(𝐴 + 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵), with 𝑃(𝐴𝐵) = 0. The set 
theory used to derive this concept is shown in Figure 2-4. Note in this illustration, 
there is no overlap between sets A and B, which indicates mutual exclusivity.  
 
Figure 2-4: Illustration of mutual exclusivity in sets A and B 
These basic rules, derived from simple set theory, can be applied to calculate the 
probability of occurrence for the top event. This is illustrated using an example shown in 
Figure 2-5. In Figure 19, the top event can only occur if both Failure A AND Failure B 
occur. Failure A can only occur if one OR more of Failure C, D, or E occur. The basic 
probabilistic analysis process is shown in the example figure. To calculate the probability 
of the top event, the probabilities of Failures B, C, D and E are required. The possible cut 
sets are CB, DB, EB, CDB, DEB, CEB, and CDEB. Failure A has its own set of primary 
events, so it is not a primary event and is not counted in the cut sets, while Failure B is a 
primary event because it is not further decomposed. 
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Figure 2-5: Simple fault tree example 
As mentioned previously, fault tree analysis can be complicated when events or failures 
appear multiple times within the tree. This indicates common-cause failures (SAE 1996). 
Qualitatively, this can be analyzed by looking at the list of possible cut sets. For cut sets 
where a failure can lead to more than one primary event, a common cause failure has 
occurred. This more complex situation necessitates the use of Boolean Analysis to 
appropriately compute the probability of the top event (SAE 1996). Boolean algebra is a 
mathematical formulation that deals with True or False events (1’s and 0’s), which is useful 
for fault trees where events either occur or do not occur (Hartford and Baecher 2004). The 
SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice manual provides an excellent example of 
“Boolean reduction” in analysis of complex fault trees (SAE 1996). The method for 
determining the minimal cut sets is shown and the Boolean Logic rules are described. There 
are a variety of computational software packages available to aid in the construction and 
57 
 
mathematical assessment of fault trees, including Prepp/Kitt, SETS, FTAP, Importance, 
Isograph and COMCAN (Lee et al. 1985; Ericson 1999; Barker et al. 2006). These tools 
are typically capable of performing cutset determination and probability calculation 
automatically (SAE 1996). 
Due to its general simplicity and ability to graphically illustrate potential paths to failure, 
FTA has become widely used across a variety of industries as mentioned previously. It is 
a powerful tool that provides excellent insight into the possible ways in which primary 
events (failures) can lead to top events. The limitations of the approach are also well 
documented. Thomas (2012) notes that the approach relies heavily on the initial list of top 
events – it does not determine these. Some other approach must be used. FTA also heavily 
relies on the quality of information pertaining to the system of interest, and it may be 
possible to omit events from the tree inadvertently. No systematic techniques are available 
to ensure an exhaustive analysis is completed. Thomas (2012) notes that the decomposition 
in an FTA often stops at a subjective point in the analysis, where causes of failure become 
less obvious and more complex – essentially, “FTA often finds what is only intuitively 
obvious”. Human factors and software errors are not easily reduced to a simple binary 
representation (failing or functioning) and as such they are not easily incorporated into an 
FTA analysis (Thomas 2012). Perhaps most importantly, FTA focuses on failures alone, 
and as such it may omit non-failure causes of a top event that could occur as a result of 
design errors, omissions or other factors such as delays and human error. Many issues that 
contribute to accidents historically are dynamic processes that may not be easily 
represented as simple failures (Thomas 2012). Furthermore, the fault tree assumes linear 
relationships among system components and is unable to capture component interactions 
or time-dependent, nonlinear feedback behaviour which may lead to unexpected outcomes 
for the system of interest. 
Hartford and Baecher (2004) provide an excellent overview of FTA within the context of 
dam safety. They describe methods of estimating the probability of the top event when 
common-cause failures are observed. Their review of FTA also discusses methods for 
determining the relative importance of cutsets. In general, there are a limited number of 
dam safety applications of FTA available within the public domain. Putcha and Patev 
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(2005) describe the application of fault trees as a method for analyzing dam gates and 
operating equipment, presenting generalized fault trees showing how a gate may fail to 
open or close. These generalized fault trees could be useful for practitioners as a starting 
point for application to a specific system of interest. Putcha and Patev (2005) suggest the 
use of criticality indices derived through FMEA as a means of ranking the relative 
importance of components within the gate system fault trees. They go on to use the 
criticality along with failure rates to determine probabilities of individual component 
failures, which can then be used to determine the overall probability of the top event (Patev 
et al. 2005). The approach presented provides a good starting point for fault tree analysis 
of dam gate systems.   
Barker et al. (2006) used fault tree analysis to assess the reliability of various options for a 
spillway system upgrade in Queensland, Australia. A variety of different operating states 
were analyzed using fault trees, and human error was included in the analysis. Several 
scenarios were tested, and sensitivity analysis was performed for various assumptions 
regarding grid reliability, operating staff assumptions, PLC reliability and redundancy, as 
well as backup power source reliability and redundancy (Barker et al. 2006). The authors 
note that the results of the analysis were useful in selecting the final configuration for the 
system upgrade, but do not show the fault tree arrangement or mathematical computations 
used. 
The advantages and disadvantages of FTA are summarized in Table 2-5. Hartford and 
Baecher (2004) note some disadvantages to the use of fault trees for analysis of dam 
systems, mainly pertaining to the high level of complexity in large fault trees and the 
reliance on expert judgement in their construction. Nevertheless, they note that fault tree 
analysis may be the only alternative in some cases to modelling complex systems in an 
attempt to understand and quantify failure modes. One key issue in the use of fault trees is 
they represent a linear event progression (Thomas 2012). In dam systems, components may 
not instantaneously progress towards a failed state, instead degrading in some way over 
time. Inflows introduce another nonlinear variable that complicates analysis using fault 
trees. Traditional FTA may not be capable of characterizing the reservoir level with respect 
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to different system operating conditions and inputs, which is an important goal in the 
context of dam safety. 
In more recent studies, Bayesian Networks and algorithms have been applied as a means 
to overcome some of the limitations associated with fault trees (Ching and Leu 2009; Jong 
and Leu 2013). Ching and Leu (2009) used a Poisson process to model time-varying 
arrivals of disturbances, representing the system using a fault tree model with a Bayesian 
algorithm incorporated to assess uncertainty. The goal of the analysis was to model how 
the reliability of civil infrastructure changes over time. The approach was demonstrated on 
a spillway gate system for a dam in Taiwan and was found to offer a fast solution that 
helped overcome some of the issues associated with lack of failure rate data. Results 
showing remaining life and failure rate plotted against time are shown for the case study. 
Jong and Leu (2013) applied a hybrid approach using fault tree analysis in conjunction 
with Bayesian Networking to overcome some of the limitations associated with both 
approaches. Their approach was to transform fault trees, which are more easily and 
logically developed, into Bayesian Networks, which are more tedious and difficult to set 
up for complex systems but allow for expert knowledge to be incorporated with Bayesian 
Probability Theory for improved diagnosis of system faults (Jong and Leu 2013). The 
approach was demonstrated on three Taiwanese dam systems and shown to match Weibull-
distribution based reliability analysis of those systems. While these approaches do address 
the traditional FTA limitation of failure rates that change over time, they do not consider 
system inflows, interactions between components or the overall system response to 
component failures. These issues remain outside of the capabilities of FTA at the current 
time. 
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Table 2-5: Advantages and disadvantages of FTA 
Advantages Disadvantages 
-Logical and visual method for displaying 
failure paths through a system1 
-Can be used to estimate probability of 
top events and unique paths to the top 
event2 
-Works very well at identifying the 
importance of component failure modes3 
 
 
-Failure-based method that can miss 
unsafe scenarios caused by interactions or 
non-failures3 
-May not follow system flow diagram so 
it can be difficult to relate fault tree logic 
to the actual interactions within the 
system1 
-Difficulty capturing software errors or 
human behaviour3 
-Relies on mental models of system 
structure and expert judgement3 
-Static analysis with limited ability to 
analyze time or dynamic system 
behaviour3 
-Discrete component states for variables 
that may be continuous or have multiple 
states3 
1 Hartford and Baecher (2004) 
2 Lee et al. (1985) 
3 Thomas (2013) 
 
2.2.4 Event Tree Analysis 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) was originally developed for safety assessments of nuclear 
power plants in the United States in 1975 through the WASH-1400 study (IEC 2010; 
Thomas 2013). The original goal of the WASH-1400 study had been to develop a large 
and detailed fault tree of the system, but it was determined that this would be far too large 
to be practical. Event trees were conceived as a means of defining potential accident paths, 
where failures within the path could be further deconstructed using FTA (Thomas 2013). 
61 
 
Despite being developed for use alongside FTA, ETA has also been presented as a separate 
tool for analysis of system dependability (Skelton 1997; Rausand and Hoyland 2004; IEC 
2010).  
Rausand and Hoyland (2004) define ETA as an inductive technique that begins with a 
problem in the system (an initiating event), and proceeds to identify paths by which the 
problem may develop. ETA is similar to FTA in that it is a chain-of-events type analysis, 
but differs from FTA in that it starts with an event and proceeds forward to determine the 
possible outcomes (Thomas 2013). Event trees can be used to determine the probability of 
the possible outcomes resulting from an initiating event (IEC 2010). The International 
Electrotechnical Commission has published a standard detailing ETA which documents 
the steps in event tree development and quantitative assessment of outcome probabilities 
(IEC 2010). In ETA, mitigating factors are considered to be factors within the system that 
are intended to reduce the consequences of an initiating event. ETA then logically steps 
through each of these mitigating factors and determines what happens next when the factor 
either succeeds or fails to perform its intended function (Rausand and Hoyland 2004; IEC 
2010). The different steps of the event tree are called nodes, and their probability can be 
calculated using FTA, as originally intended by the developers in the WASH-1400 study 
(IEC 2010). The probabilities of each unique path in the event tree are then simply 
multiplied together to estimate the ultimate probability of the outcome.  
It is important to note that in an ETA, the initiating events are not determined through the 
analysis. Rather, the sequences of events and outcomes that could possibly result from an 
initiating event are determined and their probabilities are quantified (IEC 2010). In this 
way, ETA is not a standalone analysis tool (Thomas 2013). Initiating events may be 
determined using some other form of analysis. Rausand and Hoyland (2004) mention 
FMECA along with Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and hazard and operability 
analysis (HAZOP) as potential techniques to determine the initiating event. 
The first step in an ETA involves clearly defining the system of interest and its boundaries. 
Next, initiating events are selected and the mitigating factors required to prevent outcomes 
or accidents are determined and organized depending on their respective time of 
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intervention (IEC 2010). The success or failure of a mitigating factor determines the next 
step in the tree and in this way, sequences of events are defined. Each unique path through 
the tree represents a unique sequence of events. The probability of success or failure of 
each mitigating factor is multiplied together along with the initiating event’s probability, 
𝑃(𝐼𝐸) to determine the probability of the outcome (Rausand and Hoyland 2004). This is 
demonstrated using the simple example shown in Figure 2-6. 
 
Figure 2-6: Generic event tree with probability calculation 
The IEC standard specifies that overbars are used to indicate failed mitigating factors (IEC 
2010). For example, the probability of mitigating factor A failing is 𝑃(?̅?). The probability 
of success and failure are mutually exclusive. That is, 𝑃(𝐴) = 1 − 𝑃(?̅?). A success and a 
failure may not occur concurrently.  
In general, the ETA method is relatively easy to apply, and quantification uses 
straightforward mathematical concepts. It is a useful tool for visualization of event chains 
and can enable identification of outcomes that may not be generated using simple 
brainstorming (IEC 2010). With a complete set of initiating events, ETA provides a useful 
tool for depicting and analyzing potential system outcomes. Event trees are capable of 
improving the understanding of various failure modes and estimating the likelihoods of 
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failure of systems in general. They remain a widely used tool across many industries, 
including but not limited to hazardous processes (Ferdous et al. 2011; Villa and Cozzani 
2016), supply chain risk management (Tummala and Schoenherr 2011), infrastructure risk 
management (Ezell et al. 2000), and nuclear safety (Rychkov and Kawahara 2015). Many 
of the recent applications of ETA incorporate new techniques to deal with uncertainty in 
the probability estimates (Ferdous et al. 2011; Srivastava 2013) or dynamic behaviour 
(Bowles et al. 2011b; Rychkov and Kawahara 2015). 
Like all approaches, ETA is not without its limitations, and these are well documented 
within the applicable reference material. The approach is inherently reliant on practical 
experience and understanding of the system (IEC 2010). Thomas (2013) points out that 
because ETA starts with an initiating event and the functions in place to mitigate its 
consequences, preventative measures for the event itself can not be included in the analysis. 
Software has also been developed to address human factor considerations in event trees, 
however the decisions are typically either randomized or reduced to binary variables of 
success or failure (Thomas 2012). Thomas (2012) suggests that the mitigating factors in 
event trees are assumed to be independent of one another, when in reality this may not be 
the case. He cites the Three Mile Island and Fukushima nuclear incidents as an example of 
how seemingly independent issues may be caused by the same factors (Thomas 2013). 
Multi-state variables are unable to be modelled in event trees, despite being present in may 
complex systems (Villa and Cozzani 2016). Finally, Thomas (2013) states that ETA is 
fundamentally a failure-based method focusing on the propagation of component failures 
through the system. As such, an entire subset of potentially unsafe scenarios that do not 
involve failures at all may be impossible to assess through the use of ETA. Importantly, 
Hartford et al. (2016) suggests that the nature of ETA requires that events and their 
combinations must be identified at the outset. Because of this, the development of thorough 
and complete event trees is incredibly challenging since the number of physically possible 
conditions is so large. Further, consideration of time, feedbacks and nonlinear behaviour 
present additional challenges that are not obviously surmountable given the current state 
of the science (IEC 2010; Hartford et al. 2016).   
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Because of its relative simplicity for the analysis of complex systems, ETA has become a 
prominent tool in dam safety risk assessment since the mid 1980s (Whitman 1984; 
Stedinger et al. 1989; Bowles et al. 1999; Hill et al. 2001; Hill and Bowles 2003; Goodarzi 
2010). They are considered by many to be the next step in quantitative risk assessment after 
a PFMA, in particular by the American dam associations (FERC 2005b; Bowles et al. 
2011b; USACE 2011; USBR and USACE 2015b).  
In the dams industry, the approach is commonly paired with PFMA to further analyze and 
quantify chains of events (USBR and USACE 2015b). PFMA is used to come up with the 
initiating events and ETA is used to quantify the various potential outcomes. Figure 2-7 
(Hill et al. 2001) illustrates an event tree for a fictitious dam, showing how the event 
propagates through the system. Some event sequences are collapsed at the black nodes.  
 
Figure 2-7: Event tree examples (Hill et al. 2001) 
Whitman (1984) was one of the first authors to apply event trees in the dams domain, 
modelling the geotechnical aspects of dam safety with an event tree that progressed from 
embankment dam cracks through drain and filter states to either non-failure, piping failure 
or slope instability. The event tree is described as a very simplistic and generalized 
representation and interpretation of possible outcomes; however, it is thought by the author 
to give some structure to a process that would otherwise be very subjective. Similar, high 
level event tree examples from the early dam safety ETA literature are presented by Bowles 
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et al. (1987) and Yeigan (1991). Quantifying the probabilities of events in the event trees 
presents a major analytical challenge, so in early applications of risk analysis a verbal 
guideline or “Kent Chart” was used. Kent Charts were developed by Sherman Kent in the 
1960’s and were adopted by the CIA for a brief time to assign numerical probabilities to 
verbal descriptors (Hartford 2001). Vick (1992) presented one such chart for use within the 
dams domain. 
By the mid 1990’s and early 2000’s, a “de-compositional” approach to event trees began 
being used. In response to the subjectivity of the simplified approaches being utilized, BC 
Hydro began investigating the use of analytical techniques for estimating probabilities in 
event trees (Hartford 2001). Hartford (2001) presented a detailed event tree as part of the 
quantitative risk assessment for seismic events at Hugh Keenleyside dam in BC, noting 
that this was the first analytically based risk analysis of a dam performed to date. Analytical 
and numerical techniques were used in the quantification of failure probabilities instead of 
subjective judgement. Another early application of quantitative, analytical risk assessment 
from the late 1990’s was for the Hume Dam in Australia (McDonald and Wan 1999). By 
the late 1990’s both BC Hydro and the Australian engineers who performed the Hume Dam 
assessment had concluded that simplified risk analysis, using Kent Charts and high-level 
event trees, was not sufficient to provide conclusive evidence of a dam’s degree of safety 
or for use in dam safety decision making (Hartford 2001). 
In more recent years, the use of event tree analysis has become more widespread and 
computational tools have been developed to improve the degree of analysis that can be 
achieved. DAMRAE is an event tree software which improves the capabilities of event 
trees, allowing for (a) modelling of continuous variables (such as inflow or ground 
acceleration) and (b) modelling of deterministic relationships between variables, for 
example the reservoir stage-discharge relationship or the deformation function as a result 
of earthquake loading and initial conditions (Srivastava 2008, 2013; Srivastava et al. 2012). 
The DAMRAE software was able to overcome some of the issues with the earlier 
applications of event trees and provides a path forward for use of this technique in the 
future. It was developed for the USACE to be used in their dam safety risk management 
program and is included in USACE’s dam safety policy and procedures (Bowles et al. 
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2011a; USACE 2011). The DAMRAE software has since been applied in several 
applications (Bowles et al. 2010, 2011a, b, 2015). Srivastava (2013) includes a detailed 
description of DAMRAE and uses an example system to show how it can be used to test 
various risk-reduction alternatives.  
A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of ETA is presented in Table 2-6. Regan 
(2010) has identified examples of dam failures, including Teton and Taum Sauk, in which 
nonlinear behavior was observed, noting that event trees are too simplistic to anticipate the 
complex interactions occurring within various levels of a dam system. This echoes the 
general conclusions made by Thomas (2012) with respect to accidents in the nuclear and 
aerospace domain. Zhang et al. (2011) note that ETA may not be suitable for analysis when 
there are multiple initiating events. Dam systems involve dynamic, interacting components 
with time-varying inputs. These result in a time-dependent evolution of events, which the 
IEC (2010) identifies as another limitation of ETA. The development of more advanced 
software overcomes some of these limitations, however it remains challenging to include 
timing in event tree analysis (Hartford et al. 2016). Because of this, ETA has limited 
applicability for dam safety applications in which reservoir response to disturbances 
occurring over time is a specific goal. Despite these limitations, it remains a useful tool for 
envisioning and understanding general possibilities for event propagation through complex 
systems.  
  
67 
 
Table 2-6: Advantages and disadvantages of ETA 
Advantages Disadvantages 
-Logical and visual method for displaying 
sequences of events1 
-Very efficient way to estimate the 
probability of failure as a result of an 
initiating event1 
 
 
-Failure-based method that can miss 
unsafe scenarios caused by interactions or 
non-failures2 
-Static analysis of a one-way chain-of-
events with limited ability to analyze 
feedbacks, time or dynamic system 
behaviour2 
-Difficulty capturing software errors or 
human behaviour2 
-Discrete component states for variables 
that may be continuous or have multiple 
possible states2 
-Difficult to assess common-cause 
failures2 
1 Hartford and Baecher (2004) 
2 Thomas (2013) 
2.2.5 Additional methods 
The following sections provide a brief overview of some additional methods that may be 
used in system safety assessment.    
2.2.5.1 Dependence Diagrams (DD) 
Dependence Diagrams (DD) are described by SAE (1996) as “pictorial representation[s] 
of combinations of failures for the purpose of probability analysis”. DD’s may also be 
referred to as Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD). The DD shows the same logic as a fault 
tree using either serial or parallel arrangements of boxes (faults), showing the different 
paths that could lead to a top event (failure condition). The fault event links represent AND 
events when organized in parallel and OR events when organized in series. The setup and 
mathematical formulation are demonstrated using a very simple example shown in Figure 
2-8.  
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Figure 2-8: Dependence Diagram example 
DDs may become very complex, and it may be possible for multiple instances of the same 
fault to appear in different paths within the diagram (SAE 1996). These represent the 
common cause failures. Like in FTA, Boolean Algebra and Boolean reduction may be 
required to ensure probabilities are correctly combined (SAE 1996). A variety of different 
box types may be used to illustrate different types of failure events. DDs (or RBDs) and 
fault trees achieve the same goal, and they require the same inputs and knowledge of the 
system. DDs are particularly useful for showing redundancy, which may not be as 
obviously visible in a fault tree.  They are also subject to the same limitations as described 
in the discussions regarding FTA. 
2.2.5.2 Bayesian Networks (BN) 
Bayesian Networks (BN) are becoming more widely used in risk analysis across a variety 
of industries. They are probabilistic, graphical models of the dependencies between 
different variables within a system (Villa and Cozzani 2016). The variables of the system 
are represented using nodes, and the dependence between them is represented using arrows. 
Each node or variable can be represented by a number of states – these can include 
failed/working, true/false, or various literal descriptors or numerical values (Smith 2006). 
Probabilistic calculations can proceed based on the diagram using Bayes theorem of 
relationships among conditional probabilities, which states that:  
𝑃(𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒|𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) =
𝑃(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒) ∗ 𝑃(𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒)
𝑃(𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒)
 
Figure 2-9 contains a simple example of a BN, with the corresponding probability 
calculations shown (Hartford and Baecher 2004). As the number of variables (nodes) 
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increases in a BN, the calculation of the probability of the final state becomes increasingly 
complex.  
 
Figure 2-9: Simple Bayesian network example 
BNs are capable of dealing with multi-state variables and conditional dependencies which 
gives them an advantage over other chain-of-event style models like FTA and ETA (Villa 
and Cozzani 2016; El-Awady 2019). Villa and Cozzani (2016) notes that ETA and FTA 
can be used as a starting point for development of a BN, and presents a software capable 
of performing the transformation.  
Zhang et al. (2011) applied BN to determine probability of overtopping or internal erosion 
failures of embankment dams using data available from an embankment dam distress 
database. The networks developed had a number of different components of the dam and 
their potential states were either yes/no or a literal descriptor such as satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory. The goal of the analysis was to determine the probability of failure and 
sensitivity analyses were performed to determine the most important factors that 
contributed to the failure modes in consideration (Zhang et al. 2011). Smith (2006) 
developed a BN for a dam, considering internal erosion and overtopping failure modes. 
The model developed included variables for precipitation and reservoir level, though it is 
unclear how these were modelled and whether the approach developed is capable of 
determining the reservoir level with respect to time. El-Awady (2019) used simulation 
supported BN to improve the ability of the BN approach to model feedback behaviour. The 
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approach presented is able to model sub-BN’s of particular components in more detail than 
previous applications. Contributors to failure were identified for case studies within the 
nuclear and hydropower industries. The approach is promising for determining system 
vulnerabilities and estimates of probability given limited information. Despite the advances 
offered by the recent applications of BN, the approach may not be well suited to determine 
the reservoir elevation (and the values of other variables) with respect to time. 
 
2.2.5.3 Markov Analysis (MA) 
Markov Analysis (MA) is another widely-used failure-based method for assessment of 
system safety and probability of failure. Markov models (also known as Markov chains) 
are useful for representing the different system states and the relationships between them 
over time. In Markov models, the transitions between different states are represented by 
the rates of failure of the different components. The key property of Markov models is that 
future system states depend only on the current system state, regardless of what led to the 
current state (SAE 1996). Markov models can be used to represent series systems, parallel 
systems, and systems which are able to recover and repair themselves.   
MA is able to handle common cause failures and interactions in ways that are more 
challenging using FTA and DD’s. They are also able to handle a wider range of system 
behaviours (SAE 1996). The size of the Markov model grows exponentially in relation to 
the number of components, which can make MA an extremely complex process.  
 
2.3 Systems approach to safety 
 
The research of Leveson (2011) and Thomas (2012) provide an excellent overview of the 
limitations associated with the risk-based approaches described in the previous sections. 
One of the key issues mentioned is that the commonly used techniques focus on failures, 
which means an entire sub-set of potentially unsafe scenarios may be missing in the 
analysis. Additionally, the authors state that these traditional risk analysis techniques are 
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unable to effectively deal with software issues as well as human error and judgement. 
Commonly used risk analysis tools are often static and/or linear, and as such the ability to 
determine potentially unsafe scenarios arising from interaction and feedback is limited. 
Analysis of common cause failures also presents some challenges. Based on these 
limitations, a systems approach to safety engineering has emerged within the aerospace 
industry (Leveson 1995, 2011; Leveson et al. 2003), and it is beginning to be recognized 
and applied in other industries, including nuclear (Song 2012; Thomas 2012), automotive 
(Vernacchia 2018), railway (France et al. 2018b), software (Pope and Breneman 2018) and 
dams (Dusil and To 2016; To et al. 2018). 
Leveson (2011) utilizes control systems theory to assess several accidents. Many of the 
examples deal with aerospace and aviation, however examples from other high-profile 
accidents such as the Walkerton drinking water incident and the Titanic disaster are also 
provided. Analysis of these accidents led to the development of two generic tools that use 
a control systems approach to the analyze system safety. The first is Systems Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), which was developed for post-accident 
assessments. The second, Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), stems from the 
STAMP technique and was developed for analysis of existing control systems or systems 
in the design phase.  STPA is a systematic process for brainstorming potential control flaws 
of control systems.  
Prior to initiating STPA, the hierarchical control system structure for the system of interest 
should be developed and the hazards for the system should be defined. This is often done 
using a flow chart, showing the interactions among elements at different levels of the 
system. Four general categories of unsafe control actions are provided (Leveson 2011; 
Thomas 2013): 
(1) A required control action not provided or not followed 
(2) Unsafe control action is provided that leads to a hazard 
(3) A required control action is provided either too late, too early or out of sequence 
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(4) A required control action is not applied for the wrong amount of time (either applied 
too long or stopped too soon).  
The first step of STPA is to define unsafe control actions for each of the controls in the 
system of interest. The control actions can be documented using a table such as the example 
shown in Table 2-7. For each control action identified, the analysts will describe how the 
situation would unfold and what hazard it could lead to. There may be multiple descriptions 
under each column for each control action, pertaining to different situations that could lead 
to a particular unsafe control action being applied and the resultant effects it would have. 
The second step is to take each of the identified unsafe control actions and identify its 
causal factors. This is done by using the hierarchical system structure as a guide and 
looking at the control loop. Investigating the control loop with respect to each unsafe 
control action can help identify how an unsafe control action might occur – for example, 
due to incorrect information, a faulty process model or a failed component.  
Table 2-7: STPA example table documenting potentially hazardous control actions 
Control action (1) Not 
provided 
(2) Not 
followed 
(3) Initiated at 
the wrong time 
(4) Applied for 
the wrong 
amount of time 
Control action 1 … … … … 
 
The result of the STPA analysis is a detailed list of what might cause hazards within the 
system and why. Unlike failure-based methods used in traditional risk assessment, STPA 
is able to identify non-failure causes of hazards for a system, which makes it a very 
promising tool for system safety assessment. The approach also does not attempt to 
estimate probabilities of different outcomes, instead aiming to identify them so they can be 
addressed or eliminated.  
Thomas (2012) advocates the use of Leveson’s (2011) tools and presents a methodology 
for automating the identification of hazards using Leveson’s (2011) Systems Theoretic 
Process Analysis (STPA) model, mainly focusing on potential applications in the nuclear 
industry. Song (2012) applied the STPA procedure to a specific process at the Darlington 
Nuclear facility in Ontario, Canada, finding that this procedure enhanced the ability to 
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identify potentially hazardous conditions at the system level. BC Hydro has recently 
applied STPA for analysis of dam systems in two applications, the results of which are 
described by Dusil and To (2016) and To and Dusil (2018). The researchers found that the 
STPA approach is able to identify vulnerabilities which may be overlooked using 
conventional risk assessment techniques used for dam safety. It was noted that STPA may 
not be able to replace existing techniques, but it does provide useful and complimentary 
insights (Dusil and To 2016).  
There are two key limitations of STPA as it pertains to the analysis of dam systems. The 
first is the natural variability within which the infrastructure is operating and may be 
attempting to control (inflows, earthquakes, debris build up, ice, etc.). It is not possible to 
use STPA to determine at what inflow a potentially unsafe situation would become an 
accident or determine reservoir level response to a set of inflows and operating conditions. 
The second limitation is that dam systems have components which control the system in a 
passive way, and STPA was designed for analysis of actively controlled systems. In a dam 
system, the dams are passively retaining water and the free overflow spillway passively 
conveys water. Identifying issues that could arise with these passive system components is 
not possible using STPA. Despite these limitations, STPA does offer a promising tool for 
addressing issues relating to software and human factors as well as non-failure related 
causes of potential hazards. 
Another systems technique that is becoming more widely used in dam safety applications 
is simulation. Simulation is a “what if” assessment approach that describes how the system 
responds to different inputs (Simonovic 2009). A simulation model describes the 
relationships and interactions between different components within a system, and it can be 
as detailed as is necessary to achieve its desired purpose. Simulation models contain 
numerical representations of physical and nonphysical relationships within the system, and 
may have some type of operating rules in place to determine how controls are applied 
(Simonovic 2009). Simulation results include a set of outputs, which are the values of the 
different variables of the system over time. Analysts can experiment with various inputs to 
determine how the outputs change. The two most common simulation techniques are 
deterministic and stochastic. In deterministic simulation, a specific set of inputs generates 
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a specific set of outputs, and multiple runs of the model will always produce the same 
results. In stochastic simulation, inputs or internal processes of the model may be randomly 
generated using Monte Carlo techniques. This means that two simulation runs with the 
same input parameters will produce different results. 
Simulation is particularly suited to the problem of dam safety (Hartford et al. 2016). It 
allows for interactive and dynamic behaviour to be modelled, which is important when 
considering the different types of both physical and non-physical components in dam 
systems. Simulation is capable of determining how the system state changes over time 
(Simonovic 2009), and as such it is the only tool described in this literature review that is 
capable of directly calculating the reservoir level response to various operating scenarios. 
Dam system behaviour is highly dependent on the inflows, the initial system state, the 
states of operating equipment and many other factors – experimenting with these factors 
through simulation is perhaps the most straightforward way to determine the system 
response. Simulation allows for an investigation into the emergent behaviour of systems, 
which results from complex interactions between components and events, and may be 
difficult to envision by analysing components or sub-systems individually. By modelling 
the whole system at a sufficient level of detail, the feedbacks and relationships that may 
lead to emergent behaviour can be incorporated into the model structure.  
The potential benefits of simulation and the systems approach in general are becoming 
recognized within the dams industry. Regan (2010), Baecher (2013), Komey et al., (2015), 
Micovic et al. (2015), and Hartford et al. (2016) all advocate for the consideration of dams 
as systems. Baecher et al. (2013) present a stochastic simulation methodology framework 
for dam safety flow control analysis. Hartford et al. (2016) present two examples that 
utilize a systems approach embedded within a stochastic simulation to determine the 
likelihood of failures for dam systems. One of the examples described by Hartford et al. 
(2016) and developed by Komey (2014; 2015) involves stochastic simulation of 
hydropower dam response to disturbances such as ice, debris, and human intervention on 
the Mattagami River System in Ontario, Canada. The approach utilizes the GoldSim 
Monte-Carlo modelling platform to determine various impacts these disturbances may 
have on safe operation of the system (Komey 2014; Hartford et al. 2016). A probabilistic 
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framework is used to model disturbances such as ice and debris, with fragility curves and 
simple failure rates defined to determine the probability of gate or turbine failure, and 
gamma distributions to determine time to repair (Komey 2014; Hartford et al. 2016). 
(Zielinski et al. 2016) use a similar approach to Komey (2014; 2015) to assess the safety 
of the Madawaska River System in Ontario, Canada, using a 10,000 year continuous 
simulation to estimate the probability of failure for each dam in the system. Another 
example described by Hartford et al. (2016) involves a system dynamics model of the Göta 
River System in Sweden, with the system built up in layers of increasing complexity. The 
model can be run in either stochastic or deterministic mode and is used to investigate 
system response to sea level fluctuations, landslides and climate change. 
These probability-driven stochastic model examples help address many of the 
shortcomings of traditional risk assessment approaches. Dynamic, nonlinear behaviour can 
be captured by these models and they can be developed to be as complex as necessary to 
more realistically represent the system of interest. One limitation of the stochastic 
simulation approach is that it requires a very large number of simulation years in order to 
assess combinations of component operating states that have a very low probability of 
occurring together. There is no way of assuring the modeller that a complete set of possible 
operating states has been captured in the simulation. The operating state combinations that 
arise from a stochastic simulation model will differ between two different runs of a 
simulation with the same inputs. Beyond some certain limit, if the stochastic simulation is 
run for long enough, there would be a complete set of possible operating scenarios. 
However, there would be a significant amount of time and resources spent simulating 
conditions where nothing is wrong with the system. Given the large number of potential 
combinations of operating states and current computational abilities, a full assessment of 
all scenarios using stochastic techniques is not currently possible. Despite these limitations, 
the work of Zielinski et al. (2016) and Komey (2014, 2015) provide a good indication that 
a shift in focus is required from extreme events to events occurring within the design 
envelope that might actually contribute more to the overall system risk.  
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2.4 Summary 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, a number of tools were presented that are 
commonly used within the dams industry to analyze system risk. A description of the 
advantages and limitations of each approach was provided. Ultimately, the more commonly 
applied techniques in risk analysis have served the dams community well. Hartford et al. 
(2016) suggest that the risk based approach has significantly improved the understanding 
of dam safety in a number of ways. These include facilitating analysis of less easily 
analyzed failure modes such as internal erosion, highlighting the importance of analyzing 
human factors, and indicating that the extreme events required for dam design may not be 
the most significant contributors to risk. There are, however, limitations to the most 
commonly applied techniques. It would be extremely challenging using these approaches 
to analyze the combinatorically large number of possible events that may possible occur. 
Interactions and feedbacks are typically simplified or omitted using the traditional 
techniques, meaning dynamic behaviour cannot be effectively analyzed. Many issues arise 
when dealing with human factors, software errors and design flaws. Analysis of time-
considerations is also beyond the scope of applicability of these existing approaches. 
Finally, many existing approaches omit further consideration of certain combinations of 
events which have a low combined probability – despite there being enough of these 
combinations to add up to a significant risk to the system. The following paragraphs detail 
the main conclusions from the assessment of current practices in risk analysis.  
FMEA is a tool for determining how components of a system can fail and what their causes 
and effects will be. The effects of failures at one level of the system can be determined on 
the next level up until the entire system is analyzed. This approach is a useful tool for 
brainstorming and determining potential disturbances which create the constraints within 
which the system may operate. However, FMEA is a failure-based method that may miss 
a sub-set of potentially unsafe scenarios that are not triggered by failures. It is not able to 
systematically determine combinations of constraints that could be encountered in system 
operation. It is also unable to determine and quantify the reservoir level response and has 
presented some challenges when dealing with complexity, feedback and interaction within 
77 
 
hierarchical systems (the IEC standard on FMEA states that limiting analysis to a 
maximum of two levels of hierarchy is good practice). 
PFMA is a useful tool for looking at systems as a whole and brainstorming potential failure 
modes which could develop at the system level. However, it is a completely heuristic 
approach, and does not explicitly involve analysis of various levels of a hierarchical system 
or the interactions between the levels. It does not facilitate quantification of system 
behaviour and may miss certain components which are considered to be of less importance 
to the analysts due to perceived low consequence or likelihood. It has the same limitations 
as FMEA and relies more heavily on expert judgement and subjectivity. 
ETA and FTA are both very practical tools for quantitative probabilistic assessment of 
failures and their impacts. However, these approaches are failure-based, linearize the 
progression of events and are unable to easily deal with feedback and nonlinear 
interactions. ETA and FTA also begin with initiating events, and top events (faults), 
respectively, which must be predetermined in some way. There is a very serious challenge 
using these approaches in analyzing combinations of events, of which there may be an 
extremely large number of possibilities. This is not a challenge that will be easily overcome 
given the current state of the science. Finally, these approaches are not able to determine 
the reservoir level response to various operating conditions due to their inability to analyze 
component interactions and feedback behaviour.  
Ultimately, the existing approaches, while useful, may not be adequate to capture the 
dynamic behaviour of complex, interacting hierarchical systems. Because of the 
recognized limitations, a systems approach has begun to emerge, and is beginning to gain 
some momentum within the dams industry for analysis of system safety (Hartford et al. 
2016). STPA is an excellent tool for analyzing potential control flaws in complex, actively 
controlled systems. The key limitations of STPA that pertain to the analysis of dam systems 
are that (a) dam systems may have many safety-critical components that provide passive 
control, and (b) dam systems are acting to control natural inflows, so determining the 
dynamic system response to the inflows is necessary to get a complete picture of system 
safety. STPA is unable to determine the reservoir level response to various conditions. 
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Nevertheless, STPA does provide a good starting point for the assessment of the actively 
controlled components of a dam system. It provides very useful information for 
determining potential system operating constraints (scenarios) for actively controlled 
components in a systematic way and includes both failures and non-failures.  
Simulation is another tool that can be used in the systems approach, and it is becoming 
more commonly applied within the dams industry for safety analysis. Hartford et al. (2016) 
focuses on several applications of stochastic simulation. In stochastic simulation, random 
failures of components may be initiated (with random outage lengths) to determine the 
overall probability of failure for the system. In this way, each run of a stochastic simulation 
model would produce a different output. If run for enough years, the probability of failure 
would begin to converge on a single value. The approach is becoming more widely applied 
for dam safety analysis (Komey 2014; Komey et al. 2015; Hartford et al. 2016). Stochastic 
simulation addresses more of the research requirements described previously than other 
safety assessment approaches for dam systems. Stochastic simulation can capture dynamic 
feedback relationships between system components if the system is modelled in adequate 
detail. Simulation outputs for a dam system can include the reservoir level fluctuations in 
response to various inflows and constraints, which makes simulation a particularly 
promising tool for dam safety analysis. It is also possible to assess potential “combinations 
of events” using stochastic simulation, though the ability to do so is limited by the length 
of the run (computing power). Because the probabilities applied to the events (equipment 
states) are relatively low, multiple events occurring and impacting one another are very 
rare within a stochastic simulation if not run for enough years. In theory, stochastic 
simulations run for enough simulation-years would eventually cover all of the possibilities, 
however the computational requirements to achieve a complete coverage of the 
possibilities would be beyond current capabilities. As such, the existing implementations 
of stochastic simulation may not be able to capture a complete set of possible combinations 
of component operating states at the current time. Stochastic simulation has the benefit of 
easily estimating the overall probability of flow control failure of a system, though the 
assessment of criticality for specific scenarios would require the use of data mining 
techniques as well as extremely large number of simulation-years. Some of the current 
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limitations associated with a purely stochastic approach can be demonstrated using a 
simple example.  
Consider a system with five components, A, B, C, D and E. Assuming each component is 
either functioning or failed, there are 25=32 potential combinations of failures as follows 
(normal component states are not shown): 
No failures, A, B, C, D, E, AB, AC, AD, AE, BC, BD, BE, CD, CE, DE, ABC, ABD, ABE, 
ACD, ACE, ADE, BCD, BCE, BDE, CDE, ABCD, ABCE, ABDE, ACDE, BCDE, 
ABCDE. 
For this example, assume that the goal of the stochastic simulation is to generate all possible 
combinations of the component operating states at least once. Assuming that the probability 
of failure for each component is 0.1% per day, and the model is run for as many years as 
necessary at a daily time step until each combination has been simulated at least once, the 
number of years required to arrive at each combination is shown in Table 2-8, which also 
shows the corresponding number of years within which each combination was simulated.  
Obviously, the combinations (scenarios) with less failures have a higher probability and 
are simulated more frequently than the combinations with a higher number of failures. It is 
also worth noting the high number of non-failure years simulated. Averaging over 50 total 
runs, the simulation spends about 25% of its time simulating non-failure years. This 
number is dependent on the assumed failure rates and will increase as the assumed failure 
rates decrease. The amount of effort spent simulating each scenario is a function of its 
probability, so some of the worse scenarios are focused on less because of their low 
likelihood. About half of the possible scenarios (the lower, less probable part of the list) 
are simulated less than 40 times, which means the simulation focuses less than ~0.5% of 
the simulation effort on those scenarios. A very large number of simulation-years would 
be required to collect enough data with which to assess the criticality of these more severe 
and less likely combinations of operating states. 
A volumetric representation of the system’s “possibility space” is another useful way of 
demonstrating how stochastic simulation samples different events. The “possibility space”  
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Table 2-8: Stochastic simulation of operating state combinations 
Combination 
Run 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
A 1007 485 319 685 1152 667 328 310 498 202 
B 922 479 316 674 1132 624 341 313 517 176 
C 952 475 312 649 1191 684 349 289 510 191 
D 955 462 293 701 1149 625 324 299 508 180 
E 984 462 266 683 1183 668 362 295 518 198 
AB 192 91 58 125 219 130 57 58 87 40 
AC 205 95 55 130 192 138 86 68 104 35 
AD 183 77 43 131 212 144 60 49 103 32 
AE 172 97 56 128 263 107 72 61 98 40 
BC 195 111 61 142 233 118 69 56 105 30 
BD 185 95 56 143 225 124 59 59 88 38 
BE 184 93 67 126 221 139 68 55 103 32 
CD 190 84 65 129 252 145 57 60 112 50 
CE 198 92 68 135 218 133 66 57 110 43 
DE 188 87 54 135 233 139 77 51 102 42 
ABC 36 24 9 29 40 25 11 9 24 7 
ABD 46 24 7 27 44 26 18 12 22 8 
ABE 34 20 12 24 54 22 11 20 15 8 
ACD 45 19 9 25 43 26 14 8 26 6 
ACE 31 21 12 36 50 21 13 12 20 6 
ADE 30 18 7 24 39 28 15 8 16 9 
BCD 44 14 19 29 36 25 11 14 22 6 
BCE 34 13 12 29 49 23 14 10 20 9 
BDE 25 20 9 16 51 29 12 14 25 8 
CDE 39 13 9 15 59 26 14 15 31 7 
ABCD 7 3 2 2 6 2 2 1 2 2 
ABCE 4 7 3 3 5 6 3 3 3 2 
ABDE 10 6 6 7 9 7 1 2 7 1 
ACDE 8 2 3 6 3 10 5 5 4 2 
BCDE 5 2 1 6 14 5 1 1 5 2 
ABCDE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total number of 
failures simulated 7111 3492 2210 4995 8578 4867 2521 2215 3806 1413 
Total number of 
non-failures 
simulated 4814 2428 1483 3433 5801 3206 1719 1597 2506 968 
Total 11925 5920 3693 8428 14379 8073 4240 3812 6312 2381 
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is a visual representation of the full realm of physically possible system states and their 
frequency of occurrence. In Figure 2-10 (King and Simonovic, 2020), the frequency, 𝐹𝑁 of 
𝑁 components in an adverse operating state (𝑁𝑈) is plotted against the frequency, 𝐹𝐷 of 
outage durations 𝐷𝑈. Simple FN relationships are assumed and a 3-dimensional possibility 
space is created. The planes of adverse component operating states are represented using 
red, orange, green, blue and purple outlined areas. It is important to note that this possibility 
space is a very simplified representation of the problem – the possibility space would also 
include inflows, starting reservoir elevations and timing of component outages. 
Nevertheless, using this simplified example figure, the stochastic samples can be plotted 
(shown as black dots). Each dot represents one sample that could be stochastically 
generated. The dots are centred around zero component outages, which have a higher 
frequency, zero components out of service and zero outage length. While the samples do 
extend into the outer reaches of the possibility space, they provide the best coverage of the 
higher-frequency scenarios (zero to one components unavailable). The coverage of the less 
probable, more extreme scenarios (where more components are out of service) is limited 
by the number of years for which the simulation is run. In a stochastic simulation, this 
volume is predefined, since the components, their outage frequency and their outage length 
frequency are inputs to the model. 
In conclusion, neither the more commonly used risk assessment approaches or the existing 
techniques utilized from the systems approach are currently capable of systematic and 
dynamic evaluation of the combinations of events that can lead to flow control failure in 
dam systems. A new methodology is required, building on the existing tools from the 
systems approach to define, analyze and evaluate a more complete range of potential 
combinations of events (scenarios). The approach must be able to handle complexity, 
feedback and nonlinear behaviour. Dynamic indicators of the system performance are a 
required output of the analysis, as well as parameters that can be used to rank the relative 
importance of a large number of potential scenarios.  
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Figure 2-10: Stochastic sampling from within the possibility space 
 
83 
 
Chapter 3  
3 Methodology 
In this chapter, an improved methodology for assessment of flow control in dam safety is 
developed. The methodology draws on the benefits of existing approaches where possible, 
making improvements that can facilitate a more thorough understanding of system 
response to a more complete set of scenarios. The next section describes the methodology 
justification and development, followed by a complete description of the methodology 
steps.  
3.1 Justification and development 
A dam system is fundamentally an open control system. It is forced by inputs (inflows) 
which vary with time in a relatively predictable way. Dam system outputs (outflows, 
energy, etc.) are also constrained in relatively predictable ways, but random deviations 
within the system may occur that affect the system outputs. For example, a spillway gate 
can open or close to release the desired amount of flow downstream, but failure of 
infrastructure which supports the gate function can cause the output constraints to deviate 
from their normal values. There is a need within the dams industry to better understand 
how dam system outputs may be constrained and what possible system outcomes may 
result. Specifically, determining the reservoir level and outflow response to the full range 
of possible operating constraints is an important goal that can help dam owners better 
understand vulnerabilities within the system and determine appropriate courses of action 
to address them. Using the control system structure presented by Leveson (2011) and 
modified for a dam system, a basic mathematical framework can be developed for 
calculation of the reservoir storage over time (which is directly related to the elevation 
through a stage-storage curve). This is shown in Figure 3-1. The boundaries of the system 
are the point at which the inflows enter the reservoir and the point at which the outflows 
leave the dam. Included in the system is all of the infrastructure at the dam site, including 
dams, gates, gate actuators, sensors as well as information relay, processing, operational 
decision making and implementation of operations (which may take place off site).  
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Figure 3-1: Mathematical framework for determining dam system behaviour 
The control loop shows how information is passed through the system and what the main 
connections are between different sectors (feedbacks). The relationships between Storage, 
Inflow and Release are easily represented by basic mathematical equations and rule curves 
for decision making with respect to controlled flow releases. This type of modelling is done 
frequently for operations planning and analysis of dam systems. The area where more work 
is needed is in determining constraints that come into play in several sectors of the system 
and may impact measured system state values, operational decisions, operability of 
equipment and capacity of water passages. The goal of this research is (a) systematically 
defining these operating conditions and (b) understanding how they may adversely impact 
the system state and outputs. A new approach is necessary with the following goals: 
• Reduced reliance on subjectivity and expert judgement. 
• Ability to determine potential constraints on system operation.  
• Ability to determine potential constraints that are not limited to failure modes.  
• Automatic generation of potential combinations of constraints.  
• Determine the likelihood of constraints without significant simplifying 
assumptions.  
• Quantification of the dynamic system response to constraints. Specifically, how the 
reservoir level and outflows change with time for a given set of constraints 
(component operating states), constraint parameters and inflows. 
85 
 
• Inclusion of feedbacks, interactions and nonlinear behaviour. 
• Ability to deal with system complexity without the use of extreme simplifications 
that undermine the results. 
• Ability to deal with uncertainty in the outcomes. 
• Estimation of criticality for a given scenario. 
• Estimation of overall probability of flow control failure for the system. 
Table 3-1 contains a list of the main approaches discussed in the literature review, 
evaluating them within the context of these research goals based on the observations in the 
previous chapter. It is important to note that many of these tools may not be utilized 
independently. The results of FMEA, for example, can be used as inputs to FTA or ETA. 
Combining the tools may result in improved ability to achieve these research goals, 
however the key limitations remain for the majority: an inability to model dynamic system 
behaviour, complexity, feedback and interaction. The most promising tool in terms of the 
aforementioned research requirements is the stochastic simulation approach, described in 
detail by Hartford et al. (2016). The key limitation of the stochastic simulation is that it 
spends a significant amount of effort simulating non-failures, and as such may not be an 
efficient means of systematic evaluation of each possible combination of events. The 
methodology proposed in this work seeks to determine (a) what the possible combinations 
of events are, (b) what their range of impacts might be and (c) what their relative 
importance (criticality) is, with respect to other scenarios. 
Systematic analysis of each possible scenario, in theory, may be achieved using a 
completely deterministic simulation of predefined scenarios. However, the timing of the 
scenario’s predetermined adverse operating states (events) and determining whether events 
influence one another significantly complicates the analysis. To completely and 
deterministically analyze the full range of possible outcomes of a single scenario, all 
possible combinations of event timing and inflows should be considered. Consider an 
example scenario with three events, A, B, and C, and 10,000 years of possible daily inflow 
values (this number of inflow-years is selected, in theory, to include inflows up to the PMF 
which has an annual exceedance frequency of 1 in 10,000 years). There are a total of 365 ∗
10,000 = 3,650,000 possible inflow start days. Assuming the events can happen any time  
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Table 3-1: Overview of approaches and their applicability to the research problem 
Requirement FMEA PFMA ETA FTA STPA 
Stochastic 
Simulation 
Reduced 
subjectivity 
Slightly 
(systematic 
process) 
No (fully 
heuristic) 
No No 
Slightly 
(systematic 
process) 
Slightly (simulation 
model 
automatically 
determine system 
outcomes) 
Determine 
constraints on 
system 
operation 
Yes Yes 
No – 
Requires this 
upfront 
No – 
Requires this 
upfront 
Yes 
No – Requires this 
upfront 
Ability to 
address non-
failure related 
constraints  
No – 
Failure 
based 
method 
No – 
Failure 
based 
method 
No – Failure 
based 
method 
No – Failure 
based 
method 
Yes 
Yes – If non-
failures included in 
potential constraints 
Automatically 
determine 
potential 
combinations of 
constraints 
(scenarios) 
No No No No Yes No 
Determine 
likelihood of 
constraints 
without 
significant 
simplifying 
assumptions 
No No No No No No 
Quantification 
of dynamic 
system response  
No – Static 
analysis 
No – 
Static 
analysis 
No – Linear 
chain-of-
events 
No – Linear 
chain-of-
events 
No – Static 
analysis 
Yes – Dynamic 
analysis 
Inclusion of 
feedbacks and 
nonlinear 
behaviour 
No – Static 
analysis  
No – 
Static 
analysis  
No – Linear 
chain-of-
events 
No – Linear 
chain-of-
events 
Includes 
feedbacks 
but does not 
analyze 
system 
behaviour 
Yes – Dynamic 
analysis that can 
include feedbacks 
and nonlinear 
behaviour 
Ability to 
handle 
complexity 
Somewhat, 
can pose 
challenges  
Somewhat, 
can pose 
challenges 
Somewhat, 
can pose 
challenges 
Somewhat, 
can pose 
challenges 
Yes Yes 
Assessment of 
uncertainty in 
the outcomes of 
a scenario 
No – Does 
not 
analyze 
scenario 
outcomes 
No – Does 
not 
analyze 
scenario 
outcomes 
Yes – Can 
experiment 
with 
assumptions 
Yes – Can 
experiment 
with 
assumptions 
No – Does 
not analyze 
scenario 
outcomes 
Not directly – 
Could potentially 
assess specific 
scenarios using data 
mining 
Ability to deal 
with common 
cause failures 
Limited to 
qualitative 
only 
Limited to 
qualitative 
only 
Limited – 
requires 
careful 
consideration 
Limited – 
requires 
careful 
consideration 
Yes Yes 
Estimation of 
scenario's 
criticality 
No – Static 
analysis 
No – 
Static 
analysis 
Yes  Yes  
No – STPA 
is generally 
qualitative 
Not directly – 
Could potentially 
assess specific 
scenarios using data 
mining 
Estimation of 
overall system 
flow control 
failure 
probability 
No – Static 
analysis 
No – 
Static 
analysis 
Yes, if all 
possible 
combinations 
included 
Yes, if all 
possible 
combinations 
included 
No – STPA 
does not 
involve 
probabilistic 
assessment 
Yes 
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within a one-year window, there are a total of 365 ∗ 365 ∗ 365 = 48,627,125 possible 
combinations of event initiation times (the day in which the adverse operating state begins). 
This means 3,650,000 ∗ 48,627,125 = 1.77 × 1014 possible ways to execute the 
simulation for a single scenario with three events occurring. This number considers only 
one set of possible impacts for event A, B, and C, which may have impacts (for example, 
outage lengths), that can significantly vary. Clearly, the number of combinations and 
scenarios that must be analyzed to fully define the suite of potential outcomes for a system 
becomes computationally prohibitive, even with state-of-the-art computing technology 
such as cluster computing. Monte Carlo selection of event timing and inflow start day from 
s synthetically generated inflow record can be useful to sample a small number of these 
possibilities and dynamically characterize some of the possible outcomes for a given 
scenario. Each predetermined scenario can be simulated through a number of Monte Carlo 
iterations to better understand the possible range of outcomes resulting from that scenario. 
This is the hybrid Deterministic Monte Carlo approach proposed in this research, where 
events (component operating states) are pre-selected and their impacts, timing and inflows 
are varied to better understand the possibilities within current computational capabilities. 
The scenario inputs represent the deterministic portion of the model, and the varying of 
scenario parameters represents the Monte Carlo portion of the model. 
The approach presented in this thesis aims to provide a more even coverage of the 
possibility space, as shown in Figure 3-2 (King and Simonovic, 2020). The sample dots 
are color coded, to indicate which “adverse component operating state plane” the samples 
are taken from. The Deterministic Monte Carlo approach forces the simulation to take 
samples from within each plane, because it does not rely on the frequencies of failure and 
duration to generate the samples. Each plane represents a single scenario, and the scenarios 
are predetermined and simulated regardless of their likelihood. For the Deterministic 
Monte Carlo approach, only a single sample would be taken to represent “normal” 
conditions. In the proposed approach, the frequencies of the component outages and outage 
lengths are not required to run the model, so the frequency dimension of the possibility 
space is not defined. If enough information is available to define these frequencies, a 
complete probabilistic analysis using the results of the analysis is possible.  
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Figure 3-2: Deterministic Monte Carlo sampling from within the possibility space 
Another key timing related issue that must be considered is the problem of whether 
preceding events are influencing the results of subsequent events. Such considerations arise 
when a component failure has been rectified, but the overall system remains in a “disturbed 
state”, that is, the system has not been restored to the state that it would have been in if the 
component failure had not occurred.  This means that the “system state deviance” must be 
a factor to be considered along with the timing of component failures. Since “system state 
deviance” is determined by operational decisions, (eg. The decision to release water to 
return to a normal state), these decisions must be somehow included as factors in 
determining the extent of the deviance. This can be achieved by analyzing whether the 
reservoir level has returned to a predefined “normal” state following the initiation of an 
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event. If not, there may be independent sub-scenarios within the simulation that should not 
count towards results of the scenario being analyzed. Consider the example shown in 
Figure 3-3 (King and Simonovic, 2020), which has three events A, B and C occurring 
within some time of one another.  
 
Figure 3-3: Example output reservoir elevations for Scenario ABC (King and 
Simonovic, 2020) 
In the example, the reservoir has a constant elevation of 1 m under normal circumstances 
where everything is operational. The event outage occurrence dates and lengths (durations) 
are represented by the horizontal lines above the plots. For Outcome 1 (light red), Event A 
causes an increase to about 1.3 m and then the reservoir level returns to the normal 
elevation of 1 m prior to the initiation of Event B. The rate at which it returns to the normal 
elevation would be determined by the operations planning algorithm within the simulation 
model. Event B causes in increase in reservoir elevation to about 1.8 m, after which Event 
C begins and increases the reservoir a further 0.1 m. After Event C, the reservoir returns to 
its normal elevation as a result of the operations planning decisions. In Outcome 1, Event 
A does not have any impact on the outcome of Events B and C, because the reservoir level 
has returned to a normal elevation. Event B, however, does impact Event C. Thus, for 
Outcome 1, two sub-scenarios are observed: (1) The result of Event A, and (2) the 
combined result of Events B and C. In Outcome 2 (dark red), the reservoir rises to about 
1.95 m following Event A, at which point dam breach is triggered and the reservoir drops 
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to 0 m in elevation. In this case, the only sub-scenario being analyzed is Event A. This 
example shows that despite the simulation being intended to analyze the combined impacts 
of Events A, B and C, they cannot be assumed to be influencing one another. Some analysis 
of each simulated outcome (the reservoir levels from each simulated Monte-Carlo iteration) 
is required to ensure simulation results are attributed to the actual scenarios being 
represented within the analysis. “Complete iterations” are considered to be the subset of 
scenario results where all of the scenario’s events both occurred and affected one another.  
In using the proposed Deterministic Monte Carlo approach, it is important to consider that 
the goal of the exercise is to analyze all scenarios (predefined combinations of operating 
states) as completely as possible given computational time constraints, to determine the 
criticality of these combinations and identify particularly vulnerable components. There 
should be enough data on each scenario to estimate the range of expected system 
performance as well as the failure frequencies, failure inflow thresholds and reservoir level 
exceedance frequencies. To ensure there is enough data collected for each scenario, it may 
be necessary to limit the time between events to ensure their collective impacts can be 
assessed. This limit may be determined as a function of the impact lengths for a given 
iteration (for example, by taking the sum of impact lengths). Whether the event initiation 
time limit should be more or less than the sum of the impact lengths requires experimenting 
with scenarios to determine how long the system typically takes to return to normal 
operation. For “flashy” reservoirs with relatively limited storage compared to inflows, the 
recovery time following a return to normal operations may be quite short – days or even 
hours. For reservoirs with large storage in comparison to inflows, this recovery time may 
be significantly longer. The recovery time may also be less than the sum of impact lengths, 
due to inflows that are less than the total capacity of the available flow conveyance 
facilities. The recovery time should influence the modellers decision regarding the 
appropriate time limit for event initiation. 
In summary, the methodology developed in this work uses a systems approach for dam 
safety analysis, attempting to draw on the strengths of the existing techniques, combining 
and building on them with the goal of addressing the key element that is missing in all of 
them – assessing outcomes from a large number of the possible combinations of events.  
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This research focuses on identification and analysis of a more complete subset of 
potentially unsafe scenarios than has previously been considered in dam safety analysis. A 
Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation approach is proposed, in which scenarios are 
systematically defined upfront and used as a deterministic input to the model. Defining the 
complete set of failures and events to be simulated ensures all combinations of the defined 
component operating states (or constraints) are evaluated. It also means that the simulation 
efforts are divided equally between each scenario (combination of operating states), so a 
more thorough analysis of each scenario is possible than using a purely stochastic 
approach. Finally, the proposed approach reduces the amount of time spent simulating non-
failures. The scenario parameters, such as the timing and magnitude of impacts, are varied 
using Monte Carlo techniques so that each scenario is run as many times as possible given 
computational time constraints. Varying impact parameters allows some analysis of the 
uncertainty relating to the estimate of scenario impact magnitudes (for example, it is hard 
to estimate how long a component will be out of service, so a range of different values can 
be tested). Conditional probabilities of failure and reservoir level exceedances above key 
elevations (given a scenario has occurred) are direct outputs of the simulation. In this way, 
a much larger subset of the events that contribute to the probability are analyzed. Focusing 
on numerically assessing the entire design envelope and the complete range of possibilities 
can help asset owners in becoming more prepared for any event (or combination of events), 
regardless of its probability.  
A flow chart detailing the overall methodology is shown in Figure 3-4 (King and 
Simonovic, 2020). First, a component operating states database is created, which defines 
individual components and their operating states, causal factors and potential range of 
direct impacts. These represent the constraints within which the system may have to 
function. Population of the database requires extensive knowledge of the system and is 
similar to a FMEA but also includes non-failure operating states. A combinatorial 
procedure uses the database entries to come up with the complete range of potential 
scenarios for the system, which are used as inputs to a simulation model. Synthetic climate 
data is generated for the system of interest and used in a hydrological model to develop a 
long, synthetic timeseries of inflows to be used as inputs in the simulation model. The 
scenarios become the inputs for a deterministic simulation model which is run many times 
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for each scenario, with Monte-Carlo generated inputs that vary the inflows and incident 
timing, as well as the scenario impacts. Outcomes are descriptors of the system behaviour 
over time, including the releases through various conduits as well as adverse impacts, such 
as dam overtopping, uncontrolled flow releases, or dam breach. Outcomes for each 
scenario are assessed and aggregated performance measures for scenario groups are 
computed. The results of the analysis could be utilized to develop or refine response and 
mitigation strategies to improve system performance. Further analysis may be possible that 
would allow for overall estimates of the probability of failure for each individual scenario, 
and probability of failure for the system as a whole – this would require probabilistic 
analysis of operating states, which is a complex task that is not explored in this research.  
The proposed methodology has been developed to meet as many of the requirements in 
Table 3-1 as possible within the time frame of the work. The key missing pieces are that 
(a) it still inherently relies on subjectivity in the population of the operating states database 
and development of the simulation model – there is currently no substitute for expert 
knowledge and engineering judgement; (b) the likelihood of operating states are still 
difficult to estimate without significant simplifying assumptions; and, (c) the approach 
does not directly result in estimates of overall probability of flow control failure for the 
system, though with some additional analysis this may be possible. There are also an 
extremely large number of configurations (with different inflow sequences, event timing, 
and impact magnitudes) for each combination of operating states, as described earlier in 
this section – this approach covers only a small subset of the possible configurations for 
each scenario, through the use of Monte Carlo techniques. This means that results between 
two identical simulations of a given scenario would vary, and the results are only estimates 
of the criticality of each scenario, given computational time constraints. 
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Figure 3-4: Overall methodology flow chart (King and Simonovic, 2020) 
Each of the methodology steps are described in detail in the following sections. First, a 
description of the components operating state database and the process for database 
population is provided. Next, scenario development is discussed with a description of the 
combinatorial procedure developed in this research. Then, a detailed description of the 
Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation approach is presented, which uses a system 
dynamics simulation model with Monte-Carlo varied inputs. The following section 
contains a description of the modelling approach used for inflow generation. Finally, 
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scenario outcome assessment is discussed including the selection of criticality parameters 
and performance measures.   
3.2 Component Operating States Database 
A component operating states database is used to define the operating states for each 
system component and the causal factors that could lead to the development of the 
operating states. The approach of database population is similar to FMEA but also 
considers non-failure related operating states, including normal or functional operating 
states. Population of the database can significantly benefit from the application of (a) the 
STPA technique for actively controlled components and (b) a single-level FMEA analysis 
for system components. There is still a significant amount of reliance on expert judgement, 
but this may be slightly reduced if the systematic approach of STPA is used to inform 
database population.  
In order to develop an exhaustive list of potential operating scenarios for a hydropower 
system, each individual component of the system (whether it be physical or non-physical) 
must be analysed and its modes of operation considered. This is achieved using an 
operating states database, which was designed using a relational database software called 
Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL). MSSQL is a software used to generate and populate 
computer databases. It can be used to generate interfaces that assist with database 
population and information access. Using MSSQL, data are organized into relational tables 
to model aspects of reality, such as the system elements, at different levels (system, 
component and reservoir), the operating states and their characteristics as well as the causal 
factors. Another important feature used in the design of the database is the store 
procedures, which include functions that provide flexibility for developers, and are used 
to insert and recover data very efficiently from the database with less computational 
burden. In addition to this, there are views which allow the combination of several tables 
in a relational way and return aggregated data to the user interface. The structure and the 
entity relationship (ER) diagram of the database is shown in Figure 3-5 which depicts the 
relationships between various levels of the system. The lines connecting the objects (tables) 
in Figure 3-5 represent “foreigner keys” which ensure data consistency and integrity. The 
database was designed to facilitate simple data entry using a web-based user interface. It 
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may also be accessed, modified and queried using MSSQL Server Management Studio. 
The design of the database is meant to be as general as possible, facilitating the analysis of 
various dam systems with different configurations. Figure 3-5 presents three major groups 
of tables organized as: a) System elements: containing the tables representing the System, 
Component and Reservoir level elements; b) Operational States: containing the tables 
representing the operating states for each of the system elements; c) Casual Factors: 
containing the tables storing the causal factors; d) Auxiliary objects: containing tables that 
are used to store user accounts and system logs.  
 
Figure 3-5: Database Structure 
In order to keep track of and assess each individual component in the system, a hierarchical 
database structure is used in which components can be broken down into multiple sub-
components and easily tracked using a components tree with drop-down lists containing 
components in an increasingly higher level of detail. Hydropower systems consist of a large 
number of complex, interacting components at various levels of the system, and often in 
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various locations. Use of a components tree helps the user set up the relationships between 
these higher and lower level components of the system. 
The components tree consists of three levels. These are as follows: 
• System level, which includes reservoirs, communications equipment and other 
high-level components of the overall system 
• Reservoir level, which breaks down the system-level components into their sub-
components. This includes dams, spillway gates, generating units, sensors and other 
infrastructure assemblies that exist for a single reservoir. Reservoir level 
components also include non-infrastructure system components such as the 
operations staff and inflow forecasting for the reservoir.  
• Component level, which breaks down (when possible) the reservoir-level 
components into their sub-components. A spillway gate may have several 
interacting sub-components which function together, and these can be broken down 
at the component level and tied to the gate for which they represent.  
These levels of the system are stored as tables in the database and can be seen in Figure 
3-5a under “System elements” group and the object names are: “ComponentLevel”, 
“ReservoirLevel” and “SystemLevel”. The components tree ensures that each sub-
component is tied to an individual component at a higher level, allowing for complex 
system structures to be represented fully while maintaining relationships between the 
higher-level components and the sub-components of which they are comprised. 
Components are also assigned a type to facilitate integration with the simulation model. 
Once components are defined, the individual operating states for each component can be 
described. The operating states database includes normal operating status for each 
component, as well as adverse operating states which can include failure or non-failure 
events. Operating states include several entries, shown in Figure 3-5b under “Operating 
States” group and listed below – these may be expanded upon, if necessary, for different 
systems being analyzed:  
• Operating state type: normal, failed, failed closed, failed in place, collapsed, 
delayed, erroneous 
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• Impact type: none, outage, delay, error, blockage, settlement, cracking, wave, 
uncontrolled release of water 
• Operating state description: qualitative descriptor for operating state 
• Minimum impact: numerical minimum value of impact 
• Maximum impact: numerical maximum value of impact 
• Average impact: numerical average value (mode) of impact 
• Unit type: The units of the impact 
• Notes: user entries on data sources and/or assumptions 
A numerical range of impact magnitudes is included (see “Operating States” table in Figure 
3-5b since it may not be possible to estimate accurately the exact amount of time needed 
to repair certain components or the magnitude of error or delay which may occur under 
varying circumstances. For the more extreme failure modes, such as collapse of a dam or 
spillway gate, the process of repair could take years due to a number of factors including 
the degree of damage, the design process, the contract tendering process and even political 
considerations. Including a wide range of potential impacts for each operating state allows 
the full range of potential impact times to be explored. This structure also facilitates Monte-
Carlo simulation which can be used to investigate the full range of system behaviour 
outcomes for a given scenario (set of component operating states).  
Each operating state can be assigned one or more causal factors, with details as specified 
in Figure 3-5c under “Causal Factors”. Causal factors are the events which lead to the 
operating state being described. Several causal factor types are required as various 
components of the system may be vulnerable to different disturbances. These include 
earthquake, maintenance, debris, excessive rainfall, ice, etc. The user may create a specific 
list for the system of interest. It may be desirable in some cases to define the magnitude of 
causal factor that could lead to the event. In the case of an earthquake, certain components 
may be vulnerable under certain degrees of ground acceleration. For some causal factors, 
it may not be possible to provide a numerical definition. Causal factors may also be 
assigned date index ranges, which specify the minimum or maximum date within which 
the causal factor can occur (as an integer between 1 and 365). An entry under causal factors 
was also added to allow for quantification of the probability of the causal factor leading to 
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the operating state. While this information is useful in overall calculations of scenario 
probability, it is extremely hard to define in the presence of limited data. The focus of this 
research is to define and analyze the full range of potential operating conditions for a dam 
system, and probabilistic assessment remains an important area for future work. 
The procedure for population of the database is detailed in Figure 3-6. First, system 
documentation and details can be used to populate the components tree for the system of 
interest. Components at the different levels of the system are defined. Next, gathering of 
information relating to failures, expert knowledge, and any FMEA and STPA outcomes  
 
Figure 3-6: Component operating states database population flow chart 
should be gathered to begin definition of operating states, population of operating states 
tables and causal factor information. Populating the table is quite similar to an FMEA in 
that it is expert knowledge and judgement from a variety of experts would be recommended 
in populating the database to ensure the most exhaustive list of operating states, impacts 
and causal factors which is as accurate as possible. The key difference from an FMEA is 
that non-failure operating states may also be included within the database. In addition, 
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component failure effects on other components or higher levels of the system can be 
programmed into the simulation model and do not need to be addressed within the database. 
While a significant amount of subjectivity remains in database population, placing the 
focus on individual components at different levels of the system and determining their 
direct impacts is necessary to allow for automated scenario generation. The database is 
structured so that various users can work together to provide inputs, facilitated using user 
identification (see “Auxiliary objects” in Figure 3-5d). Users of the database can enter in 
their details and create a user ID and password to be entered upon accessing the database 
interface. This, along with IP address tracking ensures all sensitive information is kept 
secure. 
 
3.3 Operating State Scenario Development 
The information in the database contains as many of the systems components and their 
potential operating states that can be defined by the modeller(s). A combinatorial procedure 
is required to automatically generate the complete list of operating state combinations from 
the database. Each scenario will represent one possible combination of operating states (or 
set of constraints) for each component in the system. The use of combinatorics will ensure 
an exhaustive list of potential operating scenarios is developed. Deterministic modelling of 
each of the scenarios, with Monte Carlo variation of their potential parameters, will allow 
for a more complete investigation of scenarios and potential system outcomes than may be 
possible using a purely stochastic model. 
Consider a system of three components, A, B, and C, each which can either be functional 
or failed. The total number of possible combinations of operating states is 23 = 8. These 
are:  
𝐴𝐵𝐶, ?̅?𝐵𝐶, 𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶, ?̅?𝐵𝐶̅, 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝐴?̅?𝐶, 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅  
where a solid line over the variable represents its failed state. A process is required that can 
not only determine the number of combinations but can determine what the combinations 
themselves are. The process should also work for components with more than one 
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operating state, since this methodology considers operating states outside of the traditional 
binary definition of “functional” or “failed”. The Cartesian Product meets these 
requirements. Consider a set of operating states for each component, such that: 
𝐴,  ?̅?  ∈ 𝑨 
𝐵. ?̅? ∈ 𝑩 
𝐶,  𝐶 ̅̅ ̅ ∈ 𝑪 
The Cartesian Product 𝑨 × 𝑩 × 𝑪 defines all possible combinations, as listed above. 
Consider component 𝑨 has an additional operating state in its operating state set, such that 
𝐴, ?̅?, ?̂? ∈ 𝑨. The operation 𝑨 × 𝑩 × 𝑪 would then yield 3 × 2 × 2 = 12 possible 
outcomes, as follows:  
𝐴𝐵𝐶, ?̅?𝐵𝐶, 𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶, ?̅?𝐵𝐶̅, 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝐴?̅?𝐶, 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅, ?̂?𝐵𝐶, ?̂??̅?𝐶, ?̂?𝐵𝐶̅, ?̂?𝐵𝐶̅̅ ̅̅  
This example demonstrates the use of the Cartesian Product for generating all possible 
combinations of sets of varying lengths. To achieve the goal of coming up with all possible 
combinations of operating states for the system, the information from the database can be 
converted into operating state sets for each component of the system. Then, the Cartesian 
Product is applied to come up with a list of all possible combinations, where each 
combination is one unique set of operating states for each component in the system (a 
scenario). The process for scenario generation is detailed in Figure 3-7. The scenarios 
generated through this process become the input to the simulation model. The following 
paragraphs describe the steps and mathematical descriptions of the process.  
From the database, tables detailing the database inputs at each level of the system can be 
extracted. The component number and operating state number for each of the components 
and operating states can be used to generate unique identifiers, as shown in Equation 3.1. 
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Figure 3-7: Scenario generation flow chart 
𝐶1 = [𝑐1𝑜𝑠1, 𝑐1𝑜𝑠2, 𝑐1𝑜𝑠3, 𝑐1𝑜𝑠4…𝑐1𝑜𝑠𝑚1]
𝐶2 = [𝑐2𝑜𝑠1, 𝑐2𝑜𝑠2, 𝑐2𝑜𝑠3, 𝑐2𝑜𝑠4…𝑐2𝑜𝑠𝑚2]
⋮
𝐶𝑛 = [𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑠1, 𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑠2, 𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑠3, 𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑠4…𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑚𝑛]
(3.1) 
where 𝐶1…𝐶𝑛 represent the system component operating state sets for components 1 
through 𝑛 and 𝑛 ∈ (1…𝑁), 𝑐1…𝑐𝑛 represent the components 1 through n, 
and 𝑜𝑠1…𝑜𝑠𝑚𝑛  represent operating states 1 through 𝑚𝑛 for component n which has 𝑚 
operating states, 𝑚 ∈ (1…𝑀). The component operating state sets contain a list of all 
unique operating state and causal factor combinations for a given component. The actual 
numbers given to components are generated directly from the database identifiers, and the 
operating states are then labelled 1 to m. The number of unique operating state/causal factor 
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combinations for each component may vary so the component operating state sets are not 
equal in length from component to component. 
Cartesian product of these sets can be easily obtained using Python’s itertools package, 
with the product function (Python Software Foundation 2012). The function is an efficient 
iterator containing nested “for” loops which essentially work as an odometer that advances 
the rightmost element on each iteration. This produces an exhaustive list of potential 
system operating scenarios, which contain one operating state for each component in the 
system. Using the Cartesian Product of each component’s operating state set produces an 
exhaustive list of elements (scenarios) which include a complete list of operating states for 
every component in the system. Scenarios take the form shown in Equation 3.2: 
𝑆 = [𝑐1𝑜𝑠𝑚1, 𝑐2𝑜𝑠𝑚2, … , 𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑚𝑛] (3.2) 
where each scenario S consists of a single operating state for every component in the 
system. The operating states are kept track of using operating state identifiers as shown in 
Equation 1.  
The total number of possible operating states TS is therefore equal to the number of 
elements in the Cartesian product of the component operating state sets. The number of 
elements in the Cartesian product is the product of the length of each set: 
𝑇𝑆 =∏𝑀𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
(3.3) 
where 𝑀𝑛 is equal to the number of individual operating state/causal factor combinations 
for each component 𝑛, 𝑛 ∈ (1…𝑁).  
The resultant number of potential scenarios will be a function of the number of operating 
states and components, and as such will be extremely high for a complex system modelled 
in significant detail. Because the goal of this methodology is to simulate each and every 
scenario to determine the potential impacts, it may be necessary in practice to consolidate 
multiple components or causal factors into categories based on the modes of failure or 
adverse impacts, to reduce the number of scenarios and ensure the computational feasibility 
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of the simulation model. This could potentially be achieved through additional analysis – 
fault tree analysis may be particularly suited to determining multiple paths of failures that 
lead to the same higher-level fault, which could then be consolidated into a single operating 
state (this could be particularly promising for spillway gate and turbine systems).  
While some of the generated scenarios may be relatively unrealistic in comparison to 
others, this approach focuses on determining all of the possibilities. The worst-case 
scenario where every component is in an undesirable state is extremely unlikely, yet still 
possible and does contribute (in a very small way) to the overall probability of failure. 
Understanding system behaviour in response to any scenario can help guide the selection 
of operating strategies and investments to improve system safety and guide system 
recovery.  
This methodology for scenario generation does not consider the time between changes in 
operating states for different components or the inflows, which would significantly 
complicate the procedure. Instead, this is dealt with using a Deterministic Monte Carlo 
Simulation framework, where the operating states for each component (scenarios) are 
predetermined and used as inputs to a simulation model. For each deterministic simulation 
of a particular scenario, the uncertainty arising from varying time between events, impact 
magnitudes and inflows is varied in a number of Monte Carlo iterations, as detailed in 
Section 3.4.  
 
3.4 Deterministic Monte Carlo Simulation Framework 
This section presents a framework for the Deterministic Monte Carlo Simulation. First, a 
description of the simulation model development is provided. In this research, a system 
dynamics simulation environment is used. Next, a discussion of the Monte-Carlo variation 
of scenario parameters is provided. The system dynamics simulation model is run in a 
hybrid deterministic/Monte Carlo environment where (a) the operating states associated 
with a single scenario are used as inputs for a single execution of the simulation, and (b) 
the parameters of that particular scenario are varied in a series of iterations, using Monte 
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Carlo generated parameters for operating state timing, impacts and inflows. The final 
section of this chapter details the simulation execution steps.  
 
3.4.1 System Dynamics Simulation Model Development 
Simonovic (2009) presents simulation techniques that deal with water resources in general, 
with a particular focus on system dynamics simulation as a tool for water resources 
engineers. In system dynamics, a stock-and-flow model can be used to represent the system 
structure, showing the complex interactions between system components. These complex 
interactions are the source of the system behaviour and can help identify emergent 
behaviours that may not be easily assessed through analysis of the system’s individual 
parts. By modelling the system as a whole and all relevant feedbacks and relationships 
between components, the overall system behaviour can be characterized. The stock-and-
flow representation facilitates easy modification of the system structure to experiment with 
various upgrades or operational strategies that have the potential to improve system 
performance. Recall, stocks are represented as boxes and flows are represented as pipelines 
into or out of the stock controlled by spigots (with a “source” or “sink” that supplies or 
drains flows). Flows have units of material over time, and while inflows and outflows for 
the dam system are represented as flows in this particular application, there are many other 
types of flows that can be used which may have nothing to do with water. Auxiliary 
variables and arrows make up the other major components of a stock-and-flow model, and 
these represent constants or variables that change with time according to a mathematical 
equation or algorithm.  
Consider a simple dam system, with a single reservoir and dam that is controlled only by 
a free overflow weir.  Figure 3-8 contains a representation of this system. Reservoir Storage 
is represented as a stock with units m3. The value of Reservoir Storage can only be changed 
by the flows into or out of the stock. Flows have the same units as the stock over time. In 
this example. Inflow and Outflow are the stocks and have units of m3/s. 
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Figure 3-8: Simple dam system with free overflow weir 
The change in Reservoir Storage can be computed as: 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐼 − 𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡 (3.4) 
Where 𝑆 represents Reservoir Storage, 𝑡 represents time, 𝐼 represents Inflows and 𝑂 
represents Outflows. System dynamics tools use integration to calculate the value of the 
stock at each timestep. The Reservoir Level (𝑅𝑆𝐸) value is a function of the Reservoir 
Storage as defined by the Stage-Storage Curve. Similarly, Free Overflow Weir Discharge 
(𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟) is a function of the Reservoir Level, as defined by the Stage-Discharge Curve for 
the weir. Equations presented here are generated from the Cheakamus System 
characteristics, the details of which are summarized in Appendix A.   
𝑅𝑆𝐸 = −1.12 ∗ 10−5  ∗  𝑆2  +  3.24 ∗ 10−2  ∗ 𝑆 +  3.64 ∗ 102 (3.5) 
𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 = −35.8 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐸
3 +  40.9 ∗ 103 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐸2  − 15.6 ∗ 106 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 +  19.8 ∗ 108 
𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 378.41 (3.6)
 
Note that for “flashy” reservoirs with little storage in comparison to inflow volumes, the 
reservoir elevation may vary greatly throughout the day, so weir discharges may also vary 
hourly. For a model run on a daily timestep, it may be necessary to compute the Free 
Overflow Weir Discharge, 𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 for a given day by iterating within the function over a 24-
hour period. This will ensure weir discharges accurately reflect reality.  
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Inflows represent an external model input, which in this case ranges from 5 to 25 m3/s. 
Outflows (𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡) are equal to the Free Overflow Weir Discharge: 
𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 (3.7) 
If we simulate this model with a constant inflow and user-defined Stage-Storage and Stage-
Discharge curves, as well as an initial starting reservoir level (10 m3/s-d), we can see that 
the model reaches a steady state, where the discharge over the weir is equal to the constant 
inflow. This is shown in Figure 3-9 for three different constant discharge values. Note that 
the reservoir level can be represented using units of volume (m3), however using the units 
m3/s-d can considers the available flow rate over time, which simplifies the calculations 
required. 
 
Figure 3-9: Simulation of simple dam system with free overflow weir 
 
Suppose we add a single gate to this system, modifying the stock-and-flow diagram in 
Figure 3-10. The Gate Discharge (𝑄𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒) is a function of the Gate Position (𝐺𝑃) and 
Reservoir Level, as defined by the Gate Rating Curve (provided by BC Hydro and 
summarized in Appendix A). For this single-gate system, the rating curves for both gates 
are combined into a single gate (by simply adding the discharge columns). The gate rating 
curves can be used in a two-dimensional interpolation to determine what the corresponding 
flow is for a given reservoir elevation and gate position. This can be done using simple 
Python functions such as interp2d which is part of the scipy package. 
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𝑄𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝐺𝑃) (3.8) 
The outflow then becomes: 
𝑄𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝑄𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑟 + 𝑄𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 (3.9) 
Simulating this system for constant inflows of 32 m3/s with a variable gate position yields 
a similar result where a steady state is achieved, as shown in Figure 3-11. In the blue line 
in Figure 11, the gate position is the smallest and the reservoir rises to the free overflow 
spill. At this point, an instantaneous increase in the outflow is observed as the overflow 
spillway begins to pass flow. It is important to note that the increase in outflow at a smaller 
time step (say, hourly) would be more gradual than the daily plots may indicate. 
 
 
Figure 3-10: Simple dam system with free overflow weir and gate 
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Figure 3-11: Simulation results for simple system with free overflow weir and gate 
If we add a sinusoidal relationship to represent seasonal variations in the system inflow, 
we start to see some more variation in the resultant reservoir levels, as shown in Figure 
3-12. The relationship used in this simple simulation model is chosen to roughly mimic the 
natural seasonal variation in flows for the Cheakamus system, with time 𝑡: 
𝐼 = 60 ∗ sin 0.015(𝑡 − 80) + 70 (3.10) 
 
Figure 3-12: Simulation results for simple system with free overflow weir, gate, and 
sinusoidal-varying inflows 
Including some day-to-day variability in inflows for the simple system can be done using 
a random normally distributed variable (with a mean of 0 and a scale of 30) which is added 
to the time-dependent sinusoidal inflow value. The value is then truncated, so that the 
minimum inflow value cannot be less than 2 m3/s. The simple system simulation results 
with added daily variability are shown in Figure 3-13. The fluctuation in the reservoir levels 
is more extreme, and the resulting reservoir levels and inflows begin to vary more greatly.  
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Figure 3-13: Simulation results for simple system with free overflow weir, gate, 
sinusoidal inflows with daily variability 
Obviously, for normal operation of a dam with a gated spillway, the gate positions are not 
kept constant throughout the year and for all inflows. Gate positions may be selected based 
on a number of inputs, including the inflow forecast, rule curves, target reservoir 
elevations, outflow constraints and downstream impacts. Creating an algorithm to simulate 
operations planning is a more challenging aspect of model development, in particular in 
the case of cascading and parallel dam systems. Optimization is frequently cited in the 
literature and works well for balancing inflows, downstream effects, reservoir operational 
limits and outflow constraints. However, optimization may significantly impede 
computational efficiency, which is an important consideration when running the simulation 
model a large number of times. For this simplified example based on a version of the 
Cheakamus project with only a single gate, an if-then-else type algorithm has been 
developed for Operations Planning. The algorithm uses 14 days of inflow forecasting to 
determine the appropriate gate releases that will keep the reservoir level between target 
elevations (see Figure A5 in Appendix A). Inflow Forecast is based on the sinusoidal 
relationship described previously, with no random normal variable added. This means the 
operations planning algorithm has some indication of the average inflow to expect over the 
next 14 days but is not aware of any major deviations from the normal level due to the 
random normally distributed variable that is added. The Operations Planning algorithm is 
detailed in Figure 3-14 (King and Simonovic 2020). The output variable from Operations 
Planning for this simple example is gate flow, which can be transformed into a gate position 
instruction. The Gate Position is calculated using a reverse two-dimensional interpolation 
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using the Operations Planning output (the desired gate flow) and the Reservoir Level, based 
on the Gate Rating Curve. The resultant stock and flow model is shown in Figure 3-15.  
 
 
Figure 3-14: Simple operations planning algorithm King and Simonovic (2020) 
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The simulation results for the example with operations planning implemented are shown 
in Figure 3-16. The reservoir rises to the level of El 376.5 m (the Normal Maximum 
Reservoir Level), and hovers at that level or just above and below based on the deviations 
introduced by the random normal variable added to the inflow. Note that there are no power 
flow release facilities included in the model, so the algorithm keeps the reservoir level high 
because there is no reason to discharge more additional water than necessary to meet the 
maximum reservoir level target.  
 
 
Figure 3-15: Simple dam system with a single weir and gate, with operations 
planning algorithm implemented (King and Simonovic, 2020) 
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Figure 3-16: Simulation results for simple dam system with single weir and gate, 
with operations planning algorithm implemented (King and Simonovic, 2020) 
Another important feature of the simulation model will be the ability to simulate 
component failures or outages. Considering the simple example developed, this can be 
added by creating a variable that tracks remaining time to repair following gate failures, 
Gate Remaining Time to Repair, 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅. This is modelled as a stock, which receives a 
pulse of Gate Failure, 𝐺𝐹, when the gate fails. The stock drains with the value time when 
its value is positive, using the flow Gate Repair, 𝐺𝑅. The gate remaining time to repair can 
then be implemented in the model based on the impacts of a gate outage – in this simple 
example the situation modelled will be that the gate fails in the closed position. Gate failure 
causes an inflow to the stock of 20 days at time 𝑡 = 100, and the gate becomes stuck in 
the closed position for a 20-day period. The modified stock and flow diagram for this is 
shown in Figure 3-17. 
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Figure 3-17: Simple system with gate and weir, with operations planning and gate 
failures implemented (King and Simonovic 2020) 
In this example, the gate remaining time to repair is calculated as: 
𝑑𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐺𝐹 − 𝐺𝑅 (3.11) 
Gate Failure is calculated as: 
𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 100, 𝐺𝐹 = 20 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒, 𝐺𝐹 = 0 (3.12) 
 
Gate Repair is calculated as: 
𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 > 0, 𝐺𝑅 = 1 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐺𝑅 = 0 (3.13) 
The Gate Position can then be calculated based on the gate availability: 
𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 = 0, 𝐺𝑃 = 𝑓(𝑂𝑃, 𝑅𝑆𝐸) 
114 
 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒, 𝐺𝑃 = 0 (3.14) 
where 𝑂𝑃 represents the operations planning output, which is representative of the desired 
gate flow. Simulating this model yields the outcomes shown in Figure 3-18. The impacts 
of the gate failure can be seen in the image starting at day 100 of the simulation, where the 
gate position and gate flow drop to zero, and the reservoir elevation rises above the target 
elevation. Flow over the free overflow weir is observed during the gate outage (these are 
not shown but are the difference between Outflow and Gate Flow). Once the gate is back 
online, the gated spillway flow is increased significantly to reduce the reservoir elevation 
to within the target levels. The inflow on the day of the gate’s return to service is less than 
predicted, so the operator opens the gate more than is necessary and the reservoir drops to 
just above the gate sill elevation (El. 367.28 m). In reality, operators will have a relatively 
better idea with respect to the expected inflow. Dam operators would also be able to adjust 
the gate position within the 24-hour period if the inflows are less than predicted to ensure 
rapid drawdown of the reservoir does not occur. This is one potential limitation of running 
the model on a 24-hour timestep, though improved inflow prediction for the operations 
planning algorithm would avoid the issue. For less flashy reservoirs, a daily time step may 
be adequate. 
As more features are added to the simple simulation model, the nonlinearity of the problem 
becomes more obvious. Calculation of the reservoir level response becomes increasingly 
more complex as additional components, variable gate positions, natural variability in 
inflows, outages, etc. are added to the simulation model. These interactions are not easily 
modelled using traditional tools, so simulation is necessary for quantifying the system 
response to various inputs. These simple examples help build a clear case for system 
dynamics simulation as a tool to determine reservoir level response to various operating 
conditions. The system dynamics platform offers a particularly suitable modelling 
environment for complex, dynamic systems with interactions among components.  The 
object-oriented building blocks help visualize the connections between the different 
components of the system. This visual representation of the system structure can be 
inspected to help gain confidence in the model performance. Subscripting is another useful 
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tool that can help modellers easily add series and parallel dams to a system without 
complete re-programming. Subscripting is also useful for the modelling of multiple sub-
components or redundant features of the system.  
 
Figure 3-18: Simulation of simple system with single gate and weir, operations 
planning, and gate failure implemented (King and Simonovic 2020) 
The general process for the development of a system dynamics simulation model for a 
hydropower system is described in Figure 3-19 (King and Simonovic, 2020). The process 
is iterative, that is, model development is influenced by model testing, and development 
continues until the modeller is satisfied that the modelled system is an adequate 
representation of reality. The model is a description of physical and nonphysical 
relationships among system components. A significant amount of information about the 
system is required to define these relationships mathematically, and expert judgement is 
necessary in model development. Dividing the model into interconnected sub-systems 
shown in different views or sectors may be helpful to organize the model presentation. Sub-
systems may be connected to each other by one or more variables. These sectors can follow 
a generic control loop, such as the one presented in Section 1.3 and Figure 1-20, as 
described by Leveson (2011) and adapted for a hydropower system. The sectors include: 
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(1) A controller, who interprets information relating to the state of the system and produces 
a set of operating instructions, (2) Actuators, the mechanical-electrical assemblies which 
work to move gates in the controlled process, (3) A controlled process, representing the 
infrastructure being controlled or the hydraulic system state, (4) Sensors, which relay 
information back to the controller and (5) Disturbances, which are not directly part of the 
control loop but may affect the functionality of any one of its features. This high-level 
system structure represents a hierarchical system of systems, with each box representing 
its own system (Leveson 2011). King et al. (2017) presents a detailed system dynamics 
model of a dam system that is broken down into control system sectors. The benefit of 
developing a detailed model of the system components is that low-level failures and other 
events within the system can be initiated and the simulation model can determine the 
system-level impacts for a particular set of inflows and event parameters.  
Selection of the variables that will be required to adequately represent the system is 
another important step. The variables represent states of the system which the modeller is 
interested in over time, and there may also be a number of intermediate variables that 
transform information between the key variables of interest. The variable types are 
stocks, flows and auxiliary variables. Stocks may include reservoir levels, remaining 
repair times and even gate positions, depending on how the modeller wants to set up the 
equations. Flows are the values which have units over time and represent the inflow and 
outflow of the stock value. Auxiliary variables are neither stocks, nor flows, and may 
represent physical or nonphysical relationships and processes. Subscripting can be used 
so that a single representation of a variable and its relationships (equations) can be 
applied. This is particularly useful for representation of multiple reservoirs, gates or other 
redundant features of the system. Defining the relationships requires expert knowledge of 
the system, data, and programming capability. Some auxiliary variable equations can be 
represented by simple if-then-else type formulae, others may represent nonlinear 
relationships or even complex algorithms with a number of processes occurring 
internally. 
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Figure 3-19: Simulation model development flow chart (King and Simonovic 2020) 
The model output is only as good as the modellers understanding of the interactions and 
relationships within the system being analyzed. Like all models, simulation models are 
abstractions of reality. Sterman (2000) argues that, because of this, all models are “wrong” 
and that simulation models can never be validated or verified in the traditional sense of the 
word. There are, however, a number of tests that can be done to gain confidence in the 
model performance. These tests should be done iteratively throughout the model 
development process. Analyzing the system structure and feedbacks to ensure all important 
variables are represented and their equations are grounded in reality is important. This 
includes checking the water balance, rating curves and other physically-derived variables. 
Checking the dimensions is another important model test. Historical records of system 
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operation are also particularly useful for testing and development of the model. A direct 
comparison between simulated and actual values provides information to the modeller 
about how well the system is mimicking reality in terms of normal operation. Comparison 
of system reservoir levels and outflows can help the modeller adjust the system structure 
so the system behaviour better captures the dynamics – this is particularly important during 
the development of operating rules. Once the model results are relatively close to reality, 
the model is ready for simulation.   
 
3.4.2 Monte-Carlo variation of scenario parameters 
Each automatically generated scenario (see Section 3.3) contains a list of component 
operating states which may be normal, erroneous, failed, etc. Each component operating 
state is tied to one or more causal factors and has a specified range of impacts that can be 
expected should the operating state occur. Impacts may include outage length, error 
magnitude, or delay length. Linking this information into the simulation model in a way 
that allows a wide range of potential outcomes to be explored for each scenario is a critical 
part of the implementation. An example of such a link was shown in the previous section. 
System dynamics modelling is inherently deterministic, so specific instructions for how to 
implement the scenario must be given to the model before running. Monte-Carlo selection 
of simulation inputs is considered to be the most efficient way to assess the outcomes from 
as many implementation possibilities for a single scenario as can be achieved within the 
computational time constraints. Each operating state has varying impact magnitudes 
between minimum and maximum values specified in the database. In addition to this, the 
adverse operating states may be occurring within some temporal proximity to one another 
but not at the exact same time. Inflows may also significantly affect the way an operating 
state changes the system behaviour. While simulation facilitates the assessment of 
component interactions, feedbacks and nonlinear system behaviour, the Monte-Carlo 
variation of these important simulation inputs can help better capture a range of system 
behaviour that is possible as a result of a given scenario. The temporal proximity of the 
adverse operating states, the magnitude of impacts and the system inflows can all easily be 
varied using a Monte-Carlo simulation approach. Each scenario can be run many times 
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(iterations), varying these inputs to explore the system behavior in response to a random 
subset of the total implementation possibilities for each scenario. This helps provide more 
information about the uncertainty associated with a particular scenario in terms of the range 
of system response that can be expected. 
A wide range of hydrological conditions may be tested for each operating scenario, by 
selecting a random year and start date for each Monte-Carlo run of each scenario. The year 
and start date can be linked to a synthetic inflow time series (this is discussed in Section 
3.5.2. 
Operating state impact magnitudes may be difficult to estimate, and can vary significantly 
depending on the timing, organizational factors, and availability of materials to rectify the 
adverse operating state, etc. The potential range of operating state impact magnitudes is 
represented using minimum impact, maximum impact and average impact (mode) as 
specified in the component operating states database in the operating states description. 
This information can be used to generate Monte-Carlo inputs with a triangular distribution 
(Kotz and van Dorp 2004): 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 =
{
 
 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 +√𝑈(𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑖min)(𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 − 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛)                 𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 < 𝑈 < 𝐹(𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔)
𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 −√(1 − 𝑈)(𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑖min)(𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔)    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐹(𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔) ≤ 𝑈 < 1
(3.15) 
where 𝑈 represents a random variate from the uniform distribution between 0 and 1,  𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 
represents the minimum impact value specified in the database, 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 represents the 
maximum impact value specified in the database, 𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 represents the average value 
specified in the database and 𝐹(𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔) = (𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔 − 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛)/(𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑖min). A random impact 
magnitude for each operating state is generated in this way and used as the second Monte-
Carlo input to the simulation model.  
Timing of events may also vary within a scenario, and events can occur at the same time 
or within hours, weeks or even months of one another. The temporal proximity of events 
represents the third Monte-Carlo input to the simulation model. The causal factors for each 
operating state play a roll in determining operating state proximity. The number of causal 
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factors can be used to determine the number of time steps between adverse operating states 
arising from different causal factors. Operating states with the same causal factor (for 
example, an earthquake) are initiated at the same time. Operating states for subsequent 
causal factors are initiated at some value, ∆𝑡𝑛𝑐 in the future where 𝑛𝑐 ∈ (0,… ,𝑁𝐶) and 
𝑁𝐶 is equal to the number of unique causal factors less one (because the first causal factor 
is implemented at time t=0 in the simulation). The ordering of causal factors is also shuffled 
for each iteration so that the first operating state(s) change between Monte-Carlo inputs. 
For some causal factors, including lack of maintenance and aging, impact timing is 
completely randomized if more than one component is affected; that is, failure of one 
component due to lack of maintenance may not occur at the same time as the failure of 
another component that has not been maintained. There may be a time limit within which 
these events can occur, as defined by the user for the system of interest. This is a parameter 
that helps increase the chance that the events are impacting one another so that the scenarios 
represented in the outputs are reflective of the input scenario (discussed further in Section 
3.4.3).   
In addition to generating these randomized parameters for each scenario, it is necessary to 
program component-specific connections that link the database’s operating state identifiers 
to the specific point in the simulation model where the component failure, error or delay 
occurs. An example of how this can be done was provided in Section 3.4.1. The timing and 
impact magnitude can be represented by variables that change with each Monte Carlo 
iteration. Inflow sequences for each iteration can be selected from the historical record 
using the randomly generated start day and year. Directing the impact towards the correct 
component and implementing it requires significant modelling effort and expert 
judgement. The implementation of these connections will differ from application to 
application and must be done at the front-end of the simulation model to ensure the scenario 
information is routed properly through the simulation model. The randomly generated 
impact parameters and timing must be connected to the appropriate variable within the 
simulation model. Once the connections are made, simulation can proceed following 
Figure 3-20 as discussed in the following section.  
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It is important to note that random numbers generated by computer code are not truly 
random, because they rely on algorithms that repeat. They are technically “pseudo-
random” numbers. When a very large number of scenarios is run for many iterations, there 
is a possibility that a pattern may be observed within the random numbers generated by the 
model. This issue is not explored further in this research but remains an important issue in 
computational science. 
3.4.3 Deterministic Monte Carlo Simulation Process 
The process for scenario simulation is described in Figure 3-20 (King and Simonovic, 
2020). In the simulation, each scenario is given a unique simulation number (“seed 
number”). At the start of the simulation, a “seeds to run” list is developed. Each seed 
number corresponds to a line in a list of the scenarios, which contains a unique set of 
operating state combinations for the system. This is used to gather the information from 
the database tables and set-up the Monte-Carlo parameters for the particular scenario being 
simulated. The Monte Carlo parameters are randomized inputs that vary within the bounds 
specified in the operating states database. This allows for a more subset of the potential 
outcomes for a given scenario to be explored. Once the Monte Carlo input generation is 
completed based on the scenario of interest, the simulation of the scenario proceeds.  
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Figure 3-20: Simulation flow chart 
Following the simulation of each scenario iteration, timing considerations must be 
addressed, to ensure the results are accurately attributed to the scenario being represented. 
This can be done by analyzing the “system state deviance” to determine whether 
subsequent events are dependant on preceding events. An event dependency algorithm to 
analyze the outputs from each iteration is necessary in order to count the simulation results 
towards the scenarios that are truly represented within the output data. Recall the example 
reservoir elevation plots for two iterations shown in Figure 3-21 (King and Simonovic, 
2020). Given the time of occurrence of A, B and C, the reservoir level under normal 
operations, and the resultant reservoir levels, a simple comparison can be used to determine 
whether events are influencing one another. The algorithm to analyze scenario outcomes 
is shown in Figure 3-22 (King and Simonovic, 2020). 
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Figure 3-21: Example output reservoir elevations for Scenario ABC (King and 
Simonovic 2020) 
 
First, an empty event list is created, and the time is set to 𝑡 = 0. The analysis starts by first 
checking if a new event (adverse operating state) is initiated at the current time step The 
event initiation time is determined through Monte-Carlo sampling. If a new event is 
initiated, the event is added to the event list. If no previous events are in the list, time t 
represents the scenario start day. If there are events in the event list, a check is done to see 
whether the event impacts are over – this is a simple comparison of the following y days 
of simulated reservoir elevations with the previously expected reservoir elevations for that 
set of inflows. The choice of the number of subsequent days to be compared depends on 
the system being modelled and may be shorter or longer depending on the storage relative 
to the inflows. If the elevations are within a certain threshold, 𝑥, of the previously expected 
reservoir levels for all days within a three-day period, the scenario is considered to be over. 
The threshold is a small number that indicates the reservoir levels are basically the same – 
it may also vary depending on the reservoir being modelled and must be chosen by the 
analyst for the system of interest. Once the reservoir levels are restored to the previously 
expected values, the results for the scenario are saved, the event list is emptied, and the 
analysis proceeds to the next timestep. If the elevations are not yet matching, the analysis 
proceeds to the next time step, as long as the reservoir elevations haven’t risen to a 
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sufficient level to fail the dam by overtopping. If the dam has failed by overtopping, the 
results are processed and saved for the events in the list. The process continues through all 
of the timesteps, until either there are no more time steps to analyze or the dam has failed. 
 
Figure 3-22: Event dependency algorithm (King and Simonovic, 2020) 
This process, when applied to Outcome 1 in Figure 3-21 saves results for Scenario A, and 
Scenario BC. For Outcome 2, it saves results for Scenario A only. This process could also 
be useful to analyze outcomes from fully stochastic simulation models, extracting more 
information than a singular probability of failure for the system being analyzed (though 
this is not examined in this research). 
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Once all iterations for a given scenario are analyzed, the scenario results are saved and the 
seed number is added to the completed seeds list. Then, a new scenario is chosen from the 
seeds to run list and executed. Simulation of the complete list of scenarios is a significant 
computational task, depending on the size of the scenario list and complexity of the 
simulation model. Linking of each individual component in the database to the 
corresponding system dynamics model component is required prior to the start of the 
simulation. Synthetic inflow sequences are also required for the simulation, to provide 
more variable hydrological conditions than can typically be observed in the historical 
record (see Section 3.5.2). Depending on the size of the problem, it may be beneficial to 
use cluster computing to simulate multiple scenarios (seeds) in parallel, since the scenarios 
are completely independent and do not communicate between one another. More 
information about the cluster computing application is provided in Appendix F. 
In using the Deterministic Monte Carlo approach, it is important to consider that the goal 
of the exercise is to analyze all scenarios (predefined combinations of operating states) as 
completely as possible given computational time constraints, to determine the criticality of 
these combinations. There should be enough data on each scenario to estimate the range of 
expected system performance and calculate the criticality parameters: conditional failure 
frequencies, failure inflow thresholds and conditional reservoir level exceedance 
frequencies. To ensure there is enough data collected for each scenario, it may be necessary 
to limit the time between events to ensure their collective impacts can be assessed. This 
limit may be determined as a function of the impact lengths for a given iteration (for 
example, by taking the sum of impact lengths). Whether the event initiation time limit 
should be greater than or less than the sum of the impact lengths requires experimenting 
with scenarios to determine how long the system typically takes to return to normal 
operation. For “flashy” reservoirs with relatively limited storage compared to inflows, the 
recovery time following a return to normal operations may be quite short – days or even 
hours. For reservoirs with large storage in comparison to inflows, this recovery time may 
be significantly longer. The recovery time may also be less than the sum of impact lengths, 
due to inflows that are less than the total capacity of the available flow conveyance 
facilities. The recovery time should influence the modellers decision regarding the 
appropriate time limit for event initiation. If the time limit for event initiation is too long, 
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there may be two or more sub-scenarios within each scenario, and not enough data relating 
to the collective impact of the combination of events. 
 
3.4.4 Computational Considerations 
Another important topic relevant to the simulation framework is the computational 
considerations. Computational efficiency is a major factor in this research, since a large 
number of scenarios are being analyzed, each for many iterations. The computing time for 
a single year and the number of scenarios to be analyzed governs the computational effort 
that will be required to execute the Deterministic Monte Carlo approach. As the modelled 
system complexity increases, so does the length of time to run a simulation. In addition, 
the number of scenarios is exponentially proportional to the number of component 
operating state-causal factor combinations. As such, a trade-off becomes evident between 
the level of detail to which the system is modelled and the amount of computational time 
the simulations will take to execute. This is one potential limitation of the approach. Each 
modeller may evaluate the trade-off differently, and this could result in two modellers 
creating different versions of the same system. Ultimately, this issue remains unavoidable 
within current computational abilities. That said, cluster computing is becoming more 
widely available and can be utilized to improve the simulation throughput. In the case 
study, Compute Canada cluster computing resources are leveraged to evaluate a large 
number of scenarios in parallel. This is made possible by the fact that each scenario can 
run independently of other scenarios, so a large number of cores may be used independently 
to run different scenarios at the same time. Despite the advantages of using cluster 
computing, an extremely large number of scenarios may still take a significant amount of 
time to evaluate, and output data storage is another potential factor that limits the level of 
complexity and number of scenarios that can be efficiently analyzed. The trade-off between 
complexity and computational effort remains. While the issue is not investigated further in 
this work, there are some potential directions for future research that may help to reduce 
the impacts of this limitation.  
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3.5 Simulation Model Input Data 
There is a significant amount of data required to execute the simulation model. This 
includes site-specific physical relationships, synthetic inflows and baseline operations data 
for comparison with simulation outcomes to assess whether events are influenced by 
preceding events within the simulation. 
3.5.1 Physical Relationships 
The physical relationships for the system of interest are a required input of the simulation 
model. Stage-storage relationships relate the amount of water in the reservoir to the 
reservoir elevation which is used in various calculations. These relationships may be 
developed using bathymetry or pre-flooding lidar surveys and are typically readily 
available for existing dam systems. The relationship may be in the form of a table or a 
graph. Curve-fitting can be used to avoid interpolation calculations by creating a function 
that is representative of the stage-storage curve for all relevant reservoir elevations (the 
minimum to absolute maximum elevation that could be observed in simulation). Piecewise 
functions may be required for certain systems, to better capture the relationship over 
specific reservoir elevation bands.  
Stage-discharge relationships relate the reservoir elevation to water spilling over free 
overflow weirs and dam structures and are another required input to the model. These can 
be developed using simple free-crest weir equations, and may also be readily available for 
the system being modelled. Again, converting the relationship to a function using curve-
fitting may be desirable to avoid interpolations within the simulation (for efficiency). 
Another key input is the relationship between gate position, reservoir elevation and flow, 
which is known as the gate rating curve. For most dam systems, these are developed in the 
form of either a table or curve. Two-dimensional interpolations can be used within the 
simulation to calculate the flow value based on inputs of reservoir level and gate position. 
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3.5.2 Synthetic Inflow Generation 
For many dam systems, the historical record of inflows may only be as old as the dam itself 
and may not be a good indicator of potential variability in inflow conditions. Basing the 
outcomes of a dam safety assessment on the historically observed flows alone would 
significantly limit the analysis. As such, tools that can be applied for generation of synthetic 
inflows are described in this research. First, a stochastic weather generator (KnnCAD) is 
used to generate synthetic daily climate data, and next, a hydrologic model (Raven) is used 
to convert the daily climate data into reservoir inflows.  
The KnnCAD weather generator is a non-parametric tool for stochastic, multi-site, multi-
variable generation of climate data that was first introduced by Sharif and Burn (2006) and 
later modified by Prodanovic and Simonovic (2008), Eum and Simonovic (2012) and King 
et al. (2014, 2015). The weather generator is based on the K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN) 
resampling technique which reshuffles and perturbs the historical climate data to generate 
a longer time series with increased variability that is statistically similar to the historical 
record. The approach allows for easy multi-site climate data generation that preserves the 
spatial correlation between sites without assuming relationships between weather 
variables. In addition, no assumptions about the probability distributions of variables are 
required. King et al (2014, 2015) modified the KNN approach using a block resampling 
technique which was found to significantly improve temporal correlations in the resulting 
temperatures. These temporal correlations are extremely important in climates such as 
Canada where snow accumulation and melt contribute significantly to flood events. The 
KnnCAD weather generator was chosen for this research due to the demonstrated ability 
to generate statistically similar climate datasets. The most current version of the model is 
available on the GitHub repository FIDS-UWO/Climate and a technical manual containing 
the model equations, scripts and step-by-step instructions was developed by Mandal et al. 
(2017). A user interface makes application of this model quite straightforward. Historical 
time-series of climate variables are uploaded to the user interface for each site of interest. 
Perturbation parameters are selected – these parameters dictate the proportion of 
“randomness” that is applied to the climate variables. The model is then run for a user-
selected number of “blocks” which are the length of the historical input data. 
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Following generation of climate data, hydrological modelling is required to convert the 
daily climate data into reservoir inflows for the site of interest. There are a number of 
approaches that can be used; however Raven Hydrological Modelling Framework is the 
platform used by BC Hydro and as such was selected for this project. Raven is a highly 
flexible modelling framework that allows the user to select the specific modelling code or 
approach to be utilized. In this research, the application is a mountain watershed, and as 
such the UBC Watershed Model approach is used (Quick and Pipes 1977; Micovic and 
Quick 1999). The UBC Watershed model utilizes daily maximum and minimum 
temperatures as well as precipitation to forecast snow accumulation and melt, along with 
soil moisture, groundwater transfer and evapotranspiration. Basin area-elevation 
characteristics are direct inputs to the model, which has the ability to include several 
elevation bands or zones that allows more realistic modelling of mountain runoff (Quick 
and Pipes 1977). Calibration of the model involves experimentation with specific 
parameters relating to various physical aspects of the system in order to find the parameter 
set that most closely correlates the outputs with the runoff calibration period (Quick and 
Pipes 1977). Combinations of different weather stations may be experimented with to find 
the set that provides the best calibration. Once the model is calibrated, the synthetic daily 
climate data from the stochastic weather generator can be used directly as an input to the 
calibrated model. Simulation of runoff is done in water-years which begin in October and 
end in September, to allow for proper continuity of snowmelt modelling. The resulting 
dataset is a long, synthetic inflow time series with higher variability than the historically 
observed data. This synthetic inflow set can be used directly in the simulation model. 
3.5.3 Baseline Operations Data 
Once the simulation model has been completed and synthetic inflows are developed, it is 
necessary to develop baseline operations data. The baseline operations data is the normal 
reservoir elevations, which are used in the final step of the simulation to analyze whether 
the events simulated within an iteration are independent of one another (and whether the 
iteration is “complete”). This is described in detail in Section 3.4.3. 
The baseline reservoir elevations can be calculated by running a single continuous 
simulation of the same length as the synthetic inflows. During the simulation, no 
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disturbances are implemented and the system is operated normally. The resulting reservoir 
levels are recorded and saved to be utilized in the scenario iteration analysis following each 
simulation.  
 
3.6 Scenario Outcome Assessment 
Following completion of the scenario simulations, there is an extremely large amount of 
data from which useful information needs to be extracted. In this research, criticality 
parameters are used to provide information about the severity of a scenario. The criticality 
parameters assessed are the conditional failure frequency, conditional frequency of 
exceeding key reservoir levels and failure inflow thresholds for each scenario. Ranking and 
filtering scenario subsets (of N affected components) can give insights into system 
vulnerabilities and key components affecting dam safety.  
Accessing and analyzing individual scenario results may also be useful. Dynamic 
performance measures are used in this research to better understand the dynamic system 
response to a given scenario. These performance measures may differ depending on the 
system of interest and can change from application to application. In this work, reservoir 
elevations over critical levels, flow conveyance capacity, and uncontrolled releases are 
selected and described in the following sections.   
3.6.1 Criticality Parameters 
The simulation environment presented in this research explores a random subset of the 
potential outcomes relating to a given scenario. Each scenario is simulated 2000 times, 
providing increased coverage of the possibility space (See Figure 3-2). This allows for an 
estimation of the criticality associated with a given scenario. Criticality parameters have 
been selected to provide useful insights about the range of outcomes simulated for each 
scenario. These include: the conditional failure frequency, the failure inflow thresholds, 
and the conditional reservoir level exceedance frequency (conditional on the scenario 
occurring).  
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As a direct result of the simulation, it is possible to determine the conditional probability 
of failure for a scenario from its complete iterations (all of the operating states for that 
particular scenario have both occurred and affected one another). This is easily done by 
determining the number of complete iterations, calculating the number of dam breaches 
occurring within the complete iterations, and determining the total proportion of failures, 
as follows. 
𝐶𝐹𝐹 (%) =
𝑁𝐵
𝐼𝑡
× 100 (3.16) 
where 𝑁𝐵 is equal to the number of breaches observed in all complete iterations, and 𝐼𝑡 is 
equal to the number of complete iterations for the scenario being analyzed. Again, complete 
iterations are where all operating states for a given scenario have both occurred and affected 
one another – so iterations with multiple sub-scenarios or dam breaches occurring prior to 
all events being initiated are excluded from the calculation.  
Another useful outcome from the simulation model is the inflow thresholds, above which 
failure occurs for a given scenario. In this research, the inflow thresholds are computed by 
looking at the 5-day average daily inflow preceding a dam breach, as well as the 5-day 
maximum daily inflow preceding a dam breach, taking the minimum across all simulations, 
as follows. 
𝐼𝑇𝑎𝑣 = min(avg [𝐼1, 𝐼2, 𝐼3, 𝐼4, 𝐼5]𝑖𝑓) (3.17) 
𝐼𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 = min(max [𝐼1, 𝐼2, 𝐼3, 𝐼4, 𝐼5]𝑖𝑡𝑓 ) (3.18) 
where 𝐼𝑛 represents the inflow on the 𝑛𝑡ℎ day preceeding the dam breach, 𝑛 = 1. . .5, and 𝑠 
represents the simulation iteration, 𝑖𝑡𝑓 = 1… 𝐼𝑇𝐹 and 𝐼𝑇𝐹 is equal to the number of 
iterations that were completely simulated for a certain scenario and where the dam failed. 
The minimum is taken of all maximum or average 5-day inflows preceding failure, for the 
complete iterations within which a failure occurred. It is also possible to consider volume 
of inflows in the days preceding a dam failure, however that was not explored in this 
research. 
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Another useful criticality parameter is the time it takes, following the start of the scenario, 
for the system to reach a failed state. This is simply calculated as the mean time to failure.  
Finally, regardless of whether a dam failure occurs, there may be adverse impacts relating 
to exceedances above particular reservoir elevations. The likelihood of exceeding a key 
reservoir elevation is another easily calculated outcome from the model. The maximum 
reservoir elevation for each run of a given scenario can be computed and used to compute 
the proportion of runs where elevations exceed the reservoir level of interest, as follows. 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐹(%) =
𝐼𝑅𝑆𝐸>𝐶𝐸
𝐼𝑡
× 100 (3.19) 
where 𝐼𝑅𝑆𝐸>𝐶𝐸 represents the number of complete iterations where the reservoir elevation 
exceeded the critical level, 𝐶𝐸, and 𝐼𝑡 represents the total number of complete iterations. 
This is the conditional probability of exceedance for that reservoir elevation and scenario. 
The scenarios can then be sorted based on their criticality parameters to illuminate the most 
troublesome operating conditions within which the system may be operating. Grouping the 
list of scenarios into a smaller list is possible by combining scenarios that contain the same 
operating states with different causal factors. This can help reduce the list size while 
providing extra simulation-years with which to estimate the failure frequency. If there is 
sufficient information to estimate the frequencies of each operating state in the model, it 
may be possible to compute the frequency of failure for the system using simple probability 
theory, as can be illustrated using a simple example. 
Conditional overtopping failure frequencies for an example scenario are shown in Table 
3-2 (given the scenario has occurred). When combined with the estimated frequency of 
occurrence of the events, an overall estimate for the frequency of overtopping failure for 
the system can be made using basic concepts from probability theory. A simple example is 
used to demonstrate this. Consider a system with components A, B, and C, which are each 
functional or failed. If each of the three components has lower and upper bound failure rate 
estimates ranging from 0.1% to 1%, an overall probabilistic assessment of the system can 
be made using the conditional overtopping failure frequencies generated through 
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Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation, as shown in Table 3-2. The conditional failure 
frequencies are assumed for the sake of the example. 
Table 3-2: Probabilistic risk assessment using example simulation 
Scenario 
Conditional 
frequency of system 
failure given 
scenario occurs (%) 
Lower bound frequency of 
component failure: 
A=0.1% 
B=0.1% 
C=0.1% 
Lower bound frequency of 
component failure: 
A=1% 
B=1% 
C=1% 
A 1 9.98*10-4 9.80E*10-3 
B 1 9.98*10-4 9.80*10-3 
C 1 9.98*10-4 9.80*10-3 
AB 5 5.00*10-6 4.95*10-4 
AC 5 5.00E*10-6 4.95*10-4 
BC 5 5.00E*10-6 4.95*10-4 
ABC 20 2.00E*10-8 2.00*10-5 
Total 
probability 
of flow 
control 
failure  3.01*10
-3 3.09*10-2 
 
In Table 3, the conditional frequency of dam overtopping failure for each scenario is 
multiplied by the probabilities of the system states , as follows: 𝑃(𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(?̅?) ∗
𝑃(𝐶̅) ∗ 𝑃(𝑓), where ?̅? = 1 − 𝐵, and the solid line over the component indicates it is not 
failed, and 𝑃(𝑓) represents the conditional probability of overtopping failure for the system 
given the scenario has occurred. In the table, the lower and upper bound estimates are 
calculated to illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the assumed component failure 
probabilities. This is particularly advantageous where failure rate data is limited and 
uncertain. The Deterministic Monte Carlo approach does not require complete re-
simulation if the sensitivity of the results to the assumed probabilities is to be analyzed. 
The sensitivity of the overall probability of failure for the system can be easily calculated 
by simply modifying the assumed component failure rates and updating the equation. In 
contrast, a fully stochastic simulation approach would require re-simulation to analyze the 
sensitivity of results to assumed failure rates, since the probabilities are embedded within 
the stochastic simulation model.  
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In the absence of reliable information relating to the failure of various components, the 
overall failure rates were not explored further in this research. This topic remains an 
important area for future work.   
3.6.2 Performance measures  
In terms of overall assessment of the system performance, it is useful to define dynamic 
safety performance measures that can be plotted over time from the scenario outputs. These 
performance measures show how the system changes over time and, where possible, the 
recovery from the disturbance. Different performance measures may be selected for 
different systems of interest. In selecting these performance measures, it is important to 
consider the functions which a dam is meant to carry out and how the system may reach a 
less desirable state.  
Dam systems act to store and convey water for beneficial purposes such as hydropower, 
water supply and flood control. The dam acts to retain water and its flow-conveyance 
features (eg. spillways, turbines, low level outlets and valves) are controlled by dam 
operators to pass water and maintain reservoir levels within safe limits. Loss of control of 
the reservoir can occur as a result of natural disturbances such as earthquakes, landslides, 
debris, etc., as well as a number of internal factors including operational failures, inflow 
forecasting errors, site access and staffing problems as well as systemic problems like 
failing to maintain and upgrade infrastructure. Loss of functionality of flow-conveyance 
features of the system can directly lead to loss of reservoir control, potentially causing 
overtopping and failure. Issues with dam design or external disturbances can also affect the 
dam itself resulting in the inability to retain water which could potentially lead to dam 
collapse and catastrophic flooding. In considering the functions a dam is meant to perform, 
it becomes clear that two key performance measures relate to flow retention and flow 
conveyance. Flow conveyance capacity and uncontrolled flow releases are chosen to 
represent flow conveyance and retention, and reservoir elevations exceeding critical safety 
levels is also selected. These performance indicators and their values over time can be 
calculated directly from simulation outputs. The result is a numerical indicator showing 
how the dams condition changes with time for a given operating scenario.  
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It is ultimately up to the experts and asset owners to determine an appropriate amount of 
detail for the simulation model and select a particular set of performance measures of 
interest for a specific system. The following sections describe the performance measures 
selected for this research, but others may be added depending on the dam of interest. A 
final section describes aggregation of scenario outcomes to reach general conclusions about 
the performance of the dam. 
3.6.2.1 Conveyance Capacity 
Conveyance capacity represents the ability of flow-conveyance infrastructure such as 
turbines and spillways to pass water through the system. This is an important indicator of 
system safety because a loss in conveyance results in a lowered ability to manage inflows 
safely. Conveyance capacity is equal to the available total discharge capacity as a function 
of time (Equation 22):  
𝐶𝐶(𝑡) =∑𝐹𝐶(𝑐, 𝑡)
𝐶
𝑐=0
 (3.20) 
Where 𝐶𝐶(𝑡) is the discharge capacity of the system at full pool for time 𝑡, and 𝐹𝐶(𝑐, 𝑡) is 
the discharge capacity of flow-conveyance component 𝑐 (𝑐 = 1…𝐶) at full pool for time 
𝑡. If all conveyance facilities are performing, the maximum performance value is thus equal 
to the maximum discharge at full pool, including free overflow facilities (and the minimum 
performance is 0 m3/s). 
3.6.2.2 Total Uncontrolled Release 
Another key indicator of dam system safety is the ability of the system to retain water 
where it is meant to do so. Failure to retain water results in an uncontrolled release of flow, 
which may be through the dam itself (dam breach), or through a failed penstock, spillway 
gate, or turbine head cover. Uncontrolled release also includes any water passing over the 
free-crest spillway and dam, which represents flow that is no longer under the control of 
the operators. Total uncontrolled release (𝑈𝑅) is calculated at each time step and is shown 
in Equation 22: 
𝑈𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑄𝐷𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑄𝑃𝐿(𝑡) + 𝑄𝑂𝐹(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐻𝐶(𝑡) + 𝑄𝐺𝐶(𝑡) (3.21) 
136 
 
Where 𝑄𝐷𝐵 is the dam breach flow, 𝑄𝑃𝐿 is the penstock leakage, 𝑄𝑂𝐹 is the flow passing 
through the overflow weir or over the dam, 𝑄𝐻𝐶 is any water escaping through the head 
cover of the turbine, and 𝑄𝐺𝐶 is any water passing through a failed spillway gate. The 
individual uncontrolled release variables are useful on their own as well, and can be 
investigated for a particular scenario and iteration directly from the model output. 
Combining these into a single variable, 𝑈𝑅, provides some useful indication about the 
performance and helps reduce the size of the simulation output files, but when there are 
multiple sources of uncontrolled release it may become more difficult to analyze what the 
sources are. This is a minor limitation that can be overcome by saving these flows 
separately if additional data storage capacity is available.   
3.6.2.3 Reservoir elevations exceeding critical safety levels 
Perhaps the most important indicator of dam system safety is the reservoir elevation itself. 
Dam systems typically have reservoir operating limits within which the reservoir remains, 
known as the normal minimum and normal maximum flows. Some excursions above the 
maximum level may be expected during high inflow conditions, and there may be a safety-
critical reservoir levels which the reservoir should not exceed due to potential dam safety 
problems. For an earth dam, the elevation of the core or filter material should not be 
exceeded as this may result in internal erosion and could potentially progress to dam 
failure. For a concrete dam, there may be other factors such as structural stability being 
reduced above a certain reservoir level. This elevation will differ between dam systems 
and could be equal to the height of the dam itself. Elevations over critical safety levels can 
be visualized in two ways: (1) by observing the resulting reservoir level plots for each 
complete iteration of a scenario, where all scenario events both occurred and affected one 
another, and (2) through reservoir level time exceedance frequency plots. These plots can 
be easily derived by collecting all observations for each complete scenario iteration and 
determining the percentage of time that various elevations are exceeded using the following 
formula (USBR 2018): 
𝐸𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. =
𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑠 − (𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. + 1)
𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑠 + 1
∗ 100 (3.22) 
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Where 𝐸𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. is the exceedance frequency for a specific reservoir elevation 𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙., 
𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑠 is the total number of observed daily reservoir elevation values from the scenario’s 
complete iterations (all events occurring and affecting one another), and 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. is the 
number of observations where the elevation exceeded 𝑟𝑒𝑓 𝑒𝑙. To generate exceedance 
frequency curves, a range of reservoir elevations is taken from the minimum to the 
maximum at a user-defined interval, and the exceedance frequency is computed for each. 
The reservoir levels are then plotted against the exceedance frequencies. Key critical levels 
(such as free overflow spillway sill elevation and the elevations of key structures) can be 
plotted on the exceedance frequency curves to help illustrate the severity of the scenario.  
3.7  Summary 
This chapter presents the methodology for the research. First, a description of the 
requirements of a new approach and the ability of existing tools to meet these requirements 
is provided. While each approach offers specific advantages, there are limitations inherent 
to all of the approaches used within and outside of the dams industry. This leads to the 
methodology development, which aims to meet as many of the requirements as possible. 
This research proposes using a systems approach to the problem of dam safety analysis, 
systematically characterizing pre-generated scenarios through simulation.  
A new methodology is presented that uses Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation to analyze 
a wide range of potential operating conditions for a dam system. Scenarios are used as 
deterministic inputs to the model, and the scenario parameters are varied using Monte Carlo 
techniques to explore each scenario’s potential outcomes. In order to generate a list of 
scenarios for the simulation model, an operating states database is developed which can be 
applied to any system, and used to document components, their operating states, causal 
factors, and operating state impacts. Using database outputs and component operating state 
sets, a combinatorial procedure applies the Cartesian Product to come up with the complete 
range of component operating state combinations (scenarios). The scenarios becomes the 
input to the Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework. 
The simulation framework uses the pre-generated scenarios (operating states) as inputs, 
with Monte Carlo variation of inflows as well as operating state impact timing and 
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magnitude. This simulation framework has the advantage of (a) investigating a larger, more 
complete set of potential scenarios than is practical using traditional methods, and (b) 
providing a more in-depth analysis of the range of system behaviour in response to each 
scenario.  
Simulations are performed using a system dynamics simulation model, which is capable of 
representing complexity, feedbacks and component interactions in a relatively 
straightforward way. The object-oriented modelling environment used in system dynamics 
clearly shows the components and the relationships between them which improves the 
transparency of the model and the ease with which it is built and modified. Timing 
considerations are also addressed in this work. An algorithm is proposed to assess whether 
preceding events within a simulation affected the events that occurred later.  
The results from the simulation can be analyzed in a number of ways. Post-processing of 
individual scenarios can be performed to determine the conditional probabilities of failure 
and excursions above key reservoir elevations, as well as inflow thresholds for failure. 
Individual scenario results can be used to plot the reservoir elevations, flow conveyance 
capacity and uncontrolled releases over time, as well as reservoir exceedance frequency 
plots.  The methodology proposed in this work provides a means of evaluating the full 
range of possible operating state combinations for the system within current computational 
abilities. At this time, the same outcome would not be possible using stochastic techniques 
because the occurrence of these combinations of events is quite rare (they have a low 
probability), so a prohibitively large number of simulation-years would be required to 
achieve the same result. The methodology in this research also evaluates scenarios dynamic 
outcomes, taking into account feedbacks and nonlinear behaviour which are not readily 
dealt with using the traditional risk assessment techniques.   
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Chapter 4 
4 Case Study: Cheakamus Hydropower Project 
The methodology presented in the previous chapter has been applied to BC Hydro’s 
Cheakamus Hydropower Project. A complete database representation of the system is 
presented, and the combinatorial procedure is used to generate all combinations of 
component operating states (scenarios). A full detailed system dynamics model 
representative of the Cheakamus Project is described in King et al. (2017). Due to an 
extremely large number of potential scenarios for the case study, a simplified proof-of-
concept example was subsequently developed, which has some of the characteristics of the 
Cheakamus Project. The key difference is a reduced number of system features, with the 
goal of reducing the number of potential scenarios to ensure simulation feasibility with the 
limited computational resources available. With limited computational resources on the 
Compute Canada systems, it was possible to simulate two complete runs through 1.11 
Million scenarios, each with over 1000 different Monte-Carlo input parameters (iterations). 
The two runs completed were the base case and the dam safety improved case which 
contained modifications to operating rules and components.  
The following section provides a description of the Cheakamus Hydropower Project which 
was the study area for this research. Next, a description of the system dynamics model 
development is provided for the detailed representation of this system. The following 
section deals with scenario generation for the detailed Cheakamus representation. Next, a 
description of the simplified version of the Cheakamus system is provided, due to the 
extremely high number of scenarios generated for the complex system representation. The 
simplified generation of scenario is described, as well as a detailed description of the 
simulation model configuration and testing. Inflow generation for the case study is 
presented, followed by a description of the scenario simulation process. Finally, simulation 
results and discussion are provided. 
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4.1 Cheakamus Hydropower Project Description 
The Cheakamus Hydropower Project is located 30km north of Squamish, British 
Columbia, Canada and is operated by BC Hydro, the provincial power utility. The 
Cheakamus River originates approximately 25km southeast of Whistler, B.C. and has an 
area of 1070km2. The headwaters start at 2500m above sea level and the river eventually 
discharges into the Squamish River 26km downstream of the dam at El. 30m (above sea 
level). Cheakamus Dam impounds Daisy Lake and has a drainage area of 780km2, 
receiving about 75% of the Cheakamus river inflow (BC Hydro 2005).  The average 
reservoir inflow is around 50m3/s (BC Hydro 2005). 
 
Figure 4-1: Cheakamus Hydropower Project area map (BC Hydro, 2005) 
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Figure 4-1 contains a map of the region with the locations of the dam and powerhouse 
shown. Daisy lake has a live storage capability of 55 million m3 and a typical operating 
range of El. 364.90m to El. 377.25m (BC Hydro 2005). The stage-storage curve for Daisy 
Lake is provided in Appendix A. 
The Cheakamus Main Dam consists of an Earthfill Dam, a Concrete Main Dam gravity 
structure, and a concrete gravity overflow Wing Dam. Daisy Lake is also impounded 
Saddle Dam No 1. An overflow channel, along with the Wing Dam and Saddle Dam No. 
1, provide free overflow discharge capability for the system. A power canal leads to the 
power intake structure at Shadow Lake which is impounded by the Shadow Lake Saddle 
Dam. Water for power is drawn through a canal beneath Highway 99 and into an 11km 
tunnel through Cloudburst Mountain. At the end of the tunnel, two penstocks carry the 
water to a powerhouse that discharges into the Squamish River upstream of its confluence 
with the Cheakamus River. The maximum power discharge is 65m3/s which can generate 
up to 157MW of power through two vertical Francis units. Flood flows are discharged into 
the Cheakamus River at the Concrete Main Dam, which contains two Spillway Operating 
Gates (SPOGs) with a combined discharge capacity of 1590m3/s at the maximum normal 
reservoir level (MNRL) of El. 378.26m. A low level outlet sluice (LLO) with a discharge 
capacity of 196m3/s at MNRL and five free overflow spillway ports are also located at the 
concrete dam. There is an additional low level outlet controlled by a Hollow Cone Valve 
which is considered to be out of service. Details regarding the relationship between 
elevation and discharge for fully open gates are provided in Appendix A. The project 
schematic is shown in Figure 4-2. An overall site plan showing the locations of the dams 
can be found in Figure 4-3. 
The province of BC underwent a water use planning process for Cheakamus Dam that 
prescribed minimum discharges downstream of the dam, flow ramping rates (rates of 
discharge increase) and operating levels to be adhered to (if possible) by the system 
operators. The minimum discharge information is shown in Appendix A (BC Hydro 2005). 
The historical daily inflows are also shown in Appendix A.  
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Figure 4-2: Cheakamus Hydropower Project system schematic (BC Hydro, 2005) 
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Figure 4-3: Cheakamus dam site overview 
It is also useful to understand the control system infrastructure in place for the Cheakamus 
System. A hierarchical control system structure is shown in Figure 4-4. This schematic 
shows the regulatory and organizational controllers at the top, moving down towards the 
control infrastructure itself. The exchange, transfer and movement of information 
throughout the system is shown in detail in this figure.  
The Cheakamus System structure and data were used with the framework described in 
Section 3.2 to populate the component operating states database for the Cheakamus System 
and generate an extensive list of potential operating scenarios (Section 3.3). This process 
is described in the following section. 
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Figure 4-4: Hierarchical control system structure of Cheakamus Project 
 
4.2 Cheakamus Database Population and Scenario 
Development 
To generate scenarios for the Cheakamus System, an in-depth understanding of the system 
and its interactions is required. Information should be collected about the system structure, 
components and connections. This will help in identifying the components and their 
potential operating states within the database. In this research, STPA is used to improve 
the understanding of the system for database population. The process also helps inform the 
development of the system structure within the simulation model. Following STPA, the 
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database is populated and the database outcomes are used to generate the complete list of 
scenarios.  
4.2.1 Systems Theoretic Process Analysis for Cheakamus System 
In order to help facilitate the development of the operating states database, the STPA 
procedure of Leveson (2011) was applied to a high-level version of the detailed Cheakamus 
system. STPA is a systematic approach to evaluating potential control actions that can lead 
to hazards for a system. The control actions can then, if possible, become operating states 
within the database or can be programmed into the simulation model.  
The goal of the STPA analysis was a high level review of potentially hazardous conditions 
at the dam site, to help guide the development of the model and operating states database. 
The control system structure developed for this process is shown in Figure 4-4 and 
Appendix B contains the complete analysis that was done (though this would likely change 
and become much more comprehensive with expert input from BC Hydro). 
Prior to initiating an STPA analysis, the high-level system hazards must be defined. The 
hazards selected for Cheakamus Dam are as follows: 
• H1: High flows released into Cheakamus River and/or Squamish River (flood) 
• H2: Flow releases to Cheakamus River stopped (fish kill) 
• H3: Equipment damaged (economic/safety impact) 
• H4: Loss of power production (economic impact) 
Next, a set of high-level system safety constraints (requirements) are defined, as follows: 
• SH1: Flows released into Cheakamus and/or Squamish must not exceed a level that 
causes damage downstream  
• SH2: Flow must always be released to Cheakamus River 
• SH3: Equipment must not become damaged 
Following the definition of these hazards and safety constraints or requirements, a detailed 
hierarchical control system structure can be developed, as shown in Figure 4-4. Then, the 
process can begin, with the first step being to identify unsafe control actions. Unsafe 
control actions are defined for each control feature of the system, which in this case 
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includes both gates, both turbines and the low-level outlet. A table is used with four 
columns that can be used to guide the assessment: providing causes hazard, not providing 
causes hazard, wrong timing or order causes hazard, and stopping too soon or applying too 
long causes hazard.  
Once the unsafe control actions (UCA’s) are defined, the next step in the process involves 
looking at each UCA individually and considering how the issue may arise (the causes). 
Finally, additional factors can be listed.  
Looking at the detailed description of UCA’s and their causes (Step 2 in Appendix B) 
provides some interesting insights regarding the degree to which the approach presented in 
this work is able to fully cover the range of potential operating states. Focusing on the 
scenarios that involve flooding (H1), there are some instances where human factors may 
lead to more complicated scenarios than the automated procedure developed in this work 
is able to generate. Some scenarios may require additional effort for simulation due to the 
complex nature of human decision making. UCA1/UCA10 from the STPA analysis is 
presented below to illustrate this. 
UCA1/UCA10: SPOG Open command not provided when water level high, inflow high or 
both [H1, H3] 
 Case 1: Water level high, inflow low, open command not provided 
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DS) unaware of reservoir level due to 
gauge failure, sensor failures or communication delays 
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional 
flows are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, 
DC) make a decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to an 
unsafe state even though the inflow is relatively low. 
 Case 2: Water level high, inflow high, open command not provided 
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-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) believe they can return the reservoir to a 
safe level using the powerhouse and/or LLO and/or other SPOG due to 
inflow forecast errors 
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DS) unaware of reservoir level due to 
gauge failure, sensor failures or communication delays 
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional 
flows are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, 
DC) make a decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to 
unsafe levels 
-Controllers do not follow procedure (human error due to fatigue or shift 
change at PSOSE/FVO) 
 Case 3: Water level low, inflow high, open command not provided 
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) believe they can keep the reservoir at a 
safe level without opening the gate, due to inflow forecast errors or process 
errors 
 -Gate(s) out of service for maintenance purposes and therefore cannot be opened. 
 -Controller thinks gate open (sensor failure, communication delay) 
In this example, there is a potential scenario where high tides at Squamish (downstream of 
Cheakamus) lead the operator to hold back water when a high-inflow event is occurring. 
This scenario would be difficult to analyze within the proposed Deterministic Monte Carlo 
model, due to the major factor being human decision making. It would require additional 
simulation effort to fully capture this potential scenario. Process errors or controllers not 
following procedure are difficult to simulate since there are so many different ways in 
which the decision-making can unfold.  Some of the causes of the UCA shown above (for 
example gates being out of service, sensor failures, communication delays, inflow forecast 
errors, etc.) are both easily incorporated into the operating states database, and easily 
simulated using the system dynamics model. 
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STPA is quite useful as a preliminary assessment tool that can be used to inform the 
development of the operating states database and simulation model. The results of the 
assessment can also significantly help with identifying and some non-failure related 
operating constraints that have the potential to lead to a hazard – the operating states 
database and simulation model can then be developed to ensure simulation of these non-
failure related events is possible. Some of the scenarios uncovered through this systematic 
assessment approach would be difficult to quantify using the automated simulation 
approach described in this work and may not fit well into the database structure. However, 
they may be able to be analyzed through a more case-specific simulation experiment. 
Performing an STPA is helpful to improve the understanding of the system and ensure 
operators are aware of all potential causes of failure for the system in order to manage risks 
and avoid catastrophic impacts of dam failure.  
It is important to note that the STPA analysis in Appendix B is provided for illustrative 
purposes only. It is in no way representative of a complete assessment for the real 
Cheakamus System, and was not performed by BC Hydro personnel.  
 
4.2.2 Database Population and Scenario Generation 
The component operating states database was populated based on the components in the 
Cheakamus Hydropower Project and the information gathered through the STPA process. 
The components tree showing the system configuration is provided in Figure 4-5. Each 
component in the leftmost column is at the Reservoir Level. Each drop-down to the right 
of this consists of the Component Level features of the system. Each of the components 
contains a minimum of two operating states (normal and adverse) and each operating state 
has a minimum of one causal factor. Each combination of operating state and causal factor 
is recorded as a separate operating state. The complete database extract table for the 
complex system is presented in Appendix C. 
The information in the database is used to come up with a unique identifier for each object 
in the system as well as it’s causal factors. For Reservoir Level components, the 
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ReservoirLevelID is used as the component identifier, 𝑛, and a number 𝑚𝑛, 𝑚𝑛 ∈
 (1…𝑀𝑛) is assigned to each operating state/causal factor combination for component 𝑛. 
The operating state identifier takes the form 𝑛_𝑚𝑛, which is used to group the operating 
states into sets for each component that are used in the calculation of the Cartesian product. 
For objects at the component level, the ReservoirLevelID and the ComponentLevelID are 
combined into a three to four-digit number which is used as the component identifier, 𝑛, 
since there may be multiple items at the Component Level for a single Reservoir Level 
item. Operating state/causal factor combinations are similarly assigned a number 𝑚𝑛. The 
identifiers can be seen in the database extract table in Appendix C Once the identifiers are 
assigned, they are grouped into sets and Python’s itertools product function is used to 
compute the Cartesian Product, which results in a list of all possible combinations of 
operating state identifiers for each component. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Components tree for the Cheakamus System 
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Table 4-1 contains a list of each component in the system and its object identifier, n, which 
is a two-digit number for Reservoir Level items and a three to four-digit number for 
Component Level items. The name of each component is shown as well as the total number 
of operating states in each operating state set, Mn. Multiplying together all of the numbers 
in the column Mn, as per Equation 3 gives the total number of possible scenarios, or the 
number of elements in the Cartesian product, which is equal to 1.83 x 1027. This number 
can be verified by computing the Cartesian product using Python’s itertools product 
function, which generates a list of the same length. Each element in the generated list 
contains a single operating state for all components in the system. This is an exhaustive list 
which includes everything from a completely functional system to a system where every 
component has some adverse operating state.  
An additional calculation was done where causal factors leading to the same operating state 
were grouped as a single operating state. This would avoid redundant simulations of the 
same operating states with different contributing causal factors – though the model does 
distinguish between causal factors in terms of time-of-year restrictions. The number of 
scenarios with grouped causal factors for the Cheakamus system model is 1.54 x 1017, 
which is significantly fewer scenarios than if each causal factor-operating state 
combination is considered separately. Grouping of causal factors to avoid redundancy may 
potentially be an effective way to reduce the number of simulations required to evaluate 
each scenario. 
Obviously, simulation of such large number of scenarios would be computationally 
prohibitive given the current state of technology and the finite resources available for this 
research project. As such, the simulation portion of this research is focusing on a simplified 
abstraction of the Cheakamus System, described in the following section.   
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Table 4-1: Number of unique operating state and causal factor combinations for 
each component in the complex system 
Object ID, 
n 
ReservoirLevelID ComponentLevelID Reservoir Level Name Component Level Name Mn 
46 46  Gate Pier 2 
22 22  Main Earth Dam 1 
18 18  Dam Programmable Logic Controller 3 
19 19  Powerhouse Programmable Logic Controller 3 
16 16  Dam Remote Terminal Unit 3 
17 17  Powerhouse Remote Terminal Unit 3 
21 21  Main Dam 2 
27 27  Backup Diesel Generator 5 
29 29  Dam Access 5 
28 28  Powerhouse Access 5 
30 30  Reservoir Elevation Sensor 1 7 
31 31  Reservoir Elevation Sensor 2 7 
47 47  Reservoir Elevation Sensor 3 7 
37 37  Gate 1 Linear Position Sensor 4 
39 39  Gate 2 Linear Position Sensor 4 
38 38  Gate 2 Rotational Position Sensor 4 
36 36  Gate 1 Rotational Position Sensor 4 
41 41  Power tunnel 2 
42 42  Penstock 2 
44 44  Powerhouse Grid 5 
43 43  Dam Grid 5 
45 45  Inflow Forecast 3 
48 48  Site Staff Availability 3 
1326 13 26 Gate 1 Gate Hoist 1 6 
1328 13 28 Gate 1 Skinplate 3 
1331 13 31 Gate 1 Gearbox 3 
1332 13 32 Gate 1 Motor 4 
1333 13 33 Gate 1 Structural Supports 4 
1334 13 34 Gate 1 Hoist Gate Connection 1 2 
1343 13 43 Gate 1 Thrustor Brake 3 
1355 13 55 Gate 1 Backup Motor 4 
1357 13 57 Gate 1 Gate 1 Opening 2 
1416 14 16 Gate 2 Gate Hoist 2 6 
1418 14 18 Gate 2 Skinplate 3 
1421 14 21 Gate 2 Gearbox 3 
1422 14 22 Gate 2 Motor 4 
1423 14 23 Gate 2 Structural Supports 4 
1424 14 24 Gate 2 Hoist Gate Connection 2 2 
1444 14 44 Gate 2 Thrustor Brake 3 
1456 14 56 Gate 2 Backup Motor 4 
1458 14 58 Gate 2 Gate 2 Opening 2 
836 8 36 Turbine 1 Head Cover 2 
837 8 37 Turbine 1 Wicket Gates 2 
838 8 38 Turbine 1 Generator 2 
1039 10 39 Turbine 2 Head Cover 2 
1040 10 40 Turbine 2 Wicket Gates 2 
1041 10 41 Turbine 2 Generator 2 
1546 15 46 Low Level Outlet Hoist 6 
1547 15 47 Low Level Outlet Skinplate 3 
1548 15 48 Low Level Outlet Motor 4 
1549 15 49 Low Level Outlet Support 4 
1550 15 50 Low Level Outlet Hoist Gate Connection 2 
1551 15 51 Low Level Outlet Thrustor Brake 3 
1554 15 54 Low Level Outlet Gearbox 3 
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4.3 Simplified System Database Population and Scenario 
Development 
Due to the extremely large number of scenarios generated for a complex representation of 
the Cheakamus System, a simplified abstraction of the system was developed to facilitate 
scenario simulation. The goal of this simplification was to create a system that mimics the 
function of Cheakamus but has significantly less components and as such fewer scenarios 
to simulate. This simplified system provides a proof-of-concept for the methodology 
described in this research. For applications to similar systems to Cheakamus, it may be 
desirable to utilize some of the simplifications described here, such as aggregating 
components with similar impacts into grouped components, with the goal of reducing the 
occurrence of redundant scenarios. This process could potentially be guided by the use of 
fault tree analysis for sub-systems such as the gate equipment. Due to computational 
resource limitations for this research, the simplified system lacks some of the key 
redundancy features of the real Cheakamus System that increase its overall level of safety. 
As such, results for the simplified system are not considered to be representative of the real 
Cheakamus Project safety and performance. 
In the simplified version of the system, the existing reservoir stage-storage relationship is 
used. The two spillway gates (SPOG1 and SPOG2) are combined into a single gate (SPOG) 
with a rating curve equal to the sum of the discharge columns from the individual rating 
curves. The Low Level Outlet sluice is omitted from the model. The two turbines are 
combined into a single unit capable of conveying the total flow of both units. The main 
communications equipment in the Cheakamus System (the PLC and the RTU) are idealized 
as a single component (PLCRTU). Gate components are also simplified into categories 
representing the impacts that occur upon failure – gate failing in place, gate failing closed, 
and gate collapse. The sensors for the reservoir level are combined into a single sensor and 
the sensors for gate position are omitted. Wicket gates are eliminated from the turbine 
components and a single grid is modelled instead of separate power connections to the 
powerhouse and the dam. In addition to the component changes, some causal factors were 
omitted from the analysis to reduce further the scenario list, since each operating state-
causal factor combination is counted as a unique operating state.  
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To show how the model can be useful in assessment of safety improvements realized by 
potential capital upgrades and operating rules, two cases are simulated. These are a “base 
case” which has a significantly smaller free overflow spillway than the real system, and a 
“dam safety improved case” which has an identical free overflow spillway as well as 
improved operating rules and a slightly reduced failure frequency for certain components. 
These scenarios are described further in Section 4.4.3. 
Using the simplified abstraction of the Cheakamus System, a new version of the database 
was developed. Figure 4-6 contains the components tree for the simplified system. 
Appendix D contains the full database details for the simplified system. Table 4-2 contains 
a list of each component in the simplified system including its identifier, 𝑛, the 
ReservoirLevelID and ComponentLevelID (from the database), component description 
and the number of operating states in each component’s operating state set, Mn.  
  
Figure 4-6: Components tree for the simplified system 
Multiplying together the values of Mn as shown in Equation 3 yields the total number of 
possible scenarios for the system, which is equal to 5.5 x 105. This number can be verified 
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by computing the Cartesian Product using Python’s itertools product function, which 
generates a list of scenarios of the same length. 
Table 4-2: Number of unique operating state and causal factor combinations for 
each component in the simplified system 
Object ID, n ReservoirLevelID ComponentLevelID Reservoir Level Name Component Level Name Mn 
18 18  Programmable Logic Controller / Remote Terminal Unit 4 
29 29  Dam Access 4 
30 30  Res El Sensor 1 5 
42 42  Penstock 2 
44 44  Grid 4 
45 45  CMS Inflow Forecast 1 
48 48  Site Staff Availability 3 
836 8 36 Turbine 1 Head Cover 2 
838 8 38 Turbine 1 Generator 2 
1359 13 59 Gate 1 Gate opening 2 
1361 13 61 Gate 1 Components failing open 3 
1362 13 62 Gate 1 Components failing closed 4 
1360 13 60 Gate 1 Components failing in place 3 
Comparing the total number of possible scenarios for the complex representation of 
Cheakamus to the simple system, it is clear that with more components and a larger number 
of operating states and causal factors, the number of possible operating scenarios grows 
exponentially. There is a trade-off between the level of complexity represented and the 
amount of computational effort required – this requires serious consideration in model 
development and could result in different modellers creating different versions of the same 
system. It is very important to ensure any simplifications of real-world systems take into 
consideration component redundancies that can significantly improve scenario outcomes. 
Future work should explore methods for reducing the impact of this tradeoff by decreasing 
the computational effort required to cover larger numbers of scenarios – this may include 
the use of pattern recognition techniques.    
Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 contain the key database parameters from a single example 
scenario for the simple system, for the components at the Reservoir Level and the 
Component Level, respectively. The example scenario contains the following identifiers 
(in the form Component_OperatingStateNumber): 
155 
 
[18_1, 44_1, 30_1, 45_1, 29_4, 42_2, 48_3, 838_1, 836_2, 1359_1, 1360_2, 1361_1, 
1362_1] 
 
Table 4-3: Database information from example scenario: Reservoir Level 
Identifier 
Reservoir 
Level 
Name 
Operating 
State 
Name 
Min Max Avg 
Causal 
Factor 
Name 
Max 
Date 
Min 
Date 
18_1 
PLC/RTU PLC offline 
1 24 6 
Voltage 
Fluctuation 
365 0 
44_1 Grid Grid failure 0.04 7 0.16 Wind storm 365 0 
30_1 
Reservoir Elevation 
Sensor 1 
Wrong Reading 
10 100 25 
Temperature 
365 0 
45_1 
CMS Inflow Forecast Inflow forecast 
normal 
0 0 0 
None 
365 1 
29_4 Dam Access Typical access time 2 4 2.5 None 365 1 
42_2 Penstock Normal operation 0 0 0 None 365 0 
48_3 Site Staff Availability Staff available 0 0 0 None 365 0 
Table 4-4: Database information from example scenario: Component Level 
Identifier Reservoir 
Level 
Name 
Component 
Level 
Name 
Operating 
State 
Name 
Min Max Avg Causal 
Factor 
Name 
Min 
Date 
Max 
Date 
838_1 Turbine 1 Generator Load Rejection 0.1 7 0.25 Maintenance 1 365 
836_2 Turbine 1 Head Cover Normal 0 0 0 None 1 365 
1359_1 Gate 1 Gate opening Normal 0 0 0 None 1 365 
1360_2 Gate 1 Components 
failing in place 
Components of 
the gate fail 
causing it to 
remain in place 
0.5 120 7 Maintenance 1 365 
1361_1 Gate 1 Components 
failing open 
Normal 0 0 0 Normal 1 365 
1362_1 Gate 1 Components 
failing closed 
Normal 0 0 0 Normal 1 365 
In the example scenario, the PLC/RTU is offline due to a voltage fluctuation, and the grid 
is offline because of a wind storm. Temperature fluctuations have affected the reservoir 
elevation sensor which is giving a false reading. There is also a load rejection which results 
in the unit being offline. Components of the gate are also failed due to a lack of maintenance 
and the gate is stuck in its current position. These tables provide a good indication of the 
information that the simulation model reads in to run the simulation: The minimum, 
maximum and average impact magnitudes and the causal factor date restrictions are used 
in the Monte Carlo generation of parameters for each iteration of the particular scenario 
being run.   
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A description of the system dynamics model developed for the simplified system is 
provided in the following section.  
 
4.4 Simplified System Model Description 
The simplified system as described in the database was initially modelled using the system 
dynamics software Vensim (Ventana Systems 2015) interfaced with Python (Python 
Software Foundation, 2012). It was eventually converted into a pure-code Python script 
using the sdpy package to facilitate simulation using cluster computing on the Linux 
operating systems at Compute Canada. Converting the code to a Python environment also 
significantly improved the simulation efficiency by reducing the overhead associated with 
passing information between Vensim and Python. Appendix E contains the Python script 
for the scenario generation. A complete package that can be used to run simulations can be 
found in the electronic files under the dam_safety_simulation folder. This section describes 
the model in more detail and provides the model testing results that compare the simulation 
outputs to the historically observed Cheakamus System (on which the model is loosely 
based). A description of the base case and the dam safety improved case for the simulations 
is also provided. 
The key benefit of using a system dynamics software package such as Vensim is that the 
system structure can be constructed in an object-oriented way, allowing for easy 
visualization and modification of the relationships between system components. 
Subscripting is another useful feature. Vensim allows for multiple sectors or model views, 
which are related to one another using “shadow variables” that link the variables between 
the sectors. One drawback associated with Vensim and similar software packages is there 
may be limitations to the complexity of functions defined within the software. As a result 
of this limitation, a link between the Vensim program and Python programming language 
was made using the venpy package (Breach 2015) which allows function equations to be 
programmed directly in python. While this link is useful for model development and 
testing, there is a significant amount of overhead associated with passing information 
between the two programs. Since the goal of this research is to simulate the full suite of 
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potential scenarios, the model was eventually converted directly to Python script, however 
the model structure remains the same. The object-oriented building blocks and equations 
in Vensim and Python can easily be translated to the pure Python environment using the 
pysd package (provided in the dam_safety_simulation folder of the electronic appendix).  
The following sections describe the system dynamics model development. Screen shots of 
the system structure are taken from Vensim.   
4.4.1 Model description 
The following sections provide the detailed equations used in each of the system dynamics 
model sectors. The model sectors follow the generic control loop of Leveson (2011), which 
is expanded on to detail the relationships modelled in each sector in Figure 4-7. The 
Hydraulic System State sector contains the water balance and pertinent relationships to 
that. Reservoir inflows, storage and outflows are modelled. Outflows are a sum of flows 
through the turbine, uncontrolled flows through the penstock, gate flows, overflows and 
dam breach flows. Dam breach initiation and gate blockage are also modelled within the 
sector, as well as the binary position of the power intake gate. The Sensors Sector includes 
the collection and relay of reservoir level information for use in the operations sector. 
Reservoir sensor errors and relay issues are also modelled within the sector. The Operations 
Sector models the decision making and implementation. This includes inflow forecasting, 
operations planning, remote or manual actuation and delays in mobilization of personnel 
to the site. The Gate Actuators Sector models the gate position and availability, which is a 
function of the condition of the gate components as well as power supply. The Turbine 
Actuators Sector models the condition of power flow release components and determines 
the releases through the unit and uncontrolled releases through a ruptured penstock or failed 
head cover. Finally, the Disturbances Sector models the implementation of adverse 
operating states (which are a model input). This includes failures, errors and delays as well 
as capacity losses at the gate due to debris accumulation.  
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Figure 4-7: Simulation model sectors 
The following paragraphs provide the stock-and-flow diagrams, details and equations for 
each of the model sectors. Each stock-and-flow diagram shows the relationships within the 
sub-system. Variables can also enter the sub-system from other sub-systems. 
4.4.1.1 Hydraulic System State Sector 
The Hydraulic System State Sector is shown in Figure 4-8 with the variable names and 
symbols shown in Table 4-5. This sector represents the status of the hydraulic infrastructure 
in the system relating to water retention (dams) and conveyance (water passages). It should 
be noted that components which move – such as gates, valves, and turbines – are considered 
Actuators. The functioning of these electrical, mechanical and structural components are 
represented within the Actuators sector and are not modelled as part of the Hydraulic 
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System State sector. Reservoir storage, flow conveyance through gates and turbines, 
overtopping and breach are represented in this sector.  
 
Figure 4-8: Hydraulic System State Sector 
Table 4-5: Hydraulic System State Sector variable names 
Variable name Variable symbol 
Reservoir Storage (m3/s-day) S 
Reservoir Level (m) El 
Inflow (m3/s) I 
Outflow (m3/s) O 
Unobstructed gate flow (m3/s) QGU 
Gated spill release (m3/s) QG 
Power flow release (m3/s) QP 
Gate position (m) g 
Gate capacity (%) GC 
Overflow (m3/s) QOF 
Breach triggered (binary) EDB 
Breach flow (m3/s) QDB 
Powerhouse flow conveyance (m3/s) PQC 
Penstock leakage (m3/s) QPen 
Other component time to repair (penstock) (days) Pttr 
Intake gate closure (binary) IG 
160 
 
In this sector, reservoir storage is represented as a stock, with flows Inflow, I, increasing 
its value and Outflow, O, decreasing its value. The reservoir storage stock value is 
calculated by determining the difference in inflow and outflow at each time step, as shown 
in Equation 4:  
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐼 − 𝑂 (4.1) 
Where S represents storage, t represents time, I represents inflow and O represents outflow. 
Storage is directly related to reservoir elevation (El) as described by the stage-storage table 
for the reservoir of interest. The Stage-storage curve (SSC) which determines reservoir 
elevation El from storage S and it’s reverse (SSCRev) are supporting functions described 
in more detail in Appendix E. 
The model outflow O represents a summation of the outflows from each of the N spillway 
gate conduits (QGi, i=1….n), flows passing through the turbines (QP), and any 
uncontrolled flow releases (UCR). Uncontrolled flow releases include additional outflows 
from penstock leakage (PL), overflows (OF), and dam breach flows (DBF). Equations 5 
and 6 pertain to model outflow (O) and Uncontrolled flow releases, respectively: 
𝑂 = 𝑄𝐺 + 𝑄𝑃 + 𝑈𝐶𝑅 (4.2) 
𝑈𝐶𝑅 = 𝑄𝑃𝐿 + 𝑄𝑂𝐹 + 𝑄𝐷𝐵 (4.3) 
Unobstructed gated spill releases (UGO) are a function of reservoir elevation (El) and 
spillway gate position (g), as determined by the spill release rating curve. This function 
retrieves the value of the reservoir level and the gate position and calls the supporting 
function “GateFlowCalc” using those as arguments (See Appendix E).  
In some operating scenarios, debris may block the spillway gate opening, reducing the 
capacity of the spillway gate, so the unobstructed gated spill release is then multiplied by 
the gate’s real time capacity, (GC), to get the actual gated spill release (QG).  This is shown 
in Equation 7:  
𝑄𝐺𝑖 = 𝐺𝐶 ∗ 𝑄𝐺𝑈 (4.4) 
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Where GC is a ratio of full capacity and has a value between 0 and 1.  
Overflow (QOF) is determined following Figure 4-9 using the overflow stage-discharge 
curve OTC as well as the stage-storage curve SSC and its reverse SSCrev from the 
supporting functions in Appendix D. The overflow stage-discharge curve represents the 
hydraulic relationship between the elevation of the reservoir and the total overflow 
discharge (through the free overflow spillways, as well as any additional discharges over 
the concrete and earthfill dams). The stage-discharge curve OTC is manipulated in the base 
case by increasing the spillway crest by 2m and multiplying the result by 0.3 to represent 
a scaled down capacity of the free overflow structures in the base case.  
 
Figure 4-9: Overflow calculation 
Because the Cheakamus Reservoir is somewhat flashy (the reservoir can fluctuate 
relatively quickly), the daily time step introduces some issues in calculating the aggregated 
162 
 
daily overflow spill. Because the fluctuations in reservoir level can occur at a finer time 
step than daily, the overflow values at the start of the day may not be equal to the overflow 
values at the end of the day. To address this problem, a nested hourly calculation is used, 
as shown in Figure 4-9. This takes into account whether the reservoir will exceed or drop 
below the free overflow spillway within the 24-hour period, and the resultant changes in 
overflow spill based on the fluctuating reservoir elevation.  
Dam breach is assumed to be triggered (EDB) once the reservoir elevation exceeds a 
particular level (DBEl) above the earth dam crest (defined using expert judgement), and 
takes on a value of 0 for not breached or 1 for breached (Equations 8 and 9), with dam 
breach flows (DBF) equal to the full reservoir storage (the reservoir is completely emptied 
when the dam breaches): 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 (𝐸𝑙 > 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑙): 𝐸𝐷𝐵 = 1,     𝐹𝑜𝑟 (𝐸𝑙 < 𝐷𝐵𝐸𝑙): 𝐸𝐷𝐵 = 0 (4.5) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝐷𝐵 = 1:𝑄𝐷𝐵 = 𝑆,     𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝐷𝐵 = 0:𝑄𝐷𝐵 = 0 (4.6) 
Penstock rupture is initiated through the Disturbances Sector when the penstock fails, 
which is represented by Other components time to repair with subscript Penstock, 𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑟. 
Penstock leakage, 𝑄𝑝𝑒𝑛 is equal to the “head cover max flow” from the turbine actuators 
sector (see Section 4.4.1.5), unless the intake gate is closed. This is described in Equation 
4.7:  
𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐺 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑟 > 0:      𝑄𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:   𝑄𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 0 (4.7) 
The variable intake gate (IG) represents the status of the maintenance gate at the top of the 
penstock, where zero represents an open gate and 1 represents a closed gate. Power intake 
gates are present in most dam systems with hydropower generation at the upstream end of 
the power flow conduit. The intake gate provides a means to dewater and inspect/maintain 
the penstock and powerhouse components. In some dam systems, these gates may be able 
to close under excessive flows resulting from penstock rupture or head cover failure, 
reducing the negative impacts. In other systems, the reservoir must be at an elevation below 
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the sill of the intake gate before it can close. In the case of penstock failure, all of the water 
moving towards the powerhouse exits the penstock before making it there. Power flow 
releases from all units (QP) are equal to the powerhouse flow conveyance PQC less the 
water escaping through the penstock (QPen) via leakage or rupture as shown in Equation 
4.8. 
𝑄𝑃 = 𝑃𝑄𝐶 − 𝑄𝑃𝑒𝑛        𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐺 = 0, (4.8)
𝑄𝑃 = 0                          𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐺 = 1
 
If the intake gate is closed (IG=1), power outflow (PO) is equal to zero.  
Variables shown in Figure 4-8 in grey font with chevron brackets are known as “shadow 
variables” These are the key variables which connect into the Hydraulic System State 
Sector from other sectors of the model. The variable “Other component remaining time to 
repair” enters the Hydraulic System State Sector from the Disturbances Sector. Variables 
“Gate position” and “Powerhouse flow conveyance” enter into the Hydraulic System State 
Sector from the Actuators Sector, which is broken down into Gate Actuators and Turbine 
Actuators. 
4.4.1.2 Sensors Sector 
The sensors sector is shown in Figure 4-10 and the variable symbols are outlined in Table 
4-6.  
 
Figure 4-10: Sensors Sector 
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Table 4-6: Sensors Sector variable names 
Variable name Variable symbol 
Reservoir level (m) El 
Sensor Error (%) SE 
Sensor condition (binary) SC 
Gauge reading (-) SRd 
Gauge processing (-) SP 
Gauge relay (-) SRl 
If the gauge is functioning properly (SC=1) then the gauge reading is equal to the reservoir 
level (El). If the gauge is failed (flat-lined), the value is equal to the last read reservoir 
elevation as per Equation 4.9: 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝐶 = 1:   𝑆𝑅𝑑 = 𝐸𝑙 + 𝐸𝑙 ∗ (
𝑆𝐸
100
)      
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝐶 = 0:   𝑆𝑅𝑑 = −9999 (4.9)
 
The gauge processing (SP) represents the interpretation step in the data collection system, 
which is carried out by software (a PLC) and will be site-specific. If the PLC is non-
functional the SP will return a value of -9999 which indicates a missing value. The 
processed value is transmitted to the controller through the gauge relay (SRl) if the relay is 
available. The relay is usually carried out by a remote terminal unit (RTU), which is 
modelled as a single variable with the PLC. Thus, if the PLCRTU component is non-
functional (RA=0), this also means that no information is transmitted to the controller 
Operations Sector. 
4.4.1.3 Operations Sector 
The Operations Sector for the hydropower system is shown in Figure 4-11 and Table 4-7 
contains the relevant variables. This sector describes the use of information relating to the 
current state of the system to forecast inflows and make reservoir operating decisions.  
Inflow forecasting may be done by applying a random, normally distributed error to the 
actual reservoir inflows, which are an input to the hydraulic system state sector. In 
reality, hydrologists use climate forecasts and watershed modelling to develop inflow 
forecasts that are considered during operations planning. While these processes could be 
incorporated into the simulation model, it would necessitate significant additional 
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computational effort. Instead, random errors may be applied to reservoir inflows to 
ensure operations planning is simulated using realistically inaccurate inflow information. 
Since the objective of this case study is to compare directly the base case and the dam 
safety improved case, inflow forecasting errors were removed from the potential 
operating states, since the random errors would differ between these two runs. Inflow 
forecast is simply the upcoming 14 days of inflows, as follows: 
𝐼𝐹𝑑 = 𝐼𝑡+𝑑 (4.10) 
where 𝑑 = 0,… ,13 and 𝑡 is the current timestep. 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Operations Sector 
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Table 4-7: Operations Sector variable names 
Variable description Variable symbol 
Inflow (m3/s) I 
Inflow forecast calculation (m3/s) IFd, d=1…D 
Operations planning (m3/s) OPf, f=1…F 
Turbine instructions (m3/s) Ip 
Gate instructions (m) Ig 
Gate control redundancy (-) GCR 
Other Component time to repair (-) OCttr 
Sensor time to repair (-) Sttr 
Manual actuation required (binary) MA 
Delay in contacting site staff Ds 
Delay in accessing site Da 
Contact initiated with site staff CI 
Contacting site staff CS 
Time remaining to contact site staff TRC 
Plant staff notified PSN 
Mobilizing initiated MobI 
Mobilizing Mob 
Site staff mobilized SSM 
Demobilize Demob 
Following inflow forecasting, operations planning (OPf) proceeds. The result for 
operations planning is a vector of two variables (f=1…F and F=K+N), each representing 
a single instruction for a single controlled flow release component (K turbines and N gates, 
in this case study, K=N=1 and 𝐹=2). The main operations planning algorithm takes several 
key inputs (inflow forecast, reservoir elevation, day references, component availabilities 
and reservoir elevation limits) and determines the corresponding operating instructions for 
the system to ensure minimum flow releases are met and reservoir level restrictions are 
adhered to if possible. It can be found in the function OpsPlan which is described in 
Appendix E. The algorithm begins by assuming the minimum fish flow is released and the 
remainder of the inflow is passed through the powerhouse (up to the maximum) for a 14-
day window from the current date. The resultant reservoir levels are then checked, adjusted 
and re-checked to ensure the operating instructions result in reservoir levels that are within 
the specified normal maximum (NMax) and minimum (NMin). To ensure enough water is 
available for the winter low-flow period, the normal minimum reservoir level was adjusted 
to El. 370 m for the months of November and December for the purposes of the modelling. 
Operations planning follows the algorithm shown in Figure 4-12, which includes power  
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Figure 4-12: Operations Planning algorithm 
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flow releases through the turbine, following the logic that (a) fish flows are met, (b) 
additional inflows can be released through the power conduit, (c) any exceedance over 
NMax can be avoided by releasing more water through the power conduit or spill, and (d) 
any exceedance below NMin can be reduced from spill flows, then power flows. The 
algorithm generates instructions in terms of flow for the gate and turbine. The operations 
planning function in the Operations Sector OPf collects and organizes the information 
necessary to be passed to the OpsPlan function which is described further Appendix E. 
Gate operation may be carried out remotely or on-site. The default operation is remote, 
however manual actuation (MA) may be required if (a) communications equipment 
(PLCRTU) is out of service (OCttr>0) or (b) the reservoir elevation sensor is not functional 
(Sttr>0). The value of MA is set to 0 as the default, but changes to 1 if the equipment 
required to operate the gate remotely is failed, as per Equation 4.11: 
𝑀𝐴 = 0      𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑟 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑟 = 0 
𝑀𝐴 = 1      𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑟 > 0 𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑟 > 0 (4.11) 
When MA=1, manual actuation is initiated. This occurs through a series of auxiliary 
variables and stocks which appear complex but are simple value holders that implement 
delays in contacting staff and mobilizing them to site.   
The stock “Manual actuation initiated” (MAI) is a variable that, when equal to 1, indicates 
that the mobilization process is underway. The inflow to this stock is the variable Initiate, 
which is calculated as per Equation 4.12: 
𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝐴𝐼 = 0: 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1 
𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 0 (4.12) 
Demobilization (DM) is the outflow of the stock MAI, and sets this value back to zero when 
staff have mobilized and are on site (SSM) and manual actuation (MA) is no longer required, 
as per Equation 4.13: 
𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝐴 = 0:𝐷𝑀 = 1 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝐷𝑀 = 0 (4.13) 
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The next step in the process is notifying the plant manager so that site staff can be 
mobilized. This is represented using a stock “Time remaining to contact staff”, (TRC), 
which tracks any delays in this process. The stock input is “Contact initiation” (CI) and the 
delay associated with the contacting and dispatch of staff, Ds, is an input from the 
disturbances sector. Plant staff notified (PSN) is another variable that tracks whether staff 
have been made aware of any issues at the site. Contact initiation (CI) is calculated as 
follows: 
    𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑆𝑁 = 0:     𝐶𝐼 = 𝐷𝑠 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:     𝐶𝐼 = 0 (4.14) 
This sends a pulse to the TRC stock, which is equal to the predetermined delay time (if 
any), which is pre-determined at the start of the simulation through the Monte Carlo 
scenario generation. The stock outflow, “Contacting” (CS) is then equal to the timestep 
while the value of the stock is greater than zero. Once the TRC stock has filled and drained, 
the plant staff are considered to be notified PSN. The PSN variable represents this by taking 
on a value of 1 when the staff are dispatched to site, and zero when they are not, as follows: 
𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑅𝐶 = 0: 𝑃𝑆𝑁 = 1 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝑃𝑆𝑁 = 0 (4.15) 
Next, the site staff begin to mobilize to the site. There may be a delay in mobilization due 
to site access issues such as traffic or emergencies, “delay in accessing site” (Ds). These 
delays are a direct Monte Carlo generated input from the simulation model when site access 
is delayed. This delay is again represented using a stock “Time remaining to access site”, 
(TRA), which receives a pulse of inflow from “Mobilization initiated” (MobI), and has 
outflow “Mobilizing” (Mob). The variable MobI is calculated as follows: 
𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑆𝑁(𝑡) = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑆𝑁(𝑡 − 1) = 0:𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼 = 𝐷𝑠 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑏 = 1:𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼 = 1 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:𝑀𝑜𝑏𝐼 = 0 (4.16) 
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This variable sends a pulse equal to Ds (the delay time) when mobilization is initiated, and 
zero otherwise except during demobilization, when the standard mobilization time (1 day) 
is sent as a pulse to the stock TRA to re-set the standard site access time. The variable 
“Mobilizing” (Mob), drains the stock TRA at the rate of time, when its value is positive – 
this represents the travel of site staff to the dam. Finally, once the value of the TRA stock 
is zero and mobilization is still required (MAI=1), the site staff are mobilized and at the 
dam “Site staff mobilized” (SSM=1), as per Equation 4.17: 
    𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑅𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝐴𝐼 = 1:      𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 1 
       𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:     𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 0 (4.17) 
Once the site staff are mobilized, actuation of the gate can occur manually. Demobilization 
(Demob) occurs when manual actuation is no longer required (MA=0) and site staff are 
present at the site (SSM=1), as follows: 
    𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝑀 = 1:      𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑏 = 1 
       𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:     𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑏 = 0 (4.18) 
4.4.1.4 Gate Actuators Sector 
The Actuators Sector has been broken down into two sub-sectors: (1) Gate Actuators and 
(2) Turbine Actuators, because both the function and purpose of these components are very 
different. Outlet Gates may be operated manually or remotely and rely on either grid power 
or a backup power source as well as a series of interconnected mechanical and electrical 
components which function together to make the gate operable. Turbines are typically 
operated remotely, require an operational grid to be functional (power must be exported 
somewhere) and rely on vastly different components to achieve their intended purpose. As 
such, actuation of a gate is not modelled alongside actuation of a turbine and the sectors 
are shown separately. 
The Spillway Gate Actuators Sector is shown in Figure 4-13 with relevant variable symbols 
presented in Table 4-8. This sector represents each of the mechanical, electrical and 
structural components involved in operation of a spill release gate. The components are 
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grouped based on the outcomes of component failure into three categories: (1) Components 
failing the gate in the closed position, (2) Components collapsing the gate and (3) 
Components causing the gate to fail in its current position. The model has been generalized 
as much as possible to represent both radial and sluice-type spillway gates but may need to 
be modified for representation of different types of gates or for valve release facilities (eg. 
Stop-log gates, Hollow cone valves, Howell-Bunger valves). Backup power supplies may 
also easily be added to the model. 
 
Figure 4-13: Gate Actuators Sector 
Table 4-8: Gate Actuators variable names 
Variable Description Variable Name 
Gate instructions (m) Ig 
Site staff mobilized (binary) SSM 
Gate position (m) g 
Last gate position (m) Lg 
Gate availability (binary) GAv 
Gate remaining time to repair (days) GRTTRc, c=1…C 
Gate power supply (binary) GPS 
Gate collapse (binary) GC 
Gate failed closed FC 
Gate failed in place FIP 
Maximum gate position MGP 
Failures of the component groups are each associated with different times to repair which 
are modelled in the “Disturbances” sector. Disturbances in the system, for example seismic 
events, may affect all or some of these components and the maximum repair time for each 
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of the affected components then becomes the length of time the gate is unavailable (out of 
service) for. 
The gate can either be operated remotely or by site staff if manual actuation (MA) is 
triggered as described in the previous section. If MA=1, site staff must be mobilized 
(SSM=1) in order for the gate control system to be operated and for actuation to take place. 
If MA=0, the gate’s remote actuator is functioning properly and the gate may be operated 
from the control center.  
The gate components are binary indicators of component availability and are used in the 
calculation of overall gate availability and as indicators of whether the gate is collapsed 
(GC) or failed in place (FIP) or failed closed (FC). The values of the C affected gate 
components for each gate, i, are set to 0 if the remaining time to repair is greater than 0 and 
1 if the remaining time to repair is 0 (ie. there is no damage to the component), as per 
Equation 4.19: 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑐 > 0: 𝑐 = 0 ,    𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑐 = 0: 𝑐 = 1 (4.19)   
Gate availability is set equal to one if all gate components are available (values equal to 
one), the power supply is available (GPS=1) and either remote actuation is possible (MA=0) 
or staff are on site to operate the gate (MA=1 and SSA=1). Gate collapse (GCi) is set equal 
to one if the “components collapsing gate” is equal to zero and fail closed (FCi) is set equal 
to one if the “components failing gate closed” is equal to zero. Gate instructions are 
measured in meters of opening and are determined from the Operations Sector, entering 
the Gate Actuators sub-system as a shadow variable. Gate position is then determined as 
follows. 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝑀𝐺𝑃    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝐶 = 1 
𝑔𝑖 = 0   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝐶 = 1 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝐼𝑔    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝐴𝑣 = 1 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝐿𝑔   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝐴𝑣 = 0 (4.20) 
173 
 
Last gate position Lg is stored by Python and used as the default gate position if the gate is 
unable to be moved due to failure of a component. The gate position g is then used as an 
input to the Hydraulic System State sector.   
4.4.1.5 Turbine Actuators Sector 
The model structure for the power Actuators Sector is shown in Figure 4-14 with relevant 
variables described in Table 4-9. The power Actuators Sector has been simplified 
significantly due to the high complexity associated with operation of a generating unit. 
Wicket gates could be modelled as a stock with flows of opening and closing, however this 
would require modelling the governor and other turbine components in significant detail. 
It was assumed that modelling in this way would increase complexity but not improve the 
result significantly. As such, powerhouse flow conveyance is the key variable being 
modelled, and the availability of the components required for the powerhouse to function 
are shown as inputs that determine whether power can pass through the powerhouse and 
electricity can be generated (Power remaining time to repair). The two very high-level 
power component failures that are being modelled are the generator (which causes a load 
rejection) and the turbine head cover which can fail causing an uncontrolled release of 
water into the powerhouse and downstream. In reality, there are many ways in which a 
turbine can fail to operate safely, however the inability to pass flow and the uncontrolled 
release of flow are the two major outcomes of significant power related failures, so these 
components were considered to be representative. 
The values for head cover (HC) and generator (PGen) are determined by “Power remaining 
time to repair” which tracks the time left in repairs following failures of these components. 
If the remaining time to repair value is positive, their value is set to zero (this equation is 
the same as for the gate components above). Unit availability then depends on the 
availability of the wicket gates, generator and grid (GrAv) following Equation 4.21: 
𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝐶 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝐺𝑒𝑛 = 1:     𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 1     
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒: 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 0 (4.21)
 
 
174 
 
 
Figure 4-14: Power Actuators Sector 
Table 4-9: Power Actuators variable names 
Variable description Variable name 
Turbine instructions (m3/s) IP 
Unit availability (binary) PUA 
Unit flow (m3/s) QU 
Generator (binary) PGen 
Head cover (binary) HC 
Powerhouse grid availability (binary) GrAv 
Powerhouse flow conveyance (m3/s) PFC 
Head cover max flow (m3/s) HCMF 
Intake gate closed (binary) IG 
If any of PWG, PGen or GA are equal to zero, PUA=0 and the unit cannot release any water 
(QP=0) unless the head cover (HC) is failed, in which case the maximum head cover flow 
is released through the unit, as per Equation 4.22: 
   𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 1:      𝑄𝑃 = 𝐼𝑃  
𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝐶 = 1:     𝑄𝑃𝑗 = 0   
𝐼𝐹 𝑃𝑈𝐴 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝐶 = 0, 𝑄𝑃 = 𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹 (4.22)
 
Head cover max flow (HCMF) is a site-specific relationship to be determined by the 
modeller. In this case, the assumption is that the maximum turbine flow for the current 
reservoir level can be multiplied by five to represent the total flow that would pass through 
the failed unit. If this flow causes reservoir elevations to drop below the sill, a correction 
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is made to represent the reduction in flow being passed into the power tunnel from the 
reservoir (Qsill). The head cover release also depends on the intake gate closed variable 
(IG), and is equal to zero if the intake gate is closed. The equation is as follows: 
𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐺 = 0:    𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹 = min(5 ∗ 𝑇𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 1), 𝑄𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑙) 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:     𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹 = 0 (4.23) 
Where 𝑇𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋 represents the supporting function described in Appendix E which 
calculates the maximum flow through the turbine for a given reservoir level (RSE) and 
availability set equal to 1. Qsill represents the reduction in this value that would be 
observed when the reservoir passes below the sill within the current day. A simple volume 
calculation is done to calculate Qsill as follows: 
𝑄𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑙 = max (𝑆 + 𝐼 − 𝑄𝐺 − 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑣(363.06), 0) (4.24) 
where S is the storage, I is the inflow QG is the gated spill release, and SSCrev represents 
the reverse lookup from reservoir level to storage. El. 363.06 is the elevation of the gate 
sill. Qsill cannot be negative. It is important to note here a key difference between the base 
case and the dam safety improved case. For the dam safety improved case, the head cover 
maximum flow, 𝐻𝐶𝑀𝐹, is multiplied by 1/24 to represent intake gate closure within an 
hour of rupture occurrence. This is because the time-step of the model is daily and it is 
assumed that the gate closure would happen immediately upon detection of the rupture 
(within one hour), so the maximum flows are simply scaled by this factor.  
Equation 18 shows that the powerhouse flow conveyance (PQC) is equal to the sum of 
releases through each turbine: 
𝑃𝑄𝐶 = 𝑄𝑈 (4.25) 
Powerhouse flow conveyance connects into the Hydraulic System State Sector.  
4.4.1.6 Disturbances Sector 
The main goal of the Disturbances Sector is to implement component failures which result 
from a variety of causes from the components operating state database. Components have 
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been divided into four groups: Gate components, power components, other components 
and sensors. This helps facilitate detailed modelling of various component failures, for 
example the gate hoist or the gate motor becoming out of service following some 
disturbance. Other components include the penstock, communications equipment, and the 
grid. The gate and power components include all key components of the “Gate actuators” 
and “Turbine actuators” sectors, respectively, which may fail resulting in various impacts 
to the system. Stocks are used in this sector to represent the remaining time left on the 
repair. The stock inflows consist of a single pulse (incoming time to repair). The stocks are 
drained by a constant time when their value is positive, as shown in the following equation: 
𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 > 1:  𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 = 1 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓  0 < 𝑐𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 < 1:  𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 = 𝑐𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:           𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 = 0                                       (4.26) 
This ensures the stock is drained by time when its value is positive and prevents the stock 
value from becoming negative. The small c represents the component type (Gate, Power, 
Other or Sensor). The component failure variables connecting to the time to repair stock 
inflows receive information from the model to implement component failures of various 
lengths at specific time steps (the Monte Carlo inputs). This is demonstrated in Section 
3.4.1 and has been generalized to take Monte Carlo inputs of Impact Time 𝐼𝑇 and Impact 
Length 𝐼𝐿:  
𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 𝐼𝑇:  𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝐼𝐿 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒:  𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 0 (4.27) 
GateAll and PowerAll represent the total maximum remaining time to repair of all 
components represented by the stock, as indicators that are used in the Gate Availability 
and Turbine Availability calculation. The component Remaining Time to Repair (𝑐𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅) 
values for Gate, Power, Sensor and Other components are then routed into the model to the 
corresponding location to be implemented in simulation, as described in the previous model 
description sections. 
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Figure 4-15: Disturbances Sector 
4.4.2 Simulation model testing 
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, testing can be done to gain confidence in the model 
performance. Checking the water balance to ensure the formulae are properly defined is an 
important step. Another very useful test is to compare the model outputs with the observed 
data for the system. This was done by running the simulation using Cheakamus historical 
inflows and comparing the results with the real Cheakamus operating data. The model was 
tested by modifying the operations planning function and comparing the results with the 
historical data for operations including reservoir elevation, turbine flow and spill. The 
results of the model test are shown in Figure 4-16. 
Figure 4-16(a) and (b) contain the reservoir elevations from the observed record and 
simulation, respectively. It is clear from the plots that the simulation model tends to hold 
the reservoir higher than it would be under typical operation. This is a result of the 
operations planning algorithm, which does not use optimization. In the initial development 
of the complex model, operations planning was performed daily using a differential 
evolution optimization model. The optimization model planned reservoir levels for one 
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year of expected inflows using the 14-day inflow forecast and weekly average inflows for 
the remainder of the year. The change in reservoir storage was used to calculate the 
instructions for the gates and turbines. This procedure for operations planning results in a 
very accurate model test that is shown in King et al (2017). Once the scale of the simulation 
problem was more accurately defined, the optimization step was determined to be 
sufficiently time consuming to justify its removal from the program, and the model was 
switched to a simple algorithm to calculate releases. As such, the simulated reservoir levels 
for the historical model test are not as close to the observed values, however they are still 
well within the operational limits.  
Figure 4-16 (c) and (d) show the turbine flows from the historical operations record in 
comparison to the simulation. The median lines are fairly close, though the simulation 
model tends to release more water than the historical record, which is likely due to the fact 
that the Cheakamus System is often used for peaking, meaning it may run fully during 
certain hours of the day and be shut off at night, resulting in lower overall flows.  
Figure 4-16 (e) and (f) show total spill releases for the historical and simulated operations, 
respectively. There is a close agreement between the medians for spill release, however 
larger spill events tend to be reduced in the simulated results in favour of slightly longer, 
more moderate spills. 
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Figure 4-16: Operations validation for the simplified system model 
4.4.3 Base case vs. dam safety improved model runs 
Two full runs through the potential operating scenarios are performed in this research for 
two different cases: the base case and the dam safety improved case. The difference 
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between these scenarios is described in this section and summarized in Table 4-10. The 
goal of these two different runs is to show how the simulation model results can be used to 
assess improvements made by changing operating strategies and investing in upgrades to 
the system.  
Scenario A: The base case is a simplified version of the Cheakamus system as described 
above. The key change that was made for this case was that the free overflow spillway 
capacity was significantly reduced (by 70%) and the crest was raised by 2m. The purpose 
of this was to directly induce more failures in the base case, creating a substantial difference 
between the dam safety improved case which has a free overflow spillway identical in size 
to the one in the real Cheakamus system. This change was made in response to a very low 
observed failure rate for the dam safety improved case, given the ability of the free 
overflow spillway to safely pass even large inflows when the capacity of the system to 
convey water through the gates and turbines is significantly reduced.   
Scenario B: The dam safety improved case has a full-sized free overflow spillway 
consistent with that of the real Cheakamus Dam. In addition to this, the intake gate for the 
powerhouse is upgraded to allow it to close under penstock rupture or head cover failure 
flow. Because of the daily timestep and the relatively small and flashy Daisy Lake, this is 
implemented in two ways. First, the intake gate is closed immediately the day after a 
rupture or head cover failure is realized. Secondly, the total penstock rupture and head 
cover failure flows are reduced to 1/24th of their actual values, to reflect closure of the gate 
within an hour of the initiating failure. Another key change in the dam safety improved 
model is that in the event of lowered capacity in the system resulting from a gate outage, 
or loss of remote control due to PLCRTU outage or grid outage, the target reservoir level 
is lowered to El. 367.8m which is 0.5m above the crest of the spillway. The goal of this 
operational change is to avoid free overflow events and dam failure by preparing for large 
inflow events which the system may not be capable of conveying through the power 
passage alone. Increased redundancy in the communications equipment was modelled by 
reducing the number of outages for the PLCRTU component to one half of the scenarios. 
This is done by modifying the Monte-Carlo generated outage times for a randomly selected 
half of the iterations to zero. Sensor errors and outages were similarly reduced by one half 
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to indicate improved sensory equipment at the site. Finally, the instances of the gate failing 
closed were reduced by 20% to reflect upgraded components in the gate resulting in fewer 
of these failures.  
Table 4-10: Base Case vs. Dam Safety Improved Case 
Base Case Dam Safety Improved 
Free overflow spillway restricted to release 
only 30% of Cheakamus Dam discharges, 
with a crest 2m higher 
Free overflow spillway identical to 
Cheakamus Dam 
Single PLC/RTU device 
Dual PLC/RTU device, resulting in 
50% fewer outages of that component 
Intake gate unable to close under penstock 
rupture or head cover failure flows 
Intake gate upgraded to allow closure 
under penstock rupture or head cover 
failure flows 
Default gate redundancy 
Gate redundancy improved to reduce 
instances of the gate failing closed by 
20% 
Reservoir level targets consistent with 
typical Cheakamus operations 
Reservoir level target lowered to El. 
367.8m if system capacity is restricted 
Each scenario is run through the simulation model with two thousand iterations and the 
complete simulation is run once for the base case and once for the dam safety improved 
case. The goal of this is to illustrate the improvements made between the two runs. Because 
there are such a large number of scenarios and iterations being modelled, more varied 
inflow sequences are required than observed in the historical record. This is described in 
the following section.   
4.5 Simulation Model Input Data 
The simulation model data inputs include the physical relationships, the synthetic inflows 
and the baseline operations (reservoir levels) for the system. 
4.5.1 Physical Relationships 
The first physical relationship used in the model is the stage-storage curve, which relates 
the elevation of the reservoir to the storage in m3/s-day. The units chosen to represent 
storage help simplify the calculations within the simulation model. The stage-storage data 
for the Cheakamus Project were used in the simulation model and are presented in 
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Appendix A. Curve-fitting was used to develop a relationship valid for the possible 
reservoir elevations, and the resultant relationship is described in Appendix E for the stage-
storage curve (𝑆𝑆𝐶).  
The stage-discharge curve for the Cheakamus System are also used in the simulation model 
(See Appendix A). A function representing the total overflow is created using curve-fitting 
to reflect the overflow discharge pertaining to a certain elevation. The resultant function is 
described in Appendix E for the overflow curve 𝑂𝑇𝐶.  
The combined gate rating curve for the two Cheakamus Spillway Operating Gates (SPOGs) 
is also used in the model. The rating curves for each gate are combined into a single curve 
for a larger gate by adding the discharge columns from the curve. The resulting combined 
curve is used directly in the model in a 2-dimensional interpolation.  
The maximum turbine flow pertaining to different reservoir elevations is required in the 
model to ensure generating restrictions at low reservoir elevations are taken into account. 
This is calculated from the units operating curves and converted to a piecewise linear 
function. A similar piecewise linear curve is developed for the maximum possible gate 
flow at different reservoir elevations.  
 
4.5.2 Synthetic Inflow Generation 
Synthetic inflow generation was carried out by reshuffling and perturbing the historical 
climate data using a stochastic weather generator (KnnCAD) and using the results as inputs 
to the Raven hydrologic modelling tool. KnnCAD and Raven are described in Section 
3.3.1. For the Cheakamus Hydropower Project, a single station located at the dam (CMS) 
is used for inflow forecasting.  
Twenty-seven years of historical daily climate data from the CMS station was used as an 
input to the KnnCAD weather generator. The data included daily minimum and maximum 
temperatures as well as precipitation. KnnCAD reshuffles and perturbs the historical 
climate data to come up with a statistically similar block of data the same length as the 
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input data, so 371 blocks of climate data were created by the weather generator for a total 
of 10,017 years of data. For real applications of this approach, closer to 1 Million years of 
climate data is recommended to ensure adequate variability in the inflow sequences, 
however 10,000 was determined to be adequate for the purposes of this proof-of-concept 
example.  
A validation of the historical versus simulated climate data is shown in Figure 4-17. Figure 
4-17(a) and (b) contain boxplots of daily precipitation (no outliers) and total monthly 
precipitation respectively. The blue line plot overlaid on the boxplots shows the historical 
median values. For daily precipitation, there is a close match between the median historical 
and simulated values. The daily precipitation values were shown without outliers because 
the outliers were quite high in comparison with the boxplots, with one simulated value 
exceeding 800mm in March. The number of outliers in the data indicates the ability of the 
model to simulate more extreme precipitation events than in the observed record. The 
synthetic climate data tends to underestimate the total monthly precipitation, with the 
historical medians being close to the 75th percentile of the simulated data in January, March 
through July, October and December. For February and August there is a close agreement 
and there is a smaller underestimation in September and November. Despite the 
underestimation of the median total monthly precipitation values, the simulated data does 
match the monthly trend shape and there are a fair number of outliers from the monthly 
data. Figure 4-16(c) and (d) contain monthly minimum and maximum temperature 
boxplots of the simulated data, with historical medians overlaid on the graphs. There is a 
fairly close agreement in the trends, however both the median minimum and maximum 
temperatures do tend to slightly underestimate the historical medians. There are, however, 
a significant number of outliers which indicates values outside of the historical record are 
present in the simulated data.  
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Figure 4-17: Validation plots for synthetic climate data at for CMS station 
The UBC watershed model requires water-years as an input, which run from October 1 to 
September 31, so some reorganizing of the resultant datasets is required. Once the data is 
reorganized, it can be used as an input to the calibrated watershed model (UBC Watershed 
model on Raven) for the Cheakamus System. BC Hydro provided an up-to-date calibration 
for use in this research so the calibration and validation procedure for the hydrologic 
modelling is not discussed in this text.  
Figure 4-18 (a) and (b) show the historical and simulated daily inflow data, respectively 
with the lightest blue lines showing the 10th and 90th percentiles, the medium blue lines 
showing the 25th and 75th percentiles and the 50th percentile shown in dark blue. The 
percentiles of the historical vs. simulated data align well and there are significantly more 
extreme inflow events observed in the simulated record, which is the goal of synthetic 
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inflow generation. The synthetic inflow percentiles are slightly smoother because of the 
large number of observations for each day (10,000). The maximum inflow event observed 
historically is approximately 650m3/s and the maximum inflow event observed in the 
simulated record is about 2000m3/s.  
 
Figure 4-18: Validation of synthetic inflow sequences, Daisy Lake inflows 
4.5.3 Baseline Operations Data 
The baseline operations data were computed by running the simulation model for the 
10,000 years of synthetic inflows and recording the observed reservoir elevations given 
that nothing within the system had failed. The results from the baseline operations data are 
shown in Figure 4-19. It is important to note that the operations planning algorithm in this 
simulation has perfect 14-day foresight about inflows and all flow release facilities are 
operational, so only one reservoir level excursion above the normal maximum level of El. 
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376.5 is observed over the 10,000 years. This excursion corresponds to a peak daily inflow 
of 2,000 m3/s. During this large inflow event, the spill capacity of the gates and power 
flow releases are exceeded and the reservoir increases to El. 380 m. This is below the 
elevation of the free-overflow spillway, which is at El 380.41 in the base case (the crest of 
the concrete dam).  
 
Figure 4-19: Baseline operations data from 10,000 year synthetic inflow record 
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4.6 Simulation Results 
The results from the simulation are presented in the following sub-sections. There were a 
total of 552,960 scenarios run for the base case and the dam safety improved case. Each 
scenario was executed for 2000 iterations, for a total of 1.1 Billion simulated years per run. 
The high performance computing environment used to execute the scenarios is provided in 
Appendix F. The following section presents a description of the overall results, which 
include both the criticality parameters as well as maximum and minimum values of 
performance measures for each simulated scenario. Next is a description of outcomes for 
selected scenarios, where performance measures and reservoir elevations can be explored 
in further detail. 
4.6.1 Overall results discussion 
Using the output .npz files from the simulation, the criticality parameters and minimum (or 
maximum) performance measures were computed for each simulated scenario. The output 
files and output analysis code are formulated so that only the complete iterations (those 
where all scenario operating states both occurred and affected one another) for a given 
scenario are considered in the computation of that scenario’s parameters. Results can be 
found in the electronic appendix, in the folder “Simulation_Results”. The file 
“OutputResultsAll_base.xlsx” contains the simulation results for the base case, and 
“OutputResultsAll_dsi.xlsx” contains the results for the dam safety improved case. For the 
base case, there were a total of 9,669,654 failures simulated over a total of 857,102,076 
completely implemented iterations (regardless of scenario), making the overall simulation 
flow control failure rate for the base case equal to 1.13%. This is not to be misinterpreted 
as the failure rate for the system – the failure rate for the system overall would be 
significantly reduced if the probabilities of occurrence of the operating states were taken 
into consideration. For the dam safety improved case, only 2 out of 809,563,591 complete 
iterations resulted in dam failure, making the overall simulation flow control failure rate 
for the system equal to 2.47 × 10-7%. Again, this is not to be misinterpreted as the overall 
estimated failure rate for the dam system – it simply represents the proportion of 
simulations that resulted in dam failure, regardless of the probabilities of each simulated 
scenario. The number of failures observed in the dam safety improved case was extremely 
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small – likely as a result of the significantly larger free overflow spillway being capable of 
passing the largest inflows in the synthetic record if the reservoir elevation is below a 
certain level. Comparing the simulation failure rates for the two cases shows how 
significantly the increased overflow spillway capacity affects the rates of failure for the 
scenarios. These results are summarized in Table 4-11. 
Investigating specific scenarios can give further insights into the vulnerability of the system 
to various combinations of events. Within the results spreadsheets 
(OutputResultsAll_base.xlsx and OutputResultsAll_dsi.xlsx), column headers are used to 
describe the parameters calculated for each scenario. In this analysis, the operating state 
impacts did not depend on the causal factors – that is, a single operating state would have 
the same range of impacts regardless of what causal factor resulted in it occurring. Because 
of this, it is possible to combine scenarios with the same sets of adverse operating states 
into a causal factor-independent set of scenarios, which have more observations and 
therefore an improved estimate of the criticality parameters. This sorting resulted in a total 
of 6,144 combined scenarios that can be easily analyzed in more detail. These are presented 
in “Results_CombinedComps_base.xlsx” and “Results_CombinedComps_dsi” for the 
base case and the dam safety improved case, respectively. Within each of these results 
spreadsheets, there are different tabs containing the complete results (All) as well as filtered 
results which contain scenarios that have the same number of adverse causal factors (𝑁 =
1…5). 
Sorting the failure rate values in the combined results spreadsheet (All) for the base case 
shows that for 229 scenarios, the failure rate was greater than or equal to 10%. Scrolling 
through this list shows that all of these scenarios involved a restriction in capacity as a 
result of the gate being failed, either closed or in place. Interestingly, another component 
that frequently appears in the most severe scenarios is the penstock rupture. This is a direct 
result of the outage length of penstock rupture scenarios – which can exceed a full year 
following the event. In this case, the reservoir would initially drain through the penstock 
until it is below the sill of the intake gate, which would then be closed. After the intake 
gate is closed, the power water passages are out of service for a significant amount of time. 
This means that while initially some uncontrolled release may be observed, there may be 
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longer-term complications associated with operating the reservoir once the power passages 
are isolated and the flow conveyance capacity has been lost. Turbine head cover failures 
are also higher up on the list for the same reasons. Other issues that come up within this 
more severe scenario list include site access and staffing issues, communications 
equipment (PLC/RTU) failures, and sensor issues.  
 
Table 4-11: Overall results summary 
 
Base Case Dam Safety Improved 
Total number of years 
simulated (complete 
iterations) 
857,102,076 809,563,591 
Total number of 
failures simulated 
(complete iterations) 
9,669,654 4 
Simulation Failure 
Rate* 
1.13% 2.47 × 10-7% 
Highest scenario 
failure rate 
16.227% 0.005% 
Average failure inflow 
threshold (mean 5-day 
inflow preceding 
failure) 
114 m3/s 835 m3/s 
Average failure inflow 
threshold (max 5-day 
inflow preceding 
failure) 
160 m3/s 1588 m3/s 
 
For the dam safety improved case, the two scenarios that lead to failure resulted from a loss 
in gate capacity (gate failing closed or in place), in combination with sensor issues, access 
delays. Additionally, both failure scenarios included a loss of power flow conveyance 
through either penstock rupture (and subsequent lengthy outage) or as a result of grid 
failure and resulting load rejection. 
The overall average inflow thresholds – the minimum average/maximum daily inflow in 
the 5 days preceding failure – are 114 m3/s and 160 m3/s, respectively, for the base case. 
These increase to 835 m3/s and 1588 m3/s for the dam safety improved case (with only two 
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failures). Obviously, the failures in the dam safety improved case are a result of very high 
inflows that exceed the safe discharge capacity of system.  
A few more general conclusions can be drawn from the overall results tables. The highest 
observed conditional failure rate in the base case was 16.227%, versus only 0.005% in the 
dam safety improved case. For both cases, dam overtopping failure and high reservoir 
elevations were most frequently occurring as a result of loss of flow conveyance capacity 
– specifically, losses in conveyance capacity involving the gate, which can pass 
significantly more flow than the power conduit. Sensor errors, communications failures 
and access/staffing issues were also significant contributors to overtopping failures and 
reservoir level excursions above the key levels.  
Looking at the results based on the number of affected components may also provide useful 
insights into the most vulnerable aspects of the system. Filtering the list to only a single 
component being affected gives the results in  Table 4-12 and Table 4-13, for the base case 
and the dam safety improved case, respectively. These tables have been abbreviated 
slightly (by reducing number of columns) to ensure the columns fit on the page. The 
columns in the table show the conditional failure frequency, failure inflow thresholds, 
conditional frequency of exceeding key reservoir elevations, the minimum discharge 
capacity and the maximum uncontrolled release. The final column shows the name of the 
affected component.  
For the base case (Table 4-12), the obvious result is that the components whose failure 
results in the most significant capacity loss (the gate components causing the gate to fail 
closed or in place) lead to the greatest failure rates and highest reservoir levels. Next are 
the sensor errors, which can result in lack of conservatism in reservoir operations. None of 
the other components on their own lead to failure in the base case, but gate blockage, grid 
outages and sensor failures also caused reservoir elevations to exceed key levels. For the 
dam safety improved case, none of the components on their own lead to failure of the dam 
due to overtopping. Issues with communication or sensors lead to the highest reservoir 
levels. Interestingly, penstock ruptures and head cover failures also resulted in some 
scenarios with reservoir elevations exceeding key levels. This is an unexpected result that 
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may be a result of the operations planning algorithm not taking into account the lost power 
flow release capacity, and thus keeping the spillway gate closed during those scenarios. In 
future runs of this model, the unit availability function should be modified to reflect the 
lost ability to pass water through the power conduit following closure of the power intake 
gate.   
Looking more closely at the reservoir level exceedances in the base case, it is clear that 
reservoir excursions above key levels were directly related to either a loss of capacity or 
loss of remote visibility (reservoir level sensor failure or error). For the base case, failure 
of the gate in the closed position had a 15% chance of resulting in overtopping of the 
earthfill dam (and a 1.6% chance of overtopping it enough to cause dam breach). The 
frequency of overtopping the earthfill dam was reduced to about 2.8% for the gate failing 
in place as a result of some residual discharge capacity resulting from the gate being stuck 
in the position it was at prior to failure. For the dam safety improved case, overtopping of 
the earthfill dam was avoided for all single affected component simulations, except for the 
penstock rupture which results in a lengthy outage that, as discussed above, may not (but 
should have been) be recognized by the operations planning algorithm. In general for the 
dam safety improved case, loss of visibility resulting from either sensor issues or 
communication system failure (PLCRTU) resulted in the most significant exceedances of 
key reservoir levels. Surprisingly, loss of conveyance through the gate alone was not 
enough to cause reservoir level excursions even resulting in spill, which is somewhat 
surprising. This is likely a direct result of the conservative operating strategy in the dam 
safety improved simulations, which target reduced reservoir elevations in the case of loss 
of gate functionality.  
Looking at the minimum discharge capacity gives some context to why the reservoir 
elevations may have risen. For both cases, the most significant losses in flow conveyance 
capacity (the maximum active discharge capacity being 1655 m3/s) resulted from gate 
issues – the gate failing closed, in place, or being blocked. Not surprisingly, these were 
associated with higher likelihoods of exceeding key reservoir levels in the base case (but 
not in the dam safety improved simulations as a result of more conservative operations).
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Table 4-12: Results for a single affected component, base case 
Conditional 
Failure 
Frequency 
(%) 
5-day 
Inflow 
Threshold 
(average 
daily) 
5-day 
Inflow 
Threshold 
(maximum 
daily) 
Conditional 
Frequency of 
Exceeding El. 
377.95 m 
(WL Max) 
Conditional 
Frequency of 
Exceeding El. 
378.41 m (free 
overflow spill) 
Conditional 
Frequency of 
Exceeding El. 
380.4 m 
(Concrete dam) 
Conditional 
Frequency of 
Exceeding El. 
381.42 m 
(Earthfill dam) 
Minimum 
Discharge 
Capacity 
Mean 
time to 
failure 
(days) 
Components 
1.63 147.54 229.20 41.41 40.31 36.41 15.53 65.00 34.36 Gate fails closed 
0.53 195.65 242.17 18.20 17.37 14.08 2.84 69.91 45.00 Gate fails in place 
0.05 753.10 1995.10 10.36 8.50 3.77 0.25 1655.00 7.00 Sensor Error 
0.00 NA NA 48.82 41.81 18.09 0.25 383.60 NA Gate opening 
0.00 NA NA 26.82 22.02 4.37 0.00 1655.00 NA Grid 
0.00 NA NA 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 1655.00 NA Sensor Fail 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1655.00 NA PLCRTU 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1590.00 NA Penstock 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1590.00 NA Head Cover 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1590.00 NA Generator 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1655.00 NA Gate collapse 
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Table 4-13: Results for a single affected component, dam safety improved case 
Conditional 
Failure 
Frequency 
(%) 
5-day 
Inflow 
Threshold 
(average 
daily) 
5-day 
Inflow 
Threshold 
(maximu
m daily) 
Conditional 
Frequency of 
Exceeding El. 
377.95 m (WL 
Max) 
Conditional 
Frequency of 
Exceeding El. 
378.41 m (free 
overflow spill) 
Conditional 
Frequency of 
Exceeding El. 
380.4 m 
(Concrete dam) 
Conditional 
Frequency of 
Exceeding El. 
381.42 m 
(Earthfill dam) 
Minimum 
Discharge 
Capacity 
Mean 
time to 
failure 
(days) 
Components 
0.00 NA NA 51.55 43.56 0.00 0.00 1655.00 NA PLCRTU 
0.00 NA NA 40.05 39.07 0.00 0.00 1655.00 NA Sensor Fail 
0.00 NA NA 28.34 24.59 0.00 0.00 1655.00 NA Sensor Error 
0.00 NA NA 18.17 17.11 0.03 0.00 1590.00 NA Penstock 
0.00 NA NA 12.55 9.91 0.00 0.00 1655.00 NA Grid 
0.00 NA NA 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.00 1590.00 NA Head Cover 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1590.00 NA Generator 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 383.60 NA Gate opening 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 69.91 NA 
Gate fails in 
place 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1655.00 NA Gate collapse 
0.00 NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 65.00 NA 
Gate fails 
closed 
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Sensor errors did not result in any losses in discharge capacity but lead to increased 
reservoir levels in both cases through improper reservoir level operation.  
Another indicator of the criticality of a scenario is the mean time to failure. For the base 
case, this ranged from 34-45 days in the scenarios with a loss of conveyance through the 
gate. This reduces to only 7 days in the case of reservoir level sensor errors, which indicates 
the potential severity of operating the reservoir assuming the reservoir level is lower than 
it actually is.  
For scenarios with two affected components, the results for the base case and dam safety 
improved case are shown in tab N=2 of “Results_CombinedComps_base.xlsx” and 
“Results_CombinedComps_dsi.xlsx”, in the Simulation_Results folder of the electronic 
appendix. There are 77 total combinations of components in these two-component 
scenarios (these combinations represent the combined scenarios which take into account 
results from the same scenario with different causal factors). For the base case, the 
combinations with the highest failure frequencies (2-15%) involved failure of both gate 
and power discharge components. Despite failures of the turbine head cover and penstock 
resulting initially in uncontrolled releases, the long-term impacts of these component 
failures is lengthy outages of the discharge facilities (once the intake gate is closed) – this 
means lower overall flow conveyance capacity in the long term. These higher failure 
frequency cases resulted in a 19-35% chance of overtopping the earthfill dam – even if the 
overtopping did not lead to a failure, significant damage would be observed in these cases.  
For the dam safety improved case, the combined loss of both power and gate releases lead 
to some instances of overtopping of the concrete dam, which could potentially cause 
significant damage. Free overflow spill was observed more frequently when both gate and 
power flow release facilities were out of service, and sensor issues in combination with 
gate failures also had a high conditional frequency of free overflow spill.  
In the N=3 tabs of the same spreadsheets, the three-component combined scenarios are 
presented. For the base case, similar results are seen where the scenarios resulting in a 
complete loss of controlled discharge capacity (both gated and power flow releases) had 
the highest failure rates. The most extreme case involved a penstock rupture and 
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subsequent outage of the power flow release facilities, the gate failing in place and in the 
closed position – which had a 16% failure rate and a 43% chance of overtopping the 
earthfill dam. In this case, there are two potentially overlapping conditions of the gate – 
failed in place and failed closed – in the simulation model, the gate failing closed takes 
precedence over failures in place. For the dam safety improved case, the scenarios with the 
most significant overflow frequencies tended to include gate outages or capacity 
restrictions, loss of flow through the power conduit, and either sensor errors and/or 
communications equipment failures.  
Another important observation is that for a relatively small proportion of the scenarios 
simulated, there may not have been enough complete iterations simulated to develop a 
meaningful characterization of the scenario. This is because in the post-processing, an 
analysis is done that determines whether all of the events occurred and affected one 
another. For some scenarios, events may be initiated after the system has already recovered 
from preceding events. In this case, the iteration is not representative of the cumulative 
effects of the combination of events and is filtered out of the scenario results. This can be 
observed by sorting the “OutputResultsAll_base.xlsx” and “OutputResultsAll_dsi.xlsx” by 
the column “Number of simulation-years”. In the base case, about 30,000 scenarios had 
less than 500 complete iterations out of 2000 simulated, and 1170 of these had less than 
100 complete iterations. About 32,000 scenarios in the dam safety improved case had less 
than 500 complete iterations out of 2000 simulated years, and 519 of these had less than 
100 complete iterations. This indicates a significant limitation of the modelling framework 
applied in the case study – the number of iterations completed may not provide sufficient 
data with which to estimate credible conditional failure or reservoir level exceedance 
frequencies. This observation indicates that additional computing time may be required to 
properly analyze scenarios without sufficient data points – perhaps by setting some 
minimum complete iteration threshold within the simulation. It is worth noting that these 
scenarios involved a higher number of events occurring. This means that the time frame 
within which the different events can occur is relatively large (since it is equal to the sum 
of the Monte Carlo generated outage lengths and can be up to 365 days). As such, there 
may be several instances where the events do not affect one another (the reservoir level 
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recovers prior to the next subsequent event). This observation will be an important 
consideration in future applications of this methodology. 
 
4.6.2 Assessment of individual scenario outcomes 
Another output from the simulation model is arrays containing the dynamic performance 
indicators for complete iterations of each scenario, as well as the reservoir levels. These 
can be plotted to visually represent the system behaviour in response to various input 
scenarios and Monte Carlo parameters. Five scenarios have been selected and plotted to 
illustrate how results individually can be compared between the two cases. The summary 
tables containing the key data for each of the selected scenarios are shown in Table 4-14 
and Table 4-15 for the base case and the dam safety improved case, respectively.  
The first scenario involves the gate failing in the closed position as a result of ice, the grid 
being failed due to wind, and the site access being delayed due to traffic issues (Seed 
number 301490). Figure 4-20 contains the plotted reservoir elevations (in the first row), 
flow conveyance capacities (second row) and total uncontrolled releases (third row), for 
the base case (first column) and the dam safety improved case (second column). For the 
reservoir levels, the mean value is shown in black and the 10th and 90th percentiles are 
shown in darker grey. Each light grey line represents the dynamic reservoir level response 
for a single iteration of the scenario. Only completely implemented iterations are plotted – 
that is, scenarios in which the dam failed, or the events did not affect one another are not 
included. The length of each light grey line depends on the length of time within which the 
reservoir differed from the “normal” reservoir elevations for the same time period and 
inflow. For this scenario, the maximum length of time for which the reservoir deviated 
from the normal elevation was 250 days.  
Looking at the reservoir elevation plots, it is immediately clear that the reservoir elevations 
in the base case were significantly higher than in the dam safety improved case. In the base 
case, no significant efforts are made to operate the system more conservatively given a loss 
in capacity. In contrast, for the dam safety improved case, the target reservoir elevation is  
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Figure 4-20: Dynamic results for seed 301490 
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reduced when the gate becomes unavailable. The reservoir is then lowered with whatever 
capacity is available, creating more storage should inflows exceed the remaining available 
capacity. As such, the dam safety improved case 90th percentile reservoir levels rise to a 
maximum of El. 379 m, which is significantly less than the El. 381 m observed in the base 
case. Failures within the base case are observed when the reservoir level sharply drops to 
El. 353.75 m. There are a total of 44 failures observed in the base case, with a failure rate 
of around 4%. The mean time to failure in this scenario was about 24 days. There were no 
failures observed in the dam safety improved case. It is also worth noting that the reservoir 
elevations dropped below the normal minimum (NMin) in the dam safety improved case. 
It is not immediately clear why this is the case since the target reservoir elevation is equal 
to NMin. The problem results from the operations planning algorithm not accounting for 
any free overflow spill when the projected reservoir elevations exceed the sill of the 
overflow spillway – in these cases, the reservoir level is reduced more than is necessary to 
achieve the NMin target. Future runs of the model should address this issue. 
The total active flow conveyance capacities are plotted in the second row of Figure 4-20. 
The black line represents the mean values. The results are similar for both the base case 
and the dam safety improved case. One issue with these values is that the grid failure does 
not register as a loss of capacity though the power conveyance system, despite resulting in 
a load rejection and closure of the wicket gates. This component interaction is programmed 
into the simulation model, but not accounted for in the calculation of available capacity. 
Again, future runs of the model can be modified to address this problem. Because of this, 
the minimum flow conveyance capacity recorded for both scenarios was 65 m3/s, which is 
the maximum flow that can be passed through the power conduit. 
The third row shows the uncontrolled releases for the system, which are clearly 
significantly higher in the base case as the concrete and earthfill dams are overtopped. The 
maximum uncontrolled release for the base case was around 2000 m3/s, and about 620 m3/s 
in the dam safety improved case.  The average uncontrolled release was similar for both 
the base case and the dam safety improved case.  
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It is also possible from the dynamic reservoir elevation plots to determine the conditional 
reservoir level exceedance frequencies for the scenario – that is, the percentage of time 
where the observed reservoir elevations for the scenario exceeded various levels. The daily 
reservoir level values are recorded from each complete iteration (where all events occurred 
and affected one another) and the percent of observations exceeding various reservoir 
levels is calculated. Figure 4-21 contains the conditional reservoir level exceedance 
frequencies for seed 301490, with the base case shown in red and the dam safety improved 
case shown in blue. This graphic is an excellent indicator of the improvement made by the 
dam safety improved case over the base case. The difference between the two lines is 
indicative of the level of improvement gained by the system upgrades and operating 
strategies employed in the dam safety improved case.  
 
Figure 4-21: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for seed 301490 
The second scenario involves debris blockage of the gate as well as a reservoir level sensor 
error resulting from temperature fluctuations causing instrument decalibration (seed 
386196). The results are shown in Figure 4-22, where the first row shows the reservoir 
levels with the base case in the first column and the dam safety improved case in the second 
column. For this scenario, results show similar mean and 90th percentile reservoir 
elevations, with higher maximum levels observed in the base case. The higher maximum 
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levels are a direct result of the increase in free overflow spill capacity, which helps to offset 
the loss in capacity caused by debris buildup at the gates. There are some excursions below 
the normal minimum (NMin) reservoir level in both cases as a result of the sensor errors. 
The dam failed by overtopping in two scenarios for the base case and the average time to 
failure was 146 days.   
The second row shows the active flow conveyance capacities for the base case and dam 
safety improved case in the first and second columns, respectively. The results are similar 
for both cases, with average values that are almost equal. The debris blockage is 
predetermined using the Monte Carlo randomization of scenario input parameters, however 
the length of time for which the debris blockage remains depends on the system inflows. 
When inflows fall below 65 m3/s, the simulation model assumes that debris can be removed 
from the gate and capacity is restored.  
In the third row, uncontrolled releases are presented for the base case and the dam safety 
improved case in the first and second column. Again, uncontrolled releases involve any 
free overflow spill, as well as dam breach flows and flows from penstock rupture or gate 
collapse. In this case, the majority of observed uncontrolled release is due to overflow spill, 
which may be through the overflow spillway but potentially can include dangerous 
concrete and earthfill dam overtopping. In the base case, there are two spikes when the 
uncontrolled releases exceed 1250 m3/s, at approximately day 120 and day 180. These 
correspond to the iterations where dam breach occurred. Omitting these two scenarios, the 
overall uncontrolled release observed in the dam safety improved case was slightly higher, 
likely as a result of the increased free overflow spillway capacity at lower elevations.  
Figure 4-23 contains the conditional reservoir level exceedance plots for seed 386196. The 
plots for both the base case and the dam safety improved case are very similar, with the 
only notable difference at the tail end of the curve where the maximum observed elevations 
in the base case exceeded those observed in the dam safety improved case. This small 
difference can be attributed primarily to the increased free overflow spillway capacity in 
the dam safety improved case – the decrease in the exceedance line occurs just above the 
level at which free overflow spill is initiated.  
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Figure 4-22: Dynamic results for seed 386196 
202 
 
 
Figure 4-23: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for seed 386196 
The next scenario is one of the more extreme combinations of events that lead to the highest 
combined scenario failure rate in the base case. This scenario involves failure of the gate 
in place, failure of the gate closed and a penstock rupture (seed 403429). For the reservoir 
elevations, a clear improvement is seen in the dam safety improved case in comparison 
with the base case. The reservoir level 90th percentile is around El. 379 m for the dam safety 
improved case, and El. 381.13 m in the base case. Because of the higher maximum 
reservoir elevations in the base case, a large number of failures are observed (296) and the 
failure frequency is quite high (17.3%). The average time to failure in the base case was 
114 days. There are no failures in the dam safety improved case, partly due to the increased 
free overflow spillway capacity, and partly due to the operator reducing the reservoir level 
and operating more conservatively (if reservoir drawdown capacity is available).  
The second row shows the available active flow conveyance capacity of the system. For 
both cases, the available capacity drops to zero when both power and gated releases are 
unavailable as a result of the penstock rupture. The 65 m3/s capacity of the power conduit 
is seen at the top part of the figure where the gate capacity recovers but the penstock is still 
unavailable. The results are similar between the dam safety improved and the base case.  
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The third row shows the total uncontrolled releases for the base case and the dam safety 
improved case in the first and second column, respectively. The total uncontrolled releases 
include penstock rupture flows, free overflow, dam overtopping flows and dam breach 
flows, so it can be somewhat difficult to decipher what the contributing factors are in a 
scenario which could have all of these. Obviously, the dam breach flows significantly 
increase the maximum values observed in the base case. The uncontrolled releases in the 
dam safety improved case have a maximum of about 390 m3/s with the 90th percentile being 
around 80 m3/s. For the base case, the 90th percentile values are around the same. The initial 
spike in the mean uncontrolled release values can be attributed to penstock ruptures, which 
may happen on day 1 of the simulation for about 1/3 of the simulated scenarios (based on 
the random selection of initiating event). In the base case, the initial spike is near 100 m3/s, 
and this is reduced to about 15 m3/s in the dam safety improved case since the intake gate 
can be closed under rupture flows. 
Figure 4-25 contains the conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for seed 
403429. There is a relatively close agreement between the base case and the dam safety 
improved case, with the latter actually exceeding the base case values for elevations less 
than El. 378.5 m. This is somewhat surprising given the differences observed in the 
dynamic reservoir elevation plots for the same scenario. One potential contributing factor 
is that less water is released from uncontrolled penstock rupture flows in the dam safety 
improved case (since the intake gate closes under rupture flows). This means the reservoir 
level may be higher when gate failures initiate, or that the reservoir level does not decrease 
by a substantial amount if the penstock failure is initiated after the gate failure. The result 
is moderately higher reservoir elevations through parts of the curve up until free overflow 
spill is initiated (El. 378.41 m). Above El 378.5, the dam safety improved case drops off 
below the base case curve, meaning the reservoir level did not reach the same maximum 
levels. This is a result of the increased free overflow spillway capacity, which helps 
maintain reservoir levels below El. 380 m.  
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Figure 4-24: Dynamic results for seed 403429 
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Figure 4-25: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for seed 403429 
 
The next scenario involves a single component failure – a penstock rupture due to an 
earthquake (seed 403440). The reservoir levels are shown in the first row, with the base 
case in the first column and the dam safety improved case in the second column. The key 
difference between the two plots is that the reservoir level drops significantly lower in the 
base case. This is a direct result of the ability of the intake gate to close under rupture flows 
in the dam safety improved case. This results in significantly smaller uncontrolled release 
flows (see the figures in the third row). It is important to note that the flows recorded 
represent the average daily flows, and that peak outflows may be significantly higher for 
the dam safety improved case where the intake gate closes within an hour of rupture. The 
loss in capacity observed is related to the inability to pass flows through the generating unit 
while the penstock is being repaired.  
Figure 4-27 contains the conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies for the base 
case (red) and the dam safety improved case (blue), respectively. The dam safety improved 
case has a higher conditional reservoir level exceedance frequency in comparison with the 
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base case, as a result of a smaller volume of water being lost through the penstock. This 
means the reservoir remains at a higher elevation throughout the course of the scenario. 
 
Figure 4-26: Dynamic results for seed 403440 
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Figure 4-27: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequency, seed 403440 
 
The final scenario selected for discussion is one of only two scenarios that resulted in an 
overtopping failure in the dam safety improved case. This scenario involved a number of 
events: the gate failing closed, a sensor error, delays in accessing the site and an outage of 
the grid (seed 281617). Figure 4-28 contains the dynamic results for this scenario. The first 
row of the figure shows the dynamic reservoir levels for the scenario. In the base case (first 
column) many of the scenarios exceeded the water licensed maximum level and 21 dam 
breaches occurred. The average time to failure in the base case was about 47 days. In the 
dam safety improved case, there were excursions above the water licensed normal level, 
however these tended to be less extreme than in the base case. This is in part due to a larger 
free overflow spillway, and also because of the operating strategy to reduce the reservoir 
elevation during outages affecting the gate. One failure is observed, occurring within three 
days of the start of the scenario. In both cases, the capacity loss is similar, dropping down 
to the turbine only being available during the gate outage. Uncontrolled releases are 
generally similar between the two cases, with the more extreme spikes in the base case 
corresponding with the dam failures. Figure 4-29 contains the reservoir level exceedance  
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Figure 4-28: Dynamic results for seed 281617 
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plots for seed 281617. There is a significant difference between the two curves, with the 
dam safety improved case generally spending less time at higher reservoir elevations than 
the base case. 
 
Figure 4-29: Conditional reservoir level exceedance frequency, seed 281617 
 
Overall, the results from these individual example scenarios provide useful information 
that can help to better understand the dynamic system response to individual scenarios. 
Comparing the results between the two cases gives a good indication about the 
improvements made by introducing refined operational strategies and improving 
infrastructure. The conditional reservoir level exceedance frequencies provide an 
additional indication of whether there are significant improvements between scenarios.  
The summary of the results from each of the highlighted scenarios can be found in Table 
4-14 and Table 4-15, respectively. These tables, along with the dynamic results and 
reservoir time exceedance plots provide a good comparison between the two runs of the 
model. Ultimately, there are a large number of scenarios to be discussed and only a very 
small subset were analyzed in this thesis. However, the analysis of these scenarios provides 
some indication of how the modifications to the system improve the performance in these 
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extreme conditions. The dynamic analyses, as well as the tabular outputs from the 
simulation (discussed in the previous section) are useful outputs that can help identify 
vulnerable components of the system. Comparing the results between the different model 
runs can help build a business case for upgrades to the system and may be helpful to guide 
emergency planning activities.  
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Table 4-14: Summary of results from individual scenario outcomes, base case 
Seed 
Number 
Condition
al Failure 
Frequency 
(%) 
5-day 
Inflow 
Threshold 
(avg 
daily) 
5-day 
Inflow 
Threshold 
(max 
daily) 
Minimum 
Discharge 
Capacity 
(m3/s) 
Maximum 
Uncontrolled 
Release 
(m3/s) 
Maximum 
Reservoir 
Level (m) 
Number of 
Simulation-
years 
Average time 
to failure 
(days) 
Components 
301490 4.37 150 164 65 2026 383.65 1007 23.91 
Access delay, grid failure, 
gate fails closed 
386196 0.10 350 582 383 1928 382.74 1992 145.50 
Sensor error, gate opening 
blocked 
403429 17.32 109 164 0 1766 383.61 1709 114.59 
Penstock rupture, gate fails 
in place, gate fails closed 
403440 0.00 NA NA 1590 316 377.94 2000 NA Penstock rupture 
281617 3.11 154 168 65 1671.01 382.33 676 46.76 
Access delay, sensor error, 
grid failure, gate fails closed 
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Table 4-15: Summary of results from individual scenario outcomes, dam safety improved case 
Seed 
Number 
Conditional 
Failure 
Frequency 
(%) 
5-day 
Inflow 
Threshold 
(avg 
daily) 
5-day 
Inflow 
Threshold 
(max 
daily) 
Minimum 
Discharge 
Capacity 
(m3/s) 
Maximum 
Uncontrolled 
Release 
(m3/s) 
Maximum 
Reservoir 
Level (m) 
Number 
of 
Simulati
on-
years 
Average 
time to 
failure 
(days) 
Components 
301490 0 NA NA 65 620 379.92 NA 917 
Access delay, grid failure, 
gate fails closed 
386196 0 NA NA 383 370 379.65 NA 1830 
Sensor error, gate opening 
blocked 
403429 0 NA NA 0 400 379.52 NA 1691 
Penstock rupture, gate fails in 
place, gate fails closed 
403440 0 NA NA 1590 14 377.94 NA 2000 Penstock rupture 
281617 0.17 835.35 1588.17 65 1882.25 385.29 3 605 
Access delay, sensor error, 
grid failure, gate fails closed 
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4.7 Summary 
The methodology developed in this research was applied to the Cheakamus System, located 
near Squamish, BC. First, a detailed representation of the Cheakamus System was created 
within the components operating state database. Operating states, impacts and causal 
factors were defined in the operating states database. The combinatorial procedure 
developed in this research was applied to the outputs of the dataset. For the detailed 
representation of Cheakamus, a total of 1.83 x 1027 operating state combinations 
(scenarios) were defined. This is a good indication of the dimensionality of the problem – 
the number of potential scenarios increases exponentially with the level of detail.  
A simplified proof-of-concept representation of Cheakamus was developed next, with a 
single gate and a single turbine. This representation of the system returned 552,960 
potential scenarios. A system dynamics simulation model representative of the simplified 
system was developed and tested by comparing the results with historical operations data. 
The simulation model was run 2000 times for each of the 552,960 scenarios, and for two 
separate cases (a total of 2.2 Billion years of inflows were run through the simulation 
model). The base case is representative of the simplified Cheakamus System with a smaller 
free overflow spillway. The dam safety improved case represents the same system with a 
free overflow spillway size that mimics the real system. The dam safety improved case also 
included a number of operational improvements, including power flow intake gates that 
could be closed under extreme flows, as well as improved communications redundancy 
and more conservative operating rules that aim to prevent reservoir level excursions above 
target levels. Each of the 2000 iterations for a scenario contained unique Monte Carlo-
varied parameters for timing, impact magnitude and inflows. Synthetic inflows outside of 
the historically observed range were simulated using a stochastic weather generator and a 
hydrological model. The Monte Carlo variation of inflows was done by randomly choosing 
a day and year from the historical record and sampling the subsequent inflows. A 
triangularly distributed variable was generated using the minimum, maximum and average 
specified impact magnitude from the database for each adverse operating state simulated. 
Timing of adverse operating states was done by shuffling the operating states and assigning 
random times from within the first six months of the year long simulation.  
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In terms of implementation, high-performance computing (HPC) resources are required for 
implementation of this ambitious simulation exercise. In this research, there were 1.11 
Billion years of daily simulations performed, with 2000 Monte-Carlo iterations for each of 
the 552,960 Million scenarios. This was performed twice – once for a base case and once 
for a dam safety improved case. The total of 2.22 Billion simulation-years was made 
possible by development of a very efficient simulation model and use of a serial farming 
approach that runs many simulations in parallel on HPC clusters. The simulations were 
completed in a period of about three weeks, though results would vary depending on the 
resources available and the HPC clusters utilized. The speed with which this large 
simulation task was completed is considered to be a substantive achievement. 
The results from the simulation were analyzed by sorting and filtering the lists of results 
for each scenario. Scenarios with 1, 2 and 3 contributing components were filtered out and 
discussed to gain insights about the most critical components that could contribute to 
failure. The dam failures in the base case occurred in 1.3% of the total simulated years. For 
the dam safety improved case, this was reduced to 2.47 × 10-7% of simulated years. These 
failure rates are not to be confused with estimates of overtopping failure frequency for the 
system as a whole – in order to compute that, operating state frequencies must be pre-
defined. The proportion of failures simulated does give some indication as to the level of 
improvement made when the dam safety improved modifications are made to the system. 
For the base case, loss of conveyance through both power and gate release facilities was 
the most significant contributor to failure. For the dam safety improved case, only two 
failures were observed – both of these corresponded with a loss of gate and power flow 
capacity, sensor issues and the most extreme flood in the synthetic record. This is indicative 
of a much more robust overflow spillway system in the dam safety improved version of 
the model.   
An assessment of some of the individual scenario results was also provided. Five scenarios 
were selected and the dynamic reservoir elevations and performance measures were 
plotted, along with the reservoir exceedance frequencies. These plots provided useful 
indications of the difference between the base case and the dam safety improved case for a 
given scenario, and could be used to better understand the system response to the scenarios.  
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Because the case study and analyses in this work were representative of a very simplified 
version of the Cheakamus System, they should not be interpreted as conclusions for the 
existing Cheakamus Project. Comparing the base case results (with a smaller free overflow 
spillway) to the dam safety results (with a free overflow spillway equal in size to the 
Cheakamus Dam), showed that the free overflow spillway was, in all but two cases, able 
to prevent reservoir elevations from reaching the level assumed to fail the dam. The 
comparison of results between the two cases simulated shows how the methodology may 
be useful in quantifying the improvements made by various system upgrades and 
configurations. Results from the case study illustrated that the approach presented here 
could be useful to assist dam safety emergency response decision making, by indicating 
how critical a scenario is and roughly how long there is to regain control over the reservoir. 
In addition, the results may be useful in operational decision making with respect to outages 
and operating rules, and could help build a business case for capital improvements to the 
system. The analysis was also useful in predicting potential combinations of event that 
could lead to failure, and identifying the events (or component states) that were most likely 
to result in significant safety impacts.   
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5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Dam systems are arrangements of physical and nonphysical components which act to store 
and convey water for beneficial purposes such as power production, irrigation, water 
supply and flood control. Dams can be thought of as open systems, where inflows, outflows 
and disturbances cross the system boundary. Within the boundary of the system, feedbacks 
act to monitor reservoir levels and inflows, and adjust controls to maintain reservoir levels 
within target values, and meet desired outflow requirements, if possible. There are a wide 
range of potential constraints which may impact the ability of the dam to achieve its desired 
purpose for safe containment and conveyance of flows. The major research contributions 
in this work are (a) the systematic definition of combinations of events which can influence 
the ability to safely control flow in a dam system, and (b) the dynamic characterization of 
the system performance in response to these events using a Deterministic Monte Carlo 
simulation framework with a system dynamics simulation model.  
The following paragraphs discuss the outcomes of this work as they pertain to the 
objectives outlined in Chapter 1.   
• The first objective was to investigate the use of systems analysis and risk 
assessment concepts from within and outside of the dams industry in terms of their 
ability to determine potential operating scenarios for dam systems and the impacts 
scenarios have on system outcomes. This was achieved by looking at the relevant 
literature and evaluating the various techniques with respect to their ability to 
achieve the research requirements.  
• The second objective was to develop an approach that helps define a more complete 
range of potential operating scenarios (operating constraints) than is possible using 
existing techniques alone. This was achieved through the use of a components 
operating states database that details each component, their operating states, 
operating state impacts and causal factors. Combinatorics was used to 
automatically convert the database entries into an exhaustive list of potential 
operating scenarios. The existing methodologies described in the literature review 
rely on expert judgement to determine possible combinations of events – of which 
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there are so many that it would be unreasonable for a team of experts to conceive 
of them. Thus, the number of scenarios that can be defined using this methodology 
far exceeds the scope of existing methods.  
• The third objective was to develop an improved dam safety analysis methodology 
that facilitates systematic investigation of all potential operating scenarios and 
allows for the outcomes of individual scenarios to be characterized. The 
Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework proposed in this research is able 
to dynamically evaluate each possible scenario through a number of iterations. 
Scenarios are used as an input to the model, to ensure each scenario is 
systematically characterized and an equal amount of simulation effort is spent on 
each. This allows for a more complete assessment of potentially hazardous 
outcomes than has been achieved using existing techniques.  
• The fourth objective was to develop a simulation approach that can handle 
complexity in system structure, feedbacks, interactivity and nonlinear behaviour 
and uses object-oriented modelling to improve model accessibility. The system 
dynamics simulation model developed in this work is well suited to this objective 
and can be built to as much detail as is required to adequately capture the failure 
modes of interest to the modeller.  
• The fifth objective was to investigate dynamic indicators of system performance 
with respect to safety, as well as scenario criticality parameters that can be used to 
rank the importance of various scenarios from the simulation outcomes. A number 
of criticality parameters are proposed in this work, and these as well as the dynamic 
outcomes of the system performance were shown in the simulation results.  
The following section contains a more detailed evaluation of the methodology which 
pertains to the requirements stated in Chapter 3. Next is a discussion of potential areas for 
future work.   
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5.1 Methodology evaluation  
Like all approaches, the proposed methodology described in this research does have some 
limitations. A discussion of its strengths and weaknesses of the methodology is provided 
here. The requirements for a new approach to dam safety analysis were outlined in Chapter 
3 and are repeated here with a more detailed discussion regarding the progress made 
towards each. 
The first requirement is for an approach with reduced subjectivity. The approach presented 
in this research achieves this requirement. The automated generation of scenarios helps 
eliminate reliance on heuristic thinking and expert judgement with respect to combinations 
of possible system states. Use of STPA in the development of the operating states database 
for actively controlled system components such as gates and turbines also helps to reduce 
subjectivity. Despite the improvements in limiting subjectivity, there is still (and will 
always be) a requirement for expert judgement in the component operating state database 
population and the level of detail in which to model the system.  
The second requirement of the approach developed is to address non-failure related 
constraints on system operation. All failure-based approaches are inherently limited in 
terms of the analysis of non-failures, and this is documented well by Leveson (2011) and 
Thomas (2012). Approaches which are focused on failures alone may miss a sub-set of 
potentially unsafe scenarios triggered by conditions that did not result from a failure. The 
proposed methodology is capable of assessing many of the scenarios not triggered by a 
failure. The database developed in this research includes both failure and non-failure 
operating states. The database and simulation model are well suited to deal with errors and 
delays which do not necessarily involve failure of components. There are, however, some 
non-failure related scenarios that were revealed through STPA analysis that were not 
captured within the simulation model presented in this work. Human factors and software 
requirements are issues that simulation is well-suited to address, so it may be possible in 
the future to improve the capabilities of the simulation model in this respect. Design flaws 
may be simulated, but need to be well understood and programmed into the simulation 
model. The simulations run in the case study do not specifically address these issues, and 
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the STPA portion of the case study (Section 4.1) highlights some of the scenarios that were 
missed within this application, but could potentially be represented in the future.    
The next requirements on the list are to determine the potential constraints on system 
operation and to systematically determine potential combinations of these. The approach 
presented in this work achieves this requirement through the use of the operating states 
database population, and automatically generates combinations of operating states using 
the combinatorial procedure. Population of the database will benefit from the strengths of 
the systematic FMEA and STPA approaches.   
Another requirement is to determine the likelihood of operational constraints (operating 
states) without significant simplifying assumptions. This remains a significant issue in 
probabilistic risk assessment that is difficult to address in the absence of supporting failure 
rate data. The methodology presented in this research does not attempt to address this 
problem. However, this research does determine the conditional probability of 
failure/reservoir level exceedance, given a scenario. Using this information, it may be 
possible to perform sensitivity analyses to assumptions regarding component probability 
of failure, without significant simulation effort. This represents one advantage over 
completely stochastic simulation models, which require re-simulation to analyze the 
sensitivity to assumed probabilities. The extension of this work to include full probabilistic 
assessment was not considered, since failure rate data for the components modelled was 
not available to provide a meaningful assessment. 
The next few requirements are (a) quantifying the dynamic system response to operating 
scenarios, (b) including feedbacks and nonlinear behaviour, (c) capability to handle 
complexity. These are all dealt with specifically using the system dynamics simulation 
approach. System dynamics simulation is well suited to modelling the complex web of 
component interactions and feedbacks using object-oriented programming which is 
relatively transparent (interactions shown using stock and flow diagrams) and also easily 
modifiable. Inspection of the system structure is a useful way of gaining confidence in the 
model. The simulation model characterizes how the values of variables change with time 
– a direct output of the model is the reservoir level response to a particular scenario, which 
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is of significant importance for dam safety analysis. The outputs of the simulation may 
indicate emergent behaviour that results from component interactions. One major 
consideration for the simulation model presented is that the choice of simulation timestep 
must be selected such that all failure modes being considered are properly modelled. 
Penstock pressure transients and cavitation in turbines or spillway chutes happens over 
seconds, milliseconds or even shorter time intervals. These issues were not explored within 
this thesis, but could potentially be included in future applications of the work using nested 
processes within a simulation model that operates at a larger timestep (this would reduce 
the computational effort associated with such a fine time-resolution). While the approach 
presented is, in theory, capable of modelling the system with any desired level of 
complexity and at any time-resolution, there may be significant computational challenges 
when applying the methodology to very complex systems. As the complexity of the system 
being modelled increases, so does computational effort and number of scenarios to be 
analyzed. Future research should focus on improving the computational efficiency of the 
simulation model framework. Another time-related limitation is that the randomly initiated 
failures of components may not coincide with likely instances of failure in the real world. 
For example, in a real dam system, a spillway gate may be dormant or not “on demand” 
for a substantial period during the year. Failing the gate randomly may under-estimate the 
potential impacts this failure could have by initiating it when inflows are normal or low. 
That said, with regular gate testing being implemented in many dam safety programs across 
the world, it may not be unrealistic to detect a failed state during a low-flow period.  
The next requirement is to assess the uncertainty in scenario outcomes. This is a 
particularly challenging issue in all modelling exercises. The uncertainty of scenario 
outcomes can be assessed by looking at the range of results from the Monte Carlo iterations 
of each scenario. By varying the simulation parameters and event timing, the sensitivity of 
the results to various inflows, event timing and event impact magnitudes is performed. 
There are a number of uncertainties in other model assumptions that have not been 
analyzed in this work and remain an important area for future work. 
The ability to deal with common cause failures is another requirement of the methodology 
presented in this work. This is addressed within the operating states database and 
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simulation. Operating states which have the same causal factor are programmed to occur 
at the same point in time in the simulation. Computing the scenario probability (if the 
failure rate data are available) may be slightly more challenging, since care must be taken 
to ensure the probabilities of the common causes are not double counted. 
The last two requirements of this research are the ability to calculate the conditional 
probability of failure for a given scenario, and the ability to calculate the probability of 
failure for the system as a whole. A direct outcome of the Monte Carlo simulation for each 
scenario is the conditional frequency of failure for that scenario, given the inflows and the 
range of impact parameters simulated. One limitation is that the number of data points with 
which to estimate these frequencies may be limited, since there may be many iterations 
within a scenario that are not representative of a “complete scenario” where all events are 
both occurring and impacting one another. These incomplete iterations, which are not 
representative of the scenario, increase the simulation effort without improving the result 
and result in fewer data points with which to calculate the overall failure likelihood. In the 
future, this could be dealt with by setting a minimum number of “completely implemented” 
iterations, or experimenting with the maximum timestep before which all events must occur 
within the scenario. Estimation of a system’s overall frequency of overtopping failure is 
not a direct outcome of this research. However, assuming the frequency of each operating 
state can be estimated, it may be possible to perform a complete probabilistic analysis of 
simulation results. Ensuring calculations are correct may be challenging for common-cause 
failures, though there is some guidance in the literature on this subject. Running the 
simulation using Deterministic Monte Carlo will also facilitate a relatively straightforward 
sensitivity analysis to assumed operating state frequencies. This is an important area for 
future work.  
In general, the approach presented in this work provides some key advantages over the 
existing techniques used within and outside of the dams industry. Traditional assessments 
tend to rely on techniques developed for use in industries that face different challenges than 
are experienced in dams systems. Dam systems are dynamic systems of many interacting 
components acting to control (both actively and passively) a randomly varying natural 
input (inflow). Determining the reservoir level response to various inflows and operating 
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constraints is not easily done using traditional failure modes brainstorming exercises or 
chain-of-event style analysis. Chain-of-events analyses (FTA and ETA) are limited in their 
ability to address interactivity and nonlinear response. Existing systems approaches to 
safety such as STPA offer some improvements, but are designed to deal with actively 
controlled systems, whereas dam systems have both active and passive controls. STPA is 
also unable to analyze reservoir level fluctuations in response to constraints. Stochastic 
simulation is the only technique that is able to determine reservoir level response to various 
constraints. It is also perhaps the easiest approach to estimate the overall system probability 
of overtopping failure. If run for enough years, a fully stochastic model, in theory, would 
eventually simulate the full range of potential operating state combinations. However, a 
fully stochastic simulation spends a significant amount of computational effort simulating 
non-failure states and would require a computationally prohibitive number of simulation-
years to achieve a more thorough analysis of each possible combination of events. 
Ultimately, the ability of the traditional stochastic approach to analyze potentially 
threatening combinations of events is limited by the number of simulation-years – at the 
current time it is not possible to achieve a full coverage of all potential combinations of 
events using this method.  
The methodology described in this research draws on the strengths of existing methods to 
more fully and systematically determine how the system will respond to as many 
combinations of events as can be determined. The operating states database and 
combinatorial procedure help to automate the process of determining potential constraints 
on system operation. The Deterministic Monte Carlo simulation framework systematically 
characterizes the potential system responses which may be expected for a given scenario. 
Scenarios are deterministic inputs to a simulation model that is run for a large number of 
iterations with Monte Carlo varying scenario parameters. The system dynamics simulation 
model is capable of representing as much complexity as desired in systems with component 
interaction and feedback in a transparent and easily modifiable object-oriented 
programming environment. The level of detail with which each aspect of the system is 
modelled also facilitates linking the model with the components database to enable the 
deterministic simulation of all of the possible combinations of operating states arrived at 
in the scenario generation procedure. Through system dynamics simulation, emergent 
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behaviour may be observed as a result of component interactions, with outcomes that may 
not be easily foreseeable by analysing sub-systems or parts of the system. Simulations 
automatically generate metrics such as the conditional failure frequencies and reservoir 
level exceedance frequencies for a particular scenario. While this research focuses on 
safety-specific indicators, it may also be possible to investigate environmental, regulatory 
and economic considerations from the simulation outcomes. 
There are some limitations of the approach proposed in this thesis. Despite the much larger 
number of scenarios that this approach is able to generate and assess, the STPA analysis 
identified some scenarios that were not captured by the simulation. These scenarios 
involved operational decision making and process model errors, which would add another 
(very large) dimension to the simulation analysis – though it is theoretically possible to 
analyze such issues using simulation. The results from the case study illustrated how the 
number of possible scenarios increases exponentially with the number of components being 
modelled and the number of operating state-causal factor combinations. Ultimately, the 
methodology presented allows modellers build the system to as high a level of detail as is 
desired so that the key interactions and feedbacks are fully modelled. In applying the 
approach, however, this may result in computational feasibility challenges. It is possible 
that simplifications to improve computational efficiency could affect the outcomes of the 
analysis. Future work must address the computational requirements of fully-detailed 
models to ensure this approach can be extended to real dam systems. It is also not clear 
whether the consideration of each operating state-causal factor as a separate operating state 
is necessary – this introduces a fair amount of redundant simulation but was introduced to 
ensure causal factors and common cause failures were represented within the model. 
Finally, while the post-processing of scenarios helps to filter out scenarios that were not 
representative of the input scenario (ie. all events did not occur prior to dam failure, or all 
events did not affect one another), it may result in fewer data points than reasonable to 
estimate the conditional failure frequency and other criticality parameters. 
The following section details some potential directions for future research. 
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5.2 Directions for Future Research 
For future applications, it may be interesting to simulate the set of scenarios with starting 
reservoir elevations that would differ from “normal” conditions, in an attempt to model the 
system response to situations that could arise as a result of operational trade-offs that are 
difficult to generate automatically. 
The most important area for future research relating to this approach is to incorporate 
probabilistic assessment into the approach. The methodology presented is set up fairly well 
to achieve this goal, in that the operating states database could be extended to allow 
estimates of the probabilities of causal factors and/or probabilities of component failure 
conditional on the causal factor occurring. These probabilities along with the Deterministic 
Monte-Carlo simulation results (conditional probabilities of failure or reservoir level 
exceedance) could be used in estimating the overall failure rate for each scenario. The 
benefit of the Deterministic Monte Carlo approach for assessment of overall overtopping 
failure probability is that the sensitivity to assumed operating state probabilities can be 
analyzed without significant additional computational effort. The full suite of results could 
be used to assess the probability of overtopping failure of the dam using traditional 
probability theory. The results would be a probability assessment that takes into account a 
far wider coverage of the possible operating states for the system than may be achieved 
using traditional techniques. The probability of flow control failure of the dam is an 
important decision-making factor for dam owners in terms of fleet management. 
Obviously, resources should be directed towards dams which have a higher probability of 
failure and/or a higher consequence category. In addition to this, the change in frequency 
of overtopping failure as a result of by different alternative operating strategies and capital 
upgrades could help provide a business case for investing in different alternatives (along 
with the visual aid of the aggregated scenario performance measure plots).  
Another very important area for future work is in improving the computational feasibility 
of the approach described in this research. When the combinatorial procedure was applied 
to a detailed model of the Cheakamus System, 1.89 x 1027 scenarios resulted. This would 
obviously be computationally infeasible in a reasonable amount of time, though advances 
in computing capabilities may make it more feasible in the future. In the meantime, work 
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on applying the methodology to real systems with grouped components similar to what was 
done in the simplified system will help reduce the number of scenarios to a more realistic 
and computationally reasonable number. Grouping components could potentially be 
guided by a fault tree analysis of sub-systems within the system – for example, a fault tree 
analysis of the gate system to determine groups of components that might lead to a specific 
operating state for the gate as a whole. Implementing nested time-steps to address issues 
such as cavitation, pressure transients, erosion, slope stability and internal erosion would 
add additional complexity but is also an important area for future work. Further 
improvements to the simulation model speed may also be possible, although they would 
require a substantial effort and possibly a switch to a C++ or similar compiled 
programming language. Compiled programming languages are generally considered to be 
the most computationally efficient, however they are slightly less user friendly and require 
more programming experience.   
Another potential direction for future work is the integration of the system dynamics 
simulation with AI to drive (or even build) the simulation model. Deep learning algorithms 
could potentially be applied to process the results to provide additional useful information 
from simulation outcomes. Finally, pattern recognition techniques may be useful to reduce 
the number of combinations required to assess each simulation outcome. This is a 
particularly promising direction that could help improve the limitation resulting from the 
trade-off between computational feasibility and level of complexity modelled. 
Ultimately, these promising directions for future work may help to strengthen the approach, 
making it more readily applicable to existing, highly complex dam systems.   
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Appendix A: Cheakamus Hydropower Project Details 
This appendix contains the numerical relationships for reservoir storage and flow 
conveyance at Cheakamus Dam. These relationships can be found in the publicly 
available Water Use Plan. 
 
Figure A1 Stage-Storage curve for Daisy Lake Reservoir (BC Hydro 2005) 
 
Figure A2: Rating Curve for radial gates fully open and free overflow (BC Hydro 
2005) 
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Figure A3: Rating curve for low level outlet sluice gate fully open (BC Hydro 2005) 
 
 
Figure A4: Historical Inflows to Daisy Lake (BC Hydro 2005) 
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Figure A5: Daisy Lake NMin and NMax reservoir levels (data from BC Hydro 
2005) 
 
Figure A6: Minimum discharges below Daisy Lake Dam (data from BC Hydro 
2005)  
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Appendix B: STPA Analysis of Cheakamus Dam 
Cheakamus Dam System STPA analysis 
Note that this analysis was not done by BC Hydro personnel and therefore should not be 
interpreted to represent real conclusions for the Cheakamus System. 
High-level system hazards: 
H1: High flows released into Cheakamus River and/or Squamish River (flood) 
H2: Flow releases to Cheakamus River stopped (fish kill) 
H3: Equipment damaged (economic/safety impact) 
H4: Loss of power production (economic impact) 
-Not sure about this one. This happens quite often, during low flows or during 
maintenance, is it really to be considered an accident? I’ve decided to remove it 
from the list because it’s a pretty regular occurrence. It might be more suitable to 
be added to the list for a large dam where water is always passing through the 
powerhouse (eg. Mica, Revelstoke, GMS) 
 
High-level system safety constraints (requirements): 
SH1: Flows released into Cheakamus and/or Squamish must not exceed a level that 
causes damage downstream (unless inflows do?) 
SH2: Flow must always be released to Cheakamus River 
SH3: Equipment must not become damaged 
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System Control Structure 
 
Figure B1: Hierarchical system structure  
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Table B1: STEP 1: Unsafe control actions 
# Control 
Action 
Not Providing 
causes hazard 
Providing 
causes hazard 
Wrong 
timing/order 
causes hazard 
Stopping too 
soon/applying 
too long causes 
hazard 
1 SPOG1 
Open 
-UCA1 Open 
command not 
provided when 
water level 
high, inflow 
high or both 
[H1, H3] 
 
-UCA2 Open 
command not 
provided when 
SPOG2 and 
LLO closed 
[H2] 
 
-UCA3 Open 
command not 
provided but 
gate opens on 
its own [H1] 
-UCA4 Open 
command 
provided 
resulting in 
downstream 
flooding [H1] 
 
-UCA5 Open 
command 
provided when 
gates blocked 
with debris/ice 
[H1, H3] 
 
-UCA6 Open 
command 
provided but 
gate stays 
closed [H2, 
H3] 
-UCA7 Open 
command 
provided too 
late, after 
reservoir filled 
to unsafe level 
and/or gates 
overtopped 
[H1, H3] 
 
-UCA8 Gate 
not left open 
long enough, 
reservoir 
continues to 
rise [H1, H3] 
 
-UCA9 Gate 
left open too 
long, resulting 
in draining of 
the reservoir to 
gate sill and 
fish kill [H2] 
2 SPOG2 
Open 
-UCA10 Open 
command not 
-UCA13 Open 
command 
-UCA16 Open 
command 
-UCA17 Gate 
not left open 
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provided when 
water level 
high, inflow 
high or both 
[H1, H3] 
 
-UCA11 Open 
command not 
provided when 
SPOG1 and 
LLO closed 
[H2] 
 
-UCA12 Open 
command not 
provided but 
gate opens on 
its own [H1] 
provided 
resulting in 
downstream 
flooding [H1] 
 
-UCA14 Open 
command 
provided when 
gates blocked 
with debris/ice 
[H1, H3] 
 
-UCA15 Open 
command 
provided but 
gate stays 
closed [H2, 
H3] 
provided too 
late, after 
reservoir filled 
to unsafe level 
and/or gates 
overtopped 
[H1, H3] 
 
long enough, 
reservoir 
continues to 
rise [H1, H3] 
 
-UCA18 Gate 
left open too 
long, resulting 
in draining of 
the reservoir to 
gate sill and 
fish kill [H2] 
3 SPOG1 
Close 
-UCA19 Close 
command not 
provided when 
inflows and  
water level low 
(approaching 
sill) [H2] 
-UCA20 Close 
command not 
-UCA21 Close 
command 
provided when 
reservoir 
and/or inflows 
high [H1, H3] 
 
-UCA22 Close 
command 
-UCA23 Close 
command 
provided too 
early, reservoir 
level increases 
[H1, H3] 
 
-UCA24 Close 
command 
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provided when 
SPOG2 and/or 
LLO releasing 
excess water 
[H1] 
 
UCA25 Close 
command not 
provided, gate 
closes on its 
own [H1, H2, 
H3] 
provided when 
SPOG2 and 
LLO closed 
[H2] 
provided too 
late, reservoir 
drains [H2] 
 
4 SPOG2 
Close 
-UCA26 Close 
command not 
provided but 
gate closes on 
its own [H1, 
H2, H3] 
 
-UCA27 Close 
command not 
provided when 
inflows and  
water level low 
(approaching 
sill) [H2] 
 
-UCA29 Close 
command 
provided when 
reservoir 
and/or inflows 
high [H1, H3] 
 
-UCA30 Close 
command 
provided when 
SPOG1 and 
LLO closed 
[H2] 
-UCA31 Close 
command 
provided too 
early, reservoir 
level increases 
[H1, H3] 
 
-UCA32 Close 
command 
provided too 
late, reservoir 
drains [H2] 
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-UCA28 Close 
command not 
provided when 
SPOG1 and/or 
LLO releasing 
excess water 
[H1] 
5 LLO Open -UCA33 Open 
command not 
provided when 
SPOGs closed 
[H1, H2, H3] 
-UCA34 Open 
command 
provided when 
SPOGs open 
[H1] 
 
-UCA35 Open 
command 
provided too 
late [H1, H2, 
H3] 
UCA36 Open 
command 
provided too 
long, reservoir 
drains [H2] 
 
-UCA37 Open 
command 
stopped too 
early, reservoir 
rises [H1, H3] 
6 LLO Close -UCA38 Close 
command not 
provided when 
reservoir level 
approaching 
sill [H2] 
UCA39: Close 
command 
provided when 
inflows and 
reservoir 
elevation high 
[H1, H2, H3] 
 
 
UCA40: Close 
command 
provided too 
early [H1, H2, 
H3] 
 
UCA41: Close 
command 
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provided too 
late [H2] 
7 T1 Open -UCA42 Open 
command not 
provided when 
inflows high 
and SPOGs out 
of service [H1, 
H3] 
-UCA43 Open 
command 
provided but 
does not work, 
SPOGs out of 
service [H1, 
H3] 
-UCA44 Open 
command 
provided too 
late, SPOGs 
out of service 
and inflow 
high [H1, H3] 
 
 
-UCA45 Open 
command 
provided too 
long, reservoir 
level falls 
below power 
intake sill 
8 T2 Open -UCA46 Open 
command not 
provided when 
inflows high 
and SPOGs out 
of service [H1, 
H3] 
-UCA47 Open 
command 
provided but 
does not work, 
SPOGs out of 
service [H1, 
H3] 
-UCA48 Open 
command 
provided too 
late, SPOGs 
out of service 
and inflow 
high [H1, H3] 
 
 
-UCA49 Open 
command 
provided too 
long, reservoir 
level falls 
below power 
intake sill 
9 T1 Close -UCA50 Close 
command not 
provided when 
reservoir levels 
low [H2] 
 
-UCA52 Close 
command 
provided when 
reservoir 
levels high 
[H1, H3] 
-UCA53 Close 
command 
provided too 
late, reservoir 
level low [H2] 
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-UCA51 
Turbine closes 
when 
command not 
provided 
causing water 
hammer and 
penstock 
rupture [H3] 
10 T2 Close -UCA54 Close 
command not 
provided when 
reservoir levels 
low [H2] 
 
-UCA55 
Turbine closes 
when 
command not 
provided 
causing water 
hammer and 
penstock 
rupture [H2, 
H3] 
-UCA56 Close 
command 
provided when 
reservoir 
levels high 
[H1, H3] 
-UCA57 Close 
command 
provided too 
late, reservoir 
level low [H2] 
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STEP 2: Causes of unsafe control actions 
NOTE: additional details provided about recurring potential issues at end of this section. 
 
UCA1/UCA10: SPOG Open command not provided when water level high, inflow high 
or both [H1, H3] 
 Case 1: Water level high, inflow low, open command not provided 
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DS) unaware of reservoir level due to 
gauge failure, sensor failures or communication delays 
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional 
flows are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, 
DC) make a decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to 
an unsafe state even though the inflow is relatively low. 
 Case 2: Water level high, inflow high, open command not provided 
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) believe they can return the reservoir to a 
safe level using the powerhouse and/or LLO and/or other SPOG due to 
inflow forecast errors 
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DS) unaware of reservoir level due to 
gauge failure, sensor failures or communication delays 
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional 
flows are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, 
DC) make a decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to 
unsafe levels 
-Controllers do not follow procedure (human error due to fatigue or shift 
change at PSOSE/FVO) 
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 Case 3: Water level low, inflow high, open command not provided 
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) believe they can keep the reservoir at a 
safe level without opening the gate, due to inflow forecast errors or 
process errors 
 -Gate(s) out of service for maintenance purposes and therefore cannot be opened. 
 -Controller thinks gate open (sensor failure, communication delay) 
 
UCA2/UCA11: SPOG Open command not provided when other SPOG and LLO closed 
[H2] 
 -Procedural: Inflow low and operators want to conserve water for power 
production 
 -Controller (ACC) makes a mistake due to being tired or shift change 
-Controller thinks gate open (sensor failure, communication delay) 
 
UCA3/UCA12: SPOG Open command not provided but gate opens on its own [H1] 
-Gate position sensor failure causes PLC to open gate spuriously 
 
UCA4/UCA13: SPOG Open command provided resulting in downstream flooding [H1] 
-Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC) issue a command to open the gate to a large 
opening, resulting in downstream flooding 
 -Inflow forecast error (controller thinks inflow is going to be higher than it 
is) 
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-Sensor failure or delay resulting in operator thinking reservoir 
level/inflow is higher than it actually is and opening gate to return it to a 
safe level 
-Controllers issue a command to open the gate and the force is too high, alarm 
sent and ignored by controller, or sensor fails and alarm not sent - so the steel 
yields and there is an uncontrolled release of water. Note – hoist likely to fail first.   
-Backup motor engages when main motor functional due to missing signal, two 
motors functioning to move gears causing overforce on hoist, hoist failure and 
gate fails closed. If inflows high enough, this could potentially result in dam 
breach. 
UCA5/UCA14: SPOG Open command provided when gates blocked with debris or ice 
[H1, H2, H3] 
-Operator (remote or manual) tries to open gate but it is blocked by debris/ice and 
a gate component fails (hoist, motor, strut) [H3] 
 -Gate fails open and a large amount of water is released [H1] 
 -Gate fails closed and no water is released [H2] 
  -Could potentially result in [H1] if inflows high enough 
-Operator (remote or manual) opens gate but debris or ice result in less water 
being released than intended. Reservoir then rises to an unsafe level and excessive 
flows are discharged via free overflow spillway and/or over the dam crest [H1] 
-Gate opens as planned and debris flushed through spillway chute damages chute 
[H3] 
 
UCA6/UCA15: SPOG Open command provided but gate stays closed [H2, H3] 
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-Gate component has failed (deterioration or disturbance), resulting in inability to 
move gate  
-Unable to move due to inadequate lubrication of guidewall/skinplate 
interface or trunnion 
-Gate sensor failed and PLC thinks gate is open so it doesn’t move the gate (or 
gate sensor doing it’s job but debris in the way/some sort of interruption that 
makes the sensor sense the wrong position) 
-Grid failed, diesel backup failed, site staff unavailable to operate temporary 
diesel generator  
-Emergency situation such as an earthquake/landslide, or site 
inaccessibility 
 
UCA7/UCA16: SPOG Open command provided too late, after reservoir filled to unsafe 
level and/or gates overtopped [H1, H3] 
-Inflow forecast errors so controller doesn’t think gate needs to be opened.  
-Sensor errors so controller doesn’t realize reservoir level is high 
 -Reservoir rises to above gates which can then no longer be opened and 
may be damaged [H1, H3] 
 -Reservoir rises to above gates which may still be opened but too late to 
prevent dangerous releases over free overflow and/or dam crests [H1, H3] 
-Gate cannot be opened past 2m remotely. Delay in mobilizing site staff leads to 
unsafe conditions (access road issues/short staffed due to time of evening or 
weekend, inflows high and staff need ~2h minimum to reach site from Mission 
office) 
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-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional flows 
are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DC) make a 
decision to hold water back, allowing the reservoir to rise to an unsafe state even 
though the inflow is relatively low. Dam safety controller (DS) steps in at a 
certain reservoir elevation to override operations planners but by then it is too late 
 
UCA8/UCA17: SPOG Gate not left open long enough, reservoir continues to rise [H1, 
H3] 
-Controller thinks reservoir is lower (sensor failure) so they close gate  
-Controller thinks inflows are manageable with other release facilities (inflow 
forecast/process model error) so they close the gate 
-Gate closes on its own due to failure of some gate component (gate fails closed) 
 
UCA9/UCA18: SPOG Gate left open too long, resulting in draining of the reservoir to 
gate sill and fish kill [H2] 
-Controller thinks reservoir is higher (sensor failure/delay/relay failure) so they 
keep the gate open  
-Loss of power to close gate (grid, diesel), temporary diesel requiring staff 
mobilization which has some delay 
-Loss of site access and remote gate control meaning gate cannot be closed until 
site accessed or sat/microwave links working 
-Gate fails in open position 
-Loss of remote gate control, mobilization of staff to site to close gate takes too 
long and reservoir drains below sill  
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-UCA19/UCA27 SPOG Close command not provided when inflows and water level low 
(approaching sill) [H2] 
 -Reservoir level gauge faulty or delayed so controller thinks reservoir is higher 
than it is   and drains it to the sill  
-Controller thinks inflows are high (inflow forecast error) and keeps gate open 
despite plummeting reservoir elevation 
-Operator lowering reservoir following signs of internal erosion or earthquake 
 
-UCA20/UCA28 SPOG Close command not provided when other SPOG and/or LLO 
releasing excess water [H1] 
-Process model: Controller thinks inflows high so keeps outflows high (past 
experience/ inflow forecast error) 
-Process model: Controller thinks reservoir is high so keeps outflows high (sensor 
error, past experience with flashy reservoir) 
-Inflows and reservoir level high, controller following procedure 
-Lowering reservoir due to signs of internal erosion/damaged dam(s) 
 
-UCA25/UCA26 SPOG Close command not provided, gate closes on its own [H1, H2, 
H3] 
 -Gate fails closed (failure of hoist, connections, structural, sensor, etc.) 
 -Spurious closure due to faulty gate position sensor 
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-UCA21/UCA29 SPOG Close command provided when reservoir and/or inflows high 
[H1, H3] 
 -Case 1: Reservoir high, inflows low 
-Controller relies on past experience and thinks the situation can be 
handled with minimum fish flow and maximum power flow releases. If 
the reservoir is above the level of the earth dam filter, this decision could 
put the dam at risk of failure. 
-Controller believes reservoir is low (gauge failure or delay, relay failure) 
 -Case 2: Reservoir low, inflows high 
-Controller wants to fill reservoir higher to conserve water for energy 
production. Eventually if inflows stay high, this could mean larger spills 
later [H1] or even put the dam at risk in extreme cases [H1, H3]  
-Controller believes inflows are low (inflow forecast error) 
- High tides at Squamish and high tributary flows in Squamish and lower 
Cheakamus mean controller opts to hold water back to prevent flooding. 
 -Case 3: Reservoir high, inflows high 
-High tides at Squamish and high tributary flows in Squamish and lower 
Cheakamus mean controller opts to hold water back to prevent flooding.   
-Controller believes inflows are low (inflow forecast error) and believes 
power and minimum fish flow discharge will be sufficient to return water 
level to safe state  
-Controller believes reservoir is low (gauge failure or delay, relay failure) 
and wants to fill to higher level to use the water for power production   
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-Spillway chute becomes damaged (debris? Or age) and operator wants to avoid 
further damage to chute so the gates are closed and the reservoir is allowed to rise 
to the level of the free overflow spillway. If inflows are high enough, this could 
potentially put the dam at risk of overtopping. Could also cause damage to and/or 
undermining of saddle/wing dams 
 
-UCA22/UCA30 SPOG Close command provided when other SPOG and LLO closed 
[H2] 
-Controller thinks water is being released through SPOG and/or LLO for fish 
flows (faulty SPOG position gauge and/or delay in information from on-site 
operator of LLO) 
-ACC controller accidentally sends command to close gate  
 
-UCA23/UCA31 SPOG Close command provided too early, reservoir level increases 
[H1, H3] 
 -Controller thinks reservoir level is low (gauge failure or delay) 
 -Controller thinks inflow is low (inflow forecast error) 
-High tides at Squamish mean there are flooding impacts when additional flows 
are released from the CMS system. Controllers (OP, PSOSE, ACC, DC) make a 
decision to hold water back, closing the SPOGs to the minimum fish flow, 
allowing the reservoir to rise to an unsafe state  
 
-UCA24/UCA32 SPOG close command provided too late, reservoir drains [H2] 
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 -Controller thinks reservoir level is higher than the gate sill (gauge failure or 
delay) 
-Controller thinks inflow is high (inflow forecast error) so keeps reservoir open to 
pre-spill for a storm that never comes, resulting in the reservoir being drained to 
the sill  
-Operator is responding to issues at another site and overlooks the fact that the 
CMS reservoir is draining to the sill 
-MICROWAVE/Sat links fail, by the time site staff arrive to close gate, reservoir 
is below gate sill 
 
-UCA33 LLO Open command not provided when SPOGs closed [H1, H2, H3] 
-Controller thinks SPOGs are open (SPOG position sensor failure, or relay 
failure) [H1, H2, H3] 
 -SPOGs fail closed, controller unaware [H1, H2, H3] 
 
-UCA34 LLO Open command provided when SPOGs open [H1] 
-Controller thinks inflows are very high (inflow forecast error) and releases an 
excess amount of water downstream than is necessary to control reservoir level 
[H1] 
 
-UCA35 LLO Open command provided too late [H1, H2, H3] 
-SPOGs failed, high inflows, operator mobilization to site takes longer than 
expected (traffic/personnel issues/timing) [H1, H2, H3] 
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-UCA36 LLO Open command provided too long, reservoir drains [H2] 
-Controller expects very high inflows (inflow forecast error). Operator mobilizes 
to site and opens gate then leaves site. When inflows shown to be low and 
reservoir is draining, operator must mobilize to site to close gate (site access 
issues, personnel issues) 
  
-UCA37 LLO Open command stopped too early, reservoir level increases [H1, H3] 
-Controller thinks inflows are manageable with SPOGs so operator mobilizes to 
site to close LLO. SPOGs fail closed after operator leaves site resulting in 
increase in reservoir elevation. 
-Downstream flooding at Squamish due to high tide and tributary flows, so 
controller decides to hold water back and reduces LLO flow to minimum fish 
flow. SPOGs closed for maintenance. 
-Failure of LLO in closed position, SPOGs closed and/or out of service 
 
UCA38: LLO Close command not provided when reservoir level approaching sill [H2] 
 -Operator thinks reservoir level higher than it is (sensor failure/delay)  
-Damage to dam structure means reservoir must be drained to avoid potential 
internal erosion issues (earthquake/aging). Inflow falls to below the set LLO 
outflow and reservoir falls below sill, resulting in fish kill. 
 
UCA39: LLO Close command provided when inflows and reservoir elevation high [H1, 
H3] 
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-Controller feels inflows are manageable with SPOGs and power releases so 
operator closes LLO. SPOGs/power releases then fail after operator leaves site 
and reservoir rises to unsafe level [H1, H2, H3] 
 
UCA40: LLO close command provided too early [H1, H2, H3] 
-Controller feels inflows are manageable with SPOGs and power releases so 
operator closes LLO. Inflows increase (inflow forecast error) and/or 
SPOGs/Powerhouse fail  
-SPOGs out of service for maintenance. During the reverse lockout procedure 
when SPOGs are being brought back online, operator closes LLO too early 
(communication error with colleagues on site), resulting in fish kill 
 
UCA41: LLO Close command provided too late [H2] 
-SPOGs out of service. Controller thinks reservoir level is higher than it is (sensor 
failure or delay). Once controller realizes it is approaching sill, staff are mobilized 
to site to close the gate, but mobilization takes too long and reservoir drained to 
sill of LLO (traffic, personnel, timing)   
 
-UCA42/UCA46 Turbine Open command not provided when inflows high and SPOGs 
out of service [H1, H3] 
-Grid unavailable so turbine cannot be opened  
-Price of power is negative, PSOSE and FVO need to keep generation to a 
minimum while they import power from out of province 
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-UCA43/UCA47 Turbine Open command provided but does not work, SPOGs out of 
service [H1, H3] 
 -Load rejection at powerhouse, wicket gate failure, etc. 
-Failure of remote control, site inaccessibility (forest fire, landslide, washouts in 
Squamish valley) 
 
-UCA44/UCC48 Turbine Open command provided too late, SPOGs out of service and 
inflow high [H1, H3] 
-Remote control failed (MICROWAVE and satellite or issue within powerhouse), 
site accessibility is delayed due to poor weather conditions and traffic 
 
-UCA45/UCC49 Turbine Open command provided too long, reservoir level falls below 
power intake sill 
-Power shortages in lower mainland so PSOSE and FVO opt to prioritize 
generation, drawing reservoir to below sill of SPOG/LLO 
-Controller unaware that the reservoir is low (sensor failure) runs powerhouse 
until reservoir falls below SPOG/LLO sill resulting in fish kill 
 
-UCA50/UCA54 Turbine Close command not provided when reservoir levels low [H2] 
-Energy shortage in lower mainland pushes controllers (PSOSE, ACC) to keep 
generating when reservoir elevation dropping to below LLO sill 
-Controller unaware reservoir is low (sensor failure) so powerhouse is run until 
reservoir falls below SPOG/LLO sill resulting in fish kill 
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-UCA51/UCA55 Turbine closes when command not provided causing water hammer and 
penstock rupture [H2, H3] 
-Load rejection, plugging/collapse of surge shaft resulting in water hammer that 
ruptures penstock resulting in damage and draining of the reservoir to intake sill  
 
-UCA52/UCA56 Turbine Close command provided when reservoir levels high [H1, H3] 
-Price of energy becomes negative, SPOG1 and SPOG2 out of service for 
maintenance and inflows high. Controllers choose to close turbines and use LLO 
for spill releases, resulting in high reservoir elevations when inflows exceed LLO 
capacity  
-Price of energy becomes negative. SPOG1 and SPOG2 subsequently fail closed 
and reservoir rises to unsafe elevation when inflows exceed LLO capacity 
 
UCA53/UCA57 Turbine Close command provided too late, reservoir level low [H2] 
-Remote control of powerhouse fails, water dropping to below sill of LLO before 
personnel can access site to close wicket gates (traffic, site access restriction due 
to fire hazard, washouts or landslide) [H2] 
 
Further details about specific components/failures: 
 
Other considerations/scenarios for Turbines: 
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-Rough load zone operation leading to failure of the head cover(s), draining 
reservoir through powerhouse. Though, there does not appear to be a rough load 
zone specified for the Cheakamus units. [H2, H3] 
-Runaway turbine if generation/grid links severed? [H2, H3] 
 
Non-control related considerations: 
-Earthquake causing settlement of earth dam and/or toppling of 
wing/saddle/concrete dams [H1, H3] 
-Barrier slide failure (may or may not be earthquake induced) leading to buildup 
of material in Cheakamus Valley downstream from dam resulting in inability to 
pass water through system, eventual overtopping/breach 
 
Causes of failures of recurring components from STPA analysis: 
RTU’s (2): (1) Controls SPOGs, (2) Collects sensor info from PLC and relays to 
microwave/sat links. Failure resulting in loss of remote gate control and loss of visibility. 
-Power supply failure (backup batteries at end of service life) 
-Microprocessor failure 
-Lightning (one or both) 
-Earthquake causing structural movement of RTU/wiring/etc. 
PLC: 
-Voltage fluctuations causing them to lock themselves out. Automatically reboot 
or require manual reboot.  
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-Backup batteries at end of service life, voltage too low for PLC 
-May lose visibility in the event of grid failure since everything is coming to this 
PLC and being transferred to RTU/microwave/satellite 
 
Gate position sensors (2): One rotary, one linear. Rotary converts angular to distance 
linearized with shape of gate, lookup table within sensor to determine opening. Linear is 
a straight rod at the trunnion, linearized in PLC. Transfers info to PLC.  
 -Power supply failures (grid or rodent activity) 
 -Failure of linear sensor in the event of ice storm possible (exposed to elements) 
-Linear sensor is temperature sensitive, in hot weather it may appear gate is 
moving when it is not. 
-PLC issues when one is way off from the other? 
 
Reservoir level sensors (3) + staff gauge: PLC takes standard deviation between each 
one. If outside 4cm nominal difference, sensor omitted. Average of 2 or 3 taken. If two 
fail, PLC reads reservoir elevation as failed and passes that to RTU for control centre 
relay 
 -Linearity issues  
 -Temperature issues both high and low temperatures 
 -Must be rearranged every quarter – potential for issues in readings at end of 
quarter. 
 -If failed, site staff would have to go read staff gauge for accurate reservoir level 
reading 
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Site access: 
 -2-2.5 hours optimal 
-In emergency, may be able to instruct power crews in Squamish on how to open 
gate or fly in (helicopter) 
-Forest fires, earthquakes (highway collapse), traffic, barrier slide could all 
prevent access 
-Overtopping of dam would surely prevent access (it would be flooded. Once that 
happens, nobody can access site). 
 
Microwave failure: 
 -Earthquake  
 -Ice 
 -Can only be fixed in summer, very much weather dependant  
 
Gates: 
 -Multiple motors 
 -Can be operated by power drill via gearbox 
 -One gate stiffened for overtopping flows, one isn’t 
-Overtravel limit – mechanical switch failure stops drum from turning when gate 
opened too high 
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-Backup gate drive motor 
-Gearbox or drum failure would be catastrophic 
 -misalignment of gears (earthquake) 
 -lubrication issue (though would still work for a time) 
 -May be designed to open with a single hoist (need to check this) 
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Appendix C: Operating States Database for Cheakamus System 
Table C1: Reservoir-level database components for Cheakamus System 
ReservoirLeve
lID 
ReservoirLevelTy
peID 
ReservoirLevelNam
e 
OperatingStat
eID 
OperatingStateName OperatingStateTy
peID 
ImpactType
ID 
CausalFacto
rID 
CausalFactorTyp
eID 
CausalFactorName MaxDa
te 
MinDa
te 
46 1 Gate Pier 220 NA 2 4 226 25 None 365 1 
22 1 Main Earth Dam 104 None 2 4 227 25 None 365 1 
18 4 Dam PLC 138 Functional 2 4 252 25 None 365 0 
19 4 Powerhouse PLC 140 Functional 2 4 253 25 None 365 0 
16 5 Dam RTU 142 Functional 2 4 254 25 None 365 0 
17 5 Powerhouse RTU 144 Functional 2 4 255 25 None 365 0 
21 8 Main Dam 106 None 2 4 264 25 None 365 0 
27 11 Backup Diesel 
Generator 
113 None 2 4 265 25 None 365 0 
29 12 Dam Access 115 Typical access time 2 2 266 25 None 365 0 
28 12 Powerhouse Access 117 Typical access time 2 2 267 25 None 365 0 
30 23 Res El Sensor 1 218 Reading correct 2 4 268 25 None 365 0 
31 23 Res El Sensor 2 212 Reading correct 2 4 269 25 None 365 0 
47 23 Res El Sensor 3 209 Reading correct 2 4 270 25 None 365 0 
37 23 SPOG1Position_L 126 Reading correct 2 4 271 25 None 365 0 
39 23 SPOG2Position_L 132 Reading correct 2 4 272 25 None 365 0 
38 23 SPOG2Position_R 135 Reading correct 2 4 273 25 None 365 0 
36 23 SPOG1Position_R 221 Reading normal 2 4 274 25 None 365 0 
41 25 Power tunnel 175 None 2 4 275 25 None 365 0 
42 26 Penstock 177 Normal operation 2 4 276 25 None 365 0 
44 27 CMS Grid 187 Normal Operation 2 4 277 25 None 365 0 
43 27 Rainbow Grid 189 Normal Operation 2 4 278 25 None 365 0 
45 28 CMS Inflow 
Forecast 
192 Inflow forecast normal 2 4 279 25 None 365 0 
48 29 Site Staff 
Availability 
214 Staff available 2 4 280 25 None 365 0 
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ReservoirLeve
lID 
ReservoirLevelTy
peID 
ReservoirLevelNam
e 
OperatingStat
eID 
OperatingStateName OperatingStateTy
peID 
ImpactType
ID 
CausalFacto
rID 
CausalFactorTyp
eID 
CausalFactorName MaxDa
te 
MinDa
te 
18 4 Dam PLC 139 PLC offline 1 1 64 10 Voltage fluctuation  365 0 
18 4 Dam PLC 139 PLC offline 1 1 65 1 Earthquake 365 0 
16 5 Dam RTU 143 Offline 1 1 66 11 Lightning  274 120 
17 5 Powerhouse RTU 145 Offline 1 1 67 11 Lightning 274 120 
16 5 Dam RTU 143 Offline 1 1 68 1 Earthquake 365 0 
17 5 Powerhouse RTU 145 Offline 1 1 69 1 Earthquake 365 0 
21 8 Main Dam 107 Cracking of concrete 1 7 72 1 Earthquake 365 0 
27 11 Backup Diesel 
Generator 
114 Generator fails, no power 1 1 82 1 Earthquake 365 0 
27 11 Backup Diesel 
Generator 
114 Generator fails, no power 1 1 83 1 Earthquake 365 0 
27 11 Backup Diesel 
Generator 
114 Generator fails, no power 1 1 84 9 Aging 365 0 
27 11 Backup Diesel 
Generator 
114 Generator fails, no power 1 1 85 2 Lack of maintenance 365 0 
29 12 Dam Access 116 Access dangerous, delayed or not 
possible 
6 2 86 14 Traffic/traffic indicent 365 0 
29 12 Dam Access 116 Access dangerous, delayed or not 
possible 
6 2 87 4 Excessive rainfall causes road 
washout 
365 0 
29 12 Dam Access 116 Access dangerous, delayed or not 
possible 
6 2 88 1 Earthquake 365 0 
29 12 Dam Access 116 Access dangerous, delayed or not 
possible 
6 2 89 16 Forest fire resulting in evacuation 273 181 
19 4 Powerhouse PLC 141 PLC offline 1 1 94 10 Voltage fluctuation  365 0 
19 4 Powerhouse PLC 141 PLC offline 1 1 95 1 Earthquake 365 0 
41 25 Power tunnel 176 Power tunnel collapse 1 5 111 1 Earthquake 365 0 
42 26 Penstock 178 Penstock rupture 1 9 114 1 Earthquake 365 0 
28 12 Powerhouse Access 118 Access dangerous, delayed or not 
possible 
6 2 152 14 Traffic/traffic indicent 365 0 
28 12 Powerhouse Access 118 Access dangerous, delayed or not 
possible 
6 2 153 4 Excessive rainfall causes road 
washout 
365 0 
28 12 Powerhouse Access 118 Access dangerous, delayed or not 
possible 
6 2 154 1 Earthquake 365 0 
28 12 Powerhouse Access 118 Access dangerous, delayed or not 
possible 
6 2 155 16 Forest fire resulting in evacuation 365 0 
44 27 CMS Grid 188 Grid failure 1 1 156 5 Ice storm 59 0 
44 27 CMS Grid 188 Grid failure 1 1 157 7 Wind storm 365 0 
44 27 CMS Grid 188 Grid failure 1 1 158 16 Forest fire destroys infrastructure 273 120 
44 27 CMS Grid 188 Grid failure 1 1 159 11 Lightning destroys infrastructure 273 120 
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ReservoirLeve
lID 
ReservoirLevelTy
peID 
ReservoirLevelNam
e 
OperatingStat
eID 
OperatingStateName OperatingStateTy
peID 
ImpactType
ID 
CausalFacto
rID 
CausalFactorTyp
eID 
CausalFactorName MaxDa
te 
MinDa
te 
43 27 Rainbow Grid 190 Grid failure 1 1 160 5 Ice storm 59 0 
43 27 Rainbow Grid 190 Grid failure 1 1 161 7 Wind storm 365 0 
43 27 Rainbow Grid 190 Grid failure 1 1 162 16 Forest fire destroys infrastructure 273 120 
43 27 Rainbow Grid 190 Grid failure 1 1 163 11 Lightning destroys infrastructure 273 120 
46 1 Gate Pier 195 Failure of gate pier 1 1 164 1 Earthquake 365 0 
47 23 Res El Sensor 3 210 No Reading 1 1 180 1 Earthquake 365 0 
47 23 Res El Sensor 3 210 No Reading 1 1 181 12 Rodent activity causes short in 
wiring  
365 0 
47 23 Res El Sensor 3 210 No Reading 1 1 182 2 Lack of maintenance 365 0 
47 23 Res El Sensor 3 210 No Reading 1 1 183 9 Aging 365 0 
47 23 Res El Sensor 3 208 Wrong Reading 8 3 184 2 Failed to recalibrate seasonally 365 0 
47 23 Res El Sensor 3 208 Wrong Reading 8 3 185 17 High or low temps result in 
decalibration 
365 0 
37 23 SPOG1Position_L 128 Wrong Reading 8 3 186 5 Ice buildup 59 0 
37 23 SPOG1Position_L 128 Wrong Reading 8 3 189 2 Lack of maintenance 365 0 
37 23 SPOG1Position_L 128 Wrong Reading 8 3 190 1 Earthquake 365 0 
39 23 SPOG2Position_L 134 Wrong Reading 8 3 191 5 Ice buildup causes sensor to 
decalibrate 
59 0 
39 23 SPOG2Position_L 134 Wrong Reading 8 3 192 2 Lack of maintenance 365 0 
39 23 SPOG2Position_L 134 Wrong Reading 8 3 193 1 Earthquake 365 0 
36 23 SPOG1Position_R 131 Wrong Reading 8 3 195 2 Lack of maintenance, sensor 
deteriorates 
365 0 
36 23 SPOG1Position_R 131 Wrong Reading 8 3 196 1 Earthquake 365 0 
36 23 SPOG1Position_R 131 Wrong Reading 8 3 197 12 Rodent activity  365 0 
38 23 SPOG2Position_R 137 Wrong Reading 8 3 198 2 Lack of maintenance 365 0 
38 23 SPOG2Position_R 137 Wrong Reading 8 3 199 1 Earthquake 365 0 
38 23 SPOG2Position_R 137 Wrong Reading 8 3 200 12 Rodent activity  365 0 
31 23 Res El Sensor 2 211 Wrong Reading 8 3 204 2 Failed to recalibrate seasonally 365 0 
31 23 Res El Sensor 2 211 Wrong Reading 8 3 205 17 High or low temps result in 
decalibration 
365 0 
31 23 Res El Sensor 2 213 No Reading 1 1 206 1 Earthquake 365 0 
31 23 Res El Sensor 2 213 No Reading 1 1 207 12 Rodent activity  365 0 
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ReservoirLeve
lID 
ReservoirLevelTy
peID 
ReservoirLevelNam
e 
OperatingStat
eID 
OperatingStateName OperatingStateTy
peID 
ImpactType
ID 
CausalFacto
rID 
CausalFactorTyp
eID 
CausalFactorName MaxDa
te 
MinDa
te 
31 23 Res El Sensor 2 213 No Reading 1 1 208 2 Lack of maintenance 365 0 
31 23 Res El Sensor 2 213 No Reading 1 1 209 9 Aging 365 0 
30 23 Res El Sensor 1 217 Wrong Reading 8 3 210 2 Failed to recalibrate seasonally 365 0 
30 23 Res El Sensor 1 217 Wrong Reading 8 3 211 17 High or low temps result in 
decalibration 
365 0 
30 23 Res El Sensor 1 219 No Reading 1 1 212 1 Earthquake 365 0 
30 23 Res El Sensor 1 219 No Reading 1 1 213 12 Rodent activity  365 0 
30 23 Res El Sensor 1 219 No Reading 1 1 214 2 Lack of maintenance 365 0 
30 23 Res El Sensor 1 219 No Reading 1 1 215 9 Aging 365 0 
45 28 CMS Inflow 
Forecast 
194 Inflow forecasting error 8 3 216 20 Operator fatigue 365 1 
45 28 CMS Inflow 
Forecast 
194 Inflow forecasting error 8 3 217 21 Uncertainty 365 1 
48 29 Site Staff 
Availability 
215 Staff unavailable 6 2 218 22 Weekend or evening 365 1 
48 29 Site Staff 
Availability 
215 Staff unavailable 6 2 219 23 Staff are busy and unable to 
access site 
365 1 
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Table C2: Component-Level database components for Cheakamus System 
ReservoirL
evelID 
ReservoirLeve
lTypeID 
ReservoirLev
elName 
Component
LevelID 
ComponentLev
elTypeID 
ComponentLev
elName 
OperatingS
tateID 
OperatingStateName OperatingStat
eTypeID 
ImpactT
ypeID 
CausalFactor
TypeID 
CausalFactorName Min
Date 
Max
Date 
13 2 Gate 1 26 1 Gate Hoist 1 183 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 28 2 Skinplate 23 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 31 5 Gearbox 35 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 32 10 Motor 36 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 33 11 Structural 
Supports 
37 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 34 12 Hoist Gate 
Connection 1 
38 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 43 16 Thrustor Brake 69 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 55 10 Backup Motor 165 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 57 19 Gate 1 Opening 179 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 16 1 Gate Hoist 2 48 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 18 2 Skinplate 44 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 21 5 Gearbox 57 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 22 10 Motor 58 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 23 11 Structural 
Supports 
76 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 24 12 Hoist Gate 
Connection 2 
65 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 44 16 Thrustor Brake 74 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 56 10 Backup Motor 167 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 58 19 Gate 2 Opening 181 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
8 3 Turbine 1 36 13 Head Cover 80 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
8 3 Turbine 1 37 14 Wicket Gates 83 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
8 3 Turbine 1 38 15 Generator 85 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
10 3 Turbine 2 39 13 Head Cover 87 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
10 3 Turbine 2 40 14 Wicket Gates 90 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
10 3 Turbine 2 41 15 Generator 92 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
46 1 Hoist 146 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
47 2 Skinplate 148 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
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ReservoirL
evelID 
ReservoirLeve
lTypeID 
ReservoirLev
elName 
Component
LevelID 
ComponentLev
elTypeID 
ComponentLev
elName 
OperatingS
tateID 
OperatingStateName OperatingStat
eTypeID 
ImpactT
ypeID 
CausalFactor
TypeID 
CausalFactorName Min
Date 
Max
Date 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
48 10 Motor 150 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
49 11 Support 152 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
50 12 Hoist Gate 
Connection 
155 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
51 12 Thrustor Brake 157 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
54 5 Gearbox 160 Normal 2 4 25 None 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 26 1 Gate Hoist 1 20 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 5 Ice force on gate 1 69 
13 2 Gate 1 26 1 Gate Hoist 1 20 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 3 Debris force on gate 120 274 
14 2 Gate 2 16 1 Gate Hoist 2 94 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 5 Ice force on gate 0 69 
14 2 Gate 2 16 1 Gate Hoist 2 94 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 3 Debris force on gate 120 274 
13 2 Gate 1 28 2 Skinplate 24 Steel yields 4 1 3 Debris force 120 274 
13 2 Gate 1 28 2 Skinplate 24 Steel yields 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 18 2 Skinplate 95 Steel yields 4 1 3 Debris force on gate 120 274 
14 2 Gate 2 18 2 Skinplate 95 Steel yields 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 31 5 Gearbox 34 Gearbox stripped 4 1 1 Movement of gears 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 31 5 Gearbox 34 Gearbox stripped 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 21 5 Gearbox 96 Gearbox stripped 4 1 1 Movement of gears 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 21 5 Gearbox 96 Gearbox stripped 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 26 1 Gate Hoist 1 20 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 8 Both motors engage 
resulting in overforce 
0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 26 1 Gate Hoist 1 20 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 8 Overforce alarm fails 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 16 1 Gate Hoist 2 94 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 8 Both motors engage 
resulting in overforce 
0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 16 1 Gate Hoist 2 94 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 8 Overforce alarm fails 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 32 10 Motor 40 Motor Failure 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 32 10 Motor 40 Motor Failure 4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 32 10 Motor 40 Motor Failure 4 1 9 Old motor 1 364 
13 2 Gate 1 55 10 Backup Motor 166 Motor Failure 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 55 10 Backup Motor 166 Motor Failure 4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 55 10 Backup Motor 166 Motor Failure 4 1 9 Old motor 0 365 
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ReservoirL
evelID 
ReservoirLeve
lTypeID 
ReservoirLev
elName 
Component
LevelID 
ComponentLev
elTypeID 
ComponentLev
elName 
OperatingS
tateID 
OperatingStateName OperatingStat
eTypeID 
ImpactT
ypeID 
CausalFactor
TypeID 
CausalFactorName Min
Date 
Max
Date 
14 2 Gate 2 22 10 Motor 97 Motor Failure 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 22 10 Motor 97 Motor Failure 4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 22 10 Motor 97 Motor Failure 4 1 9 Old motor 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 56 10 Backup Motor 168 Motor Failure 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 56 10 Backup Motor 168 Motor Failure 4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 56 10 Backup Motor 168 Motor Failure 4 1 9 Old motor 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 33 11 Structural 
Supports 
41 Supports deform and gate 
collapses 
5 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 33 11 Structural 
Supports 
41 Supports deform and gate 
collapses 
5 1 8 Overforce alarm fails 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 23 11 Structural 
Supports 
98 Supports deform and gate 
collapses 
5 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 23 11 Structural 
Supports 
98 Supports deform and gate 
collapses 
5 1 8 Overforce alarm fails 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 33 11 Structural 
Supports 
42 Supports deform and gate 
becomes immoveable 
4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 23 11 Structural 
Supports 
99 Supports deform and gate 
becomes immoveable 
4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 34 12 Hoist Gate 
Connection 1 
43 Gate connection snaps 3 1 9 Aging 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 24 12 Hoist Gate 
Connection 2 
100 Gate connection snaps 3 1 9 Aging 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 43 16 Thrustor Brake 70 Brake fails, gate closes 3 1 9 Aging 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 43 16 Thrustor Brake 70 Brake fails, gate closes 3 1 8 Feedback failure 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 44 16 Thrustor Brake 101 Brake fails, gate closes 3 1 9 Aging 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 44 16 Thrustor Brake 101 Brake fails, gate closes 3 1 8 Feedback failure 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 57 19 Gate 1 Opening 180 Opening is blocked 2 5 3 Debris accumulates at gate 
opening 
120 274 
14 2 Gate 2 58 19 Gate 2 Opening 182 Opening is blocked 2 5 3 Debris accumulates at gate 
opening 
120 274 
8 3 Turbine 1 36 13 Head Cover 81 Bolt fatigue, head cover failure 5 9 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
8 3 Turbine 1 37 14 Wicket Gates 82 Wicket gates fail closed 1 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
10 3 Turbine 2 39 13 Head Cover 88 Bolt fatigue, head cover failure 5 9 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
48 10 Motor 151 Motor Failure 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
48 10 Motor 151 Motor Failure 4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
48 10 Motor 151 Motor Failure 4 1 9 Old motor 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
49 11 Support 184 Supports deform and gate 
collapses 
5 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
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ReservoirL
evelID 
ReservoirLeve
lTypeID 
ReservoirLev
elName 
Component
LevelID 
ComponentLev
elTypeID 
ComponentLev
elName 
OperatingS
tateID 
OperatingStateName OperatingStat
eTypeID 
ImpactT
ypeID 
CausalFactor
TypeID 
CausalFactorName Min
Date 
Max
Date 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
49 11 Support 184 Supports deform and gate 
collapses 
5 1 8 Feedback failure 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
49 11 Support 185 Supports deform and gate 
becomes immoveable 
4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
50 12 Hoist Gate 
Connection 
156 Gate connection snaps 3 1 9 Aging 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
51 12 Thrustor Brake 158 Brake fails, gate closes 3 1 9 Aging 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
51 12 Thrustor Brake 158 Brake fails, gate closes 3 1 8 Feedback failure 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
54 5 Gearbox 159 Gearbox stripped 4 1 1 Earthquake 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
54 5 Gearbox 159 Gearbox stripped 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
47 2 Skinplate 149 Steel yields 4 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
47 2 Skinplate 149 Steel yields 4 1 3 Debris force on gate 0 365 
13 2 Gate 1 26 1 Gate Hoist 1 20 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
14 2 Gate 2 16 1 Gate Hoist 2 94 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
46 1 Hoist 186 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 8 Both motors engage 
resulting in overforce 
0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
46 1 Hoist 186 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 8 Feedback failure 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
46 1 Hoist 186 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
46 1 Hoist 186 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 5 Ice force on gate 0 365 
15 7 Low Level 
Outlet 
46 1 Hoist 186 Steel yields, hoists fail, gate 
fails closed 
3 1 3 Debris force on gate 0 365 
8 3 Turbine 1 38 15 Generator 86 Load Rejection 1 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
10 3 Turbine 2 41 15 Generator 93 Load Rejection 1 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
10 3 Turbine 2 40 14 Wicket Gates 216 Wicket gates fail closed 1 1 2 Lack of maintenance 0 365 
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Appendix D: Operating States Database for Simplified System 
Table D1: Reservoir-Level database components for Simplified System 
 
Ind 
Reservoir 
LevelId 
ReservoirLevel
TypeId 
ReservoirLevel 
Name 
Operating 
StateId 
OperatingStateName 
Operating 
StateTypeId 
Impact 
TypeId 
Min Max Avg UnitId 
Causal 
FactorId 
CausalFactor
TypeId 
CausalFactor 
Name 
Max 
Date 
Min
Date 
18_1 18 4 PLC/RTU 139 PLC offline 1 1 1 24 6 2 64 10 
Voltage 
Fluctuation 
365 0 
18_2 18 4 PLC/RTU 139 PLC offline 1 1 1 24 6 2 65 1 Earthquake 365 0 
29_1 29 12 Dam Access 116 
Access dangerous, 
delayed or not possible 
6 2 4 48 12 1 86 14 Traffic 365 0 
29_2 29 12 Dam Access 116 
Access dangerous, 
delayed or not possible 
6 2 4 48 12 1 88 1 Earthquake 365 0 
29_3 29 12 Dam Access 116 
Access dangerous, 
delayed or not possible 
6 2 4 48 12 1 89 16 Forest Fire 273 181 
42_1 42 26 Penstock 178 Penstock rupture 1 9 60 365 90 1 114 1 Earthquake 365 0 
44_1 44 27 Grid 188 Grid failure 1 1 0.04 7 0.167 1 157 7 Wind storm 365 0 
44_2 44 27 Grid 188 Grid failure 1 1 0.04 7 0.167 1 158 16 Forest Fire 273 120 
30_1 30 23 
Reservoir Elevation 
Sensor 1 
217 Wrong Reading 8 3 10 100 25 11 211 17 Temperature 365 0 
30_2 30 23 
Reservoir Elevation 
Sensor 1 
219 No Reading 1 1 0.167 5 1 1 212 1 Earthquake 365 0 
30_3 30 23 
Reservoir Elevation 
Sensor 1 
219 No Reading 1 1 0.167 5 1 1 214 2 
Lack of 
Maintenance 
365 0 
45_1 45 28 
CMS Inflow 
Forecast 
194 Inflow forecasting error 8 3 -3 3 0 8 217 21 Uncertainty 365 1 
48_1 48 29 
Site Staff 
Availability 
215 Staff unavailable 6 2 1 24 4 2 218 22 Timing 365 1 
48_2 48 29 
Site Staff 
Availability 
215 Staff unavailable 6 2 1 24 4 2 219 23 Timing 365 1 
18_3 18 4 PLCRTU 138 Functional 2 4 0 0 0 1 252 25 None 365 0 
29_4 29 12 Dam Access 115 Typical access time 2 2 2 4 2.5 2 266 25 None 365 1 
30_4 30 23 
Reservoir Elevation 
Sensor 1 
218 Reading correct 2 4 0 0 0 4 268 25 None 365 0 
42_2 42 26 Penstock 177 Normal operation 2 4 0 0 0 1 276 25 None 365 0 
44_3 44 27 Grid 187 Normal Operation 2 4 0 0 0 1 277 25 None 365 1 
45_2 45 28 
CMS Inflow 
Forecast 
192 Inflow forecast normal 2 4 0 0 0 11 279 25 None 365 0 
48_3 48 29 
Site Staff 
Availability 
214 Staff available 2 4 0 0 0 1 280 25 None 365 0 
18_4 18 4 PLC/RTU 139 PLC offline 1 1 1 24 6 2 292 11 Lightning 273 120 
30_5 30 23 
Reservoir Elevation 
Sensor 1 
219 No Reading 1 1 0.167 5 1 1 213 12 
Rodent 
Activity 
365 0 
44_4 44 27 Grid 188 Grid failure 1 1 0.04 7 0.16 1 159 11 Lightning 273 120 
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Table D2: Component-Level database components for Simplified System 
Identifier Reservoir
LevelID 
Reservoir
Level 
TypeID 
Reservoir 
Level 
Name 
Component 
LevelID 
Component 
LevelTypeI
D 
Component 
LevelName 
Operating
StateID 
Operating 
StateName 
Operating 
StateType 
ID 
Impact
TypeI
D 
Min Max Avg Causal 
FactorID 
Causal 
Factor 
TypeID 
CausalFactor
Name 
Min
Date 
Max
Date 
836_1 8 3 Turbine 1 36 13 Head Cover 81 Bolt fatigue, 
reservoir 
drained through 
turbine hole 
5 9 365 730 365 117 2 Maintenance 1 365 
838_1 8 3 Turbine 1 38 15 Generator 86 Load Rejection 1 1 0.1 7 0.2
5 
201 2 Maintenance 1 365 
836_2 8 3 Turbine 1 36 13 Head Cover 80 Normal 2 4 0 0 0 246 25 None 1 365 
838_2 8 3 Turbine 1 38 15 Generator 85 Normal 2 4 0 0 0 248 25 None 1 365 
1359_1 13 2 Gate 1 59 19 Gate 
opening 
222 Normal 2 4 0 0 0 281 25 None 1 365 
1359_2 13 2 Gate 1 59 19 Gate 
opening 
223 Gate is blocked 
by debris 
1 5 10 80 20 282 3 Debris 90 334 
1360_1 13 2 Gate 1 60 5 Components 
failing in 
place 
225 Components of 
the gate fail 
causing it to 
remain in place 
4 1 0.5 120 7 283 1 Earthquake 1 365 
1360_2 13 2 Gate 1 60 5 Components 
failing in 
place 
225 Components of 
the gate fail 
causing it to 
remain in place 
4 1 0.5 120 7 284 2 Maintenance 1 365 
1361_1 13 2 Gate 1 61 11 Components 
failing open 
226 Normal 2 4 0 0 0 285 25 Normal 1 365 
1361_2 13 2 Gate 1 61 11 Components 
failing open 
227 Components of 
the gate 
collapse and 
water is 
released 
5 1 210 730 240 286 1 Earthquake 1 365 
1361_3 13 2 Gate 1 61 11 Components 
failing open 
227 Components of 
the gate 
collapse and 
water is 
released 
5 1 210 730 240 287 8 Feedback 
Failure 
1 365 
1362_1 13 2 Gate 1 62 1 Components 
failing 
closed 
228 Normal 2 4 0 0 0 288 25 Normal 1 365 
1362_2 13 2 Gate 1 62 1 Components 
failing 
closed 
229 Components of 
the gate fail 
causing it to 
close 
3 1 1 120 20 289 9 Aging 1 365 
1362_3 13 2 Gate 1 62 1 Components 
failing 
closed 
229 Components of 
the gate fail 
causing it to 
close 
3 1 1 120 20 290 5 Ice 1 59 
1362_4 13 2 Gate 1 62 1 Components 
failing 
closed 
229 Components of 
the gate fail 
causing it to 
close 
3 1 1 120 20 291 8 Feedback 
Failure 
1 365 
1360_3 13 2 Gate 1 60 5 Components 
failing in 
place 
224 Normal 2 4 0 0 0 294 25 None 1 365 
280 
 
Appendix E: Simulation Script Organization and Discussion 
The general description of the steps within the simulation model code is shown in Figure . 
The complete code is presented in Appendix E. The following sub-sections provide 
additional information about the equations used in the simulation model. 
The first section of the code is entitled “1. Initialization”, where required packages are 
imported and data files are read in to be utilized within the code. The simulation model 
requires several supporting files, including input CSV’s containing information such as 
synthetic inflows, fish flow requirements, database data, baseline operating conditions (no 
failure), and rating curves for the spillway. In addition to this, several Python packages 
must be installed prior to running. These are listed below: 
• numpy 
• pandas 
• time 
• datetime  
• sys 
• argparse 
• os 
• random 
Many of the aforementioned packages are available from an open source Anaconda3 
installation at  https://www.anaconda.com/distribution/. Most of the packages can be 
installed easily using conda install in the command prompt. In addition to these packages, 
the sdpy project must also be imported, as well as scenarios.py. These files and all 
necessary input files are available in the electronic appendix in the Dam_Safety_Model 
folder.  
In the initialization section, arguments are also defined that allow the program to be called 
from the command prompt with a user-specified seed number and set the number of 
years/iterations (𝑁𝑌𝑟) to be simulated. The seed number represents the scenario number 
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and for the simplified system it can vary between 0 and 552,960 (the total number of 
scenarios).  
The following portion of the code is entitled “2. Generating Seeds”. The seed number is 
used to retrieve the scenario operating state identifiers as shown in the example scenario in 
the previous section. These operating state identifiers are used to extract the pertinent 
database information for the scenario of interest and convert the information into Monte-
Carlo parameters for simulation. The “boolop” parameter is used to determine whether a 
seed should be randomized or not. It may be set equal to zero for script testing purposes, 
which will set all randomized components of the code to a single value – start dates are set 
to zero, start years are set sequentially from zero, average values are chosen for impacts, 
and all impacts occur on day 1 of the simulation. If “boolop” is set equal to one, a complete 
Monte-Carlo randomization of the inputs is performed. Starting dates from the inflow 
sequences are randomized using a start day (0-364) and a start year (0 to the number of 
synthetic inflow years simulated) – these can then be used to select the inflows for the 
simulation. The impacts for each operating state are randomized using the triangular 
distribution, with the minimum, maximum and average values as the inputs. Timing of 
impacts is also randomized, with impacts that have the same causal factor occurring on the 
same day except for maintenance and aging issues. The first impact begins on day 1 and 
subsequent impacts can occur on any day between day 1 and day 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥. For the case study, 
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 is set equal to the sum of the outage lengths generated for the iteration being 
considered. Truncating the maximum timing allows for the impacts of each operating state 
to be realized and, if possible, recovered from, during the simulation time frame. 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 is 
selected with the goal of increasing the number of “complete iterations”, where all events 
in a scenario both occur and affect one another. This will depend on the system being 
modelled and how flashy the reservoir is. 
It is important to note that two runs were simulated for the case study (see details in Section 
4.5.2). Some of the differences between functions within the two runs are also described 
throughout the remaining text in this section. 
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The next section of the simulation code is entitled “3. Initializing Supporting Functions 
and Arrays” sets up functions and arrays to be utilized within the simulation model. The 
supporting functions are not directly part of the system dynamics model but may be called 
by it many times during the simulation. The supporting functions are optimized, if 
 
Figure E1: Simulation model process steps 
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possible, using “jit” – a “just-in-time” compiler that optimizes their performance. This 
ensures these functions, which are called many times in a given simulation, are executed 
as quickly as possible. The functions include: 
• Stage-storage curve (SSC) which determines reservoir elevation El from storage S 
as in Equation 25, and it’s reverse (SSCRev) which finds the roots of Equation 25 
to determine storage from elevation. These functions are located at line 724 and 
731 of the code at the end of this Appendix. 
𝐸𝑙 = −1.1201𝑒 − 05 𝑆2  +  0.032473 𝑆 +  364.6572 (𝐸. 1) 
• Stage-discharge curve for the free overflow sections (OTC), which is calculated 
using Equation 26, but is manipulated in the base case by increasing the spillway 
crest elevation by 2m and multiplying the result by 0.3 to represent a scaled down 
capacity of the free overflow structures in the base case. This was done to induce a 
larger number of dam failures for the proof-of-concept, since the spillway capacity 
of the real Cheakamus Dam is generally sufficient enough to prevent major 
consequences in even the most extreme scenarios. The code representing the two 
different overtopping curves for the base case and the dam safety improved case 
can be found on lines 734 and 2052, respectively, in the code at the end of this 
Appendix.  
𝑄𝑂𝑇 = −35.75 𝐸𝑙3 +  40896.27 𝐸𝑙2  − 15593240.1 𝐸𝑙 +  1981715583.1 (𝐸. 2) 
• Maximum flow calculator for the gate (SPOGMaxFlow), which follows the 
piecewise Equation __ (see line 763 of the code at the end of this Appendix). The 
maximum flow through the gate is a function of the reservoir level 𝑅𝑆𝐸 and the 
gate availability 𝑎𝑣, and was calculated in excel from the combined rating curve 
for two Cheakamus gates. 
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𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐺𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 1)
=
{
  
 
  
 
0                                                                                              𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 367.28
19.1(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 7011.7                                         𝑖𝑓 367.28 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 367.5
37.3(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 13715.8                                        𝑖𝑓  367.5 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 367.8
49.7(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 18252                                               𝑖𝑓  367.8 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 369
2.15(𝑅𝑆𝐸)2 − 1496.34(𝑅𝑆𝐸) + 258875.4      𝑖𝑓  369 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 381.6
861.1 + 728.9                                                                         𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸 ≥ 381.6
 
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐺𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 0) = 0                                                                (𝐸. 3)  
• Maximum flow calculator for the turbine (fncTurbineMaxFlow), as per Equation 
E.4. This function computes the maximum flow through the turbine for a given 
reservoir level, and was calculated from the combined gross head-power-flow 
curves from the two Cheakamus units (see line 748 in the code at the end of this 
Appendix.).  
𝑇𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 1)
=
{
 
 
0                                                                                               𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 363.05
13.98(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 5075.44                                   𝑖𝑓  363.05 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 365.05
18.02(𝑅𝑆𝐸) − 6551.46                                   𝑖𝑓  365.05 ≤ 𝑅𝑆𝐸 < 367.05
65                                                                                             𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑆𝐸 ≥ 367.05
 
𝑇𝑄𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝑅𝑆𝐸, 𝑎𝑣 = 0) = 0                                                                              (𝐸. 4)  
 
• A function to convert the spillway flow and reservoir elevation to gate instructions 
(GateInstr at line 782 in the code at the end of this Appendix) and a function to 
convert gate position and reservoir level to gate flow (GateFlowClac at line 828). 
These functions utilize a simple two-dimensional interpolation from the combined 
spillway gate rating curves provided by BC Hydro. The relationships between the 
maximum gate opening and discharge are shown in Appendix A. 
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• A function which finds the value of 𝑦0 by linear interpolation using the two closest 
point pairs (𝑥1, 𝑦1), (𝑥2, 𝑦2) to a given 𝑥0, following Equation E.5 (interpolate at 
line 814 in the code at the end of this Appendix): 
𝑦0 = 𝑦1 + (𝑥0 − 𝑥1)
𝑦2 − 𝑦1
𝑥2 − 𝑥1
 (𝐸. 5) 
• A function to calculate the date reference number that is used to determine the time 
of year for reservoir level limits and minimum flow releases (dayrefs at line 923) – 
this simply uses the startday (0 to 365) and the time step to determine the day of 
the year. 
• A function to get the minimum flow release for the upcoming days (getfishflow) 
which simply inserts the day-reference index into the fish flow array (line 902 in 
the code at the end of this Appendix) 
• A function to generate an availability array for a component based on the total 
outage time (availarray at line 1033) – this simply converts an interger into an array 
of zeros and ones that represent whether a component is available or unavailable 
over a 14 day window from the current day – for example an input value of 8 would 
mean the component is unavailable for the next 8 days, and would produce an array 
[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1]. 
• The main operations planning algorithm, which takes several key inputs (inflow 
forecast, reservoir elevation, day references, component availabilities and reservoir 
elevation limits) and determines the corresponding operating instructions for the 
system to ensure minimum flow releases are met and reservoir level restrictions are 
adhered to if possible (OpsPlan at line 960 in the code at the end of this Appendix). 
This follows a similar if-then-else type algorithm as presented in Figure 3-14, but 
with power flow releases added – see Figure . The algorithm begins by assuming 
the minimum fish flow is released and the remainder of the inflow is passed through 
the powerhouse (up to the maximum) for a 14-day window from the current date. 
The resultant reservoir levels are then checked, adjusted and re-checked to ensure 
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the operating instructions result in reservoir levels that are within the specified 
normal maximum (NMax) and minimum (NMin). To ensure enough water is 
available for the winter low-flow period, the normal minimum reservoir level was 
adjusted to El. 370 m for the months of November and December for the purposes 
of the modelling. 
 
Figure E2: Operations Planning algorithm for simulation model 
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• A function to retrieve the normal operating maximum and minimum reservoir 
elevation corresponding to the reference day (GetNMax at line 1076 in the code at 
the end of this Appendix) – this simply inserts the day reference (day of the year) 
into an array containing the normal maximum and minimum levels for each day of 
the year. 
The next section of code (4. Defining sdpy functions) contains the details of the system 
dynamics model, broken down into sectors. The functions for the hydraulic system state 
are shown in 4.1, the sensors in 4.2, the disturbances in 4.3, operations in 4.4, gate actuators 
in 4.5 and turbine actuators in 4.6. The output_saving function (line 1565) is used to store 
information from the model in memory for later post-processing. The model sectors are 
described in sub-sections 4.4.1.1 to 4.4.1.6. 
Section 5 of the code (line 2005) is where the base case model is run. This section utilizes 
the features of the sdpy package to run the simulation for each of the iterations. Stocks must 
be re-set to their initial value following each iteration. Section 6 (line 2035) contains some 
re-initiation of key functions to reflect the changes in the dam safety improved case and 
also saves the results from the first run (base case) under different names for post-
processing. Section 6 then re-runs the model with the same inputs as the base case for the 
dam safety improved case. 
Section 7 of the script (line 2220) contains post-processing of the data, which involves the 
analysis of event dependency and saving of pertinent data from the scenario into “.npz” 
file formats. This format represents a compressed dictionary of arrays that are easily loaded 
into python for future analysis and plotting. 
  
288 
 
1. """  
2. SIMULATION SCRIPT  
3.   
4. This code contains the necessary script to run the simplified system dynamics mo
del,  
5. with seed inputs as defined by the user, as well as NYr input to set the number 
of   
6. iterations. Flush_period argument should remain at 1.   
7.   
8. @author: Leanna King  
9. """   
10.    
11. """  
12. 1. INITIALIZATION  
13.   
14. -Importing necessary directories  
15. -Reading and organizing input files  
16.   
17. """   
18.    
19. import time   
20. t0=time.time()   
21. from numba import njit, jit   
22. #from scipy.interpolate import interp2d   
23. #from scipy.interpolate import interp1d   
24. import numpy as np   
25. import pandas as pd   
26. from datetime import datetime   
27. import sdpy   
28. import sys   
29. import argparse   
30. from scenarios import all_scenarios   
31. import os   
32.    
33.    
34. def datafile_path(filename):   
35.     return os.path.join(os.path.dirname(sys.argv[0]), 'data', filename)   
36.    
37. def RangeConstrainedParam(name, minvalue, maxvalue):   
38.     def parse(s):   
39.         n=int(s)   
40.         if n < minvalue or n > maxvalue:   
41.             raise ValueError()   
42.         return n   
43.     parse.__name__ = name   
44.     return parse   
45.    
46. maxseednum = len(all_scenarios)-1   
47. parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='')   
48. parser.add_argument('--NYr',   
49.                     type=RangeConstrainedParam('NYr', 1, 10000),   
50.                     default=5)   
51. parser.add_argument('--seednum',   
52.                     type=RangeConstrainedParam('seednum', 0, maxseednum),   
53.                     default=301476) #813840 represents normal conditions   
54. parser.add_argument('--flush_period',   
55.                     type=RangeConstrainedParam('flush_period', 1, 10000),   
56.                     default=1)   
57. args = parser.parse_args()   
58.    
59.    
289 
 
60. model = sdpy.Sdmodel()   
61.    
62. NYr=args.NYr   
63. seednum = args.seednum   
64.    
65. year=0   
66. boolop=1 #Set to 1 for randomized, zero for non-randomized.   
67. seedgen=1 #Set to 1 to generate seed, set to zero to read a previously generated
 seed file.   
68.    
69.    
70. NormalRSEs=pd.read_csv(datafile_path(r'BaselineRSEs.csv'), header=0).values   
71. NormalTBFs=pd.read_csv(datafile_path(r'BaselineTBFs.csv'), header=0).values   
72. NormalSPOGs=pd.read_csv(datafile_path(r'BaselineSPOGs.csv'), header=0).values   
73. NormalOTs=pd.read_csv(datafile_path(r'BaselineOTs.csv'), header=0).values   
74. NormalTSs=NormalSPOGs   
75.    
76. #Inflow timeseries - SYNTHETIC - 10,374 years   
77. Inflow_year=np.loadtxt(datafile_path("SyntheticInflow_Years.txt"), delimiter=","
)   
78. InflowJan1Start=np.zeros((365*2,10373))   
79. for yr in range(10373):   
80.     InflowJan1Start[0:365, yr]=Inflow_year[:,yr]   
81.     InflowJan1Start[365:730,yr]=Inflow_year[:,yr+1]   
82.    
83.    
84. """  
85. 2. GENERATING SEEDS  
86.   
87. -The seeds set the randomized parameters for each NYr using a Monte-
Carlo framework  
88. -Seeds can be loaded from a previous output file if seedgen=0  
89. -Or, create a seed from the seed number if seedgen=1  
90. """   
91.    
92. ScenarioRL=datafile_path("S_RLAll-Inds-d.csv")   
93. ScenarioCL=datafile_path("S_CLAll-Inds-d.csv")   
94.    
95. #print("Seednum: "+str(seednum))   
96.    
97. deltatmax=40 #set this based on system, or make it variable depending on number 
of adverse OS's   
98.    
99. if seedgen==0:   
100.     Seeds=np.load(str("Outputs-"+str(seednum)+"-e.npz"))   
101.    
102. if seedgen==1:   
103.     import time   
104.     import random   
105.    
106.     #Defining dictionaries   
107.     #Reservoir Level components   
108.     RLev={13: "G",   
109.              8: "T",   
110.              18: "PLR",   
111.              29: "ACC",   
112.              42: "PN",   
113.              44: "GD",   
114.              30: "SN",   
115.              48: "STF",   
116.              45: "IF"   
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117.             }   
118.    
119.     #Impact Types   
120.     Impacts={1: "o",   
121.              2: "d",   
122.              3: "e",   
123.              5: "bl",   
124.              4: "n",   
125.              9: "ur"   
126.             }   
127.    
128.     #OS Types   
129.     OSTypes={1: "f",   
130.              2: "n",   
131.              3: "fc",   
132.              4: "fip",   
133.              5: "c",   
134.              6: "d",   
135.              8: "e"   
136.             }   
137.    
138.     #Component level components   
139.     CLType={13: "HC",   
140.             15: "GEN",   
141.             19: "GO",   
142.             5: "FIP",   
143.             11: "FO",   
144.             1: "FC",   
145.           }   
146.    
147.     CFType={1: "eq",   
148.             2: "mt",   
149.             3: "deb",   
150.             4: "ra",   
151.             5: "ice",   
152.             7: "wnd",   
153.             8: "fb",   
154.             9: "age",   
155.             10: "vf",   
156.             11: "ltg",   
157.             12: "rat",   
158.             13: "dsg",   
159.             14: "trf",   
160.             15: "wsh",   
161.             16: "fir",   
162.             17: "tem",   
163.             18: "wha",   
164.             20: "ofa",   
165.             21: "unc",   
166.             22: "tim",   
167.             23: "emr",   
168.             25: "non",   
169.             }   
170.    
171.     CFDates={1: [0,365],   
172.              2: [0,365],   
173.              3: [90,334],   
174.              4: [0,365],   
175.              5: [0, 60],   
176.              7: [0,365],   
177.              8: [0,365],   
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178.              9: [0,365],   
179.              10: [0,365],   
180.              11: [90, 334],   
181.              12: [0,365],   
182.              13: [0,365],   
183.              14: [0,365],   
184.              15: [0,365],   
185.              16: [151, 304],   
186.              17: [0,365],   
187.              18: [0,365],   
188.              20: [0,365],   
189.              21: [0,365],   
190.              22: [0,365],   
191.              23: [0,365],   
192.              25: [0,365],   
193.             }   
194. #    @jit   
195.     def gen_avg(expected_avg, n, a, b, boolop):   
196.         if boolop==1: #random   
197.             out=np.random.uniform(a, b, n)   
198.         if boolop==0: #nonrandom   
199.             out=np.ones(n)*expected_avg   
200.         return out   
201. #    @jit   
202.     def dayrefs(Startdays, timestep, NYr):   
203.         daynum=Startdays+int(timestep) #STARTDAYS CONTAINS 1-
365 STARTING DAY REF FOR EACH INFLOW SEQUENCE   
204.         dayref365=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
205.         dayref365[0, :]=daynum   
206.         for t in range(364):  #Converts vensim date into numbers 1-
365 to represent dates in the model   
207.             for yr in range(NYr):   
208.                 if dayref365[t, yr]+1<365:   
209.                     dayref365[t+1, yr]=dayref365[t, yr]+1   
210.                 else: dayref365[t+1, yr]=0   
211.         return dayref365   
212. #    @jit   
213.     def randintswitch(low, high, NYears ,boolop):   
214.         if boolop==1: #randomly sets int between low and high   
215.             out=np.zeros(NYears)   
216.             for i in range(NYears):   
217.                 out[i]=np.random.randint(low, high[i], 1)   
218.             return out   
219.         if boolop==0: #defaults to low if non-randomized   
220.             return np.ones(NYears)*low   
221. #    @jit   
222.     def randintswitch2(low, high, NYears ,boolop):   
223.         if boolop==1: #randomly sets int between low and high   
224.             return np.random.randint(low, high, NYears)   
225.         if boolop==0: #defaults to low if non-randomized   
226.             return np.ones(NYears)*low   
227. #    @jit   
228.     def randintswitchCF(mindate, maxdate, refdates, lowest, highest,  bo
olop):   
229.         if boolop==1: #randomly sets int between low and high   
230.             if mindate!=0 or maxdate!=365:   
231.                 clipped=np.clip(refdates, mindate, maxdate)   
232.                 dates=np.random.randint(np.min(clipped), np.max(clipped)
)   
233.                 return np.where(refdates==dates)[0]   
234.             else:   
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235.                 return np.random.randint(lowest, highest)   
236.         if boolop==0: #defaults to low if non-randomized   
237.             return lowest   
238. #    @jit   
239.     def randswitch(mini, avg, maxi, Nyears, boolop):   
240.         if boolop==1:   
241.             return np.random.triangular(mini, avg, maxi, Nyears) #return
s triangular distributed variables   
242.         if boolop==0:   
243.             return np.ones(Nyears)*avg   
244.    
245.     name1=ScenarioRL   
246.     name2=ScenarioCL   
247.    
248.     S_RL=pd.read_csv(name1)   
249.     S_RL=S_RL.set_index("NewInd")   
250.     S_CL=pd.read_csv(name2)   
251.     S_CL=S_CL.set_index("NewInd") #setting index to the formatted OS IDs
   
252.    
253.     scenar = all_scenarios[seednum]   
254.     ScenarioRL=S_RL.filter(items=scenar[0:7], axis=0)   
255.     ScenarioCL=S_CL.filter(items=scenar[7:13], axis=0)   
256.    
257.    
258.     RLInds=ScenarioRL.index.tolist()   
259.     CLInds=ScenarioCL.index.tolist()   
260.     SD=[]   
261.    
262.     #Use dictonary to get scenario names   
263.     for c in range(np.shape(ScenarioRL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
264.         RLID=RLev[ScenarioRL.loc[RLInds[c]]["ReservoirLevelId"]]   
265.         IMP=Impacts[ScenarioRL.loc[RLInds[c]]["ImpactTypeId"]]   
266.         OS=OSTypes[ScenarioRL.loc[RLInds[c]]["OperatingStateTypeId"]]   
267.         CF=CFType[ScenarioRL.loc[RLInds[c]]["CausalFactorTypeId"]]   
268.         SD.append(str(RLID + "-" + OS + IMP + "-" + CF + "_"))   
269.    
270.     for c in range(np.shape(ScenarioCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
271.         RLID=RLev[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["ReservoirLevelId"]]   
272.         CLID=CLType[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["ComponentLevelTypeId"]]   
273.         IMP=Impacts[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["ImpactTypeId"]]   
274.         OS=OSTypes[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["OperatingStateTypeId"]]   
275.         CF=CFType[ScenarioCL.loc[CLInds[c]]["CausalFactorTypeId"]]   
276.         SD.append(str(RLID +"-"+ CLID + "-" + OS + IMP + "-
" + CF + "_"))   
277.    
278.     #omitting normal conditions   
279.     out=[i for i in SD if not ('-nn' in i)]   
280.    
281.     #Formatting as one long string explaining what's happening in scenar
io   
282.     ScenarioDescriptor="".join(out)   
283.    
284.     #SET RANDOM START DATES FOR SIMULATION   
285.     #Between May 1 - Sept 30 thunderstorm season   
286.     possible_starts = [ (x, y) for x in range( 0,364 ) for y in range( 0
, 9999 ) ]   
287.     if boolop == 1:   
288.         Starts = random.sample( possible_starts, NYr )   
289.     if boolop == 0:   
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290.         Starts = possible_starts[ 0 : NYr ] #just takes the first bunch 
if non-randomized   
291.    
292.     Startdays=np.zeros(NYr)   
293.     Startyears=np.zeros(NYr)   
294.     for i in range(NYr):   
295.         Startdays[i]=Starts[i][0]   
296.         Startyears[i]=Starts[i][1]   
297.    
298.     refdays=dayrefs(Startdays, 0, NYr) #returns 365xNYr array containing
 reference dates from 1-365   
299.    
300.     #Determine unique causal factors for timing   
301.     cfs=[]   
302.     ScenarioRL2=ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL["ReservoirLevelId"]!=29]   
303.     ScenarioRL3=ScenarioRL2[ScenarioRL2["ReservoirLevelId"]!=48]   
304.     cfs.append(ScenarioRL3["CausalFactorTypeId"])   
305.     #remove site access and staffing delays from cf list since they are 
implemented differently   
306.     cfs.append(ScenarioCL["CausalFactorTypeId"])   
307.    
308.     CFS=np.zeros(int(np.size(cfs[0]))+ int(np.size(cfs[1])))   
309.     for i in range(len(cfs[0])):   
310.         CFS[i]=cfs[0][i]   
311.     for i in range(len(cfs[1])):   
312.         CFS[i+np.size(cfs[0])]=cfs[1][i]   
313.     uniqueCFs=np.unique(CFS)   
314.     uniqueCFs=np.setdiff1d(uniqueCFs,[25])   
315.    
316.     impacttimes=np.zeros((np.size(uniqueCFs), 2,NYr)) #CF, Impact Time, 
Year   
317.     for i in range(NYr):   
318.         if boolop==1:   
319.             random.shuffle(uniqueCFs) #does not shuffle if boolop=0 (non
 randomized)   
320.         impacttimes[:, 0,i]=uniqueCFs   #This is the order of occurrence
 of the causal factor impacts for the simulation   
321.         for j in range(np.size(uniqueCFs)):   
322.             impacttimes[j, 1, i]=randintswitchCF(CFDates[uniqueCFs[j]][0
],CFDates[uniqueCFs[j]][1], refdays[:,i], 1, deltatmax, boolop=boolop) #Sets ran
dom times for subsequent disturbances within 6 months of original   
323.         if np.size(uniqueCFs)>0:   
324.             impacttimes[0,1,i]=1 #set all first disturbances to day 1   
325.     #now make a dataframe with start times for each CF   
326.     imptimessorted=np.zeros((np.size(uniqueCFs), 2,NYr))   
327.     for i in range(NYr):   
328.         imptime=impacttimes[:,:,i]   
329.         imptimessorted[:,:,i]=imptime[imptime[:,0].argsort()]   
330.    
331.    
332.             #Debris on gate opening. Set reduced gate capacity   
333.     ReducedCapacities=1+np.zeros(( NYr)) #default no blockage   
334.             #one for each gate and inflow (can randomize degree of block
age b/w min and max)   
335.     AllDebris=ScenarioCL[ScenarioCL["ImpactTypeId"]==5]   
336.     AllDebris=AllDebris.reset_index(drop=True)   
337.     for c in range(np.shape(AllDebris["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
338.                 cavg=1.-(AllDebris["Avg"][c]/100.)   
339.                 cmin=1.-(AllDebris["Min"][c]/100.)   
340.                 cmax=1.-(AllDebris["Max"][c]/100.)   
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341.                 ReducedCapacities=gen_avg(cavg, NYr, cmin, cmax, boolop)
   
342.    
343.     Day1Used_MtnAge=np.zeros((2,NYr))   
344.    
345.     #Organize outages by component   
346.     GateOutagesAll=np.zeros((3, NYr)) #FC, FO, FIP   
347.     GateCollapses=np.zeros((1,NYr))   
348.     Gdeltat=np.zeros((3, NYr))   
349.     SPOG1OutagesCL=ScenarioCL[(ScenarioCL["ImpactTypeId"]==1) & (Scenari
oCL["ReservoirLevelId"]==13)]   
350.     SPOG1OutagesCL=SPOG1OutagesCL.reset_index()   
351.     for c in range (np.shape(SPOG1OutagesCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
352.    
353.         if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==1: #Fail closed   
354.             GateOutagesAll[0,:]=randswitch(SPOG1OutagesCL["Min"][c], SPO
G1OutagesCL["Avg"][c], SPOG1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
355.    
356.    
357.    
358.         if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==11: #Fail open/col
lapse   
359.             GateOutagesAll[1,:]=randswitch(SPOG1OutagesCL["Min"][c], SPO
G1OutagesCL["Avg"][c], SPOG1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
360.             if SPOG1OutagesCL["OperatingStateTypeId"][c]==5:   
361.                 GateCollapses[0,:]=1+np.zeros(NYr)   
362.    
363.    
364.         if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==5: #Fail in place 
  
365.             GateOutagesAll[2,:]=randswitch(SPOG1OutagesCL["Min"][c], SPO
G1OutagesCL["Avg"][c], SPOG1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
366.    
367.    
368.    
369.     TurbineOutagesAll=np.zeros((2, NYr)) #HC, GEN   
370.     Tdeltat=np.zeros((2,NYr))   
371.     TB1OutagesCL=(ScenarioCL[ScenarioCL["ReservoirLevelId"]==8]) #filter
 to turbine only   
372.     TB1OutagesCL=(TB1OutagesCL[TB1OutagesCL["OperatingStateTypeId"]!=2])
 #omit normal conditions   
373.     TB1OutagesCL=TB1OutagesCL.reset_index(drop=True)   
374.     for c in range (np.shape(TB1OutagesCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
375.         if TB1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==13: #Head Cover HC R
ESULTS IN UNCONTROLLED RELEASE   
376.             TurbineOutagesAll[0,:]=randswitch(TB1OutagesCL["Min"][c],TB1
OutagesCL["Avg"][c], TB1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
377.    
378.         if TB1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==15: #Generator   
379.             TurbineOutagesAll[1,:]=randswitch(TB1OutagesCL["Min"][c],TB1
OutagesCL["Avg"][c], TB1OutagesCL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
380.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==TB1OutagesCL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
381.    
382.    
383.     AllOutagesRL=(ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL["ImpactTypeId"].isin([1,9])])   
384.     AllOutagesRL=AllOutagesRL.reset_index(drop=True)   
385.     ScenarioRL=ScenarioRL.reset_index(drop=True)   
386.     AllErrors=ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL["ImpactTypeId"]==3] #Errors to senso
rs and Inflow Forecast   
387.     AllErrors=AllErrors.reset_index(drop=True)   
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388.    
389.     OCOutages=np.zeros((3,NYr))   
390.     #PLCRTU,  Penstock, Grid   
391.     SOutages=np.zeros(NYr)   
392.     #Res El Sensor 1   
393.    
394.     OCdeltat=np.zeros((3,NYr))   
395.     Sdeltat=np.zeros(NYr)   
396.     for c in range (np.shape(AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
397.     #Other components   
398.         if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==18: #Dam PLC failure HOU
RS   
399.             OCOutages[0, :]=randswitch(AllOutagesRL["Min"][c], AllOutage
sRL["Avg"][c], AllOutagesRL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
400.    
401.    
402.         if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==42: #Penstock   
403.             OCOutages[1,:]=randswitch(AllOutagesRL["Min"][c], AllOutages
RL["Avg"][c], AllOutagesRL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
404.    
405.         if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==44: #CMS GRID   
406.             OCOutages[2,:]=randswitch(AllOutagesRL["Min"][c], AllOutages
RL["Avg"][c], AllOutagesRL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
407.    
408.     #Sensors   
409.         if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==30: #RE Sensor 1   
410.             SOutages=randswitch(AllOutagesRL["Min"][c], AllOutagesRL["Av
g"][c], AllOutagesRL["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
411.    
412.    
413.    
414.     SErrors=np.zeros(NYr)   
415.     SErrorDeltat=np.zeros(NYr)   
416.     SErrorDuration=randintswitch2(1, 10, NYr, boolop) #randomly setting 
error duration between 1 and 10 days   
417.     IFErrorDuration=randintswitch2(1, 10, NYr, boolop)   
418.     IFErrorDeltat=np.zeros(NYr) #randomly setting error duration between
 1 and 10 days   
419.    
420.     for c in range (np.shape(AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
421.     #Other components   
422.         if AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==30: #Res El Sensor 1   
423.             SErrors=randswitch(AllErrors["Min"][c], AllErrors["Avg"][c],
 AllErrors["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
424.    
425.         if AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==45: #Inflow forecast error 
  
426.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllErrors["CausalFac
torTypeId"][c])[0])   
427.             IFErrorDeltat=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
428.    
429.    
430.    
431.     DelayAccess=np.zeros((2, NYr))   
432.     DelayStaff=np.zeros(NYr)   
433.     AllDelays=ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL["ImpactTypeId"]==2]   
434.     AllDelays=AllDelays.reset_index(drop=True)   
435.     for c in range (np.shape(AllDelays["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
436.     #Other components   
437.         if AllDelays["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==29: #Dam Access   
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438.             DelayAccess[0, :]=randswitch(AllDelays["Min"][c], AllDelays[
"Avg"][c], AllDelays["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
439.    
440.         if AllDelays["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==28: #Powerhouse Access   
441.             DelayAccess[1, :]=randswitch(AllDelays["Min"][c], AllDelays[
"Avg"][c], AllDelays["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
442.    
443.         if AllDelays["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==48: #Powerhouse Access   
444.             DelayStaff[:]=randswitch(AllDelays["Min"][c], AllDelays["Avg
"][c], AllDelays["Max"][c], NYr, boolop)   
445.    
446.    
447.     """  
448.     NOW DETERMINE MAX IMPACT INITIATION TIME BASED ON TIME TO REPAIR FOR
 COMPONENTS THAT CAUSE A LOSS IN CAPACITY  
449.     """   
450.     #figure out length of time components are out for...   
451.     deltatmax=GateOutagesAll[0,:] + GateOutagesAll[1,:] + GateOutagesAll
[2,:] + TurbineOutagesAll[1,:] + TurbineOutagesAll[0,:] + OCOutages[0,:] + OCOut
ages[1,:]+ OCOutages[2,:] + SErrorDuration + SErrors   
452.     deltatmax=deltatmax*0.8  #somewhat arbitrary. Can experiment and sel
ect to ensure enough data points are collected for each scenario   
453.     deltatmax=deltatmax.clip(4, 180)   
454.    
455.    
456.     """  
457.     NOW THAT WE HAVE SET DELTATMAX, WE CAN SET THE IMPACT TIMES  
458.     """   
459.    
460.     for c in range (np.shape(SPOG1OutagesCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
461.    
462.         if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==1: #Fail closed   
463.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==SPOG1OutagesCL["Caus
alFactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
464.             Gdeltat[0,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
465.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
466.                 for y in range(NYr):   
467.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
468.                         Gdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)   
469.                     else:   
470.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
471.                             Gdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure   
472.                         else:   
473.                             Gdeltat[0,y]=1   
474.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
475.    
476.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
477.                 for y in range(NYr):   
478.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
479.                         Gdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure   
480.                     else:   
481.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
482.                             Gdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop)   
483.                         else:   
484.                             Gdeltat[0,y]=1   
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485.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1   
486.    
487.    
488.    
489.         if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==11: #Fail open/col
lapse   
490.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==SPOG1OutagesCL["Caus
alFactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
491.             Gdeltat[1,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
492.             if SPOG1OutagesCL["OperatingStateTypeId"][c]==5:   
493.                 GateCollapses[0,:]=1+np.zeros(NYr)   
494.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
495.                 for y in range(NYr):   
496.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
497.                         Gdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)   
498.                     else:   
499.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
500.                             Gdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure   
501.                         else:   
502.                             Gdeltat[1,y]=1   
503.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
504.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
505.                 for y in range(NYr):   
506.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
507.                         Gdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure   
508.                     else:   
509.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
510.                             Gdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop)   
511.                         else:   
512.                             Gdeltat[1,y]=1   
513.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1   
514.    
515.    
516.         if SPOG1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==5: #Fail in place 
  
517.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==SPOG1OutagesCL["Caus
alFactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
518.             Gdeltat[2,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
519.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
520.                 for y in range(NYr):   
521.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
522.                         Gdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)   
523.                     else:   
524.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
525.                             Gdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure   
526.                         else:   
527.                             Gdeltat[2,y]=1   
528.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
529.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
530.                 for y in range(NYr):   
531.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
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532.                         Gdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure   
533.                     else:   
534.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
535.                             Gdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop)   
536.                         else:   
537.                             Gdeltat[2,y]=1   
538.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1   
539.    
540.    
541.    
542.     for c in range (np.shape(TB1OutagesCL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
543.         if TB1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==13: #Head Cover HC R
ESULTS IN UNCONTROLLED RELEASE   
544.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==TB1OutagesCL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
545.             Tdeltat[0,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
546.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
547.                 for y in range(NYr):   
548.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
549.                         Tdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)   
550.                     else:   
551.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
552.                             Tdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure   
553.                         else:   
554.                             Tdeltat[0,y]=1   
555.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
556.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
557.                 for y in range(NYr):   
558.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
559.                         Tdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure   
560.                     else:   
561.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
562.                             Tdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop)   
563.                         else:   
564.                             Tdeltat[0,y]=1   
565.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1   
566.    
567.         if TB1OutagesCL["ComponentLevelTypeId"][c]==15: #Generator   
568.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==TB1OutagesCL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
569.             Tdeltat[1,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
570.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
571.                 for y in range(NYr):   
572.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
573.                         Tdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op)   
574.                     else:   
575.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
576.                             Tdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mt
nce failure   
577.                         else:   
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578.                             Tdeltat[1,y]=1   
579.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
580.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
581.                 for y in range(NYr):   
582.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
583.                         Tdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bool
op) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fa
ilure   
584.                     else:   
585.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
586.                             Tdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, 
boolop)   
587.                         else:   
588.                             Tdeltat[1,y]=1   
589.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1   
590.    
591.    
592.     for c in range (np.shape(AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
593.     #Other components   
594.         if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==18: #Dam PLC failure HOU
RS   
595.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllOutagesRL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
596.             OCdeltat[0,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
597.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
598.                 for y in range(NYr):   
599.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
600.                         OCdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop)   
601.                     else:   
602.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
603.                             OCdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
 boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 m
tnce failure   
604.                         else:   
605.                             OCdeltat[0,y]=1   
606.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
607.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
608.                 for y in range(NYr):   
609.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
610.                         OCdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age f
ailure   
611.                     else:   
612.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
613.                             OCdeltat[0,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
 boolop)   
614.                         else:   
615.                             OCdeltat[0,y]=1   
616.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1   
617.    
618.    
619.         if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==42: #Penstock   
620.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllOutagesRL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
621.             OCdeltat[1,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
622.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
623.                 for y in range(NYr):   
624.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
625.                         OCdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop)   
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626.                     else:   
627.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
628.                             OCdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
 boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 m
tnce failure   
629.                         else:   
630.                             OCdeltat[1,y]=1   
631.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
632.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
633.                 for y in range(NYr):   
634.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
635.                         OCdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age f
ailure   
636.                     else:   
637.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
638.                             OCdeltat[1,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
 boolop)   
639.                         else:   
640.                             OCdeltat[1,y]=1   
641.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1   
642.    
643.         if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==44: #CMS GRID   
644.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllOutagesRL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
645.             OCdeltat[2,:]=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
646.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
647.                 for y in range(NYr):   
648.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
649.                         OCdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop)   
650.                     else:   
651.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
652.                             OCdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
 boolop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 m
tnce failure   
653.                         else:   
654.                             OCdeltat[2,y]=1   
655.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
656.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
657.                 for y in range(NYr):   
658.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
659.                         OCdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boo
lop) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age f
ailure   
660.                     else:   
661.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
662.                             OCdeltat[2,y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1,
 boolop)   
663.                         else:   
664.                             OCdeltat[2,y]=1   
665.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]=1   
666.    
667.     #Sensors   
668.         if AllOutagesRL["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==30: #RE Sensor 1   
669.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllOutagesRL["Causal
FactorTypeId"][c])[0])   
670.             Sdeltat=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
671.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==2:  #mtnce   
672.                 for y in range(NYr):   
673.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
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674.                         Sdeltat[y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boolop
)   
675.                     else:   
676.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]==1:   
677.                             Sdeltat[y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bo
olop) #set all mtnce events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 mtnc
e failure   
678.                         else:   
679.                             Sdeltat[y]=1   
680.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[0,y]=1   
681.             if imptimessorted[ind,0,0]==9:  #aging   
682.                 for y in range(NYr):   
683.                     if imptimessorted[ind,1,y]>1:   
684.                         Sdeltat[y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, boolop
) #set all aging events randomly except the first occurrence of a day 1 age fail
ure   
685.                     else:   
686.                         if Day1Used_MtnAge[1,y]==1:   
687.                             Sdeltat[y]=randintswitch(0, deltatmax, 1, bo
olop)   
688.                         else:   
689.                             Sdeltat[y]=1   
690.                             Day1Used_MtnAge[1 ,y]=1   
691.    
692.    
693.    
694.    
695.     for c in range (np.shape(AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"])[0]):   
696.     #Other components   
697.         if AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==30: #Res El Sensor 1   
698.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllErrors["CausalFac
torTypeId"][c])[0])   
699.             SErrorDeltat=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
700.    
701.    
702.         if AllErrors["ReservoirLevelId"][c]==45: #Inflow forecast error 
  
703.             ind=int(np.where(imptimessorted[:,0,1]==AllErrors["CausalFac
torTypeId"][c])[0])   
704.             IFErrorDeltat=imptimessorted[ind,1,:]   
705.    
706.    
707.    
708.    
709. """  
710. 3. INITIALIZING SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS AND ARRAYS  
711.   
712. -Sets up arrays to be populated by SD model  
713. -Sets up supporting functions  
714. -
Functions defined here are not part of the System Dynamics model but may be call
ed from it  
715.   
716. """   
717.    
718. runname="Simple64-i1-O-2018-5yr"   
719. runname1=runname   
720.    
721. start=(str(datetime.now()))   
722.   
723. @njit   
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724. def SSC(storage): #Stage storage curve   
725.     if storage<1400:   
726.         return -1.1201e-
05 * storage**2 + 0.032473 * storage + 364.6572   
727.     else:   
728.         return 388.16   
729.   
730. @njit   
731. def SSCrev(stage): #Storage stage curve   
732.     return np.roots(np.array([-1.1201e-05, 0.032473, 364.6572-
stage]))[1]   
733. @njit   
734. def OTC(elev): #Overtopping curve   
735.     if elev<=380.41: #378.41   
736.         return 0   
737.     else:   
738.         return (-35.7505780379803*(elev-2)**3 + 40896.2749435669*(elev-
2)**2 -15593240.0619064*(elev-2) + 1981715583.08889)*0.3   
739.    
740.    
741. #Rating curves for different gates to be used to switch between gate pos
ition and flow   
742. RatingCurve1=pd.read_csv(datafile_path("SPOGAllRC.csv"), index_col=0)   
743. x1=np.asarray(RatingCurve1.index.values, dtype=float)   
744. y1=np.asarray(RatingCurve1.columns.values, dtype=float)   
745. z1=np.asarray(RatingCurve1.values, dtype=float)   
746.   
747. @njit   
748. def fncTurbineMaxFlow(elev, flagT):   
749.     if flagT==1: #// Turb on   
750.         if elev < 363.05:   
751.             result = 0   
752.         elif 363.05 <= elev < 365.05:   
753.             result = 13.98 * elev - 5075.44   
754.         elif 365.05 <= elev < 367.05:   
755.             result = 18.02334 * elev - 6551.46   
756.         else:   
757.             result = 65   
758.     else: #//both off   
759.         return 0   
760.     return result   
761.   
762. @njit   
763. def SPOGMaxFlow(elev, flag): #Sums the values from two gates into a sing
le gate discharge   
764.     if flag == 1:   
765.         if 367.28<=elev<367.5:   
766.             out1= 19.09091*elev-7011.7   
767.         if 367.5<=elev<=367.8:   
768.             out1= 37.33334*elev-13715.8   
769.         if 367.8<=elev<=369:#368.1:   
770.             out1= 49.667*elev-18252   
771.         if 369 <=elev < 381.6:  #367.8 sill   
772.             out1= 2.154624239*elev**2 - 1496.3410084*elev + 258875.37647
999998   
773.         elif elev >= 381.6:   
774.             out1= 861.1+728.9   
775.         else:   
776.             out1= 0   
777.     else:   
778.         out1=0   
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779.     return out1   
780.   
781. @njit   
782. def GateInstr(ResEl, OP):   
783.     y=y1   
784.     z=z1   
785.     x=x1   
786.     GatePosition=0   
787.     if (ResEl > 367.28):   
788.         Yo=np.abs(y-ResEl).argsort()[0:2]   
789.         WtYo0=np.abs((ResEl-y[Yo[0]])/(y[Yo[0]]-y[Yo[1]]))   
790.         WtYo1=np.abs((ResEl-y[Yo[1]])/(y[Yo[0]]-y[Yo[1]]))   
791.         ResElFlow=(1-WtYo0)*z[:,Yo[0]]+(1-WtYo1)*z[:,Yo[1]]   
792.         GateFlow=np.round(OP,2)   
793.         GateFlowMax=np.max(ResElFlow)   
794.         if GateFlow<=0:   
795.             return 0   
796.         else:   
797.             if (GateFlow>GateFlowMax):   
798.                 GateFlow=GateFlowMax-0.01   
799.             if GateFlow < ResElFlow[0]:   
800.                 return x[0]   
801.             elif GateFlow > ResElFlow[-1]:   
802.                 return x[-1]   
803.             else:   
804.                 for i in range(len(ResElFlow) - 1):   
805.                     if ResElFlow[i] <= GateFlow <= ResElFlow[i + 1]:   
806.                         X1, X2 = ResElFlow[i], ResElFlow[i + 1]   
807.                         Y1, Y2 = x[i], x[i + 1]   
808.    
809.                         return Y1 + (Y2 - Y1) / (X2 - X1) * (GateFlow - 
X1)   
810.     else:   
811.         return GatePosition   
812.   
813. @njit   
814. def interpolate(x0, x, y):   
815.     if x0 < x[0]:   
816.         return y[0]   
817.     elif x0 > x[-1]:   
818.         return y[-1]   
819.     else:   
820.         for i in range(len(x) - 1):   
821.             if x[i] <= x0 <= x[i + 1]:   
822.                 x1, x2 = x[i], x[i + 1]   
823.                 y1, y2 = y[i], y[i + 1]   
824.    
825.                 return y1 + (y2 - y1) / (x2 - x1) * (x0 - x1)   
826.   
827. @njit   
828. def GateFlowCalc(ResEl, GP):   
829.     y=y1   
830.     z=z1   
831.     x=x1   
832.     GateFlow=0   
833.     if (ResEl > 367.28):   
834.         if GP>12.5:   
835.             GP=12.4999   
836.         Yo=np.abs(y-ResEl).argsort()[0:2]   
837.         WtYo0=np.abs((ResEl-y[Yo[0]])/(y[Yo[0]]-y[Yo[1]]))   
838.         WtYo1=np.abs((ResEl-y[Yo[1]])/(y[Yo[0]]-y[Yo[1]]))   
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839.         ResElFlow=(1-WtYo0)*z[:,Yo[0]]+(1-WtYo1)*z[:,Yo[1]]   
840. #        GateFlow=interpolate(GP, x, ResElFlow)   
841.         if GP < x[0]:   
842.             return ResElFlow[0]   
843.         elif GP > x[-1]:   
844.             return ResElFlow[-1]   
845.         else:   
846.             for i in range(len(x) - 1):   
847.                 if x[i] <= GP <= x[i + 1]:   
848.                     X1, X2 = x[i], x[i + 1]   
849.                     Y1, Y2 = ResElFlow[i], ResElFlow[i + 1]   
850.    
851.                     return Y1 + (Y2 - Y1) / (X2 - X1) * (GP - X1)   
852.     else:   
853.         return GateFlow   
854.    
855. #Storage min and max   
856. Smin=8.864837907352   
857. Smax=516.35   
858.    
859. #Set arrays to save model outputs for NYr years of inflows   
860. year=0   
861. RSEs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
862. TBFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
863. SPOGs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
864. OT=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
865. INFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
866. OUTFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
867. GPs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
868. GAVs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
869. UAVs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
870. MOBI=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
871. MOB=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
872. TOTR=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
873. DEBRISREMOVAL=np.zeros(NYr)   
874. DAY=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
875. MON=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
876. AllMaxQ_t=np.zeros((365,2, NYr))   
877. AllMaxQ=[861.1+728.9,32.5+32.5]   
878. TTRS=np.zeros((365,8, NYr))   
879. Retention=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
880. yearnum=np.zeros(NYr)   
881. for yr in range(NYr):   
882.     yearnum[yr]=str(1984+yr)   
883. GateCaps=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
884. CAPs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
885. EOCs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
886. UCRs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
887. GCRs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
888. GAVs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
889. OSDs=-1+np.zeros((36,NYr)) #36 component outage start dates   
890. OLs=np.zeros((36,NYr))   
891. #Inflow forecast accuracy data   
892. #ForecastError=pd.read_csv(datafile_path("CMSForecastError.csv"), index_
col=0)   
893. #day=ForecastError.index.values #day of forecast   
894. #errordata=ForecastError.values #error mean, mean over 110cms and standa
rd deviation, std over 110cms   
895. #MAEt=interp1d(day,errordata[:,0])   
896. #MAE110t=interp1d(day,errordata[:,1])   
897. #SEt=interp1d(day,errordata[:,2])   
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898. #SE110t=interp1d(day,errordata[:,3])   
899. Fish=pd.read_csv(datafile_path("Fish.csv"), header=0).values[:,1].astype
("float64")   
900.   
901. @njit   
902. def getfishflow(dayref):   
903.     return Fish[int(dayref[0]):int(dayref[0]+14)]   
904. #Fish=np.zeros((3,3))   
905. #Fish-[0,:]=[5,7,3]   
906. #Fish [1,:]=[0,90,304]   
907. #Fish[2,:]=[89,303,365]   
908. #   
909. #@njit   
910. #def getfishflow(dayref):   
911. #    return Fish[int(dayref[0]):int(dayref[0]+14)]   
912. ##    ff=np.zeros(14)   
913. ##    for i in range(14):   
914. ##        if dayref[i]<90:   
915. ##            ff[i]=5   
916. ##        elif dayref[i]<304:   
917. ##            ff[i]=7   
918. ##        elif dayref[i]<365:   
919. ##            ff[i]=3   
920. ##    return ff   
921.   
922. @njit   
923. def dayrefs(Startdays, timestep):   
924.     daynum=Startdays+int(timestep) #STARTDAYS CONTAINS 1-
365 STARTING DAY REF   
925.     if daynum>365:   
926.         daynum=daynum-365   
927.     dayref=np.zeros(14)   
928.     dayref[0]=daynum   
929.     for t in range(13):  #Converts vensim date into numbers 1-
365 to represent dates in the model   
930.         if dayref[t]+1<366:   
931.             dayref[t+1]=dayref[t]+1   
932.         else: dayref[t+1]=1   
933.     return dayref   
934.    
935.    
936. #SETTING UP RANDOM SIMULATION START POINTS AND ASSIGNING BASELINE CONDIT
IONS FROM "NORMAL" OPS   
937.    
938.    
939. if seedgen==0:   
940.     Startdays=Seeds['Startdays']   
941.     Starts=Seeds['Starts'] #np.transpose(Seeds["Starts"]) for jan 1 star
ts   
942.    
943.    
944. #Starts=np.transpose(Starts)   
945. daynum=Startdays.copy()   
946. OutputDayrefs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
947. OutputDayrefs[0, :]=daynum   
948. for t in range(364):  #Converts vensim date into numbers 1-
365 to represent dates in the model   
949.     for yr in range(NYr):   
950.         if OutputDayrefs[t, yr]+1<366:   
951.             OutputDayrefs[t+1, yr]=OutputDayrefs[t, yr]+1   
952.         else: OutputDayrefs[t+1, yr]=1   
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953.    
954. StartRSEs=np.zeros(NYr)   
955. for i in range(NYr):   
956.     StartRSEs[i]=NormalRSEs[Starts[i][0], Starts[i][1]] #for jan 1 start
s   
957.     #StartRSEs[i]=NormalRSEs[Starts[0,i], Starts[1,i]] #for SeedsS_Nov06
_2018   
958.    
959. #SET UP INFLOWS AND BASELINE   
960.    
961. Inflow=np.zeros((730,NYr)) #2 year min   
962. B_RSEs = np.zeros((365, NYr))   
963. B_TBFs = np.zeros((365, NYr))   
964. B_TSs = np.zeros((365, NYr))   
965. B_OTs = np.zeros((365, NYr))   
966. for i in range(NYr):   
967.     startdayind=Starts[i][0]   
968.     Inflow[0:int(730-
startdayind),i]=InflowJan1Start[startdayind:730,Starts[i][1]]   
969.     Inflow[int(730-
startdayind):730,i]=InflowJan1Start[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+1]   
970.     B_RSEs[0:int(365-
startdayind),i]=NormalRSEs[startdayind:365,Starts[i][1]]   
971.     B_RSEs[int(365-
startdayind):365,i]=NormalRSEs[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+1]   
972.     B_TBFs[0:int(365-
startdayind),i]=NormalTBFs[startdayind:365,Starts[i][1]+1]   
973.     B_TBFs[int(365-
startdayind):365,i]=NormalTBFs[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+2]   
974.     B_TSs[0:int(365-
startdayind),i]=NormalTSs[startdayind:365,Starts[i][1]+1]   
975.     B_TSs[int(365-
startdayind):365,i]=NormalTSs[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+2]   
976.     B_OTs[0:int(365-
startdayind),i]=NormalOTs[startdayind:365,Starts[i][1]+1]   
977.     B_OTs[int(365-
startdayind):365,i]=NormalOTs[0:int(startdayind),Starts[i][1]+2]   
978.    
979. if seedgen==0:   
980.     ReducedCapacities=Seeds['ReducedCapacities']   
981.    
982. ReducedCapacityMinimumTime=10 #10 days to arrange debris removal, at a m
inimum   
983. global DebrisRemoval   
984. DebrisRemoval=0   
985.    
986. Inf114=np.zeros(14)   
987.    
988. #This is used to ensure inflow forecast and ops planning done once per 2
4 hours (at midnight)   
989. #def isinterger(number):   
990. #    return np.equal(np.mod(number, 1), 0)   
991.    
992.    
993. #@njit   
994. #def getmaxq(component, ResEl): #returns the maximum available discharge
 for a given component for all res els   
995. #    if component==0: #GATE 1   
996. #        GateFlowMax=SPOGMaxFlow(ResEl, 1)   
997. #    elif component==2: #TURBINE 1g   
998. #        GateFlowMax=fncTurbineMaxFlow(ResEl, 1)   
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999. #    return GateFlowMax   
1000.   
1001. @njit   
1002. def fncSPOGMaxFlow(elev, flag, El1d):   
1003.     if flag == 1:   
1004.         if 367.28<=elev<367.5:   
1005.             out1= 9.545455*elev-3505.85   
1006.             out2= 9.545455*elev-3505.85   
1007.         if 367.5<=elev<=367.8:   
1008.             out1= 18.66667*elev-6857.9   
1009.             out2= 18.66667*elev-6857.9   
1010.         if 367.8<=elev<=369:#368.1:   
1011.             out1= 25*elev-9187.3   
1012.             out2= 24.66667*elev-9064.7   
1013.         if 369 <=elev < 381.6:  #367.8 sill   
1014.             out1= 1.494595567*elev**2 - 1056.252204*elev + 186302.1873   
1015.             out2= 0.660028672*elev**2 - 440.0888044*elev + 72573.18918   
1016.         if elev >= 381.6:   
1017.             out1= 861.1   
1018.             out2= 728.9   
1019.         if elev<367.28:   
1020.             out1= 0   
1021.             out2=0   
1022.         if El1d>376.5: #corects max flow for extreme high inflow events 
  
1023.             elev=(elev+376.50)/2.   
1024.             out1= 1.494595567*elev**2 - 1056.252204*elev + 186302.1873   
1025.             out2= 0.660028672*elev**2 - 440.0888044*elev + 72573.18918   
1026.    
1027.     else:   
1028.         out1=0   
1029.         out2=0   
1030.     return out1+out2   
1031.   
1032. @njit   
1033. def availarray(length):   
1034.     out=np.ones(14)   
1035.     if length>0:   
1036.         out[0:length]=0   
1037.     return out   
1038.   
1039. @njit   
1040. def OpsPlan(InflowForecast, Storage, dayref, SPG1Av,  TbAv1, resElPens):
   
1041.     FishFlow=getfishflow(dayref)   
1042.     SPOG1Av=availarray(int(SPG1Av))   
1043.     TurbAv1=availarray(int(TbAv1))   
1044.    
1045.     VolInflow=np.sum(InflowForecast)   
1046.     #FIRST ASSUME SPILL EQUAL TO FISH FOW   
1047.     Spill=min(FishFlow[0],   
1048.                            fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], 373)
)   
1049.     #Assume power flow equal to max. of difference between inflow an fis
h flow, or total available turbine flow   
1050.     PFlow=max(min(fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), TurbAv1[0]), InflowFor
ecast[0]-Spill), 0)   
1051.    
1052.     #Now check multi-day reservoir elevation   
1053.     Spl=Spill+np.zeros(14)   
1054.     Pow=PFlow+np.zeros(14)   
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1055.     HiRes=0   
1056.     LoRes=0   
1057.     for i in range(13):   
1058.         VolOut=(i+1)*(Spill+PFlow)   
1059.         VolInflow=np.sum(InflowForecast[0:i+1])   
1060.         StorageD=Storage+VolInflow-VolOut   
1061.         SLimitsD=GetNMax(resElPens[0,:], resElPens[2,:], resElPens[1,:],
 dayref[i])   
1062.    
1063.         if StorageD>SLimitsD[1]: #If 14 day storage exceeds nmax   
1064.             HiRes+=1   
1065.             #ensure power flow is max:   
1066.             Pow[i]=min(PFlow+(StorageD-
SLimitsD[1])*(1./(i+1)),fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), TurbAv1[0]))   
1067.             #recalculate and recheck   
1068.             VolOut=(i+1)*(Spl[i]+Pow[i])   
1069.             StorageD=Storage+VolInflow-VolOut   
1070.             if StorageD>SLimitsD[1]: #add 1/14 of difference each day to
 spill to bring res el down   
1071.                 Spl[i]=min(Spill+(StorageD-
SLimitsD[1])*(1./(i+1)), fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(StorageD))
)   
1072.    
1073.         if StorageD<SLimitsD[0]: #If final storage less than nmin   
1074.             LoRes+=1   
1075.             #ensure spill is min   
1076.             Spl[i]=min(FishFlow[0],   
1077.                   fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(StorageD)
))   
1078.             #recalulate and recheck   
1079.             VolOut=(i+1)*(Spl[i]+Pow[i])   
1080.             StorageD=Storage+VolInflow-VolOut   
1081.             if StorageD<SLimitsD[0]: #reduce power flow to conserve wate
r   
1082.                 Pow[i]=max(PFlow-(1./(i+1))*(SLimitsD[0]-StorageD), 0)   
1083.    
1084.    
1085.    
1086.     if HiRes>0:   
1087.         Spill=np.max(Spl)   
1088.         PFlow=np.max(Pow) #high reservoir levels trump low reservoir lev
els   
1089.    
1090.     else:   
1091.         if LoRes>0:   
1092.             Spill=np.min(Spl)   
1093.             PFlow=np.min(Pow)   
1094.         else:   
1095.             Spill=Spl[0]   
1096.             PFlow=Pow[0]   
1097.    
1098.    
1099.     #check day 1 elevs again   
1100.     Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow   
1101.     SLimitsD=GetNMax(resElPens[0,:], resElPens[2,:], resElPens[1,:], day
ref[0])   
1102.     if Storage1d>SLimitsD[1]:   
1103.         #increase power   
1104.         PFlow=fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), TurbAv1[0])   
1105.         #recalculate   
1106.         Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow   
309 
 
1107.         if Storage1d>SLimitsD[1]:   
1108.    
1109.         #increase spill more   
1110.             spl=Spill   
1111.             Spill=min(Spill+(Storage1d-
SLimitsD[1]), fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(Storage1d)))   
1112.             if SPOG1Av[0]==1 and Spill<spl+(Storage1d-SLimitsD[1]):   
1113.                 Spill=min(Spill+(Storage1d-SLimitsD[1]), 1590)   
1114.             #recalculate   
1115.             Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow   
1116.             if Storage1d>SLimitsD[1]+0.1: #if inflow causes reservoir to
 rise to extreme levels within 1 ts   
1117.                 Spill=min(Spill+(Storage1d-
SLimitsD[1]), fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC((Storage+Storage1d)/2), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(Storage
1d)))   
1118.                 Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow   
1119.    
1120.     if Storage1d<SLimitsD[0]:   
1121.         #decrease spill   
1122.         Spill=max(Spill-(SLimitsD[0]-Storage1d), FishFlow[0])   
1123.         #recalculate   
1124.         Storage1d=Storage+InflowForecast[0]-Spill-PFlow   
1125.         if Storage1d<SLimitsD[0]:   
1126.             PFlow=max(PFlow-(SLimitsD[0]-Storage1d), 0)   
1127.    
1128.     if Spill<FishFlow[0]:   
1129.         if SPOG1Av[0]==1: #If spill less than FF and spillway is availab
le, readjust SPOG flow and Pflow   
1130.             Spill2=min(FishFlow[0], fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av
[0], SSC(Storage1d)))   
1131.             PFlow=max(fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), TurbAv1[0]), PFlow
-(Spill2-Spill))   
1132.    
1133.     Spill2=Spill   
1134.     #Now allocate discharge   
1135.     Ops=[0,0] #SPOG1,Turb1   
1136.     if SPOG1Av[0]==1:   
1137.         Ops[0]=min(Spill2, fncSPOGMaxFlow(SSC(Storage), SPOG1Av[0], SSC(
Storage1d)))   
1138.         if SPOG1Av[0]==1 and Spill2>Ops[0]: #this helps with large inflo
w events, where the initial gate capacity is too low, but the reservoir ends up 
too high   
1139.             Ops[0]=Spill2   
1140.         if (SSC(Storage)<367.28):   
1141.             Ops[0]=0   
1142.     elif SPOG1Av[0]==0:   
1143.         if SPOG1Av[0]==1:   
1144.             Ops[0]=0   
1145.    
1146.     if TurbAv1[0]==1:   
1147.         Ops[1]=PFlow   
1148.    
1149.     elif TurbAv1[0]==0:   
1150.         Ops[1]=0   
1151.    
1152.    
1153.     return Ops   
1154.   
1155. @njit   
1156. def GetNMax(lstResLimitDays, VResLower, VResUpper, dayref):   
1157.     i = -1   
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1158.     ColumnsCount = VResLower.shape[0]   
1159.     if (lstResLimitDays[1] > dayref >= lstResLimitDays[0]):   
1160.         i = 0   
1161.     if (dayref>= lstResLimitDays[1]):   
1162.         i = 1   
1163.     if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[2]):   
1164.         i = 2   
1165.     if (ColumnsCount==4):   
1166.         if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[3]):   
1167.             i = 3   
1168.     if (ColumnsCount==5):   
1169.         if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[4]):   
1170.             i = 4   
1171.     if (ColumnsCount==6):   
1172.         if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[5]):   
1173.             i = 5   
1174.     if (ColumnsCount==7):   
1175.         if (dayref >= lstResLimitDays[6]):   
1176.             i = 6   
1177.     return (VResLower[i], VResUpper[i])   
1178.    
1179.    
1180. #Determines month and day of year so fish flows and res el penalties cor
respond to timing   
1181.    
1182. if seedgen==0:   
1183.     ScenarioDescriptor=Seeds["ScenarioDescriptor"]   
1184.    
1185.    
1186. """  
1187. 4. DEFINING sdpy FUNCTIONS  
1188.   
1189. Broken down sector-by-sector:  
1190.     4.1. Hydaulic System State  
1191.     4.2. Sensors  
1192.     4.3. Disturbances  
1193.     4.4. Operations  
1194.     4.5. Gate Actuators  
1195.     4.6. Turbine Actuators  
1196.   
1197. """   
1198.    
1199. """  
1200. 4.1. HYDRAULIC SYSTEM STATE  
1201. """   
1202.    
1203. initial_reservoir_storage=SSCrev(B_RSEs[0,year])   
1204. if initial_reservoir_storage<=-
304.1:  #making sure initial reservoir level isn't breach level, if any   
1205.     initial_reservoir_storage=364.27   
1206.       
1207. @sdpy.stock(model, initial_reservoir_storage, name='Reservoir Storage',c
ache=False, jit=False)   
1208. def reservoir_storage(t):   
1209.     out=reservoir_inflow(t) - reservoir_outflow(t)   
1210.     return out   
1211.   
1212. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Inflow',cache=False, jit=False)   
1213. def reservoir_inflow(t):   
1214.     daytimestep=t   
1215.     return float(Inflow[daytimestep,year])   
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1216.   
1217. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Outflow",cache=False, jit=False)   
1218. def reservoir_outflow(t):   
1219.     return float(gated_spill_release(t) + overtopping_flow(t) + power_fl
ow_release(t) + penstock_leakage(t) + earth_dam_seepage(t) + breach_flow(t))   
1220.   
1221. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Reservoir Level",cache=False, jit=False)   
1222. def reservoir_level(t):   
1223.     return SSC(reservoir_storage(t))   
1224.   
1225. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Overtopping Flow",cache=False, jit=False)   
1226. def overtopping_flow(t):   
1227.     level=reservoir_level(t)   
1228.     storage=reservoir_storage(t)   
1229.     pf=power_flow_release(t)   
1230.     sf=gated_spill_release(t)   
1231.     inf=reservoir_inflow(t)   
1232.     storage2=storage+inf-pf-sf   
1233.     Overtoppingflow=0   
1234.     OTs=np.zeros(24)   
1235.     if level>378.41 or SSC(storage2)>378.41:   
1236.         for i in range(24):   
1237.             OTs[i]=max(OTC(SSC(storage)), 0)*(1/24.)   
1238.             #water balance   
1239.             storage=storage+inf/24.-OTs[i]-pf/24.-sf/24.   
1240.         Overtoppingflow=np.sum(OTs)   
1241.     return Overtoppingflow   
1242.   
1243. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Unobstructed Gate Flow",cache=False, jit=False)   
1244. def unobstructed_gate_flow(t):   
1245. #    av=gate_availability(t)   
1246. #    ops=operations_planning(t)[0]   
1247. #    SC=sensor_condition(t)   
1248. #    Se=sensor_error(t)   
1249.     level=reservoir_level(t)   
1250. #    SE=1   
1251. #    Spillflow=0   
1252. #    if Se!=0:   
1253. #        SE=0   
1254. #    if av==1 and (SE+SC==2) and level>367.28:   
1255. #        #if gate available, sensors functional, man act working or some
one on site set directly to operations plan   
1256. #        Spillflow=ops   
1257. #    else:   
1258.         #if gate unavailable or issues with actuation or sensors, use ga
te position to determine flow   
1259.     g = gate_position(t)   
1260.     Spillflow=GateFlowCalc(level,g)   
1261.     return Spillflow   
1262.   
1263. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gated Spill Release",cache=False, jit=False)   
1264. def gated_spill_release(t):   
1265.     if breach_triggered(t)==0:   
1266.         if components_collapsing_gate(t)==1:   
1267.             return gate_capacity(t)*unobstructed_gate_flow(t)   
1268.         else:   
1269.             return min(1590, max(reservoir_storage(t) + reservoir_inflow
(t) - 83.1357, 0))   
1270.     else:   
1271.         return 0   
1272.    
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1273. DebrisRemoval= np.zeros(1)   
1274. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gated Capacity",cache=False, jit=False)   
1275. def gate_capacity(t):   
1276.     timestep=t   
1277.     #DebrisRemoval = 0 #global todo   
1278.     currentinflow=reservoir_inflow(t)   
1279.     inflowthreshold=65 #assume less than this required to remove debris 
  
1280.     Capacity=1   
1281.     if ReducedCapacities[year]<1:   
1282.         if timestep>=1 and timestep<=24.*ReducedCapacityMinimumTime:   
1283.             Capacity=ReducedCapacities[year]   
1284.         if timestep>=24.*ReducedCapacityMinimumTime: #debris removal can
 start after a minimum time   
1285.             if DebrisRemoval[0]==0:   
1286.                 if currentinflow<inflowthreshold:  #Debris removal only 
less than inflow threshold   
1287.                     DebrisRemoval[0]=1   
1288.             if DebrisRemoval[0]==0:  #if debrs, set to reduced capacitie
s   
1289.                 Capacity=ReducedCapacities[year]   
1290.             if DebrisRemoval[0]==1: #if debris removed, set to full capa
city   
1291.                 Capacity=1   
1292.     return float(Capacity)   
1293.   
1294. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Power Flow Release",cache=False, jit=False)   
1295. def power_flow_release(t):   
1296.     if breach_triggered(t)==0:   
1297.         return powerhouse_flow_conveyance(t)   
1298.     else:   
1299.         return 0   
1300.   
1301. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Penstock Leakage",cache=False, jit=False)   
1302. def penstock_leakage(t):   
1303.     if intake_gate_closure(t)==0 and breach_triggered(t)==0 and other_co
mponent_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0:   
1304.         return head_cover_max_flow(t)   
1305.     else:   
1306.         return 0   
1307.    
1308. RESEL_IG=[]   
1309. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Intake Gate Closure",cache=False, jit=False)   
1310. def intake_gate_closure(t):   
1311.     penstockrup=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]   
1312.     hcfail=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]   
1313.     igclosed=0   
1314.     if hcfail>0 or penstockrup>0:   
1315.         RESEL_IG.append(reservoir_level(t))   
1316.         if (np.min(RESEL_IG)<363.06): #Intake gate can be closed once re
servoir drawn down past sill of intake gate   
1317.             igclosed=1   
1318.     return igclosed   
1319.   
1320. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Uncontrolled Release",cache=False, jit=False)   
1321. def uncontrolled_release(t):   
1322.     ucr=0   
1323.     if head_cover(t)==0:   
1324.         ucr+=np.max([power_flow_release(t),0])   
1325.     if gate_collapse(t)==1:   
1326.         ucr+=np.max([gated_spill_release(t),0])   
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1327.     ucr+=np.max([penstock_leakage(t),0])   
1328.     ucr+=np.max([breach_flow(t),0])   
1329.     ucr+=overtopping_flow(t)   
1330.     return ucr   
1331.    
1332. BREACHT=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
1333. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Breach Triggered",cache=False, jit=False)   
1334. def breach_triggered(t):   
1335.     bt=np.max(RSEs[:,year])   
1336.     if bt>381.73:   
1337.         BREACHT[t,year]=1   
1338.         return 1   
1339.     else:   
1340.         return 0   
1341.   
1342. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Breach Flow",cache=False, jit=False)   
1343. def breach_flow(t):   
1344.     if breach_triggered(t)==1:   
1345.         return reservoir_storage(t) + reservoir_inflow(t) - (-304.012)   
1346.     else:   
1347.         return 0   
1348.   
1349. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Earth Dam Settlement",cache=False, jit=False)   
1350. def earth_dam_settlement(t):   
1351.     return 0 #not used for this model   
1352.   
1353. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Earth Dam Seepage",cache=False, jit=False)   
1354. def earth_dam_seepage(t):   
1355.     return 0 #not used for this model   
1356.     #IF THEN ELSE(Earth dam settlement=0, 0 ,   
1357. #IF THEN ELSE(Reservoir Level>364.9, Earth dam settlement*Reservoir Leve
l*0.1 , 0 ))   
1358.    
1359.    
1360. """  
1361. 4.2. SENSORS  
1362.   
1363. """   
1364.    
1365. if seedgen==0:   
1366.     SErrorDeltat=Seeds['SErrorDeltat']   
1367.     SErrorDuration=Seeds['SErrorDuration']   
1368.     SErrors=Seeds['SErrors']   
1369.   
1370. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Sensor Condition",cache=False, jit=False)   
1371. def sensor_condition(t):   
1372.     if sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>0:   
1373.         return 0   
1374.     else:   
1375.         return 1   
1376.   
1377. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gauge Reading",cache=False, jit=False)   
1378. def gauge_reading(t):   
1379.     if sensor_condition(t)==1:   
1380.         return reservoir_level(t) + (sensor_error(t)/100)*reservoir_leve
l(t)   
1381.     else:   
1382.         return -1000   
1383.     #IF THEN ELSE( Sensor condition=1 , Reservoir Level+((Sensor Error)/
100)*Reservoir Level , -1000)   
1384.   
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1385. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gauge Processing",cache=False, jit=False)   
1386. def gauge_processing(t):   
1387.     if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0:   
1388.         return -1000   
1389.     else:   
1390.         return gauge_reading(t)   
1391.     #IF THEN ELSE(Other component remaining time to repair[PLCRTU]>0, -
1000 , Gauge reading)   
1392.   
1393. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gauge Relay",cache=False, jit=False)   
1394. def gauge_relay(t):   
1395.     return gauge_processing(t)   
1396.   
1397. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Sensor Error",cache=False, jit=False)   
1398. def sensor_error(t):   
1399.     timestep=t   
1400.     error=0   
1401.     if (timestep>=SErrorDeltat[year] and timestep<=(SErrorDeltat[year]+S
ErrorDuration[year])):   
1402.         error=SErrors[year] #sets sensor components to failure time   
1403.     return error   
1404.    
1405. """  
1406. 4.3 DISTURBANCES  
1407.   
1408. """   
1409.    
1410. gatecomps = sdpy.SubRange('gatecomps', ['C_FC', 'C_FO', 'C_FIP'])   
1411. turbinecomps = sdpy.SubRange('turbinecomps', ['HC', 'GEN'])   
1412. othercomps = sdpy.SubRange('othercomps', ["PLCRTU", "PEN", "GRID"])   
1413.    
1414.    
1415. if seedgen==0:   
1416.     GateOutagesAll=Seeds['GateOutagesAll']   
1417.     GateCollapses=Seeds['GateCollapses']   
1418.     Gdeltat=Seeds['Gdeltat']   
1419.   
1420. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gate Component Failures",cache=False, jit=False) 
  
1421. @sdpy.subscript(gatecomps)   
1422. def gate_component_failures(t):   
1423.     timestep=t   
1424.     timetorepair=np.zeros(3)   
1425.     #SPOG1, 3 different general components can be set to failure, also o
ne general   
1426.     #C_FC, C_FO, C_FIP (fail open/collapse, fail closed, fail in place) 
  
1427.     for c in range(3):   
1428.         if timestep==Gdeltat[c, year]:   
1429.             if GateOutagesAll[c, year]>0:   
1430.                 timetorepair[c]=GateOutagesAll[c, year] #sets gate compo
nents to failure time   
1431.     return timetorepair   
1432.   
1433. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Time To Repair',cache=False, jit=False)   
1434. @sdpy.subscript(gatecomps)   
1435. def gate_time_to_repair(t):   
1436.     return gate_component_failures(t)   
1437.   
1438. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Repair',cache=False, jit=False)   
1439. @sdpy.subscript(gatecomps)   
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1440. def gate_repair(t):   
1441.     ret=np.zeros(3)   
1442.     for i in range(3):   
1443.         if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]>1:   
1444.             ret[i]=1   
1445.         else:   
1446.             if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]<=1 and gate_remaining
_time_to_repair(t)[i]>0:   
1447.                 ret[i]=gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]   
1448.             else:   
1449.                 ret[i]=0   
1450.     return ret   
1451. #if_then_else(gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>1, 1,   
1452. #             if_then_else(gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)<1 and gate_r
emaining_time_to_repair(t)>0, gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t),0) )   
1453. #    IF THEN ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[GateComps]>1, 1 , IF THE
N ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[GateComps]<1 :AND: Gate remaining time to r
epair[GateComps]>0,Gate remaining time to repair[GateComps],0) )   
1454.   
1455. @sdpy.stock(model, np.zeros(3), name='Gate Remaining Time To Repair',cac
he=False, jit=False)   
1456. @sdpy.subscript(gatecomps)   
1457. def gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t):   
1458.     return gate_time_to_repair(t) - gate_repair(t)   
1459.    
1460. GFORTTR=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
1461. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate All',cache=False, jit=False)   
1462. def gate_all(t):   
1463.     GFORTTR[t,year]=gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]   
1464.     maxs=np.max(gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t))   
1465.     return maxs   
1466.    
1467. if seedgen==0:   
1468.     TurbineOutagesAll=Seeds['TurbineOutagesAll']   
1469.     Tdeltat=Seeds['Tdeltat']   
1470.   
1471. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Power component Failures',cache=False, jit=False)
   
1472. @sdpy.subscript(turbinecomps)   
1473. def power_component_failures(t):   
1474.     timestep=t   
1475.     timetorepair=np.zeros(2)   #gen #HC   
1476.     for c in range(2):   
1477.         if timestep==Tdeltat[c, year]:   
1478.             if TurbineOutagesAll[c, year]>0:   
1479.                 timetorepair[c]=TurbineOutagesAll[c, year] #sets gate co
mponents to failure time   
1480.     return timetorepair   
1481.   
1482. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Power Time To Repair',cache=False, jit=False)   
1483. @sdpy.subscript(turbinecomps)   
1484. def power_time_to_repair(t):   
1485.     return power_component_failures(t)   
1486.   
1487. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Power Repair',cache=False, jit=False)   
1488. @sdpy.subscript(turbinecomps)   
1489. def power_repair(t):   
1490.     ret=np.zeros(2)   
1491.     for i in range(2):   
1492.         if power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]>1:   
1493.             ret[i]=1   
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1494.         else:   
1495.             if power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]<=1 and power_remaini
ng_time_to_repair(t)[i]>0:   
1496.                 ret[i]=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]   
1497.             else:   
1498.                 ret[i]=0   
1499.     return ret   
1500. #    if_then_else(power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>1, 1,   
1501. #             if_then_else(power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)<1 and power
_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>0, power_remaining_time_to_repair(t),0) )   
1502.   
1503. @sdpy.stock(model, np.zeros(2), name='Power Remaining Time To Repair',ca
che=False, jit=False)   
1504. @sdpy.subscript(turbinecomps)   
1505. def power_remaining_time_to_repair(t):   
1506.     return power_time_to_repair(t) - power_repair(t)   
1507.   
1508. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Power All',cache=False, jit=False)   
1509. def power_all(t):   
1510.     maxs=np.max(power_remaining_time_to_repair(t))   
1511.     return maxs   
1512.    
1513. if seedgen==0:   
1514.     OCdeltat=Seeds['OCdeltat']   
1515.     OCOutages=Seeds['OCOutages']   
1516.   
1517. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Other Component Failures',cache=False, jit=False)
   
1518. @sdpy.subscript(othercomps)   
1519. def other_component_failures(t):   
1520.     timetorepair=np.zeros(3)   
1521.     #0 Dam PLCRTU, 1 Penstock, 2 Grid   
1522.     timestep=t   
1523.     for c in range(3):   
1524.         if timestep==OCdeltat[c, year]:   
1525.             if OCOutages[c, year]>0:   
1526.                 timetorepair[c]=OCOutages[c, year] #sets other component
s to failure time   
1527.    
1528.     return timetorepair   
1529.   
1530. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Other Component Time To Repair',cache=False, jit=
False)   
1531. @sdpy.subscript(othercomps)   
1532. def other_component_time_to_repair(t):   
1533.     return other_component_failures(t)   
1534.   
1535. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Other Component Repair',cache=False, jit=False)   
1536. @sdpy.subscript(othercomps)   
1537. def other_component_repair(t):   
1538.     ret=np.zeros(3)   
1539.     for i in range(3):   
1540.         if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]>1:   
1541.             ret[i]=1   
1542.         else:   
1543.             if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]<=1 and oth
er_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]>0:   
1544.                 ret[i]=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[i]   
1545.             else:   
1546.                 ret[i]=0   
1547.     return ret   
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1548. #    if_then_else(other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>1, 1,   
1549. #             if_then_else(other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)<1
 and other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>0, other_component_remaining_ti
me_to_repair(t),0) )   
1550.   
1551. @sdpy.stock(model, np.zeros(3), name='Other Component Remaining Time To 
Repair',cache=False, jit=False)   
1552. @sdpy.subscript(othercomps)   
1553. def other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t):   
1554.     return other_component_time_to_repair(t)-other_component_repair(t)   
1555.    
1556. if seedgen==0:   
1557.     SOutages=Seeds['SOutages']   
1558.     Sdeltat=Seeds['SOutages']   
1559.   
1560. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Sensor Failures',cache=False, jit=False)   
1561. def sensor_failures(t):   
1562.     timestep=t   
1563.     timetorepair=0   
1564.     if timestep==Sdeltat[year]:   
1565.         if SOutages[year]>0:   
1566.             timetorepair=SOutages[year] #sets sensor components to failu
re time   
1567.     return timetorepair   
1568.   
1569. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Sensor Time To Repair',cache=False, jit=False)   
1570. def sensor_time_to_repair(t):   
1571.     return sensor_failures(t)   
1572.   
1573. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Sensor Repair',cache=False, jit=False)   
1574. def sensor_repair(t):   
1575.     if sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>1:   
1576.         return 1   
1577.     else:   
1578.         if sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)<=1 and sensor_remaining_ti
me_to_repair(t)>0:   
1579.             return sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)   
1580.         else:   
1581.             return 0   
1582.   
1583. @sdpy.stock(model, 0, name='Sensor Remaining Time To Repair',cache=False
, jit=False)   
1584. def sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t):   
1585.     return sensor_time_to_repair(t)-sensor_repair(t)   
1586.    
1587.    
1588. """  
1589. 4.4. OPERATIONS  
1590.   
1591. """   
1592. controls = sdpy.SubRange('controls', ['g1', 't1'])   
1593.    
1594. if seedgen==0:   
1595.     IFErrorDeltat=Seeds['IFErrorDeltat']   
1596.     IFErrorDuration=Seeds['IFErrorDuration']   
1597.   
1598.   
1599. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Operations Planning',cache=False, jit=False)   
1600. @sdpy.subscript(controls)   
1601. def operations_planning(t):   
1602.     timestep=t   
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1603.     dayref=dayrefs(Startdays[year], timestep)   
1604.     FishFlow=getfishflow(dayref)   
1605.     Inf114=Inflow[timestep:14+timestep, year] #Changed to one day ahead 
so proper spills are released for Vensim version   
1606.     InfForecast=Inf114   
1607.     gaugerelay=gauge_relay(t)   
1608.     if gaugerelay<-
900 or gaugerelay>381.73: #If error is so high that it becomes obvious   
1609.         storage=-1000   
1610.     else:   
1611.         storage=SSCrev(gaugerelay)   
1612.     StaffOnSite=site_staff_mobilized(t)   
1613.     actualstorage=reservoir_storage(t)   
1614.     if (StaffOnSite>0) or (storage==-1000):   
1615.         if storage==-1000:   
1616.             storage=SSCrev(RSEs[timestep-
1, year]) #if unknown, takes previous days value   
1617.         if StaffOnSite==1:   
1618.             storage=actualstorage  #if someone is on site, takes actual 
value   
1619.     InitialStorage=np.float64(storage)#+lastinf-outfs   
1620.     resElPens=np.zeros((3,3))#Penalties for res el   
1621.     resElPens[0,:]=[0,273,304]   
1622.     resElPens[1,:]=[426.99, 300.39, 300.39]   
1623.     resElPens[2,:]=[99.58693574984267,99.58693574984267, 171.28] #123.60
856547318923 from 87.055 to help reduce 0 spill events   
1624.     penstockrup=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1] #penstock
   
1625.     hcfail=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0] #head cover   
1626.     igate=intake_gate_closure(t)   
1627.     if penstockrup>0 or hcfail>0:   
1628.         if igate==0: #reduce res el targets to get res below intake gate
 sill so it can be closed   
1629.             resElPens[1,:]=[-48.5, -48.5, -48.5]   
1630.             resElPens[2,:]=[-47, -47, -47] #lowered   
1631.         #draw down reservoir to sill   
1632.     SPOG1Av=gate_all(t)   #Availbility set based on "gate time to repair
"   
1633.     TurbAv1=power_all(t)   
1634.     Nextday=np.zeros(2)   
1635.    
1636.     Optimized=OpsPlan(InfForecast, InitialStorage, dayref,  SPOG1Av,  Tu
rbAv1,  resElPens)   
1637.     Nextday=np.array(Optimized.copy())   #SPOG1, Turb1   
1638.    
1639.     Nextday.clip(min=0) #omit negatives.   
1640.    
1641.     return Nextday   
1642.    
1643. BREACHQ=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
1644. IGCLOSE=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
1645. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Output Saving',cache=False, jit=False)   
1646. def output_saving(t):   
1647.     timestep=t   
1648.     outfs=reservoir_outflow(t)   
1649.     IGCLOSE[timestep,year]=intake_gate_closure(t)   
1650.     BREACHQ[timestep,year]=breach_flow(t)   
1651.     GAVs[timestep, year]=unit_availability(t)   
1652.     UAVs[timestep,year]=gate_availability(t)   
1653.     timetorepairg=gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t) #model['Gate remainin
g time to repair[GateComps]']   
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1654.     timetorepairt=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t) #model['Power remain
ing time to repair[TurbineComps]']   
1655.     RSEs[timestep, year]=reservoir_level(t) #model['Reservoir Level']   
1656.     TBFs[timestep, year]=power_flow_release(t) #model["Power flow releas
e"]   
1657.     SPOGs[timestep, year]=gated_spill_release(t) #model["Gated spill rel
ease"]   
1658.     OT[timestep, year]=overtopping_flow(t)   
1659.     INFs[timestep,year]=reservoir_inflow(t) #model["Inflow"]   
1660.     OUTFs[timestep,year]=outfs   
1661.     TTRS[timestep,0:3, year]=gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t) #model['Ga
te remaining time to repair[GateComps]']   
1662.     TTRS[timestep,3:5, year]=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t) #model['P
ower remaining time to repair[TurbineComps]']   
1663.     TTRS[int(timestep),5:8, year]=other_component_remaining_time_to_repa
ir(t) #model['Other component remaining time to repair[Other infrastructure]']   
1664.     if TTRS[timestep, 2, year]<=0:   
1665.         GPs[timestep,year]=gate_position(t) #model["Gate Position"]   
1666.     if TTRS[timestep, 2, year]>0:   
1667.         GPs[timestep,year]=GPs[timestep-1, year]   
1668.     AllMaxQ_t[timestep,:, year]=np.array(AllMaxQ)   
1669.     if timetorepairg[0]>0:   
1670.         AllMaxQ_t[timestep,0, year] = 0 #gate fails closed, cap is at 0 
  
1671.     if timetorepairg[1]>0:   
1672.         AllMaxQ_t[timestep,0, year] = 861.1+728.9 #gate fails open, cap 
is maxed   
1673.     if timetorepairg[2]>0:   
1674.         tempgatecap=GateFlowCalc(381.6,gate_position(t))   
1675.         AllMaxQ_t[timestep,0, year] = tempgatecap #gate fails in place, 
cap is max flow @ current opening   
1676.     if intake_gate_closure(t)==1: #turbine capacity is zero when intake 
gate closed   
1677.         AllMaxQ_t[timestep, 1, year]=0   
1678.     GateCaps[t,year]=gate_capacity(t)   
1679.     AllMaxQ_t[timestep,0, year]=np.multiply(AllMaxQ_t[int(timestep),0, y
ear], GateCaps[t,year]) #account for debris blockage   
1680.     if timetorepairt[1]>0: #Generator outage   
1681.          AllMaxQ_t[timestep,1, year]=0   
1682.     CAPs[timestep, year]=np.sum(AllMaxQ_t[timestep,:, year])   
1683.     UCRs[timestep, year]=uncontrolled_release(t)   
1684.     GCRs[timestep, year]=gate_control_redundancy(t)   
1685.     return 1   
1686.   
1687.   
1688. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Turbine Instructions',cache=False, jit=False)   
1689. def turbine_instructions(t):   
1690.     return operations_planning(t)[1]   
1691.   
1692.   
1693. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Instructions',cache=False, jit=False)   
1694. def gate_instructions(t):   
1695.     ResEl=reservoir_level(t)   
1696.     OP=operations_planning(t)[0]   
1697.     gps=GateInstr(ResEl, OP)   
1698. #    print("getALLgp: Gate Instruction q: "+str(OPs[0]) + "  Gate positi
on: " +str(gps) + "  Res El: "+str(ResEl))   
1699.     return gps   
1700.   
1701. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Manual Actuation',cache=False, jit=False)   
1702. def manual_actuation(t):   
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1703.     if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0 or dam_grid_avai
lability(t)==0 or sensor_remaining_time_to_repair(t)>0:   
1704.         MOBI[t,year]=1   
1705.         return 1   
1706.     else:   
1707.         return 0   
1708. #IF THEN ELSE(Other component remaining time to repair[PLCRTU]>0 :OR: Ga
te instructions>2 :OR: Dam grid availability=0 :OR: Sensor remaining time to rep
air>0, 1 , 0 )+0*Operations planning[g1]   
1709.   
1710. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Initiate',cache=False, jit=False)   
1711. def initiate(t):   
1712.     #IF THEN ELSE(Manual actuation=1:AND:Manual Actuation Initiated<=0, 
1 , 0 )   
1713.     if manual_actuation(t)==1 and manual_actuation_initiated(t)<=0:   
1714.         return 1   
1715.     else:   
1716.         return 0   
1717.   
1718. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Demobilize',cache=False, jit=False)   
1719. def demobilize(t):   
1720.     #IF THEN ELSE(Manual actuation=0:AND:Site staff mobilized=1, 1 , 0) 
  
1721.     os=output_saving(t)   
1722.     if manual_actuation(t)==0 and site_staff_mobilized(t)==1:   
1723.         return 1   
1724.     else:   
1725.         return 0   
1726.   
1727. @sdpy.stock(model, 0, name='Manual Actuation Initiated',cache=False, jit
=False)   
1728. def manual_actuation_initiated(t):   
1729.     return initiate(t)-demobilize(t)   
1730.    
1731. if seedgen==0:   
1732.     DelayStaff=Seeds['DelayStaff']   
1733.   
1734. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Delay In Contacting Staff',cache=False, jit=False
)   
1735. def delay_in_contacting_staff(t):   
1736.     delay=1   
1737.     if manual_actuation_initiated(t)==1:   
1738.         delay=DelayStaff[year] #sets sensor components to failure time   
1739.     return float(delay)   
1740.    
1741. if seedgen==0:   
1742.     DelayAccess=Seeds["DelayAccess"]   
1743.   
1744. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Delay In Accessing Site',cache=False, jit=False) 
  
1745. def delay_in_accessing_site(t):   
1746.     delay=3+np.zeros(2)   
1747.     for c in range(2):   
1748.         if manual_actuation_initiated(t)==1:   
1749.                 delay[c]=DelayAccess[c, year]   
1750.     return float(delay[0]) #Can add powerhouse delays later, ignoring fo
r now.   
1751.   
1752. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Contact Initiation',cache=False, jit=False)   
1753. def contact_initiation(t):   
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1754.     #IF THEN ELSE(Initiate=1 :AND: Site staff mobilized=0 :AND: Plant st
aff notified=0, Delay in contacting staff   
1755. #, IF THEN ELSE(Demobilize=1, 1 , 0 ))   
1756.     if initiate(t)==1 and site_staff_mobilized(t)==0 and plant_staff_not
ified(t)==0:   
1757.         return delay_in_contacting_staff(t)   
1758.     else:   
1759.         if demobilize(t)==1:   
1760.             return 1   
1761.         else:   
1762.             return 0   
1763.   
1764. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Contacting',cache=False, jit=False)   
1765. def contacting(t):   
1766.     #IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to contact plant manager and site staff
>0 :AND: Manual Actuation Initiated=1, IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to contact pl
ant manager and site staff<1, Time remaining to contact plant manager and site s
taff, 1) , 0 )   
1767.     if time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)>0 and manual_actuation_initiat
ed(t)==1:   
1768.         if time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)<1:   
1769.             return time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)   
1770.         else:   
1771.             return 1   
1772.     else:   
1773.         return 0   
1774.   
1775. @sdpy.stock(model, 1, name='Time Remaining To Contact Staff',cache=False
, jit=False)   
1776. def time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t):   
1777.     return contact_initiation(t)-contacting(t)   
1778.   
1779. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Plant Staff Notified',cache=False, jit=False)   
1780. def plant_staff_notified(t):   
1781.     #IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to contact plant manager and site staff
<=0 :AND: Manual Actuation Initiated=1, 1 , 0 )   
1782.     if time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)<=0 and manual_actuation_initia
ted(t)==1:   
1783.         return 1   
1784.     else:   
1785.         return 0   
1786.    
1787. plantStaffNotified=np.zeros(365)   
1788. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Mobilization Initiated',cache=False, jit=False)   
1789. def mobilization_initiated(t):   
1790.     time=t   
1791.     plantStaffNotified[int(time)]=plant_staff_notified(t)   
1792.     AccessDelay=delay_in_accessing_site(t)   
1793.     demob=demobilize(t)   
1794.     Mobinit=0   
1795.     if time>0:   
1796.         if plantStaffNotified[int(time)]==1 and plantStaffNotified[int(t
ime-1)]==0:   
1797.             Mobinit=AccessDelay  #Adding delays in access time to stock 
  
1798.     if demob==1:   
1799.         Mobinit=1 #returning stock to demobilized value which is 3 hr ti
me to get to site on av   
1800.     return float(Mobinit)   
1801.   
1802.   
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1803. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Mobilizing',cache=False, jit=False)   
1804. def mobilizing(t):   
1805.     #IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to access site>0 :AND: Manual Actuation
 Initiated=1 :AND: Time remaining to contact plant manager and site staff<=0, IF
 THEN ELSE(Time remaining to access site<1, Time remaining to access site, 1), 0
 )   
1806.     if time_remaining_to_access_site(t)>0 and manual_actuation_initiated
(t)==1 and time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)<=0:   
1807.         if time_remaining_to_access_site(t)<1:   
1808.             return time_remaining_to_access_site(t)   
1809.         else:   
1810.             return 1   
1811.     else:   
1812.         return 0   
1813.   
1814. @sdpy.stock(model, 1, name='Time Remaining To Access Site',cache=False, 
jit=False)   
1815. def time_remaining_to_access_site(t):   
1816.     return mobilization_initiated(t)-mobilizing(t)   
1817.   
1818. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Site Staff Mobilized',cache=False, jit=False)   
1819. def site_staff_mobilized(t):   
1820.     #IF THEN ELSE(Time remaining to access site<=0 :AND: Manual Actuatio
n Initiated=1 :AND: Time remaining to contact plant manager and site staff<=0, 1
, 0)   
1821.     if time_remaining_to_access_site(t)<=0 and manual_actuation_initiate
d(t)==1 and time_remaining_to_contact_staff(t)<=0:   
1822.         MOB[t,year]=1   
1823.         return 1   
1824.     else:   
1825.         return 0   
1826.   
1827. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Control Redundancy',cache=False, jit=False) 
  
1828. def gate_control_redundancy(t):   
1829.     #IF THEN ELSE(Manual actuation=0, 2, IF THEN ELSE(Manual actuation=1
 :AND: Site staff mobilized=1, 1 , 0 ))   
1830.     if manual_actuation(t)==0:   
1831.         return 2   
1832.     else:   
1833.         if manual_actuation(t)==1 and site_staff_mobilized(t)==1:   
1834.             return 1   
1835.         else:   
1836.             return 0   
1837.    
1838. """  
1839. 4.5.  GATE ACTUATORS  
1840.   
1841. """   
1842.   
1843. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Dam Grid Availability',cache=False, jit=False)   
1844. def dam_grid_availability(t):   
1845.     #IF THEN ELSE(Other component remaining time to repair[Grid]>0, 0, 1
)   
1846.     if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0:   
1847.         return 0   
1848.     else:   
1849.         return 1   
1850.   
1851. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Gate Power Supply',cache=False, jit=False)   
1852. def gate_power_supply(t):   
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1853.     return dam_grid_availability(t)   
1854.   
1855. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gate Availability",cache=False, jit=False)   
1856. def gate_availability(t):   
1857.     time=t   
1858.     gateavail=1   
1859.     sstaff=site_staff_mobilized(t)   
1860.     staffproblemgate=0   
1861.     if time>0:   
1862.         if (other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0 or other_co
mponent_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0) and sstaff==0:   
1863.             staffproblemgate=1   
1864.         gateout=gate_all(t)   
1865.         if gateout>0 or staffproblemgate==1:   
1866.             gateavail=0   
1867.     return float(gateavail)   
1868.   
1869. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Components Failing Gate In Place",cache=False, ji
t=False)   
1870. def components_failing_gate_in_place(t):   
1871.     #IF THEN ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[C FIP]>0, 0 , 1 )   
1872.     if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0:   
1873.         return 0   
1874.     else:   
1875.         return 1   
1876.   
1877. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Components Collapsing Gate",cache=False, jit=Fals
e)   
1878. def components_collapsing_gate(t):   
1879.     #IF THEN ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[C FO]>0, 0 , 1 )   
1880.     if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0:   
1881.         return 0   
1882.     else:   
1883.         return 1   
1884.   
1885. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Components Failing Gate Closed",cache=False, jit=
False)   
1886. def components_failing_gate_closed(t):   
1887.     #IF THEN ELSE(Gate remaining time to repair[C FC]>0, 0 , 1 )   
1888.     if gate_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0:   
1889.         return 0   
1890.     else:   
1891.         return 1   
1892.   
1893. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gate Collapsed",cache=False, jit=False)   
1894. def gate_collapse(t):   
1895.     #IF THEN ELSE(Components collapsing gate=0, 1 , 0 )   
1896.     if components_collapsing_gate(t)==0:   
1897.         return 1   
1898.     else:   
1899.         return 0   
1900.   
1901. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Fail Closed",cache=False, jit=False)   
1902. def fail_closed(t):   
1903.     #IF THEN ELSE(Components failing gate closed=0, 1 , 0)   
1904.     if components_failing_gate_closed(t)==0:   
1905.         return 1   
1906.     else:   
1907.         return 0   
1908.    
1909. max_opening=12.5   
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1910.   
1911. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Last Gate Position",cache=False, jit=False)   
1912. def last_gate_position(t):   
1913.     timestep=t   
1914.     gp=GPs[timestep,year]   
1915.     if gate_availability(t)==0:   
1916.         gateavinds=np.where(GAVs[:,year]==1)[0]   
1917.         if np.size(gateavinds)!=0:   
1918.             lastgateactivets=np.max(gateavinds)   
1919.             gp=GPs[lastgateactivets, year]   
1920.     return gp   
1921.   
1922. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Gate Position",cache=False, jit=False)   
1923. def gate_position(t):   
1924.     GColl=gate_collapse(t)   
1925.     MaxO=12.5   
1926.     GFClosed=fail_closed(t)   
1927.     GateAvailability=gate_availability(t)   
1928.     GAVs[int(t), year]=GateAvailability   
1929.     GateInstructions=gate_instructions(t)   
1930.     LastGatePosition=last_gate_position(t)   
1931.     if GColl==1:   
1932.         return MaxO   
1933.     if GFClosed==1:   
1934.         return 0   
1935.     if GateAvailability==1:   
1936.         return GateInstructions   
1937.     if GateAvailability==0:   
1938.         return LastGatePosition   
1939.    
1940.    
1941. """  
1942. 4.6. TURBINE ACTUATORS  
1943.   
1944. """   
1945.   
1946. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Unit Availability',cache=False, jit=False)   
1947. def unit_availability(t):   
1948.     time=t   
1949.     turbavail=1   
1950.     if time>0:   
1951.         turbout=power_all(t)   
1952.         penstockrup=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1] #pens
tock   
1953.         if turbout>0:   
1954.             turbavail=0   
1955.         if penstockrup>0:   
1956.             turbavail=0   
1957.         if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0: #grid failu
re   
1958.             turbavail=0   
1959.     return turbavail   
1960.   
1961. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Head Cover',cache=False, jit=False)   
1962. def head_cover(t):   
1963.     if power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0:   
1964.         return 0   
1965.     else:   
1966.         return 1   
1967.   
1968. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Generator',cache=False, jit=False)   
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1969. def generator(t):   
1970.     if power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0:   
1971.         return 0   
1972.     else:   
1973.         return 1   
1974.   
1975. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Head Cover Max Flow',cache=False, jit=False)   
1976. def head_cover_max_flow(t):   
1977.     flag1=head_cover(t)+1 #if head cover = 0 then flag=1   
1978.     if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0: #penstock   
1979.         flag1=1   
1980.     resels=reservoir_level(t)   
1981.     t1=fncTurbineMaxFlow(resels, flag1)   
1982.     if intake_gate_closure(t)==1:   
1983.         return 0   
1984.     if intake_gate_closure(t)==0:   
1985.         return np.max([np.min([5*(t1), reservoir_storage(t)+reservoir_in
flow(t)-gated_spill_release(t)-(-48.6)]), 0])   
1986.   
1987. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Turbine Flow',cache=False, jit=False)   
1988. def turbine_flow(t):   
1989.     #IF THEN ELSE(Components collapsing gate=1, IF THEN ELSE(Head Cover=
0, Head Cover Max Flow , IF THEN ELSE(Unit availability=1, Turbine instructions 
, 0)), 0)   
1990.     if components_collapsing_gate(t)==1:   
1991.         if head_cover(t)==0:   
1992.             return head_cover_max_flow(t)   
1993.         if head_cover(t)==1 and unit_availability(t)==1:   
1994.             return turbine_instructions(t)   
1995.         else: return 0   
1996.     else:   
1997.         return 0   
1998.   
1999. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Powerhouse Flow Conveyance",cache=False, jit=Fals
e)   
2000. def powerhouse_flow_conveyance(t):   
2001.     return turbine_flow(t)   
2002.    
2003. """  
2004. 5. MODEL RUNNING (Base Case)  
2005.   
2006. Stocks redefined each loop to ensure initial values are reset.  
2007. This may be changed later so stocks are also defined within their sector
s above.  
2008.   
2009. """   
2010. for yr in range(NYr):   
2011.     year=yr   
2012.     # Define time parameters to run model   
2013.     initial_time = 0   
2014.     final_time = 364   
2015.     time_step = 1   
2016.     model.run(initial_time, final_time, time_step)   
2017. #    print("Completed year :"+str(yr), flush=(yr%args.flush_period==0)) 
  
2018.     initial_reservoir_storage=SSCrev(B_RSEs[0,year])   
2019.     if initial_reservoir_storage<=-
304.1:  #making sure initial reservoir level isn't a failure   
2020.         initial_reservoir_storage=364.27   
2021.     model.reinitStock(initial_reservoir_storage, reservoir_storage)   
2022.     model.reinitStock(np.zeros(3), gate_remaining_time_to_repair)   
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2023.     model.reinitStock(np.zeros(2), power_remaining_time_to_repair)   
2024.     model.reinitStock(np.zeros(3), other_component_remaining_time_to_rep
air)   
2025.     model.reinitStock(0, sensor_remaining_time_to_repair)   
2026.     model.reinitStock(1, time_remaining_to_access_site)   
2027.     model.reinitStock(1, time_remaining_to_contact_staff)   
2028.     model.reinitStock(0, manual_actuation_initiated)   
2029.     plantStaffNotified=np.zeros(365)   
2030.     RESEL_IG=[]   
2031.    
2032.    
2033. """  
2034. 6. DAM SAFETY PRIORITIZED RUN  
2035.   
2036. """   
2037.    
2038. Output=[RSEs, TBFs, SPOGs, OT]   
2039. Otheroutput=[TTRS, TOTR, DEBRISREMOVAL, DAY, MON]   
2040. EOCs=RSEs-376.5   
2041. EOCs[EOCs<0]=0 #Filling in elevations over the core and truncating to ze
ro if less than 376.5   
2042.   
2043. @njit   
2044. def OTC(elev): #Overtopping curve   
2045.     if elev<=378.41:   
2046.         return 0   
2047.     else:   
2048.         return (-35.7505780379803*elev**3 + 40896.2749435669* elev**2 -
15593240.0619064*elev + 1981715583.08889)   
2049.    
2050.    
2051. RESEL_IG=[]   
2052. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Intake Gate Closure",cache=False, jit=False)   
2053. def intake_gate_closure(t):   
2054.     penstockrup=other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]   
2055.     hcfail=power_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]   
2056.     igclosed=0   
2057.     timestep=t   
2058.     if hcfail>0 or penstockrup>0:   
2059.         if timestep>OCdeltat[1,year]+1:   
2060.             igclosed=1 #closes immediately after 1 timestep   
2061.     return igclosed   
2062.   
2063. @sdpy.aux(model, name="Head Cover Max Flow",cache=False, jit=False)   
2064. def head_cover_max_flow(t): #reduces to 1/24th of actual release to acco
unt for intake gate closure under rupture flow   
2065.     flag1=head_cover(t)+1 #if head cover = 0 then flag=1   
2066.     if other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[1]>0: #penstock   
2067.         flag1=1   
2068.     resels=reservoir_level(t)   
2069.     t1=fncTurbineMaxFlow(resels, flag1)   
2070.     if intake_gate_closure(t)==1:   
2071.         return 0   
2072.     if intake_gate_closure(t)==0:   
2073.         return (1/24.)*np.max([np.min([5*(t1), reservoir_storage(t)+rese
rvoir_inflow(t)-gated_spill_release(t)-(-48.6)]), 0])   
2074.   
2075. @sdpy.aux(model, name='Operations Planning',cache=False, jit=False)   
2076. @sdpy.subscript(controls)   
2077. def operations_planning(t):   
2078.     timestep=t   
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2079.     dayref=dayrefs(Startdays[year], timestep)   
2080.     Inf114=Inflow[timestep:14+timestep, year] #Changed to one day ahead 
so proper spills are released for Vensim version   
2081.     InfForecast=Inf114   
2082.     gaugerelay=gauge_relay(t)   
2083.     if gaugerelay<-
900 or gaugerelay>381.73: #If error is so high that it becomes obvious   
2084.         storage=-1000   
2085.     else:   
2086.         storage=SSCrev(gaugerelay)   
2087.     StaffOnSite=site_staff_mobilized(t)   
2088.     actualstorage=reservoir_storage(t)   
2089.     if (StaffOnSite>0) or (storage==-1000):   
2090.         if storage==-1000:   
2091.             storage=SSCrev(RSEs[timestep-
1, year]) #if unknown, takes previous days value   
2092.         if StaffOnSite==1:   
2093.             storage=actualstorage  #if someone is on site, takes actual 
value   
2094.     InitialStorage=np.float64(storage)#+lastinf-outfs   
2095.     resElPens=np.zeros((3,3))#Penalties for res el   
2096.     resElPens[0,:]=[0,273,304]   
2097.     resElPens[1,:]=[426.99, 300.39, 300.39]   
2098.     resElPens[2,:]=[99.58693574984267,99.58693574984267, 171.28] #123.60
856547318923 from 87.055 to help reduce 0 spill events   
2099.     SPOG1Av=gate_all(t)   #Availbility set based on "gate time to repair
"   
2100.     TurbAv1=power_all(t)   
2101.     if SPOG1Av>0 or other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0 or 
other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0:   
2102.         #if grid, plc or gate unavailable   
2103.         resElPens[1,:]=[100, 100, 100] #reducing target nmax to 367.8 to
 keep reservoir low for large inflow events   
2104.     Nextday=np.zeros(2)   
2105.    
2106.     Optimized=OpsPlan(InfForecast, InitialStorage, dayref,  SPOG1Av,  Tu
rbAv1,  resElPens)   
2107.     if SPOG1Av>0 or other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[0]>0 or 
other_component_remaining_time_to_repair(t)[2]>0:   
2108.         if TurbAv1<=0:   
2109.             Optimized[1]=fncTurbineMaxFlow(SSC(InitialStorage), 1)   
2110.     Nextday=np.array(Optimized.copy())   #SPOG1, Turb1   
2111.     Nextday.clip(min=0) #omit negatives.   
2112.     return Nextday   
2113.    
2114.    
2115. #indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr 
* 0.5))   
2116. #OCOutages[0,indices] = 0   
2117. #OCdeltat[0,indices] = 0   
2118. #indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr 
* 0.5))   
2119. #SErrors[indices]=0   
2120. #SErrorDeltat[indices]=0   
2121. #indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr 
* 0.5))   
2122. #SOutages[indices]=0   
2123. #Sdeltat[indices]=0   
2124.    
2125.    
2126. #Save simulation 1 results with 1 in them.   
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2127. RSEs1=RSEs   
2128. TBFs1=TBFs   
2129. SPOGs1=SPOGs   
2130. OT1=OT   
2131. OUTFs1=OUTFs   
2132. TTRS1=TTRS   
2133. CAPs1=CAPs   
2134. EOCs1=EOCs   
2135. UCRs1=UCRs   
2136. GCRs1=GCRs   
2137. GAVs1=GAVs   
2138. GPs1=GPs   
2139.    
2140. #Redefining arrays for second run   
2141. RSEs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2142. GAVs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2143. TBFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2144. SPOGs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2145. OT=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2146. INFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2147. OUTFs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2148. GPs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
2149. TOTR=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2150. DEBRISREMOVAL=np.zeros(NYr)   
2151. DAY=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2152. MON=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2153. AllMaxQ_t=np.zeros((365,2, NYr))   
2154. AllMaxQ=[861.1+728.9,32.5+32.5]   
2155. TTRS=np.zeros((365,8, NYr))   
2156. Retention=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2157. yearnum=np.zeros(NYr)   
2158. for yr in range(NYr):   
2159.     yearnum[yr]=str(1984+yr)   
2160. CAPs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
2161. EOCs=np.zeros((365, NYr))   
2162. UCRs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2163. GCRs=np.zeros((365,NYr))   
2164.    
2165. #Reducing sensor issues, plcrtu failures by 50%   
2166. OCOutages1=OCOutages.copy()   
2167. OCdeltat1=OCdeltat.copy()   
2168. SErrors1=SErrors.copy()   
2169. SErrorDeltat1=SErrorDeltat.copy()   
2170. SOutages1=SOutages.copy()   
2171. Sdeltat1=Sdeltat.copy()   
2172. GateOutagesAll1=GateOutagesAll.copy()   
2173.    
2174. indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
 0.5))   
2175. OCOutages[0,indices] = 0   
2176. OCdeltat[0,indices] = 0   
2177. indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
 0.5))   
2178. SErrors[indices]=0   
2179. SErrorDeltat[indices]=0   
2180. indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
 0.5))   
2181. SOutages[indices]=0   
2182. Sdeltat[indices]=0   
2183. indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
 0.2))   
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2184. GateOutagesAll[0,indices] = 0 #gate failing closed 15% improvement   
2185. indices = np.random.choice(np.arange(NYr), replace=False, size=int(NYr *
 0.2))   
2186. GateOutagesAll[2,indices] = 0 #gate failing in place 15% improvement   
2187.    
2188.    
2189. for yr in range(NYr):   
2190.     tm=time.time()   
2191.     year=yr   
2192.     initial_reservoir_storage=SSCrev(B_RSEs[0,year])   
2193.     if initial_reservoir_storage<=-
304.1:  #making sure initial reservoir level isn't a failure   
2194.         initial_reservoir_storage=364.27   
2195.     model.reinitStock(initial_reservoir_storage, reservoir_storage)   
2196.     model.reinitStock(np.zeros(3), gate_remaining_time_to_repair)   
2197.     model.reinitStock(np.zeros(2), power_remaining_time_to_repair)   
2198.     model.reinitStock(np.zeros(3), other_component_remaining_time_to_rep
air)   
2199.     model.reinitStock(0, sensor_remaining_time_to_repair)   
2200.     model.reinitStock(1, time_remaining_to_access_site)   
2201.     model.reinitStock(1, time_remaining_to_contact_staff)   
2202.     model.reinitStock(0, manual_actuation_initiated)   
2203.    
2204.     # Define time parameters to run model   
2205.     initial_time = 0   
2206.     final_time = 364   
2207.     time_step = 1   
2208.    
2209.    
2210.     model.run(initial_time, final_time, time_step)   
2211. #    print("Completed DS year :"+str(yr), flush=(yr%args.flush_period==0
))   
2212. #    tm1=time.time()   
2213. #    timer.append(tm1-tm)   
2214.     plantStaffNotified=np.zeros(365)   
2215.     RESEL_IG=[]   
2216.    
2217.    
2218. """  
2219. 7. POST-PROCESSING AND SAVING RESULTS  
2220. Percentiles are saved to reduce output file sizes as much as possible  
2221.   
2222. """   
2223.    
2224. S_RL=pd.read_csv(name1)   
2225. S_RL=S_RL.set_index("NewInd")   
2226. S_CL=pd.read_csv(name2)   
2227. S_CL=S_CL.set_index("NewInd") #setting index to the formatted OS IDs   
2228.    
2229. scenar = all_scenarios[seednum]   
2230. ScenarioRL=S_RL.filter(items=scenar[0:7], axis=0)   
2231. ScenarioCL=S_CL.filter(items=scenar[7:13], axis=0)   
2232. AbnormalRL=ScenarioRL[ScenarioRL['CausalFactorName']!="None"]   
2233. AbnormalCL=ScenarioCL[ScenarioCL['CausalFactorName']!="None"]   
2234. AbnormalCL=AbnormalCL[AbnormalCL['CausalFactorName']!="Normal"]   
2235.    
2236. ScenarioIDs=[]   
2237.    
2238. for i in range(len(AbnormalRL)):   
2239.     ScenarioIDs.append(AbnormalRL.index[i])   
2240. for i in range(len(AbnormalCL)):   
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2241.     ScenarioIDs.append(AbnormalCL.index[i])   
2242.    
2243. AllAdScenarios=ScenarioIDs.copy()   
2244.    
2245. AllTimes=np.zeros((11, NYr))   
2246. AllTimes[0:3,:]=Gdeltat   
2247. AllTimes[3:5,:]=Tdeltat   
2248. AllTimes[5,:]=Sdeltat1   
2249. AllTimes[6:9,:]=OCdeltat1   
2250. if "1359_2" in ScenarioIDs: #adding debris   
2251.     AllTimes[9,:]=np.ones(NYr)   
2252. AllTimes[10,:]=IFErrorDeltat   
2253. AllTimes=AllTimes.transpose()   
2254. ColNames=["1362", "1361", "1360", "836", "838","30", "18","42","44", "13
59", "45"]   
2255. AllTimes=pd.DataFrame(AllTimes, columns=ColNames)   
2256.    
2257. PersonnelScenarios=[]   
2258. if "48_1" in ScenarioIDs:   
2259.     PersonnelScenarios.append("48")   
2260.     ScenarioIDs.remove("48_1")   
2261. if "48_2" in ScenarioIDs:   
2262.     PersonnelScenarios.append("48")   
2263.     ScenarioIDs.remove("48_2")   
2264. if "29_1" in ScenarioIDs:   
2265.     PersonnelScenarios.append("29")   
2266.     ScenarioIDs.remove("29_1")   
2267. if "29_2" in ScenarioIDs:   
2268.     PersonnelScenarios.append("29")   
2269.     ScenarioIDs.remove("29_2")   
2270. if "29_3" in ScenarioIDs:   
2271.     PersonnelScenarios.append("29")   
2272.     ScenarioIDs.remove("29_3")   
2273.    
2274.    
2275.    
2276. ScenarioIDs_simp=[]   
2277. for i in range(len(ScenarioIDs)):   
2278.     head, sep, tail = ScenarioIDs[i].partition('_')   
2279.     ScenarioIDs_simp.append(head)   
2280.    
2281. AdTimes=AllTimes[ScenarioIDs_simp]   
2282.    
2283. TrueScenarios1=[] #this will contain a list of true scenario results   
2284. for yr in range(NYr):   
2285.     imptimes=AdTimes.iloc[yr]   
2286.     imptimesarr=np.array(imptimes)   
2287.     RSEdiff=1 #this means there is a difference between the normal and c
ase reservoir levels   
2288.     scenar=[]   
2289.     for t in range(361):   
2290.         if t in imptimesarr:   
2291.             if len(scenar)==0:   
2292.                 scenstart=t   
2293.             imps=imptimes[imptimes == t].index   
2294.             for i in range(len(imps)):   
2295.                 scenar.append(imps[i])       #will keep adding to this s
cenario as events happen, if RSEs don't change   
2296.         #NOW check for scenario end, which happens when the next 3 days 
RSE is within 0.05 m of normal   
2297.         if len(scenar)!=0:   
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2298.             if (-0.05<(RSEs1[t+1,yr]-B_RSEs[t+1, yr])<0.05) and (-
0.05<(RSEs1[t+2,yr]-B_RSEs[t+2, yr])<0.05) and (-0.05<(RSEs1[t+3,yr]-
B_RSEs[t+3, yr])<0.05) or (RSEs1[t,yr]<=353.75) or (t==360):   
2299.                 RSEdiff=0   
2300.                 scenend=t   
2301.                 if len(PersonnelScenarios)>0:   
2302. #                    if imps[i]=='44' or imps[i]=='18': #plc/rtu or grid
 failures necessitate site access for gate op   
2303.                     scenar+=PersonnelScenarios #add site and staff delay
s to ensure they are counted towards scenario   
2304.    
2305.                 if scenstart!=scenend:   
2306.                 #post process sub-scenario   
2307.                     Failure=0   
2308.                     RSEs1subset=RSEs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2309.                     SPOGs1subset=SPOGs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2310.                     TBFs1subset=TBFs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2311.                     OTs1subset=OT1[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2312.    
2313.                     CAPs1subset=CAPs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2314.                     UCRs1subset=UCRs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2315.                     GCRs1subset=GCRs1[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2316.                     if np.sum(UCRs1subset)==0:   
2317.                         UCRs1subset=0 #avoid saving useless info   
2318.                     if min(CAPs1subset)==1655:   
2319.                         CAPs1subset=1655 #avoid saving useless info   
2320.                     if min(GCRs1subset)==2:   
2321.                         GCRs1subset=2 #avoid saving useless info   
2322.                     INFsubset=INFs[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2323.                     Avg5dInfThreshold=0   
2324.                     Max5dInfThreshold=0   
2325.                     if min(RSEs1subset)<=353.75:   
2326.                         Failure=1   
2327.                         minind=np.argmin(RSEs1subset)   
2328.                         if minind>5:   
2329.                             Avg5dInfThreshold=np.mean(INFsubset[minind-
5:minind])   
2330.                             Max5dInfThreshold=max(INFsubset[minind-
5:minind])   
2331.                         else:   
2332.                             Avg5dInfThreshold=np.mean(INFsubset[0:minind
])   
2333.                             Max5dInfThreshold=max(INFsubset[0:minind])   
2334.                     maxRSE=max(RSEs1subset)   
2335.                     #replacing elements in scenar with complete OS ident
ifier   
2336.                     scenar1= {pref:ele for pref in scenar for ele in All
AdScenarios if pref in ele}   
2337.                     scenar1 = list(scenar1.values())   
2338.                     AllOS=['18_3', '29_4', '30_4', '42_2', '44_3', '45_2
', '48_3', '836_2', '838_2', '1359_1', '1360_3', '1361_1', '1362_1']   
2339.                     for i in range(len(scenar1)): #convert all normal to
 the scenario represented in scenar1   
2340.                         head, sep, tail = scenar1[i].partition('_')   
2341.                         indices = [i for i, s in enumerate(AllOS) if hea
d in s]   
2342.                         AllOS[indices[0]]=scenar1[i] #complete list of O
S's   
2343.                     #Convert list of OS's to seed number   
2344.                     subseednum=all_scenarios.get_scenario_index(AllOS)   
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2345.                     sOut1=[subseednum, scenar1, Starts[yr], (scenstart, 
scenend), Failure, (Avg5dInfThreshold, Max5dInfThreshold), maxRSE, RSEs1subset, 
CAPs1subset, UCRs1subset, GCRs1subset, yr, SPOGs1subset, TBFs1subset, OTs1subset
]   
2346.                     #reset scenar   
2347.                     scenar=[]   
2348.                     TrueScenarios1.append(sOut1)   
2349.                     if RSEs1[t,yr]<=353.75: #eliminate unnecessary furth
er processing   
2350.                         break   
2351.                 else:   
2352.                     scenar=[] #skips scenarios that didn't cause any dif
ference in reservoir levels   
2353.    
2354. # Dam safety improved   
2355.                        
2356. AllTimes=np.zeros((11, NYr))   
2357. AllTimes[0:3,:]=Gdeltat   
2358. AllTimes[3:5,:]=Tdeltat   
2359. AllTimes[5,:]=Sdeltat   
2360. AllTimes[6:9,:]=OCdeltat   
2361. if "1359_2" in ScenarioIDs: #adding debris   
2362.     AllTimes[9,:]=np.ones(NYr)   
2363. AllTimes[10,:]=IFErrorDeltat   
2364. AllTimes=AllTimes.transpose()   
2365. ColNames=["1362", "1361", "1360", "836", "838","30", "18","42","44", "13
59", "45"]   
2366. AllTimes=pd.DataFrame(AllTimes, columns=ColNames)   
2367.    
2368.    
2369. ScenarioIDs_simp=[]   
2370. for i in range(len(ScenarioIDs)):   
2371.     head, sep, tail = ScenarioIDs[i].partition('_')   
2372.     ScenarioIDs_simp.append(head)   
2373.    
2374. AdTimes=AllTimes[ScenarioIDs_simp]   
2375.    
2376. TrueScenarios=[] #this will contain a list of true scenario results   
2377. for yr in range(NYr):   
2378.     imptimes=AdTimes.iloc[yr]   
2379.     imptimesarr=np.array(imptimes)   
2380.     RSEdiff=1 #this means there is a difference between the normal and c
ase reservoir levels   
2381.     scenar=[]   
2382.     for t in range(361):   
2383.         if t in imptimesarr:   
2384.             if len(scenar)==0:   
2385.                 scenstart=t   
2386.             imps=imptimes[imptimes == t].index   
2387.             for i in range(len(imps)):   
2388.                 scenar.append(imps[i])       #will keep adding to this s
cenario as events happen, if RSEs don't change   
2389.         #NOW check for scenario end, which happens when the next 3 days 
RSE is within 0.05 m of normal   
2390.         if len(scenar)!=0:   
2391.             if (-0.05<(RSEs[t+1,yr]-B_RSEs[t+1, yr])<0.05) and (-
0.05<(RSEs[t+2,yr]-B_RSEs[t+2, yr])<0.05) and (-0.05<(RSEs[t+3,yr]-
B_RSEs[t+3, yr])<0.05) or (RSEs[t,yr]<=353.75) or (t==360):   
2392.                 RSEdiff=0   
2393.                 scenend=t   
2394.                 if len(PersonnelScenarios)>0:   
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2395. #                    if imps[i]=='44' or imps[i]=='18': #plc/rtu or grid
 failures necessitate site access for gate op   
2396.                     scenar+=PersonnelScenarios #add site and staff delay
s to ensure they are counted towards scenario   
2397.                 if scenstart!=scenend:   
2398.                     RSEdiff=0   
2399.                     scenend=t   
2400.                     #post process sub-scenario   
2401.                     Failure=0   
2402.                     RSEs1subset=RSEs[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2403.                     CAPs1subset=CAPs[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2404.                     UCRs1subset=UCRs[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2405.                     GCRs1subset=GCRs[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2406.                     if np.sum(UCRs1subset)==0:   
2407.                         UCRs1subset=0 #avoid saving useless info   
2408.                     if min(CAPs1subset)==1655:   
2409.                         CAPs1subset=1655 #avoid saving useless info   
2410.                     if min(GCRs1subset)==2:   
2411.                         GCRs1subset=2 #avoid saving useless info   
2412.                     INFsubset=INFs[scenstart:t+1, yr]   
2413.                     Avg5dInfThreshold=0   
2414.                     Max5dInfThreshold=0   
2415.                     if min(RSEs1subset)<=353.75:   
2416.                         Failure=1   
2417.                         minind=np.argmin(RSEs1subset)   
2418.                         if minind>5:   
2419.                             Avg5dInfThreshold=np.mean(INFsubset[minind-
5:minind])   
2420.                             Max5dInfThreshold=max(INFsubset[minind-
5:minind])   
2421.                         else:   
2422.                             Avg5dInfThreshold=np.mean(INFsubset[0:minind
])   
2423.                             Max5dInfThreshold=max(INFsubset[0:minind])   
2424.                     maxRSE=max(RSEs1subset)   
2425.                     #replacing elements in scenar with complete OS ident
ifier   
2426.                     scenar1= {pref:ele for pref in scenar for ele in All
AdScenarios if pref in ele}   
2427.                     scenar1 = list(scenar1.values())   
2428.                     AllOS=['18_3', '29_4', '30_4', '42_2', '44_3', '45_2
', '48_3', '836_2', '838_2', '1359_1', '1360_3', '1361_1', '1362_1']   
2429.                     for i in range(len(scenar1)): #convert all normal to
 the scenario represented in scenar1   
2430.                         head, sep, tail = scenar1[i].partition('_')   
2431.                         indices = [i for i, s in enumerate(AllOS) if hea
d in s]   
2432.                         AllOS[indices[0]]=scenar1[i] #complete list of O
S's   
2433.                     #Convert list of OS's to seed number   
2434.                     subseednum=all_scenarios.get_scenario_index(AllOS)   
2435.                     sOut=[subseednum, scenar1, Starts[yr], (scenstart, s
cenend), Failure, (Avg5dInfThreshold, Max5dInfThreshold), maxRSE, RSEs1subset, C
APs1subset, UCRs1subset, GCRs1subset, yr]   
2436.                     #reset scenar   
2437.                     scenar=[]   
2438.                     TrueScenarios.append(sOut)   
2439.                     if RSEs[t,yr]<=353.75: #eliminate unnecessary furthe
r processing   
2440.                         break   
2441.                 else:   
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2442.                     scenar=[] #skips scenarios that didn't cause any dif
ference in reservoir levels   
2443.    
2444.                       
2445.    
2446. #Error messages   
2447. #Check min and max RSEs   
2448. err=[]   
2449. mnrse=np.min(RSEs)   
2450. if mnrse<320:   
2451.     err.append("Minimum RSE below el. 320m")   
2452. mxspog=np.max(SPOGs)   
2453. if mxspog>1590:   
2454.     err.append("Gate flow exceeds 1590 maximumum")   
2455.    
2456.    
2457. #reorganizing outputs   
2458. numscen=len(TrueScenarios1)       
2459. seednums1=np.zeros(numscen)   
2460. seedstarts1=np.zeros((numscen,2))   
2461. scendates1=np.zeros((numscen,2))   
2462. failures1=np.zeros(numscen)   
2463. infthresh1=np.zeros((numscen,2))   
2464. years1=np.zeros(numscen)   
2465. maxrse1=np.zeros(numscen)   
2466. for i in range(numscen):   
2467.     seednums1[i]=TrueScenarios1[i][0]   
2468.     seedstarts1[i,:]=TrueScenarios1[i][2]   
2469.     scendates1[i,:]=TrueScenarios1[i][3]   
2470.     failures1[i]=TrueScenarios1[i][4]   
2471.     infthresh1[i,:]=TrueScenarios1[i][5]   
2472.     maxrse1[i]=TrueScenarios1[i][6]   
2473.     years1[i]=TrueScenarios1[i][11]   
2474.    
2475. seedfailures1=0   
2476. for i in range(numscen):   
2477.     if seednums1[i]==seednum:   
2478.         seedfailures1+=failures1[i]   
2479. seedsim1=np.count_nonzero(seednums1==seednum)   
2480.    
2481.    
2482. TSIterations1=np.where(seednums1==seednum)[0]   
2483. if len(TSIterations1)>0:   
2484.     scenariolengthmax=int(np.max(scendates1[:,1]-scendates1[:,0]))+1   
2485.     RSEs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))   
2486.     RSEs1all[RSEs1all==0]='nan'   
2487.     SPOGs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))   
2488.     SPOGs1all[SPOGs1all==0]='nan'   
2489.     TBFs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))   
2490.     TBFs1all[TBFs1all==0]='nan'   
2491.     OTs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))   
2492.     OTs1all[OTs1all==0]='nan'   
2493.    
2494.     CAPs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))   
2495.     CAPs1all[CAPs1all==0]='nan'   
2496.     UCRs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))    
2497.     UCRs1all[UCRs1all==0]='nan'   
2498.     GCRs1all=np.zeros((len(TSIterations1), scenariolengthmax))   
2499.     GCRs1all[GCRs1all==0]='nan'   
2500.     for j in range(len(TSIterations1)):   
2501.         i=TSIterations1[j]   
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2502.         scenariolength=int(scendates1[i,1]-scendates1[i,0])   
2503.         RSEs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][7])]=TrueScenarios1[i][7]   
2504.         if RSEs1all[j,len(TrueScenarios1[i][7])-1]<=353.75:   
2505.             RSEs1all[j, len(TrueScenarios1[i][7]):scenariolengthmax]=353
.75 #count breach all the way to the end for plotting   
2506.         try:   
2507.             CAPs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][8])]=TrueScenarios1[i][8]
   
2508.         except:   
2509.             CAPs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][8]   
2510.         try:   
2511.             UCRs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][9])]=TrueScenarios1[i][9]
   
2512.         except:   
2513.             UCRs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][9]   
2514.         try:   
2515.             GCRs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][10])]=TrueScenarios1[i][1
0]   
2516.         except:           
2517.             GCRs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][10]   
2518.         try:   
2519.             SPOGs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][12])]=TrueScenarios1[i][
12]   
2520.         except:           
2521.             SPOGs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][12]   
2522.         try:   
2523.             TBFs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][13])]=TrueScenarios1[i][1
3]   
2524.         except:           
2525.             TBFs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][13]   
2526.         try:   
2527.             OTs1all[j,0:len(TrueScenarios1[i][14])]=TrueScenarios1[i][14
]   
2528.         except:           
2529.             OTs1all[j,0]=TrueScenarios1[i][14]   
2530.    
2531. else:   
2532.     RSEs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2533.     SPOGs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2534.     TBFs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2535.     OTs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2536.     CAPs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2537.     UCRs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2538.     GCRs1all=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2539.    
2540.    
2541. #reorganizing outputs   
2542. numscen=len(TrueScenarios)       
2543. seednums=np.zeros(numscen)   
2544. seedstarts=np.zeros((numscen,2))   
2545. scendates=np.zeros((numscen,2))   
2546. failures=np.zeros(numscen)   
2547. infthresh=np.zeros((numscen,2))   
2548. maxrse=np.zeros(numscen)   
2549. years=np.zeros((numscen,2))   
2550. for i in range(numscen):   
2551.     seednums[i]=TrueScenarios[i][0]   
2552.     seedstarts[i,:]=TrueScenarios[i][2]   
2553.     scendates[i,:]=TrueScenarios[i][3]   
2554.     failures[i]=TrueScenarios[i][4]   
2555.     infthresh[i,:]=TrueScenarios[i][5]   
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2556.     maxrse[i]=TrueScenarios[i][6]   
2557.     years[i]=TrueScenarios[i][11]   
2558.    
2559. seedfailures=0   
2560. for i in range(numscen):   
2561.     if seednums[i]==seednum:   
2562.         seedfailures+=failures[i]   
2563. seedsim=np.count_nonzero(seednums==seednum)   
2564.        
2565. TSIterations=np.where(seednums==seednum)[0]   
2566. if len(TSIterations)>0:   
2567.     scenariolengthmax=int(np.max(scendates[:,1]-scendates[:,0]))+1   
2568.     RSEsall=np.zeros((len(TSIterations), scenariolengthmax))   
2569.     RSEsall[RSEsall==0]='nan'   
2570.     CAPsall=np.zeros((len(TSIterations), scenariolengthmax))   
2571.     CAPsall[CAPsall==0]='nan'   
2572.     UCRsall=np.zeros((len(TSIterations), scenariolengthmax))    
2573.     UCRsall[UCRsall==0]='nan'   
2574.     GCRsall=np.zeros((len(TSIterations), scenariolengthmax))   
2575.     GCRsall[GCRsall==0]='nan'   
2576.     for j in range(len(TSIterations)-1):   
2577.         i=TSIterations[j]   
2578.         scenariolength=int(scendates[i,1]-scendates[i,0])   
2579.         RSEsall[j,0:len(TrueScenarios[i][7])]=TrueScenarios[i][7]   
2580.         if RSEsall[j,len(TrueScenarios[i][7])-1]<=353.75:   
2581.             RSEsall[j, len(TrueScenarios1[i][7]):scenariolengthmax]=353.
75 #count breach all the way to the end for plotting   
2582.         try:   
2583.             CAPsall[j,0:len(TrueScenarios[i][8])]=TrueScenarios[i][8]   
2584.         except:   
2585.             CAPsall[j,0]=TrueScenarios[i][8]   
2586.         try:   
2587.             UCRsall[j,0:len(TrueScenarios[i][9])]=TrueScenarios[i][9]   
2588.         except:   
2589.             UCRsall[j,0]=TrueScenarios[i][9]   
2590.         try:   
2591.             GCRsall[j,0:len(TrueScenarios[i][10])]=TrueScenarios[i][10] 
  
2592.         except:           
2593.             GCRsall[j,0]=TrueScenarios[i][10]   
2594.    
2595. else:   
2596.     RSEsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2597.     SPOGsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2598.     TBFsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2599.     OTsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2600.     CAPsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2601.     UCRsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2602.     GCRsall=np.array(["nan","nan"])   
2603.    
2604.              
2605.        
2606. #Write txt output file   
2607. if len(err)==0:       
2608.     np.savez_compressed(str("Outputs-"+str(seednum)+".npz"),   
2609.              seednums1=seednums1,   
2610.              seedstards1=seedstarts1,   
2611.              scendates1=scendates1,   
2612.              failures1=failures1,   
2613.              infthresh1=infthresh1,   
2614.              maxrse1=maxrse1,   
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2615.              seedfailures1=seedfailures1,   
2616.              seedsim1=seedsim1,   
2617.              RSEs1all=RSEs1all.transpose(),   
2618.              CAPS1all=CAPs1all.transpose(),   
2619.              UCRs1all=UCRs1all.transpose(),   
2620.              GCRs1all=GCRs1all.transpose(),   
2621.              seednums=seednums,   
2622.              seedstards=seedstarts,   
2623.              scendates=scendates,   
2624.              failures=failures,   
2625.              infthresh=infthresh,   
2626.              maxrse=maxrse,   
2627.              seedfailures=seedfailures,   
2628.              seedsim=seedsim,   
2629.              RSEsall=RSEsall.transpose(),   
2630.              CAPSall=CAPsall.transpose(),   
2631.              UCRsall=UCRsall.transpose(),   
2632.              GCRsall=GCRsall.transpose()   
2633.          )   
2634.    
2635.    
2636. if len(err)>0:   
2637.     np.savez(str("Outputs-"+str(seednum)+"-e.npz"),   
2638.              seednums1=seednums1,   
2639.              seedstards1=seedstarts1,   
2640.              scendates1=scendates1,   
2641.              failures1=failures1,   
2642.              infthresh1=infthresh1,   
2643.              maxrse1=maxrse1,   
2644.              seedfailures1=seedfailures1,   
2645.              seedsim1=seedsim1,   
2646.              RSEs1all=RSEs1all.transpose(),   
2647.              CAPS1all=CAPs1all.transpose(),   
2648.              UCRs1all=UCRs1all.transpose(),   
2649.              GCRs1all=GCRs1all.transpose(),   
2650.              seednums=seednums,   
2651.              seedstards=seedstarts,   
2652.              scendates=scendates,   
2653.              failures=failures,   
2654.              infthresh=infthresh,   
2655.              maxrse=maxrse,   
2656.              seedfailures=seedfailures,   
2657.              seedsim=seedsim,   
2658.              RSEsall=RSEsall.transpose(),   
2659.              CAPSall=CAPsall.transpose(),   
2660.              UCRsall=UCRsall.transpose(),   
2661.              GCRsall=GCRsall.transpose()       
2662.          )   
2663.    
2664. t0_2=time.time()   
2665.    
2666. #print("elapsed time: " +str(t0_2-t0))   
2667. #   
2668. #   
2669. #print("number of data points, base case:" +str(np.count_nonzero(seednum
s1==seednum)))   
2670. #   
2671. #print("number of data points, DSI case:" +str(np.count_nonzero(seednums
==seednum)))  
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Appendix F: High Performance Computing 
There are a total of 552,960 simulations, each simulated for 2000 iterations for two runs: 
the base case and the dam safety improved case. Each iteration lasts for one year, so there 
are a total of 2.2 Billion simulation-years. This is obviously a very large simulation exercise 
that requires HPC resources to be executed efficiently. Compute Canada offers several 
HPC clusters, and this research utilized Graham, Cedar and Niagara to complete the 
simulations. Each cluster has thousands of nodes and each node may have several cores. 
Because the scenarios are completely independent of one another, serial farming is the best 
implementation for efficient simulation for this project. Serial farming means that 
processes can run completely independently on multiple cores at a time, and their order of 
execution is not important. In order to set up the serial farming environment, a simulation 
controller is required.  
The controller is a bash-scripted program that performs several functions and was 
developed with assistance from a programming consultant due to its complex nature. It is 
used to set up workspaces on the various clusters, and to send scenarios to the clusters in 
preparation for simulation. Once the simulations are on the cluster and ready for 
processing, the controller is used to initiate “jobs” which process the simulations on the 
cluster. When submitting a job, the user can specify the number of jobs, the number of 
cores to be used for each individual job as well as the time limit after which the job 
terminates. The controller also manages the list of scenarios which have been completed, 
submitted, failed or are still running and ensures there are no duplicating simulations for a 
single scenario. The status of the jobs in terms of the number of scenarios running, 
completed, and waiting in the queue can be queried by the user. Once jobs on Graham or 
Cedar clusters are finished, the controller automatically resubmits the jobs to continue 
processing the list of scenarios. The user must monitor the job status periodically, and 
ensure more scenarios are available on the list for continued processing. For the Niagara 
cluster, jobs are not able to re-submit themselves, so the user must manually submit either 
smaller numbers of large jobs or larger numbers of small jobs and monitor them. Finally, 
the controller is used to download the scenario output files to the local machine, which in 
this case is a virtual private server. Given the 10TB storage capacity, the *.npz compressed 
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array files contain only the key outputs – dynamic reservoir level response, criticality 
parameters and performance measures. These *.npz array files are stored in a directory that 
contains sub-folders with 1000 files each.  
During the initial test run of the controller, some issues with the simulation model for 
specific scenarios were identified and repaired. The initial run of the model was completed 
over a three-week period. Compute Canada has a specific scheduling algorithm which 
allocates resources to users based on their priority as well as the amount of processing 
previously carried out. The jobs wait to start in a queueing system, and once a user’s 
allocation is used up the priority of their jobs is reduced. This queuing system makes it 
difficult to estimate exactly what the throughput and simulation time will be. Resource 
allocations significantly improve throughput, and this was realized on the second complete 
simulation of the scenarios.  
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